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Technology and Work in 
German Industry 
The future of work organization and the role of workers in manufacturing 
has provoked a considerable amount of debate in light o f the rapid tech-
nological developments of recent years. German industry in particular is a 
central focus for studying technical and organizational changes in industry 
due to its pivotal position in international markets, its technological so-
phistication and its well-established training systems. 
This study brings together contributions which contain both theoretical 
approaches and extensive empirical studies, on the manix factoring industry 
in Germany, including comparisons to other European countries. It looks at 
the developments of new technology, identifying trends in rationalization 
and the influences they have on organizational behaviour. It also analyses 
the consequences of such changes on the work-force asking whether they 
will become more or less skilled. As it discusses the relationships between 
technology and the work-force it includes discussions o>» flexible special-
ization, labour processes, union relations, small and larger firms and training 
processes. The studies show that optimistic assessments on the future of 
industrial work should be viewed with some scepticism showing that man-
agers and economists should be wary of being optimistic when assessing 
the future of industrial work. 
This book would be of particular interest to all those involved with new 
technology, industrial sociology and organizational behaviour. 
Norbert Altmann is Research Director at the Institute Jfor Social Science 
Research, (ISF) in Munich. Christoph Köhler is a semior research asso-
ciate and Pamela Meil is a research scientist at the Institute. 
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non-profit organization, established under German law in 1965 to serve the 
public interest, financed primarily through project-based contracts. 
Members of the institute and its governing board are all engaged in the 
work of the institute, several on the basis of a long-term affiliation. 
The main subject areas researched by the institute include: industrial 
sociology and research on technology, qualification structures and labour 
market research, and investigations on labour and personnel policy in the 
enterprise. In conducting research on these issues, international compari-
sons play an important role. The various projects at the ISF deal with either 
applied research under contract from state organizations, particularly the 
federal ministries of research and technology, education and science, and 
labour and social affairs, or basic research, especially in the framework of 
a special research unit of the University of Munich, in which the institute 
participates (SFB 333 - Perspectives on the development of work). ISF 
endeavours to coordinate applied and basic research as closely as possible. 
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and economics, often with degrees in a second discipline (economics/ 
sociology, law, engineering sciences, psychology), the majority of whom 
have many years of experience in empirical research. 
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Foreword 
Since the 1950s, industrial sociology has occupied a somewhat special 
position in the field of sociology in Germany: at the same time that it has 
concentrated on developing theory, it has also engaged, especially since the 
mid-1970s, in extensive empirically based research. Unfortunately, this 
work has just begun to be introduced and discussed in other countries. This 
is certainly due in great part to the fact that German industrial sociology has 
simply not been widely published in foreign languages. And, to be honest, 
one of the reasons for this is that German industrial sociology has only 
incorporated foreign research findings or theoretical perspectives to a very 
limited extent. We at ISF view this situation as unsatisfactory in every 
respect. Thus, one of the goals of this book is to increase the understanding, 
and we hope interest, of German issues and perspectives on industrial 
sociology in international circles and to introduce some of ISF's com-
parative research to an international audience. 
Another reason we have undertaken the publication of this book is to 
celebrate. In 1990 our institute became a quarter of a century old. Since its 
establishment in 1965, the ISF has carried out a wealth of research in the 
areas of labour markets and employment, technical and organizational 
development and its effects in a number of different industrial sectors, 
occupational and professional training, and interest representation of 
workers. ISF, Munich is one of the few research institutes in Germany that 
conducts both theoretical and empirically-based applied research. More-
over, its theoretical contribution on these subjects has strongly influenced 
the general discussions on the future of work in Germany. 
Most of the chapters in this volume contain results from empirical 
research projects; several present their results within a larger theoretical 
framework. Many are based on international comparisons. In reading this 
book you will notice that the general thrust of all of the research conducted 
at the ISF, Munich has similar intentions - understanding trends in the 
development of work in the context of larger societal developments and 
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offering the bases for the realization of a more humane design of work. 
However, this volume also makes clear that scientists at the institute have 
different premises as well as different approaches to their subjects. There is 
no desire to lose these distinctions; they have always proved fruitful in 
generating better work and creating a stimulating atmosphere. A more 
detailed account of our thoughts, differences, and common interests is 
presented in the editor's introduction in the context of the larger German 
discussion. 
A final important word. Since we have begun work on this book, a 
major historical event has taken place: German unification. Thus, all of the 
chapters here are based on the situation before unification. It is certain that 
new and challenging problems will arise in the areas that we study as a 
result. However, we are convinced that they will be strongly influenced by 
the structures and processes that characterized the 'old' Federal Republic. 
Therefore, our studies have not lost their significance. On the contrary, they 
can only add to an understanding of future developments. 
Like ISF in general, the successful compilation of this book required a 
lot of team support. Therefore, we would like to thank all of our colleagues 
at ISF who helped with the word processing, graph preparation and cor-
rections for this book, our translators,1 and Christa Hahlweg for the 
preparation of the manuscript. 
Al l of the contributions presented here were carried out in the frame-
work of the 'Special Research Unit' (SFB 333 - Perspectives on the 
development of work) of the University of Munich. Publication and editing 
were done in cooperation with the projects B2 and B3 of SFB 333. 
Munich, January 1991 
Norbert Altmann 
Christoph Köhler 
Pamela Meil 
1 Translations were carried out by the translation office Baker & Harrison (Munich), Peter 
Berg (Notre Dame, 111.), Michael Schatzschneider (Frankfurt), Language Consultancy 
(Berlin), Anton Kirchhofer (Munich). Reworking, final corrections and editing were carried 
out by the editors. 
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1 No End in Sight - Current 
Debates on the Future of 
Industrial Work 
Norbert Altmann, Christoph Köhler, Pamela Meli 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is designed to give our non-German readers an overview of the 
development of industrial sociology in Germany as we on the 'inside' see 
it. We also touch on the current debate on the future of industrial production 
work in Germany, and place the positions represented at the ISF, Munich 
within this debate. This chapter lays out the shared framework as well as the 
different perspectives and concepts of ISF members reflected in the 
following chapters found in this volume. 
WHAT IS 'INDUSTRIESOZIOLOGIE V - THE DOUBLE 
C H A L L E N G E 1 
Industrial sociology has become an important part of the discipline of 
sociology in Germany in the post-war era. It has had both a considerable 
influence on sociology as a 'science' as well as some - although seemingly 
limited - effects on industrial practice and policy (rationalization concepts 
and strategies, health and safety, humanization of work, labour market 
analyses, occupational training, etc.). The range of empirically oriented 
research projects in the field is extremely broad in terms of subject (choice 
of technology and organization; intra- and inter-company division of 
labour; production and administration; conditions of work; qualification 
and training; worker consciousness and work attitudes, etc.) and research 
focus (from the auto industry to the food processing industry; from family-
run craft industry to heavy industry; from dependent supplier to 
multinational enterprise). 
The range of subject matter and levels of intervention underline the 
inter-disciplinary character of industrial sociology. One of its tasks is to 
integrate those scientific disciplines directly related to technology and work 
which are generally distinct from one another in Anglo-Saxon research 
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traditions, such as industrial relations, (which does not exist as a separate 
field in Germany), labour economics, industrial engineering, labour psy-
chology, labour law, etc. Industrial sociology also pushes other fields to 
adopt broader perspectives, such as the extension of ergonomics (mainly 
the areas of physiology and industrial medicine) to a 'labour science' 
(Arbeitswissenscnaft) which is not limited to the physical sides of work 
organization, but addresses issues of qualification, self-development, long-
term safety, etc. in a didactic manner. Furthermore, industrial sociology 
orients itself explicitly towards macro-sociology and economics as well as 
the political sciences which is reflected in the academic training of 
industrial sociologists. What this adds up to is that economists, engineers, 
psychologists and lawyers increasingly work together with sociologists on 
industrial sociological projects. 
Despite the turn-around towards empirical research and the develop-
ment of a complex method-mix that came about with the professional-
ization of the discipline, the current debate on the future of work can only 
be understood in the context of industrial sociology's high socio-theoretical 
and critical standards.2 Since its beginnings, German industrial sociology 
has been, and continues to be, characterized by the double role of European 
sociology (Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer, Marx, Weber): that is, it strives 
to be a theory of societal development, and at the same time, a means of 
change. This double role implies a connection between the results of theory 
and research on the one hand, and implementation and application in social 
practice on the other. However, this application normally does not take the 
form of either instrumental, manipulative interventions such as seeking 
better means of worker motivation (social technology), or compensatory 
social policy. In brief, with help from critically and empirically supported 
analyses, industrial sociology wishes to show the way to more humanistic 
social practices by elucidating the starting points and obstacles for this 
realization. 
Industrial sociological theory and research is mainly directed towards 
the issue of the development of rationalization and dominance in the 
society, and the forces behind social change. This question is dealt with at 
two levels: firstly, through an explanation of the structure and development 
of industrial capitalism, and by making the possibilities for political inter-
vention visible. Secondly, by focusing on the concrete changes in company 
production and work systems, especially the interests behind changes and 
consequences for the workers. 
Due to rapid and far-reaching social changes, concrete political demands 
on industrial sociology's contribution to solving practical problems in 
companies and society have grown since the beginning of the 1970s on the 
part of the state, the firm and the unions (Bergmann 1982). Through this, 
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the discipline found itself mediating between progressive interpretations of 
current developments for political actors and direct consultation and appli-
cation. Along with its theoretical and analytical orientations, industrial 
sociology has always maintained its connections to practice. However, 
industrial sociology as a discipline has not engaged in either past or present 
internal company consulting nor direct intervention and does not have such 
an institutional infrastructure at its disposal. Consultation, or even 
influence over the technological and organizational design of work, gener-
ally takes place in the framework of (state-supported) research and action 
programmes which are mainly exemplary and demonstrative in character. 
The task, as understood by ISF members, is to inform, elucidate and clarify 
to the responsible actors, the conditions and side-effects of their activities, 
but not to direcdy intervene (Lutz, Schultz-Wild 1986). 
In carrying out empirical research, the 'case study,' especially the com-
pany case study, is the 'model' which characterizes German industrial 
sociological research methods, in contrast to the survey or interview 
methods widely used in American sociology.3 The case study has also 
played an important role in the work done at ISF. In the company case 
study, a number of different, mostiy qualitative survey instruments, come 
together in a number of different ways.4 Quantitative methods increasingly 
serve to support qualitative findings as well as to identify relevant issues, 
which can then only be meaningfully worked on in connection with quali-
tative methods. Through its particular application, the company case study 
becomes a research instrument that can stand on its own. 
In accordance with the high complexity of object, field and research 
issue, the case study makes an open-ended procedure possible with regard 
to which research instruments should be used, which company areas, per-
sonnel and data should be included, and how long the research process 
should run. The case study is the basis upon which hypotheses and theories 
can be differentiated, revised, enlarged and further developed in the re-
search process itself - thus making possible the decisive exchange between 
empirical work and theory building. This is a critical aspect of the case 
study because the problem of generalizing the results can only be solved 
through this exchange. 
New tasks arising out of current industrial sociological debates, briefly 
described in the following section, are bringing new methodological 
demands with them, still only partly foreseeable today. These include: 
encompassing longer term developments, which is only possible with the 
help of accompanying longitudinal surveys; the inclusion of inter- and 
external company conditions (such as inter-company networks, labour 
markets, activities of state or intermediary bodies); the integration of 
findings of company surveys on macro-economic and macro-social 
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structures and their changes. Al l of this leads ever more strongly toward the 
need for a greater internationalization of industrial sociological research. 
The rationalization processes to be observed and analyzed increasingly 
extend beyond the borders of a particular country. The significance and 
relevance of macro-structures in technological and organizational change 
at the company level, emerge more clearly in international comparison. 
FUTURE OF WORK - THE CURRENT DEBATE IN 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY 
There is an overwhelming consensus in German industrial sociology today 
that the development of technology and work in industry has been long 
characterized through a consistent pattern of company rationalization, 
usually coined 'Taylorism' or 'Fordism'. The characteristics of these 
rationalization strategies at the micro-level of the company (chiefly for 
large corporations and mass producers) are: the separation of conception 
and execution in work; the extension of the division of labour according to 
functions, hierarchical levels and work tasks; the tendency to plan fully all 
production processes and to standardize the work process; careful control 
of performance, based on wage incentives; finally, and most strongly tied 
to the above-mentioned points, a widespread simplification of tasks and 
thus the deskilling and polarization of the labour force. 
A consensus also exists that since the 1970s in several areas of industry 
some preconditions for the efficient functioning of these rationalization 
strategies have begun to erode, thus bringing about a new stage in the 
history of industrial rationalization which will doubtless have far-reaching 
consequences for work. In contrast to the overwhelming agreement on the 
past and present state of industrial rationalization, however, a large con-
troversy exists on predicting exactly what the future holds. 
Since the end of the 70s, empirical findings and analyses based on them 
have been produced for important areas of German industry. These have 
demonstrated that under certain technological, economic and social 
conditions, rationalization processes which are not directed toward the 
intensification of a division of labour and a deskilling of work, but on the 
contrary are based on professional competence in carrying out work, can be 
in the company's interest.5 In other large industrial nations in which 
Tayloristic strategies exhibiting a highly advanced division of labour and 
polarization of skills appeared fixed, similar developments have been 
documented. 
Some authors, such as the representatives of the post-Fordism thesis 
(Piore, Sabel 1984; Streeck 1991) consider the trend toward a 'profes-
sional' work pattern in which all workers have greater autonomy and 
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responsibility in a more open work and company organization as an im-
portant component of a new, post-Tayloristic phase of industrial develop-
ment. Several authors, the most well known being Kern and Schumann 
(Kern, Schumann 1984), judge these, at present still relatively rare, devel-
opments as a sign that a new pattern of industrial rationalization is forming. 
According to this view, the 'new production concepts' of an 'enlightened' 
management are striving for a comprehensive reprofessionalization of pro-
duction work, which goes way beyond the work structures introduced in the 
70s (such as job rotation, job enlargement, etc.). The vision is that of skilled 
production workers running flexibly automated technical systems and 
achieving high levels of productivity. 
This more or less optimistic vision of the future, however, is contradicted 
by a number of empirical and theoretical findings. Several studies predict 
development trends leading to problematic effects for workers in general or 
at least for particular branches of industry and groups of workers.6 
All in all the analyses of the structural relationships which affect the 
development of industrial work present a complex and contradictory 
picture. It is a fact that pressure coming from sales markets to produce more 
flexibly and the integration, interdependence and capital intensity tied to 
the use of CIM systems provide strong impulses to break with Tayloristic 
rationalization strategies. In this regard, political factors can play a major 
role (see chapter 15). At the same time, powerful forces remain which push 
toward the continuation of Tayloristic forms of work organization even 
under altered circumstances. Among these are the automation concepts 
developed by engineers and the interests of large manufacturers of CIM-
components and systems. The automation and centralization of complex 
functions and tasks in CIM systems makes it possible in new - technically 
mediated and fixed - ways to further the Tayloristic strategies of separating 
conception and execution even under altered production conditions. The 
still far from exhausted technical potential of CIM systems is thus often set 
up to absorb a portion of the pressure for flexible production. Long-term 
trends in labour supply may also serve as an impediment for a generali-
zation of 'new production concepts' through a shortage of skilled workers 
(see chapter 3). In any case, whether coming from general interests in 
power and control or the vested interests of particular management 
factions, strong impulses exist to find structurally conservative solutions to 
production problems. 
POSITIONS IN ISF 
The research done at ISF, as this volume reflects, tends to show that 
neo-Tayloristic strategies dominate even in the face of growing flexibility 
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needs and the introduction of CIM systems, and in general display a marked 
vitality. This is the case for mass production industries with a pre-
dominandy semi-skilled work-force (see Part IV) as well as for those with 
specialized and small series production having mainly skilled workers (see 
Part III). We do not interpret experiments with group work in mass 
production industries at low levels of automation as a departure from 
Tayloristic strategies in work design (see chapter 13). And in work systems 
with predominantly skilled workers, there are indications of an erosion of 
this high skill profile (see chapter 10). The role of small and medium-sized 
firms in flexibilization is also viewed critically (see Part VI). 
Although all of the future visions in ISF tend to be less optimistic than 
those of the 'new production concept* proponents, the chapters in this 
volume do differ in the estimation of what potential exists for the develop-
ment of industrial work. Based on observed changes in today's industry, the 
position of the 'contradictions of post-tayloristic rationalization' project 
(see chapters 3,10) sees possible alternatives to the development path of a 
modernized neo-Taylorism. According to this approach, it has to remain 
open whether one of the alternatives will win the upper hand in the long run 
and if this happens, which one it will be. The alternative paths are under-
stood as varying reactions to divergent, in part even conflicting, impulses, 
constraints, and opportunities of company rationalization. These are deter-
mined by internal company structures and interests (strongly shaped by 
Tayloristic logic) as well as by the company's external environment (the 
educational system, labour and technology markets, industrial relations, 
etc.). Decisive for those with this view of the future is the thesis that a new, 
dominant rationalization paradigm (in contrast to the Fordistic accumu-
lation regime) can only occur in the context of new and stable social and 
economic arrangements that display a high accordance between macro- and 
micro-structures. Such a new configuration is not in sight at the present 
time. 
Another position in ISF (Sauer et al. in chapter 4) sees little alternative 
to the neo-Tayloristic development path at the empirical level. This 
position argues that a new type of 'systemic' rationalization is appearing 
with predominantly problematic consequences for workers. Rationalization 
strategies are oriented toward the 'elastic potential of technology' and not 
of labour, that is on fixed and not variable capital. More importantly, these 
rationalization strategies are no longer simply directed towards an indi-
vidual company and the utilization of its capital, but on the relation between 
autonomy and control in the entire, including inter-company, production 
and distribution chain. It is in this way that companies achieve flexibility 
and economy of production. 
The concrete character of this new type of rationalization and the forms 
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of industrial work connected to it are not predetermined. With integration 
of intra- and inter-company subprocesses achieved through computer tech-
nologies, and with the decreasing weight of labour costs, work in pro-
duction can be connected to differing strategies of labour use, influenced by 
internal and external company constraints. In the long term, however, the 
technological and organizational potential that exists in systemic rationali-
zation tends to be made suitable for the flexible control of complex work 
tasks, and for organizational centralization or the central control of 
decentralized units. New demands on work which promise higher skills, 
greater autonomy, more decision-making power, and similar developments 
for the individual worker at the shop-floor level are less foreseeable, apart 
from very limited key positions, than polarization tendencies. Moreover, 
new problems are likely to arise for those workers who work in companies 
which are in the weakest or most dependent position in the hierarchy of the 
entire production chain. 
The industrial and macro-economic structural changes reflected in this 
approach signal a new quality in developed capitalist societies. With 
'systemic rationalization', a new accumulation regime, replacing the 
Fordistic-Tayloristic regime, is laid down in a nutshell. 
Both positions agree that an important and, for the development of 
industrial work, central point of departure for company strategy lies in the 
design of the production process.7 Production is understood in the general 
(Marxian) sense as a unit of the 'labour process' (material production) and 
'producing surplus value' (the transformation of money into capital and 
back into (more) money). The technological and organizational structures 
of the production process and the forms of labour deployment decide to 
what extent it will be possible to secure productivity through the maximal 
use of the labour employed in an individual company. 
In this connection, company strategies try to neutralize those external, 
environmental conditions which are not controllable (such as the situation on 
consumer and sales markets, economic fluctuations, legal and collective bar-
gaining regulations, etc.) so that they do not directly affect the production 
process. This requires that individual capital succeeds, through the organi-
zation of its production process, in transforming external conditions into 
exigencies that are subject to internal company control. Technology, 
organization and labour are the elastic potential most easily controllable by a 
company; they can be coordinated 'in the company mould'. The technological 
and organizational integration of company-external production subprocesses 
(systemic rationalization) can be interpreted as a strategy to transform and 
neutralize changing sales market conditions. The basic objective of systemic 
rationalization is the expansion and control of relationships between internal 
and external company production and capital utilization. 
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Starting from these theses, the two basic currents developed in ISF 
discussed above, have differing accents in their theoretical assumptions, 
research areas, and in their political conclusions. 
In terms of theoretical position, the differences centre on the weight that 
various factors have in determining the development of industrial work. In 
very simplified terms, one approach ('systemic rationalization') sees the 
most important determinants as being anchored in the economics of market 
and production of individual capital, taking into account the complex 
framework of considerations sketched below (see chapter 4). In selecting 
research topics and areas, this approach concentrates on the relationship 
between capital accumulation, technology, organization and work. 
Research focuses on the internal and inter-company (also international) 
division of labour in industrial branches with large series and more or less 
complex products in which the Taylorization of work is already at a 
relatively advanced stage (for example, the automobile and electronics 
industry). Also examined is the influence of the relationships between 
technology manufacturers and users on the technological and organi-
zational rationalization of the production process. 
The theoretical and empirical analyses of this approach have revealed 
very limited possibilities for political or union controls for the design of 
work. Thus, political measures and interventions for current, concrete 
situations tend to centre on improvements in labour standards rather than in 
the possibility of redirecting technological and organizational structures in 
the production process. In the longer term, one concern of this position 
tends to focus on newly defining union policy. 
The second approach ('contradictions of post-Tayloristic rationali-
zation) weights the factors determining the development of industrial work 
quite differently (see chapter 3). Company rationalization strategies and 
their consequences for work are tied together in a complex way at the 
macro-level mediated through 'meso-structures', such as technology 
markets and labour markets, and through political regulation. The develop-
ment of industrial work derives from an interaction of the various levels. In 
this view, the production process does not a priori play the central role. 
Therefore, in choosing the research topics and areas, the labour market, 
educational system and, most recently, macro-economic developments 
predominate next to analyses of technology and work. Empirical analyses 
concentrate on industries such as machine building or process industries 
such as the chemical, steel, or food industries in which skilled work (at least 
in Germany) plays a major role. The analyses of this research approach 
have produced evidence of strong structurally conservative economic and 
social forces, pushing toward the continuation of Taylorism even in chang-
ing contexts. However, alternative development paths of industrial work 
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which make sense economically have also been seen in company rational-
ization processes. Opportunities for political intervention to induce changes 
in the way industrial work is designed exist in this historical period in which 
capitalism is undergoing a restructuring. Areas of intervention are, for 
example, technology policy, education policy, labour market policy and 
industrial policy (see chapter 12). 
An important aspect in the analysis and evaluation of company rationali-
zation measures is their effects on workers. The studies carried out at ISF 
are not limited to the 'quantitative' changes occurring from rationalization, 
but particularly to the 'qualitative' ones, such as the changes in skill 
requirements, physical and mental stress and opportunities for influence 
and control. Besides the positions in ISF, laid out above, there is a further 
focus of research. The point of departure is that new demands are arising at 
the workplace which cannot be adequately understood using conventional 
categories of analysis. In particular, these involve changes in tacit know-
ledge and demands on the experiential knowledge that workers possess. 
Another issue is the existence of contradictory work requirements and the 
mental stress resulting from this. The thesis is that these conditions are new 
and potentially growing problem areas in the way labour is used. An 
examination of these issues, as well as coming to terms with them on a 
practical level, demands a conceptual and methodological expansion in the 
research on the social consequences of company rationalization. Against 
this background it becomes clear that the current controversy over 
'deskilling' and 'reskilling', and the displacement of work pressures, etc. 
do not take into consideration important aspects of the actual changes 
taking place at work. This necessarily leads to one-sided and incorrect 
estimations. In response to these deficiencies, ISF is developing a new posi-
tion to better deal with the effects that company rationalization measures 
are having on workers (see chapters 7,8). 
NEW ISSUES THROUGH UNIFICATION 
It is certainly necessary to make some initial remarks on the incorporation 
of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and what effect this 
will have on the development of industrial work. The perspectives that will 
emerge as a result of Germany's unification and the revolutionary changes 
in Eastern Europe could not be considered in this volume. Most of the 
contributions presented here were completed before the radical change that 
took place in East Germany and as of early 1991 - no one could predict 
what further developments will arise. On the topic of company rationali-
zation processes and the future of industrial work in a unified Germany, 
only conjecture is possible. 
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For the West German economy, the wave of 'immigrants' represents a 
temporary expansion of labour supply and might support strategies of 
skilled production work. However, several questions exist concerning what 
significance this increased labour supply will have on the German 
economy. Firstly, workers coming from the East have exhibited certain 
deficiencies in skill, raising the question of whether these workers are in a 
position to fill weak spots in labour supply in the West. Secondly, it is not 
clear how long the stream of workers coming from the East, drawn to the 
West due to economic problems in the former GDR, wage differences, etc., 
will continue (see Köhler, Grüner 1990 on this issue). 
In industry in the former GDR, potential for the development of alter-
native paths of development of industrial work most certainly exist. Firstly, 
control of labour policy within the company as well as political control in 
the society as a whole is at a highly critical point given the situation of crisis 
and radical change. Secondly, the technological and organizational struc-
tures of production must be completely modernized to meet the demands of 
international competition. These circumstances create the possibility for 
comprehensive organizational innovation, in contrast to step by step 
rationalization processes. Thirdly, the former GDR economy has a large 
supply of skilled workers at its disposal who, even given some deficiencies 
with regard to the mastering of new technologies, can represent an impor-
tant resource in a societal modernization process. 
However, when one observes the ongoing restructuring of the former 
GDR economy, the impression arises that existing opportunities for re-
direction will not be used due to the purely market economy-oriented 
incorporation strategy. There are several reasons why this approach is so 
strongly pursued: First and foremost, this is due to the strictly conservative-
laissez faire (CDU and FDP) policy of the Federal government. Secondly, 
it has come about as a result of the self-imposed time pressure, and finally 
because of the opportunism of the new/old ruling elite of the former GDR. 
Also decisive is the takeovers of former GDR industries by West German 
firms and with them a relatively uninterrupted transfer of their rationali-
zation models. It is still open to what extent GDR firms will become mere 
'extended workbenches' or other types of dependent companies. The 
Tayloristic rationalization paradigm could be all the more easily trans-
ferable to these companies since it was a specific form of this paradigm that 
predominated in the planned economy of the former GDR. 
Completely open is the question of what role faces those companies in 
the former GDR that survive, or put another way: how will these companies 
fit into the framework of systemic, that is inter-company oriented, rationali-
zation processes of West German corporations. The repercussions that the 
GDR's incorporation will have on the industrial structure of Germany as a 
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whole, including the supplier structures, internationalization of production, 
position in international competition, the relationships between companies 
and industrial branches, and effects on workers and industrial relations are 
still open: will there be an intensification of existing problematic trends of 
systemic rationalization, or an opportunity for a new openness in workplace 
designs? 
The chapters in this volume should be read in the light of the thoughts 
on the current discussions on the future of manufacturing work in industrial 
sociology, on the relationship between theory and practice, and on the 
various theoretical approaches that we have briefly presented here. The 
chapters concentrate, in accordance with the research focus of ISF, on 
industrial production and only include developments in services and 
administration from this perspective, and only very selectively. Some are 
written at a theoretical, conceptual level; others have a more empirical, 
analytical character. Several chapters develop arguments on the relation-
ship between technology and work based on ongoing research projects. 
Thus, the chapters of this volume concretize the positions of ISF in current 
debates described above. 
The title of this chapter - 'No end in sight' - refers to the current debate 
on the future of industrial work. For the research approach of 'systemic 
rationalization', a change in form, but no end to Tayloristically designed 
work is in sight. For the 'contradictions of post-Tayloristic rationalization 
strategies' approach, several 'ends' to present ongoing processes of the 
restructuring of capitalism are possible. In the final analysis, no end to the 
controversy in German industrial sociology is in sight: a good basis for 
fruitful research in the future. 
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2 Stranger in Paradise - An 
American's Perspective on 
German Industrial Sociology1 
Pamela Meil 
This chapter looks at some aspects of German industrial sociology: the 
discipline itself, as well as the institutions and structures which it studies. 
The purpose is to provide an introduction to the concepts underlying 
German industrial sociology and thus make the following contributions in 
this book easier to understand for the foreign reader. Within this frame-
work, some interpretations of the origins and significance of certain themes 
and concepts are offered, and comparisons with how these same concepts 
are perceived by American sociologists. 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the best way to begin introducing the subject of this paper would 
be to explain the rather provocative title. The first part is easy enough: I am 
an American living in Germany, a sociologist trained and indoctrinated at 
an American university. This makes me a stranger both in my everyday 
existence and, to a certain extent, my academic orientations. At times it is 
difficult for me to understand the motivations behind behaviours, as well as 
the perceptions behind the sociology of my colleagues, and I am sure that 
this feeling is mutual. 
Now, for paradise. Admittedly, the use of this word was meant to stir up 
some controversy as well as to pique interest, and it seems to have suc-
ceeded. In seeing the title, my German colleagues react with curiosity as 
well as a bit of nervousness. They assume, rightfully of course, that a 
certain amount of irony stands behind the use of the term. 
I could take the easy way out and point out Germany's affluence, 
extensive welfare system, and the newly acquired unity as a motivation 
behind the use of 'paradise'. But I would not be doing my colleagues justice 
to imply that they perceive themselves in a paradise. Like most social 
scientists around the world, especially sociologists, they tend to view their 
society and its problems quite critically. Their job is to point out the 
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blemishes existing in their respective paradise - in the end, making them 
strangers in paradise as well: a state perhaps all critical sociologists are 
doomed to find themselves in. 
Nevertheless, I can pinpoint three factors that make this the 'paradise' of 
my German colleagues and me a stranger in it: one, their basic under-
standing of the structures and institutions that make up their society; two, 
linked to one, the natural practice of carrying out all research (including 
comparative research) and understanding phenomena, from the perspective 
of your own society and its particular characteristics; and three, the 
language (i.e. everyone here speaks and writes in German). 
As far as industrial sociology in Germany goes, what this means is that, 
in the subjects, points of emphasis and methodology chosen for research, 
and in the understanding of certain basic institutions, we non-Germans 
cannot help but be strangers. Moreover, although considerable differences 
in opinion and approach certainly exist among German researchers, the 
outsider is quickly struck by an amazing solidarity in terms of research 
topic, methods, theoretical points of departure, and perhaps most sur-
prisingly, an agreement about the legitimacy of fundamental social 
structures and institutions. 
In sum, in carrying out their sociological research and analyses, German 
industrial sociologists bring with them a series of historical, cultural, and 
institutional legacies. My job in this chapter is to try and convey some of 
these legacies and point out the difficulties in doing so, difficulties that 
have cropped up repeatedly in translating and editing this book. Cleverly, I 
subtitled this paper, 'an American's perspective . . . '. This accomplishes 
very much the same thing as titles such as 'Impressions' or 'Some remarks 
o n . . . ' . It ensures that no one expects empirical research, or scientifically 
demonstrated theses. In fact it insures that I can present thoughts and 
information that are my - hopefully not uneducated or poorly observed -
opinion. 
Trying to translate not only words, but also meanings from one language 
to another, necessarily entails translating the context from which this 
language arises. Thus, not only German industrial sociology must be com-
municated, but also some basic aspects of German society. To begin com-
municating this paradise of shared understandings, I will briefly discuss 
some characteristics of German industrial sociology from an outsider's 
perspective. Then, I will focus on several German industrial structures and 
institutions with the goal of explaining them more fully to the uninitiated, 
thereby (I hope) making the chapters in this volume easier to understand for 
those not highly familiar with the German case. 
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INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY 
William Faunce, an American sociologist, wrote in 1967 that (paraphrasing 
Mark Twain) 'the reports of the death of the field (industrial sociology) 
have been greatly exaggerated' (Faunce 1967: 1). This was in the 
introduction to a selection of 38 readings on the subject. Unfortunately, 
Professor Faunce was wrong. In the United States, industrial sociology had 
always had a difficult time defining itself, and eventually was subsumed in 
a number of different disciplines such as the sociology of organizations and 
work, industrial relations, social psychology, etc. Originally, it comprised 
an enormously wide range of subjects - under the rubric of the study of 
industrialism - ranging from human relations, to union-management con-
flicts and relations, authority in industrial organizations, bureaucracy, work 
groups and structures, and the process of industrialization itself. 
In Germany, on the other hand, industrial sociology is alive and well and 
a blossoming discipline. You can imagine how curious I was to find out 
exactly what industrial sociology is. 
Two German sociologists with strong ties to ISF (one the retired, but still 
active, institute director, the other a former member) wrote the following on 
industrial sociology: 
What in a particular country at a particular time or from a particular 
author is understood as a characteristic subject of industrial sociology,. 
. . will be understood at another place, another time and by other authors 
to be special areas clearly delineated from industrial sociology. 
(Lutz, Schmidt 1977) 
Yet, given the wide range of possibilities of what industrial sociology could 
encompass, what strikes an outsider when confronted with industrial soci-
ology in Germany as it has been practiced up to the 1990s is the uniformity 
with which the discipline is defined. What do I mean by uniformity? Not 
that industrial sociology does not have a sufficiently broad inter-
disciplinary framework. In fact, German industrial sociology is highly 
cross-disciplinary in character in that it includes fields that are completely 
separate in American research traditions, such as industrial relations, labour 
economics, psychology, etc. Nevertheless, there is an amazing amount of 
research done all over the country specifically on the relationship between 
technology and work within industrial enterprises, especially in the pro-
duction area itself. I am going to point out what I believe are three reasons 
for this state of affairs: 
Firstly, as pointed out in chapter 1, German industrial sociologists have 
traditionally been oriented to the political sphere. This has led to the 
grappling of subjects which have also interested the unions, although from 
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a more critical perspective. Therefore, it has been not uncommon to engage 
in research, the results of which can be discussed by unions in dealing with 
current problems. Clearly, in the 1970s and 1980s (the 1990s still being a 
question mark), the introduction of new forms of technology (com-
puterization) and work organization presented an opportunity for German 
unions to reformulate their demands for codetermination of workplace 
design and qualification. This provided an impetus for German sociologists 
to concentrate on these subjects. 
Secondly, in my opinion, some of the uniformity in research thrust 
derives from the way research is funded. There are not that many different 
funding sources for industrial sociological research, especially when one 
considers that most industrial sociologists shy away from private company 
funding to circumvent the possibility of becoming 'management consul-
tants'. In turn, most companies have not been traditionally interested in 
academically oriented research. Industrial sociological research is 
organized into only a few institutes, some affiliated with universities -
some not, and some state-funded - some not. Even in cases where salaries 
are secure through state-funding, researchers must apply for money to carry 
out their studies. A major source of funding comes from the German 
Research Fund (DFG), which designates special topics for defined time 
spans. Other sources are the Federal ministries which also distribute their 
funding on the basis of special projects. Most recently, a most important 
trend in this direction was the government research programme, 'humani-
zation of working life', strongly advocated by the unions. This programme 
provided the material means for industrial sociologists to pursue long term 
research studies. As a result, obviously almost all industrial sociological 
institutes oriented their research toward this theme. 
Thirdly, another reason to favour the industrial case study as instrument 
and the production worker within industrial enterprises as research subject 
is that they are better suited to the traditional Marxist and neo-Marxist 
theoretical orientations in industrial sociological research in Germany. 
The traditional methodological tool - the industrial case study - leads 
researchers into the production area where they examine the effects of 
technological and organizational structures on workers in detail. German 
industrial sociologists have looked with disdain upon the positivistic 
orientations of their American colleagues, as they perceive most American 
social scientists to be. Positivistic methods are dismissed because of their 
superficial handling of a topic, proclaimed objectivity and neglect of 
historical developments.2 
Of course, the more you are involved with something, the more detail 
and richness you see. Being involved with industrial sociological research 
in Germany, and going beyond first impressions, has made the differences 
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in focus and orientation clearer to me. The nature of industrial sociology in 
Germany has made it possible to produce a book that is very coherent in 
terms of focus, but with differing approaches, opinions, and accents. 
However, in order to understand many of the issues, analyses of problems, 
and subtleties in this book, it is necessary to know something about the 
institutions and structures comprising industrial organizations in Germany. 
INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES IN T H E SOCIETY 
The majority of industrial sociological analyses that are written in Germany 
either deal explicitly, or at least touch on, issues of qualification at the 
workplace. Why is qualification such a central dimension of German 
industrial sociology? The basis for dealing with many issues revolving 
around the workplace, including worker autonomy, decision-making 
authority, disposition, power and job security, have been embodied in the 
subject of qualification in Germany. For the outsider, it is useful to have a 
brief overview of how the educational system is organized, especially the 
dual system of training for skilled workers, a fundamental aspect of the 
German deployment of labour. 
In secondary school, a student decides between three alternative paths of 
education: a general study programme called Hauptschule (10 years of 
schooling), and further education in the form of the practically-oriented 
Realschule (11 years), or the scholastically oriented Gymnasium (13 years) 
(where students receive Bildung, that is, they get, so to say, 'cultivated'). 
The latter leads to a high school certificate based on a comprehensive 
examination called Abitur which is the prerequisite for entering a univer-
sity. Hauptschule, followed by vocational training, was traditionally the 
path pursued by blue-collar workers. In the 1970s, about 75 per cent of 
those in training programs (Ausbildung) had graduated from the 
Hauptschule. In 1990, this figure was only about 35.5 per cent. Many who 
continue to take this road are the children of 'foreign' workers. An increas-
ing number of secondary school students are choosing Realschule, formerly 
the means to some kind of middle level white collar work, as preparation 
for vocational training or Berufsausbildung in a blue-collar or craft occupa-
tion. A Berufsausbildung generally lasts about three years.3 
Al l in all, vocational training in Germany proceeds in a nationally 
standardized system of occupations. There are presently 378 state-
recognized occupations in this system from violin maker to salesperson; in 
the metal and electrical industries the number has actually decreased from 
about 400 to about 17 in the last decade by combining some very specific 
occupations into more general categories, in part to achieve greater 
flexibility on the job (see chapter 12). The basic learning content for every 
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occupation is both predetermined and government-controlled. At the end of 
the training period, adequate ability in a given occupation is tested by the 
appropriate trade association. 
For blue-collar workers, who are of main interest to us here since the 
chapters in this volume deal exclusively with industrial work, a training 
program and successful completion of an examination leads to certification 
and the title Facharbeiter. (In this volume we have translated this term as 
skilled worker or skilled tradesman and sometimes added the German term 
in parenthesis when extra clarity was necessary.) Generally speaking, a 
Facharbeiter is trained in the dual system of vocational training, a term also 
used in several of the papers of this book and perhaps one which could use 
a bit of clarification. 
Most prospective Facharbeiter enter apprentice programmes run by a 
firm whose training programme has been approved and whose instructors 
meet government requirements. Their training, carried out by the company 
in conjunction with guidelines set by the state, is composed of both theo-
retical and practical aspects of the occupation they will be certified in - thus 
the 'dual' in dual system. This mix of theory and practice is generally 
divided up so that one or two days are spent in the classroom and the other 
days are spent on-the-job. Students attend a Berufsschule (vocational 
school) for their theoretical training. Al l students in apprenticeship from a 
particular industrial branch meet at the vocational school for their class-
room training sessions (in large firms the Berufsschule may be internal). 
The first year of training is supposed to be somewhat broad-based, allowing 
an overview of an entire field such as electronics, construction, metal-
working, etc. In the following two years, the training gets increasingly 
specialized in one particular area (see chapter 16 for a detailed comparison 
of vocational training systems). 
The idea behind the dual system of vocational training is to make the 
training general enough to go beyond a single company or even industrial 
sector and at the same time make the training specific enough to permit 
immediate implementation of what was learned on the job. When workers 
with a particular qualification are recruited, companies know exactly what 
training their recruits are bringing with them. Part of what Facharbeiter are 
expected to have acquired is 'social qualifications', i.e. discipline, depend-
ability, the ability to express themselves clearly and to define and lay out 
problems. The whole system of occupations is characterized by the compre-
hensive, regulated and structured nature of training as well as the 
coordination between different types of actors in the determination of 
training: unions, companies, government agencies. The other side of the 
coin is that those working in industrial production who are not Facharbeiter 
(the majority) are either unskilled or semi-skilled (Un- and Angelernte, 
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literally not trained and trained on-the-job). The Un- and Angelernte 
receive some learning-by-doing training for work on specific machines or 
procedures. 
From an American perspective, the German system of occupations 
contains a great deal of rigidity. The benefits of well-rounded, extensive 
occupational or professional training that is nationally uniform are obvious, 
but the disadvantages in lack of flexibility for an individual's career are 
more subtle. At about 16, or perhaps younger, the German going the 
vocational route selects an occupation and enters an apprenticeship. It is 
difficult to reverse or change this decision later in life because if you enter 
a different type of job in industry, you do so as a semi-skilled worker. 
The argument often made by industrial sociologists in Germany is how 
effective the Facharbeiter system is in attaining flexibility in the pro-
duction system (see Parts III and V in this volume for more complete 
analyses and critiques of this topic). In this book, there are really only two 
aberrations from the generally positive evaluation of this system. The 
critiques observe that unskilled and semi-skilled workers, especially the 
women and foreigners among them, have few opportunities to enter special 
training programs to improve their positions or adapt to new production 
needs. Thus, although companies' Facharbeiter are well-trained and in a 
good position to receive further training, firms with large amounts of 
semi-skilled labour cannot easily adjust their work-forces to new require-
ments, creating potential flexibility problems (see chapters 14,19). 
Another position well-represented in this book sees the Facharbeiter as 
having a key role in an optimistic scenario of the future of work (see 
chapters in Part III). Given the Facharbeiter's broad training and potential 
for improving flexibility in production, the vision is to have more and more 
workers in production being 'Facharbeiter', doing more and more chal-
lenging jobs. The proponents of this position argue that this would be good 
for new production requirements, thus for productivity, and at the same 
time good for workers from the viewpoint of job enrichment and self-
fulfilment. Obviously, this situation is not presented as the status quo, but 
as an alternative path of development in industrial work. Observed realities, 
in fact, show a number of negative trends for Facharbeiter in current work 
arrangements. 
In contrast to this view, the systemic rationalization approach in ISF 
(explained more fully in chapter 1) predicts a much less rosy future for the 
Facharbeiter. Advances in technology and automation and the way these 
are being implemented in production bring with them the potential for a 
segmentation of qualifications which can open the way for a polarization of 
skills among the work-force (see chapter 15). In addition, the concern for 
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the work experience of the Facharbeiter is extended to the loss of 'sub-
jectified action' or the ability for a skilled worker to use tacit knowledge on 
the job due to the introduction of centralized, automated production pro-
cesses (see chapter 8). 
It is difficult for someone not brought up in the German training system 
and rehearsed in the research traditions of German industrial sociology to 
really comprehend the role and significance of the Facharbeiter. What is 
striking to the outsider, whether German industrial sociologists mean to 
communicate this or not, is the acceptance of, even pride in, the industrial 
training system. Of course, the Facharbeiter's relationship to other workers 
and the way their labour is used are points of critique, but not the 
institutional form itself. Where does the motivation for the encouragement 
and defence (in the case of deskilling) of the Facharbeiter come from? 
Certainly it derives in part from the way existing structures leave their 
imprint on how a scientific discipline defines itself and its goals. German 
industrial sociology has traditionally had the 'two-sided challenge' to be 
both a social theoretical (in the sense of German Gesellschaftstheorie) as 
well as a pragmatic science (see chapter 1). On the pragmatic side, one of 
the central political orientations of German sociology has been to use its 
theoretical perspectives to help provide the potential bases for promoting 
government reform policies and labour and union policy, concretized in 
examples such as the humanization of work. In a country with such a strong 
tradition of the artisan or craft worker, it is hardly surprising that the 
concept of humanism in the world of production work would get embodied 
in the concept of the Facharbeiter. 
Another dual system repeatedly mentioned in this volume and 
potentially requiring explanation for those of us not familiar with German 
institutions, is the dual system of interest representation. This refers to 
worker representation which exists at the national/industry branch level in 
the form of the union (Gewerkschaft) and that which takes place in the firm 
in the form of the works council (Betriebsrat). In any firm that has more 
than five employees, a works council has to be established, elected by and 
representing only the employees in that particular firm. The works 
council's rights and constraints are regulated by the Works Constitution 
Act of 1972 (see Weiss 1987).4 
The industrial union is responsible for negotiating with the appropriate 
employers' association on the terms and conditions of employment for all 
employees, both hourly or salaried, covered by a collective agreement. The 
works council is responsible for operationalizing the collective agreement 
at the plant level and is both institutionally and legally delineated from 
union activities above the plant level. The works council can even enter into 
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its own agreements with the company as long as they don't contradict the 
provisions of the collective agreement Thus, what makes the union-works 
council configuration an especially 'dual' system in Germany is the works 
council's independent status. 
From the union's perspective, it is difficult to make meaningful policy 
for the special problems that arise within a particular plant. Therefore, the 
works council was meant to take on an active role of codetermination in the 
firm. This was to be done in the spirit of cooperation (in any case, works 
councils have a no-strike clause in their constitution) even though, by 
definition, it was often conflicts that were being worked out. However, up 
until quite recently, the works council's role has mainly comprised routine 
problems. They have mainly dealt with issues connected with the collective 
agreement or labour laws, such as wage classifications and bonuses, 
general working conditions (noise, heat, etc.), work safety, dismissal, or 
personnel 'matters,' such as holiday plans, transfer, etc. At present, in the 
framework of designing new workplaces in conjunction with new com-
puter technologies and flexible manufacturing systems, the unions are in a 
position to redirect their negotiation strategies to influence some funda-
mental conditions of work: job enrichment, job rotation, qualification, 
retraining, etc. The tendency is for the unions to formulate their 
programmes or demands in general terms, leaving the details to be worked 
out by the works councils. This puts greater requirements on the works 
councils, potentially leading to a difficult position in terms of capability to 
negotiate on these issues and in determining exactly what their role is (see 
chapters 23,24 for a more detailed account of these problems). 
The dual system of interest representation makes it possible to have, on 
the one hand, a national union negotiating at the national level with political 
power to back up the implementation of demands, and on the other hand, 
company level representatives that are familiar with company level prob-
lems. However, the position of the works council is not without difficulty 
in this arrangement. Works council members are company employees, 
elected by the work-force, and therefore represent the work-force (or at 
least certain groups in the work-force). Although the works council carries 
out union policy in the company, in the final analysis the works council's 
loyalty lies with the company in terms of protecting the interests of their 
constituents - the work-force. 
Another problem is that although inter-union competition is alleviated 
through single union representation in one plant, inter-worker competition 
is not necessarily eliminated. Depending on the industry, plant, region and 
other factors, a union and its inner company counterpart, the works council, 
could perceive their base to rest quite identifiably with a particular worker 
category or skill group. This essentially leaves the other categories or skill 
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groups de facto with limited representation at the collective level. 
Indirectly, this brings us back to the Facharbeiter. Unlike in the United 
States, where semi-skilled workers are the backbone of the industrial 
unions, in Germany it is the Facharbeiter who have hegemony. Not being 
as easily replaceable as unskilled workers, they have greater leverage. 
White-collar workers, although they benefit from union agreements, take a 
lesser part in union activities; fewer join the union, fewer participate in 
union meetings etc. Likewise, unions have traditionally not actively 
represented the interests of white-collar workers. 
The example of the dual system of interest representation once again 
demonstrates how strongly the national context in which research is con-
ducted and the structures and institutions making up that context influence 
what are defined as industrial sociological problems, and how they can be 
resolved. 
INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES INSIDE INDUSTRY 
Moving away from the societal level to the company level, the first subject 
is the evaluation or rating of the workplace in German industry. It is 
necessary to know something about the concept of workplace evaluation in 
order to grasp the way issues of skill and deskilling are analyzed in this 
volume. 
Often, German industrial sociologists refer to the American system of 
job classification as individually based, in contrast to the workplace-related 
German system. I find the distinctions between the two very subtle, seeing 
as how both define jobs, search for people with particular qualifications to 
carry them out, and provide compensation for negative working conditions. 
But the differences are there and can have important effects on how labour 
relations proceed and what the future of work looks like. 
In both the United States and Germany, wages are, in principle, 
determined by qualification and the level of strain (for example, physical 
burdens) at a particular workplace. However, in the United States the role 
of classifications for job assignment differs from labour deployment in 
Germany. In the United States, a certain task gets classified as the 
responsibility of a specific type of worker at the plant level. Then, these 
tasks belong, by definition, to a certain type of worker and cannot be carried 
out by another type. For example, removing the protective closures on 
machines might be assigned to the fitters based on local union and plant 
management agreement. This means that all over the plant, whenever a 
closure has to be removed for repair, in principle, only the fitters can carry 
out the task even if it is in preparation for a mechanic, electrician, or regular 
production worker to engage on some work on the machine. Obviously, it 
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would not be difficult to train other workers to perform this task in addition 
to their regular duties. However, under American practices of job demar-
cation, this is not possible. In practice, the rules of job demarcation are not 
so strictly followed; usually workers only begin adhering rigidly to job 
classifications when there is a disagreement ensuing with company 
management However, job classification does build rigidities into the 
system by making it extremely difficult to rearrange tasks and responsi-
bilities (see Jürgens et al. 1989 for a detailed account of this topic). 
In contrast, in German plants, technical planners have more room to 
determine which tasks are required at a particular workplace. A workplace 
(often translated as job although the more concrete direct translation from 
the German actually describes the concept more accurately),5 is then 
evaluated in terms of task requirements and negative working conditions 
and someone is sought whose qualifications match the demands of the 
workplace. Thus, if a workplace, in the light of its various tasks, requires an 
electrician or welder, such a skilled worker, who has a state-recognized 
certificate of training, will be chosen. This workplace will have a particular 
wage connected to it, as agreed to by the union and the appropriate em-
ployer's association, and as adapted by the work council and company 
management. 
In the United States, if you redefine which tasks a certain worker 
category, such as welders, should perform, or if you change the tasks 
previously carried out by this group, the new demarcation rules have to be 
agreed upon at the plant level. The chances are good that the workers with 
a particular classification are not going to easily accept either having tasks 
being taken away from them, which could endanger their wage and 
potentially their job security, or being assigned new, additional tasks. 
In Germany, if a workplace's requirements change due to, for instance, 
technological innovation, then the definition of which type of worker needs 
to be fulfiling the tasks at the workplace changes. The works council can 
respond with attempts to protect the wage of the worker in the case of 
downgrading, regulated for a particular time period through both collective 
and company agreements, but the integrity of the workplace is gone. For 
this reason, many of the chapters in this volume refer to the dangers for 
skilled workers in the face of changing organizational and technological 
structures. 
Due to the German system of labour relations and the way jobs or 
workplaces are delineated, the discussion about reskilling and deskilling of 
skilled workers takes on a special character. It does not mean more or less 
conflict or negotiation between union and employer association or work 
council and management than in the United States - only that the arena for 
these discussions are different. In Germany, the issue for skilled workers 
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focuses on the rating of workplaces and what skills are required at them, 
whereas under other systems, such as in the United States, the issue centres 
on the defence of particular job classifications and the demarcation of tasks 
defined by them. 
A related issue to that of workplace evaluation is how performance is 
regulated or measured. For mass production, this refers mainly to the 
Tayloristic system of time and motion studies. As far as I know, the 
significance of this issue for German industrial sociologists has no counter-
part in Anglo-American sociological traditions. 
In the United States, incentive wage systems are rare. Performance is 
regulated through definitions of output and manning levels which are 
determined by a number of different methods, including time and motion 
studies. The union generally has little say in the process and can only 
respond through grievances, and in cases of extreme conflict, by striking 
(see Jürgens et al. 1989). Under this system, the use of time and motion 
studies represents a transparent form of company control. In Germany, 
however, the whole issue of performance measurement in mass production 
has a political and theoretical relevance quite different from that of the 
United States. 
Politically, the German unions and works councils have always had 
more involvement in the implementation of time and motion studies than in 
the United States. As a means of having a so-called objective (i.e. 
'scientific') basis by which to measure performance, the unions pushed for 
the use of time and motion studies. The works councils, as part of their 
codetermination rights, were responsible for overseeing the setting of 
standards and methods of measurement within the companies. 
The works councils' equal voice with company management not only 
involves the means by which standards are carried out, but the whole 
definition of 'work performance'. In Germany, incredible efforts are made 
to try and define what 'normal performance' (100 per cent) is as the basis 
for determining wages (anything above normal performance involves addi-
tional incentive wages). The trade-off for greater codetermination is the 
prohibition of strikes on issues of the setting of performance standards. At 
the same time that this system ensures control by worker representatives in 
the process, it also legitimates time and motion studies and adds credence 
to the idea that they are scientific and non-partisan (see Jürgens et al. 1989: 
chapter 6, for more on this issue). 
The unions and works councils adhere to these systems, not necessarily 
because they believe so strongly in performance levels, but because the 
Works Constitution Act only gives them codetermination rights on these 
issues. Obviously, it is extremely difficult to 'objectively' determine what 
normal performance is at any given time. Therefore, in the final analysis, 
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behind all of the 'scientifically* based methods for defining normal 
performance, looms the issues of power and control. In Germany, these 
issues are played out in the arena of negotiating 'scientifically' determined 
performance levels. 
The combination of the union role in promoting time and motion studies 
and the long term discussion over how they should be regulated, and, at the 
theoretical level, Marxist influence on industrial sociological orientations 
in Germany, has produced a whole discussion on the 'economy of time' or 
'time regime' in German industrial sociology which does not exist in 
Anglo-American labour process debates (see chapter 14). 
The 'economy of time' is basically the determination of how much 
labour will get transformed into labour power, or how much labour power 
it takes to produce a commodity, and the company's strategy for controlling 
this transformation. Time and motion studies are a technical means for 
controlling this transformation process. The implementation of time and 
motion studies under 'time regimes' or 'time management' makes the uses 
and intensification of labour transparent. From the management side, the 
name of the game, under Tayloristic production principles, is to intensify 
labour as much as possible to produce as many standardized commodities 
as cheaply as possible. From the (German) union perspective, under 
Tayloristic production principles, the objective is to have as much co-
determination right as possible in setting the performance standard. 
Several problems develop with time management given the nature of 
changing markets and the possibility for new technological and organi-
zational structures in the production area. For management, in any 
industrialized country, a contradiction arises in that their 'economy of time' 
is pursuing the ever increasing productivity of standard production, while 
the market is demanding more diversity and higher quality products. For 
unions, German ones in particular, the presetting of standard times or doing 
away with Tayloristic methods of time management altogether could po-
tentially contribute to their pronounced goals of greater worker autonomy 
and more humane and enriching forms of work. However, it simultaneously 
removes a traditional power base in the form of codetermining standards, 
and thus in influencing wage setting, vis-á-vis company management (see 
Sohn-Rethel 1978 and Benz-Overhage et al. 1982). Thus, when authors in 
this volume refer to the 'economy of time' or even Taylorism as a form of 
regulation, all of these considerations represent the starting point of their 
analyses. 'Economy of time' can only be understood in the German dis-
cussion from the background of the term's development in both Marxist 
theoretical orientations and union politics. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Hopefully this paper has served to explain some of the intricacies of 
German society to better understand German industrial sociology, 
specifically the papers in this book. But a problem still exists, recognized 
by my German colleagues, by my American colleagues perhaps less so, and 
for the other countries I unfortunately cannot say. In sociology, the nature 
of the field is to pinpoint problems within given structures and institutions, 
ones that are so specific to national frameworks, such as training, wage 
systems, union agreements, labour market trends, etc. that the discussion 
gets limited to analyses or solutions that are completely inappropriate 
outside of the national context. Moreover, it is difficult enough to under-
stand each other in the face of the obstacles different languages pose. But, 
within our countries, we make it even worse by communicating in a sort of 
'new speak' which can only be understood by those well-versed in a 
particular system and in the discussions that have preceded the current one. 
Furthermore, often, when we carry out comparative research, the entire 
orientation is either that we have little to learn from other systems, or what 
is interesting about other systems is only what it can tell us about our own. 
This leads to unfruitful discussions in international groups. 
Given the internationalization of markets, growing numbers of joint 
ventures, and the integration of Europe, to name a few, this seems like a 
highly irrational orientation. Perhaps a change in attitude will occur, 
leading to the realization that we really can learn from the problems and 
solutions in other nations, and that other traditions, both theoretical and 
methodological, which form the basis of sociological research in other 
nations, might indeed benefit us. If this happens we may not achieve more 
of a paradise, but we will be able to communicate less as strangers. 
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3 The Contradictions of 
Post-Tayloristic Rationalization 
and the Uncertain Future of 
Industrial Work1 
BurkartLutz 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter argues that realistic assertions about the future of industrial 
work can only be made if social and economic meso- and macro-structures 
and their historical development are taken into account. European Taylor-
ism is seen as the result of specific conditions and constellations existing in 
post-war Europe. The present erosion of the 'Tayloristic syndrome' has not 
yet been replaced by any new dominant pattern of enterprise rationalization 
and social reproduction. In the ongoing process of the restructuring of 
capitalism, different paths for the future of work have become apparent 
leading to what is described here as computer-aided Taylor, computer-
aided Drucker,2 and computer-aided Huxley. 
Current research on the development of industrial technology and work is 
characterized by two indisputable findings: 
1 Extensive and rapid changes in technology and work have taken place 
under the influence of various factors, such as the international division 
of labour, changing consumer behaviour, and the availability of new 
technological components and systems. 
2 It is clear, especially when one looks beyond the borders of a single 
country, that the observed processes of adjustment lead in very different 
directions. While some far-reaching technological and organizational 
innovations are, without a doubt, an expression of 'new production 
concepts', which orient themselves to the principle of the 'reprofes-
sionalization' of production work, hundreds, in fact thousands, of highly 
qualified engineers and computer scientists work on models of an 
'unmanned' factory and expert systems, whose use is only justified by 
the definitive elimination of skilled production work. 
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The controversy about the future of industrial work, as described in chapter 
1, consists of diverging and openly conflicting positions that are not based 
on academic speculation; rather these positions can at any one time refer to 
tangible - albeit selectively interpreted - empirical evidence. 
This highly diverse empirical picture is not merely the result of too little 
observation. A much more intensive description of current adjustment 
processes in technology and work and particular enterprise policies would 
not bring greater clarity. The diversity of the observations and expected 
trends must be understood as a fundamental characteristic of the historical 
situation in which the advanced industrial nations presently find 
themselves. In complete agreement with authors such as Piore and Sabel 
(1984) or the French 'regulation school' (see Boyer 1989), I maintain that 
realistic assertions about the future (or the futures) of industrial work can 
only be the starting point of research which combines the macro-conditions 
of technology and work, and the historical processes that have been gener-
ated and changed by these macro-conditions. 
This chapter will outline this formulation in broad strokes. Therefore, it 
begins with a look back at the time following the Second World War in 
order to understand the historical context of the use of work and technology 
in the enterprise and of the decisions made to transform it. Obviously, the 
use of technology and work and the decisions surrounding it are critical for 
the present and foreseeable future. 
ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND THE SUCCESSFUL ADVANCE 
OF TAYLORISTIC RATIONALIZATION IN POST-WAR 
EUROPE 
The Welfare State and the Economic Miracle 
After the end of the Second World War, most European industrial nations 
found themselves in an absolutely desolate economic situation, despite the 
fact that the worst destruction from the war had been repaired and the most 
flagrant crises overcome. 
The export of industrial goods to non-industrialized or partially in-
dustrialized areas, which for centuries had been the most important force 
behind European development, was depressed and not likely to be restimu-
lated in the short term. 
Relief through growth based on expanding domestic demand also 
seemed to be hindered. There was an immense demand for necessities, such 
as clothing, furniture, housing and infrastructure. The standard of living 
was clearly below the level of the pre-war period, and was near subsistence 
for many segments of the population. What was destroyed or worn out 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
during the war had to be rebuilt or refurbished. Transforming these im-
mediate needs into buying-power, and thus putting into motion a self-
regulating dynamic of growing income, was made impossible by the cost 
structure of industrial production and the huge supply of labour, acute or 
latent, which was willing to work at almost any price. 
In this situation (which included the imminent threat of communist 
expansion), a totally new social strategy arose in all European industrial 
nations. This strategy can be expressed as 'welfare capitalism'. A new 
'accumulation regime' (in the sense of the regulations school), combining 
social-political, fiscal, institutional and political-economic innovations, 
was established after the war and served as the foundation for an economic 
upturn unparalleled in history. 
This accumulation regime received its, at times extraordinary, 
dynamism from the interaction of two components: 
1 The first component was found within a historically new type of 'mode 
of regulation'. At the crux of this mode was the extensive political 
neutralization of the 'law of wages' (or, one could say, the price-quantity 
mechanism of the labour market). The functions of the law of wages 
were, as the classicists said, 'brazen', but they could hardly be dismissed 
from capitalists' economic development up to this point. 
2 The second component of the constellation of prosperity that character-
ized post-war Europe was found in the opportunities opened up to the 
industrial-capitalist sectors of the economy through the new mode of 
regulation. This mode broke up and extensively absorbed economic 
sectors that had been very important and stable, i.e. the traditional, 
farm-craft economy and life-style. In this context, two powerful 
mechanisms interacted, both of which were based on continuously large 
increases in wage income: the first mechanism was the emergence of a 
'new milieu', which served to satisfy the need for fundamental material, 
and a large part of necessary non-material, goods and services. This new 
life-style could only function, be produced, or furnished through 
industrial techniques and organization. The second mechanism was the 
mobilization of large quantities of workers previously employed in the 
traditional farm-craft economy (such as proprietors and family 
members) into wage labour for the modern industrial-tertiary sectors of 
the national economy. 
Strong macro-micro congruence 
The above-outlined European prosperity in the decade following the 
Second World War could develop and stabilize only if a large number of 
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firms in the economy followed their fundamental interests in a way that was 
congruent with the newly established macro-structures, the emerging new 
mode of regulation, the newly generated economic cycles and the flow of 
money and goods. 
The principles of Tayloristic or Fordistic rationalization and the forms of 
enterprise structure, production, and work organization clearly corres-
ponded with the functional requirements of the accumulation regime and its 
model for growth, which were progressively established in post-war 
Europe. These principles include: the use of scale effects through mass 
production as the most efficient compensation for massive wage increases 
(which is necessary to generate new massive buying power); the extension 
of the division of labour in technical, hierarchical and functional dimen-
sions; and the intense standardization of work, creating the preconditions 
for large quantities of non-skilled labour to be quickly and easily integrated 
into the production process and thereby allowing the firm to react quickly 
to the growing demand for goods and services. 
However, after the Second World War, European industry found itself 
in a situation that made a quick expansion of Tayloristic-Fordistic 
rationalization policies and production methods unlikely. The industrial 
structure of the economy was characterized by a strong oversupply of raw 
material and investment goods industries. The industrial manufacturing of 
consumer goods played altogether only a small role in the economy since a 
large part of private consumption was satisfied by the traditional farm-craft 
sector (with a high share from household production). In 1950, large firms 
in West Germany with products geared toward mass production (the 
automobile and electronics industries) represented less than 8 per cent of 
the employed in industrial firms with more than 100 employees. This figure 
was much lower than the coal-mining or the textile industries. Also, in the 
'modern' industrial sectors, such as the metalworking and electronic 
industries, the dominant forms of enterprise structure, production and work 
organization as well as personnel structures were not compatible with the 
principles of Taylorism and Fordism. Rather the forms were predominately 
characterized by a high level of in-house production, a large variety of 
products, an organizational structure on the shop-floor where the foreman 
(Meister) had a strong and independent role, and a clear oversupply of 
skilled workers in many sectors. 
Nevertheless, the new rationalization norm expanded very quickly 
throughout Europe during the 1950s and into the 1960s. Increasingly, it 
shaped the structure of industrial production and industrial work. This can 
be explained for the most part by a series of extremely favourable con-
ditions which combined to sharply reduce the costs and risks of shifting to 
the new norm of rationalization and organization. 
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Consumer demand was both structurally stable and predictable. The 
goods appealing to consumers, such as furniture, household appliances, 
radios, stereos and autos (which were gaining increasing economic im-
portance), were not difficult to produce from a technical standpoint. The 
level of technology and the international price and cost level generally 
corresponded to a production method that, at least from today's 
perspective, was highly labour-intensive and required a small amount of 
capital. Workers, who up to this point were bound to traditional economic 
structures and traditional work relationships, responded to financial 
incentives being offered by industry and provided, on average, a highly 
motivated work-force. These workers showed a strong tolerance for 
physical labour and brought to industrial work a wealth of abilities; at the 
same time, they accepted relatively low wages. 
The Tayloristic concept or the forms, principles and processes of a high 
division of labour represented by mass production, reached a high degree of 
popularity and maturity in the time following the Second World War in 
German and European industry. In part, this can be attributed to pursuing the 
American example and Germany's own experience in weapons production. 
Since the 1950s, these very favourable conditions caused a rapidly 
growing number of companies to orient their organization, production and 
work process increasingly toward the principles of Tayloristic rationali-
zation in order to capitalize on the opportunities for expansion and profit. 
The Tayloristic syndrome 
Two aspects of the new welfare-state mode of regulation crystallized in a 
short time into a very powerful historical constellation in Europe in the 
1950s. The domestic demand dynamic, which made possible the 'appro-
priation' of traditional parts of the economy and society, formed a growth 
and accumulation constellation that merged with the dominant enterprise 
rationalization strategy based on Tayloristic and Fordistic principles. The 
resulting historical constellation is referred to here as the 'Tayloristic 
syndrome' (a synonym for the term would be 'Fordism', which is widely 
used in the regulation theory literature). 
The power of this syndrome is derived from strong interactive effects 
with distinct interrelationships on two levels: the macro-level consisting of 
the domestic economy, social relations and institutions, as well as political 
processes, and the micro-level consisting of individual firms with their 
production and work processes and their technical-organizational 
structures. 
Enormous buying power, as a result of rising wages, opens new oppor-
tunities through the use of scale effects to reduce costs and to secure 
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additional room for increasing wages and/or reducing prices. At the same 
time, this increases the attractiveness of wage labour as compared to 
employment in family enterprises in the traditional sector which were still 
very numerous and seemingly stable by the end of the war. Rising wages 
also exposed traditional products and services to intensive competition 
from mass-produced substitutes. Higher productivity arises from work 
intensification under Tayloristic work organization, but it also leads to the 
dissipation of workers' strength and abilities. The system of social security 
compensates for the strain on workers through payments which are 
generated from rising wages and benefits. Moreover, through the creation 
of independent 'social-political' markets and economic activity (one thinks 
here of the enormous growth of the 'health economy') it is guaranteed that 
a large part of this compensation is recycled back to the firm in the form of 
demand. 
Driven by such mechanisms of positive feedback, the 'Tayloristic syn-
drome' develops a dynamic which is without precedent in Europe and can 
be compared with certain phases of US development that were shaped by 
similar constellations. The dynamic of economic growth and well-being, 
the dynamic of industrial expansion and the dynamic of rationalization and 
mechanization of firm production and work processes all mutually support 
and strengthen one another. 
THE POWER OF THE 'TAYLORISTIC SYNDROME' TO SHAPE 
STRUCTURES 
A historical constellation of such power and dynamism cannot be estab-
lished and survive over a long period of time without causing far-reaching 
structural changes in institutions, authorities and areas of society. To better 
understand the current situation, three structural effects of the Tayloristic 
configuration are examined more closely: changes in the production and 
work process, changes in the organization and power structures of the firm, 
and changes in the environment surrounding the firm and the firm's 
relationship to this environment. 
Production and work process 
In the first instance, rationalization measures in accordance with 
Tayloristic-Fordistic principles can be understood as simple tools or 
options offered to a firm in certain situations which it undertakes, uses and, 
under changed external and internal conditions, can give up (whereby the 
firm loses at most a certain amount of investment in physical or human 
capital in the process). Over time, the progressive accumulation of steps in 
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rationalization and mechanization form structures of production and work 
in a growing number of firms. These structures are deeply shaped by the 
fundamental goals and principles of Tayloristic rationalization, and 
(without great difficulty) they can no longer be reoriented to other goals and 
principles. 
The fundamental points of restructuring and processes of change have 
been thoroughly described in the literature; however, let me refresh your 
memory: the gradual reorganization of industrial structure and factory-
design through the systematic transition to mass production; a technology 
oriented to this reorganization centred on products which make maximal 
use of large batches and production facilities with extreme specialization in 
products; technical and organizational innovations that rely on a continual 
increase in productivity from direct work and result in increasingly 
selective and rigid automation, supplemented by a few qualified 'stop-gap' 
jobs; an organization of work shaped by a deep horizontal, vertical, and 
functional division of labour and the apparent unending decline of skilled 
work; a performance and wage policy whose primary goal is short-term 
maximization; etc. 
There are two types of structural consequences of Tayloristic rationali-
zation that have received much less attention in the scientific debate. These 
structural consequences take place in both the internal firm structure and 
the relationship between the firm and its social-institutional environment as 
well as this environment itself. 
Firm and company organization 
A firm could only take full advantage of the opportunities for expansion 
and profit in Europe's post-war prosperity constellation, when it not only 
secured the efficiency created by the new Tayloristic rationalization struc-
tures in production technology, work organization and quality control, but 
also secured their continual increase over time. 
If firms want immediately to exploit every chance of increased sales and 
transform external pressure to raise wages into increased productivity, so 
that this is consistent with constant or even falling per-unit labour costs, a 
more or less regular increase in labour productivity is inevitable. Achieving 
this benefit, however, requires continual innovations in production and work 
processes and performance policy. In this regard, there must be adequate 
problem-solving and organizational skills continually available in diese 
areas of the enterprise. This should not be regarded as a sideline of general 
management responsibilities, as it was in the traditional Meister-firm. 
With the takeover of Tayloristic principles of rationalization, firms put a 
process of the functional division and differentiation of labour in motion 
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which basically appeared as the simple application of well-known organi-
zational principles or as an obvious continuation of long trusted trends. Yet 
these principles and trends gradually arose into something extensively new, 
something like a 'meta-structure' of enterprise organization. The actions and 
tasks of the administration and service areas (such as process planning and 
operations scheduling, controlling and quality control, data management, as 
well as important parts of the personnel department) of this structure are no 
longer geared directly to the production of goods. Rather they ensure that in 
the long term the conditions which enable particular parts of the firm to make 
an optimal contribution to these purposes are present. 
The institutional areas of the meta-structure increasingly take over tech-
nological and organizational responsibilities and technical knowledge that 
have, up to then, been a more or less given, although inexplicit component 
of production work skills. This meta-structure, with more and more refined 
rules of procedure, embodies a large part of what used to make up the 
dynamic of a company's personality. One could call this the 'strategic 
capacity' of the firm: the ability to recognize new external forces and 
problems that arise or opportunities and resources that offer themselves, so 
that the firm can react correctly and hopefully, prior to its competitors; and 
the ability to use the technical and organizational knowledge necessary for 
this reaction as well as to possess enough power inside the enterprise to 
carry out necessary changes. 
It is clear that these meta-bodies in the enterprise, which promote the 
rationalization process and increasingly monopolize the necessary qualifi-
cations for this process, could not arise overnight. The provision of 
technical and personnel resources needed to ensure the effectiveness of 
these institutional areas can only come about in the course of a long term 
development (see chapter 18). Because of the nature of its duties, the 
work-force requires a special skill that is not readily available on the 
external labour market, but which must be built up slowly. The applicable, 
especially technical-organizational, knowledge comes about first through a 
long process in which partners outside the firm (business consultants, 
business associations, researchers, etc.) take part. In the short or long term, 
these partners have to find a professional milieu which can serve as a 
consulting body for internal firm discussions. This increases the risk, 
however, that strategic options of the firm will be maintained long after 
their premises cease to apply. 
Environment and the environmental relationships of the firm 
An integral component of the welfare-state regulation mode which arose 
after the Second World War in the European industrial nations is a network 
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of institutions. From these, policies are articulated, given shape, and 
implemented, norms are established and executed, and public services are 
provided. The functional relationships and circulation of the new accumu-
lation regime is founded on this network. These institutions reflect the 
particular, and often strongly, nationally specific characteristics that result 
from historical tradition and represent the starting points of the individual 
countries after the war. Nevertheless, these institutions have similar, and in 
certain constellations, essential meaning for enterprise action within the 
Tayloristic syndrome. This is the case in at least three ways: 
1 First, they furnish services which the firm, in the context of Tayloristic 
rationalization, directly or indirectly benefits from. They take over costs 
if need be, such as easing obligations or opening additional room in the 
policies of the firm. A large number of examples for this exist The 
services of the educational system, which can be used by the firms to 
employ trained workers; the research results of universities or publicly 
financed research and development arrangements that are available to 
firms as they are or in the form of newly recruited labour; and the 
above-mentioned social security services which the firms at least in-
directly benefit from. 
2 Additional institutions (or other activities within the same institutions) 
affect, above all, the mobilization of resources available for the firms 
use. The most obvious examples of this are found in labour market 
policy. The public policies geared toward labour mobilization, however, 
are not limited to the activities of the state labour authorities such as the 
German Federal Labour Office. A large number of programmes and 
projects concerning regional and structural development partially serve 
the same purpose. These projects help ease the resettlement costs of 
industrial firms with large numbers of laid off workers. 
3 Finally, institutions of this type guarantee the uniform behaviour of all 
potential competitors through the establishment and use of regulations 
and minimum standards, even when these interrelationships require 
firms to act in a way that does not directly comply with their interests. 
The most prominent example of this is collective bargaining and its 
effect on raising wages; the major collective bargaining associations 
(employers' associations and labour unions) are also a fundamental 
component of the Tayloristic syndrome's institutional network. 
Thus, in the first phase of rapid Tayloristic rationalization expansion these 
institutions and their effects stand outside of the individual firm as entities 
which cannot be influenced, at least not enough to speak of. Furthermore, 
enterprise practices have adjusted around them in such a way that it is in the 
best interests of the firm to use them. This changes to the extent that a 
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growing number of firms learn, as a result of the process of the institu-
tionalization of specialized, strategic capacities as sketched above, to build 
stable relationships with institutions that are especially important for them 
and whose services increasingly further their own interests. Then a more or 
less continual interaction (directly or through associations or similar insti-
tutional bodies) between firm policies, actions and programs, and services 
of public or semi-public institutions takes place. This results in an align-
ment of these external organization's maxims, practices and instruments 
with the specific objectives, procedures and problems of Tayloristic 
rationalization. 
For example, general legal terms, such as 'efficiency', 'equity' or 'level 
of technology' on which procedures of such institutions have oriented 
themselves, are largely compatible with Tayloristic rationalization. This, 
however, leaves other rationalization strategies, such as 'flexible speciali-
zation', at a strong disadvantage. In the same way, the requirements for 
social security benefits are being increasingly defined in terms of 
relationships that are typically generated from Tayloristic rationalization. 
The orientation of public intervention toward the model of Tayloristic 
rationalization contributes to the supply structure of factor markets being 
determined within a Tayloristic logic. In this way, it strengthens the forces 
pressing for the expansion of Tayloristic rationalization and for stabili-
zation of already created structures. Thus, the markets for production 
technology are strongly and increasingly dominated by machines, equip-
ment and systems which can only be used efficiently and profitably (with 
intensified use of computer technology) in the context of a Tayloristic 
organization of work and organization of the enterprise. Markets for 
professionally skilled labour and their corresponding training courses 
increasingly dry up in the light of the decline of traditional skilled occu-
pations and the high vertical and functional division of labour which 
dominates in the economy. This makes it more advantageous for younger 
generations to make use of the growing opportunities for formally 
acquiring a higher qualification in schools and universities. In this way, the 
pressure grows for those firms that have, for whatever reason, gone down a 
different path to adopt the Tayloristic model of a high division of labour. 
THE EROSION OF THE TAYLORISTIC SYNDROME: NO NEW 
DOMINANT PATTERN OF RATIONALIZATION IN SIGHT 
The mid-1960s brought the first signs of an incipient slackening of the 
dynamics of the prosperity constellation based on the welfare mode of 
regulation and the 'appropriation' of the traditional sector of the economy; 
this trend then became increasingly evident in the 1970s. 
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This eliminated the central preconditions for the efficient functioning of 
a rationalization strategy based on Tayloristic-Fordistic principles. The 
conflict - largely neutralized at the peak of the Tayloristic syndrome -
between 'production economic' interests directed at cost control and cost 
reduction, and 'market economic' interests aimed at maximizing sales 
opportunities, began to break out on an ever broader front. The more and 
more turbulent markets demanded a higher degree of flexibility and in-
novation; measures to meet these demands contradicted the maxims and 
practices of increased productivity and cost reduction through utilization of 
scale economies and progressive standardization of products and 
production processes. 
The 1980s doubtlessly marked a break in the history of European 
industry, as decisive as that which heralded the development of the 
'Tayloristic syndrome' in 1950. To this extent, the concept of an historic 
turning point, an industrial divide (as formulated by Piore and Sabel 1984), 
is by no means exaggerated. 
What does this now mean for the development of rationalization in the 
enterprise and the future of industrial technology and industrial work? 
At first glance, it seems quite obvious that enterprises would from now 
on gradually adapt their rationalization strategies to the new historical 
conditions. Accordingly, new forms of work organization and production 
technology would have to arise. This would entail the creation of relatively 
small operational units with considerable professional and functional 
autonomy, high levels of flexibility, fast and intelligent reactions to 
unforeseen problems and challenges, and a clearly improved ability to 
innovate, as well as a necessary dismantling of the types of division of 
labour which were typical of Tayloristic-Fordistic rationalization. 
Following in the tradition of the tried and true social science analyses on 
the development of technology and work, many researchers are convinced 
that by examining typical cases of enterprise conversions in technology and 
production organization, they will be able to identify at an early stage the 
step by step implementation of post-Tayloristic rationalization logic and 
the changes in industrial work associated with it. 
With their thesis formulated in 1983-4 on the change in the rationali-
zation paradigm and the coming of the 'new production concepts', Kern 
and Schumann are characteristic representatives of this conviction. 
However, their position has not gained in credibility in recent years. The 
picture so courageously sketched by Kern and Schumann of a new generali-
zable post-Tayloristic rationalization pattern has not taken on more precise 
contours or stability in the light of developments in the last years and 
intensive research on the subject. On the contrary: the non-uniformity of 
empirical findings is increasing, especially if one looks beyond the borders 
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of an individual country. The impression among quite a few researchers is 
that at the moment a large (increasing?) number of enterprises are 
confronted with diverging constraints and opportunities to which they can 
and do respond in very different ways. 
The assumption that the most important industrial nations are currently 
in the middle of the transition from an old Tayloristic-Fordistic phase of 
development to a new one with similarly stable interactions between 
macro- and micro-levels is becoming more and more risky. To answer the 
question of what the future of industrial work will be, it would seem more 
useful and promising to assume that the non-uniform picture provided by 
empirical studies does not simply reflect mere transitional phenomena, but 
is rather an indication of essential features of a new, but lasting, historical 
constellation. In this constellation many, perhaps an ever-increasing 
number of enterprises, are forced to enter a strategy of trial and error over 
a long period, whose results and outcome are not predictable without being 
purely arbitrary. With this perspective, it is possible to make statements on 
the future of industrial work and technology to the extent that the logic of 
these experiments and identification processes, the most important internal 
and external forces influencing them, and their characteristic patterns can 
be pin pointed and analyzed. 
A first attempt in this direction is sketched below in very rough terms. 
There are two premises underlying the core of the argumentation: 
1 the fact outlined on pp. 31-3 above that Tayloristic rationalization at its 
peak had a far-reaching effect on internal company structures as well as 
many external societal structures important to the company; and 
2 the thesis that precisely because of this fact, the erosion of the Taylor-
istic syndrome caused a massive reduction in the ability and opportunity 
of many companies to redefine their rationalization strategy in accor-
dance with their current interests. 
The logic of 'identification and experimentation' can be derived from the 
efforts of companies to break away from the structures created under the 
dominance of Tayloristic principles and from the difficulties, bottlenecks 
and constraints which they attempt to overcome in the pursuit of new paths. 
CROSSROADS AND PATHS OF DEVELOPMENT OF 
POST-TAYLORISTIC RATIONALIZATION 
Three paths of development of work and technology 
Existing research findings allow the identification, without excessive 
stylization, of three ideal-typical development trends of rationalization in 
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industry (and very similar ones in many organizations in the service in-
dustry, although this will not be dealt with here); each of them corresponds 
to a very characteristic path of development of work and technology: 
1 A first path is characterized by the continuation or further consolidation 
and entrenchment of a strong division of labour of a horizontal, vertical 
and functional type. This path differs from the classic Tayloristic-
Fordistic rationalization pattern in particular through the large-scale use 
of computer-aided information and communication technologies to in-
crease companies' flexibility margin, and in this way, compensate as far 
as possible for the increasing inefficiency of the structures within the 
companies and society created by the Tayloristic syndrome. This path of 
industrial work and technology may be labeled 'computer-aided 
Taylor'. 
2 A second and sharply contrasting path is characterized by an extensive 
and lasting elimination of the Tayloristic division of labour. In this 
model, at least partially autonomous groups of very qualified 'reprofes-
sionalized' production workers without hierarchical differentiation form 
the basic unit of enterprise organization. Modern technology also plays 
an important role here: technical resources eliminate most of the 
physical and stress-related work burdens which had been inseparably 
linked to production work; the cohesion between the basic autonomous 
unit and the integration of the entire company is guaranteed by highly 
interactive information, communication and control systems. 
Taking up older, long-gone traditions of organization, this develop-
ment path (which corresponds in many respects to the 'new production 
concepts' of Kern and Schumann) can be termed 'computer-aided 
Drucker' (see note 2). 
3 A third path is characterized mainly by the fact that in connection with 
a partial abandonment of horizontal and functional divisions of labour 
by means of strong decentralization and the creation of organizational 
units with considerable autonomy to execute tasks, a new type of in-
dustrial manpower is created, that of the formally high-qualified 
'production engineer', who tends to belong to the social and professional 
milieu of academically qualified experts. In the field of direct production 
(in which he usually spends only one phase of his working life in the 
course of his career) this production engineer monopolizes what may be 
labeled 'production-intelligence'. He draws into his own domain - as the 
control centre, the system leader, the supervisor or acting in some 
similar role - all the tasks which presuppose a certain degree of com-
petency and responsibility; the complement he needs is therefore an 
unskilled work-force and one which has even fewer upgrading 
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opportunities than in Taylorism, workers who have to assume all the 
remaining heavy and unattractive tasks and carry them out according to 
strict instructions. 
With reference to Huxley's famous novel, Brave New World, and his 
strict segregation into 'alphas' and 'epsilons', this development path 
may be labeled 'computer-aided Huxley' (although few examples of this 
path exist in Germany, there are many cases in other countries). 
Comparison of these three development paths - which can also be viewed 
as scenarios - prompts the questions research must take up if the assump-
tion of a long-lasting identification and experimentation stage of company 
rationalization is to be realistic: What are the factors determining which of 
these paths a company or a group of companies takes? What factors have 
the greatest influence? What consequences would a far-reaching imple-
mentation of one or other rationalization paths have on the meso- and 
macro-levels? And how would the structural changes triggered on these 
levels effect the enterprises and their rationalization strategies? 
To illustrate how an answer must be sought to questions of this type, a 
very simplified schema with two alternative crossroads of company 
rationalization can be developed. 
The first crossroad: structural conservatism or reprofessionalization 
of production work? 
The more powerful a historic constellation has been, the more likely it is 
that the structures it gave rise to will continue to exist and stay in effect far 
beyond the point in time in which the constellation itself begins to disinte-
grate. For this reason, a large number of enterprises are still subject to 
strong influences compelling the continuation or even the intensification of 
a rationalization in line with Tayloristic principles which persistently 
hinders a fundamental reorientation. 
The reasons for this lie, first of all, in the strong influence Tayloristic 
rationalization has had on internal enterprise structures. A key role is 
played here by the 'meta' structures of enterprise organization in which 
specialized strategic competencies have crystallized into a quite specific 
orientation: on optimal use of accumulation and profit-making oppor-
tunities offered by the Tayloristic syndrome. Even with the erosion of this 
syndrome, authorities, departments, planning and decision centres, which 
make up these meta structures, are eager to draw the newly arising complex 
of problems into their own areas of responsibility, i.e. to define them so that 
they appear to be genuine cases of application of their respective areas of 
competence. As a result, enterprises are so often pinned down to the typical 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
pattern of action defined by Tayloristic rationalization that it is difficult to 
explore new paths, much less pursue them. 
The conservative effects created through the inner company relations 
which stem from Tayloristic rationalization can be reinforced by the char-
acteristic dynamics of the decline of the Tayloristic syndrome. The erosion 
of this historic constellation, and the slackening of the positive feedback 
mechanisms it is supported by, creep in over a long period of time. For the 
company, these changes manifest themselves in the form of an at first 
barely perceptible and then slowly more massive deterioration of the 
conditions characterizing the predominant rationalization strategy. For this 
reason, dramatic changes in company strategy cannot be induced; at best, 
pragmatic reactions along the line of practices and policies tried and proven 
in the past which may be conceived and implemented without any great 
modifications in the existing organizational structures seem to be the most 
appropriate plan of action. 
Other conservative effects repeatedly pinning down or retarding 
company action to the basic Tayloristic pattern stem from circumstances in 
the external environment. Thus, the tendency of most enterprises to avoid 
any far-reaching changes in organizational structure (which would be in-
evitable if they really reoriented their rationalization strategies) is very 
often reinforced by the aggressive marketing strategy of the manufacturers 
of information technology systems. The increased utilization of their infor-
mation technology in an otherwise unchanged organizational context is 
presented as an adequate response to the enterprise's problems. In fact, the 
problems could only be solved through a rejection of the basic principles of 
the rationalization they have practiced to date. Moreover, the limitations of 
such purely technical solutions usually only become visible after highly 
consolidated, integrated system structures have arisen, only permitting 
enterprise reactions which correspond to their inner logic - in as much as 
the enterprise will not risk neutralizing central functional areas for a con-
siderable length of time. Far-reaching strategic reorientation is also quite 
frequently rendered difficult by normative rules and public intervention. In 
recent decades their premises and maxims have increasingly been defining 
the specific conditions created by Tayloristic rationalization patterns as 
normal. In this way, they have fixed company policy (in particular, but not 
only, personnel policies and labour) to certain lines of action which highly 
conform to company interests under the Tayloristic syndrome, but which 
may well be totally incompatible with any other strategy. 
For both internal as well as external conservative factors, the availability 
of skilled labour for production work (and similar types of activities) and 
the forms and systems of education and training conditioning them take on 
central significance. It was, of course, one of the main objectives of 
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Tayloristic rationalization to create as large a percentage of jobs as possible 
where the work might be performed by any one of many people without 
specific training or competency. Any serious departure from Tayloristic 
principles opens the door to a 'skill gap' in production departments and 
requires that the company radically and rapidly closes this gap (perhaps 
even with proactive measures). This aspect will be treated in more detail in 
the discussion of the second crossroad. 
The forces, trends, structures and relations discussed above might well 
restrict the scope of many enterprises to a redefinition of their rationali-
zation strategy which at best only partially modifies and at certain points 
corrects the basic pattern that arose in the post-war period. As a result, these 
enterprises are tied down to the development path of 'computer-aided 
Taylor'. They must therefore invest considerable effort to improve, through 
maximum use of information technology systems, the totally inadequate 
flexibility and innovation potential of their structures which derives from 
the persistently marked division of labour and strict segmentation of un-
skilled-execution and skilled-conceptual work. This path is usually bur-
dened with considerable losses in efficiency due to the remaining massive 
barriers which impede flexibility and innovation, the possibly even rising 
costs of a division of labour, and the growing dependency on the often 
underestimated costs and the often overestimated capabilities of infor-
mation technology. This may well jeopardize the economic survival of the 
companies to the extent that competitors are not also subject to the same 
constraints and restrictions. If the latter is the case, adherence to a 
rationalization pattern corresponding to quite different historical conditions 
restricts not so much the profitability of the enterprise as the overall 
economic productivity and welfare of the country. 
The second crossroad: homogeneity or dichotomy of (reskilled) 
production work 
A series of impressive evidence indicates that enterprises do manage, often 
as a result of an external shock such as the threat of bankruptcy or a 
takeover by new owners, to break free from the web of structural con-
servative forces and open the way for truly strategic innovations. The path 
of technology and work which these enterprises (may) embark upon 
obviously depends essentially on the way they can make or buy, produce, 
train or hire the competencies needed for their new pattern of rationali-
zation. 
In the sense of the 'new production concepts' of Kern and Schumann, 
basically the most obvious answer to the continuing loss of efficiency of 
Tayloristic rationalization and division of labour should be a return to 
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forms of skilled labour in industrial production which were common in 
many economic sectors prior to the hegemony of Tayloristic-Fordistic 
principles. In this respect, the development path labeled above as 
'computer-aided Drucker' simply takes up a long tradition which has 
survived in many areas even under the dominance of Tayloristic rationali-
zation (especially the manufacture of high-quality products in small series). 
But a simple return to this tradition is no longer possible for most 
companies in most industrial nations. The radical breakdown of horizontal, 
vertical and functional divisions of labour opens the door to very high 
flexibility and innovation under usually very favourable economic 
conditions. However, it necessarily presupposes that the enterprises can 
recruit and employ a particular type of worker fairly easily, one for which 
the German industrial skilled tradesman {Facharbeiter) can serve as the 
prototype, and can keep him long-term. Workers of this type must combine 
considerable intelligence with the willingness to perform physical, at least 
at times, monotonous and taxing (and for this reason not particularly high 
status) work; he must be willing and able to gather experience in practical 
work over a long period of time and to supplement this experience with ever 
new technical knowledge. 
In most industrial nations before the historic constellation of the 
'Tayloristic syndrome', a work-force of this type in more or less large 
numbers was available virtually as a matter of course. Since their origins, 
heavy industrial enterprises found a stable and reliable reservoir for pro-
curing skilled labour or workers who could be easily trained to perform 
production work in the social and economic structures of the traditional 
farm-craft sector. Thus, the industrial skilled tradesman - including the 
traditionally and still very significant portion of technical personnel in the 
German-speaking countries who have been promoted from the skilled 
worker ranks - is embedded very deeply in the social structures and cultural 
traditions of the pre-industrial 'folk'. It is here one finds workers willing to 
perform physical, often very taxing and not particularly well-paid work, 
and at the same time accept responsibility for people, machines and 
material being dealt with, and who are able to learn many techniques, put 
them into practice and develop them. This phenomenon is only imaginable 
against the background of conditions in which hard physical labour was the 
inevitable fate for children in this social sector and skilled production work 
in industry was regarded as a real opportunity (see chapter 17). 
The coming of the Tayloristic-Fordistic pattern of rationalization and 
economic growth brought the total erosion of the conditions which ensured 
industry's supply of intelligent and competent production workers. Two 
processes interacted in this development. 
For one, the highly efficient mechanisms with which the Tayloristic 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
syndrome mobilized manpower for industrial wage labour, slowly but 
surely destroyed the social and economic structures in which the manpower 
had grown up and been socialized in traditional rural-craft (or, in the case 
of women, domestic) living conditions and production modes. In industrial 
nations today (even in the German-speaking countries, which were able to 
keep the tradition of industrial skilled work alive longer than the others), 
virtually no children who are normally gifted would consider industrial 
work as an acceptable prospect under the conditions largely applicable in 
industry today. And, massive immigration from less developed countries 
has been receiving more and more resistance for a long time. 
Second, through the generalization of behaviour oriented to utility maxi-
mization prevalent in modern industrial nations, the human capital calculus 
has become the dominant factor in selected educational and occupational 
paths. At the same time, Tayloristic rationalization has destroyed the previ-
ously dominant position workers trained in practical skills have enjoyed in 
industry. The massive rush for high-level education (towards university or 
quasi-university education) unleashed by these two trends, has made the 
schools, forced to engage in ever more scrutinous selection procedures, the 
main means of distributing professional and social chances in just a few 
decades; in the short or long term, graduation from institutions of higher 
education is going to be the necessary prerequisite for access to all the 
attractive and above-average paid jobs. Furthermore, in the course of a 
generation, the traditional forms of social reproduction of the skilled or 
highly skilled industrial work-force will lose all meaning through practical 
training and practical experience. 
To the extent that these two processes converge and are not counteracted 
by political measures, which would require both great courage as well as 
exceptionally favourable circumstances, enterprises will more and more 
frequently find intelligent employees with utilizable industrial skills and 
knowledge exclusively among the graduates of higher semi-academic or 
academic institutions. 
Under these conditions, if enterprises, nevertheless, wish to overcome 
the inefficiencies of a structure characterized by a marked division of 
labour and avail themselves of the advantages of an organization based on 
autonomous units of production, capable of reacting flexibly and in-
novatively, then they must create the necessary conditions (in work 
organization, career prospects, payment, etc.) to attract graduates from 
institutes of higher education. These potential employees come mainly 
from the middle-class or at least have assumed middle-class orientations 
and expectations for jobs in industrial production. In designing a system of 
work organization to fit these conditions, enterprises are inevitably led to 
the path of 'computer-aided Huxley'. 
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Even if it is possible at the beginning to employ qualified experienced 
workers side-by-side with young graduates, the massive utilization of 
engineers (or technical personnel with comparable academic qualifi-
cations) in production will not be possible in the long term without giving 
way to the century-old societal distinction between manual and mental 
work (and the status and pay differentials linked to it). Only within the 
context of a strict dichotomy between qualified (engineer's) work and 
unskilled (worker's) work can the differing earnings and career prospects 
be legitimized. And without these, highly qualified personnel cannot be 
drawn into the production process anything other than intermittently. 
For this reason, the chances are quite high that at the second crossroad, 
the majority of enterprises in most of the large industrial nations (specific 
national characteristics will almost certainly play a role here) will opt 
willy-nilly for the path of 'computer-aided Huxley'. This will rarely occur 
through an explicit strategic decision; it is far more likely that a multitude 
of isolated decisions and incidents, each on its own seemingly insignificant, 
will push, over the course of time, internal enterprise rationalization and 
personnel policies in a new direction which will then be difficult to modify. 
FINAL R E M A R K S : SOCIETAL EFFECTS AND THE QUESTION 
OF LONG-TERM STABILITY 
The thoughts posed so far on the realization chances of the three ideal-
typical development paths of work and technology place the societal 
macro-structures as developed in the 'Tayloristic syndrome', as external 
conditions and factors influencing company rationalization. However, 
these very structures will change to the extent that one or the other of these 
paths gain a certain degree of stability and generality. The decisive question 
is then whether the interaction between company rationalization and 
external societal structures will make it possible to attain long-term stability 
or will cause the eruption of instabilities time and again. 
No one is in a position to give a credible answer to this question today. 
However, much evidence speaks in favour of: 
1 This answer being very different depending on the prevailing develop-
ment path; 
2 the only one of the three development paths which could mean real 
long-term stability in a society with our values being the path of 
'computer-aided Drucker'; 
3 without radical changes in enterprise and societal frameworks, this 
development path (and the radical departure form a strong division of 
labour which it represents) has clearly fewer chances of success than the 
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two other paths although in many respects, it appears to be superior not 
only socially, but also economically and technically. 
The development path of 'computer-aided Huxley' would, were it to 
achieve greater generality, unleash in all probability a process on the 
societal level which would - since it would very quickly have an intensive 
effect on company rationalization - inevitably result in a 'society of 
experts'. A societal structure in which a minority of about a quarter or a 
third of the population monopolizes all knowledge, competency, power and 
influence, reproduces itself and keeps the rest of the population in a more 
or less comfortable state of immaturity, is hardly compatible with the basic 
principles of a free and modern society. 
Finally, the generalization of company rationalization patterns corre-
sponding to the category of 'computer-aided Taylor,' would most 
probably emphatically reinforce the 'meritocratic' structures existing in 
virtually all developed industrial societies. The hierarchy of functions and 
positions in the persistently bureaucratic structures of the enterprise would 
be coupled more and more closely with the complementary hierarchy of 
educational graduates, which would help to protect the occupational and 
social status associated with the most attractive educational paths from the 
growing rush to higher education. If the need for stricter and more 
differentiated selection created by this development is not to fundamentally 
jeopardize the schooling and training function of the educational system, an 
extensive (re)segmentation of the school population will have to come 
about in the short or the long term. 
This, in turn, would mean that in the long run and as a result of new 
micro-macro interactions, the originally quite autonomous development 
path of 'computer-aided Taylor' would also end up as 'computer-aided 
Huxley'. 
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4 Systemic Rationalization and 
Inter-Company Divisions of 
Labour1 
Dieter Sauer, Manfred Deiß, Volker Döhl, Daniel 
Bieber, Norbert Altmann 
For some years, increasing market saturation, stronger national and inter-
national competition, shorter product life cycles and the pressure exerted by 
rising internal costs have been forcing companies to develop new strategies 
to make their production, administration and distribution processes more 
flexible and economical. Of crucial importance in these strategies is the 
availability of computer-aided organization and control technologies in 
technology markets and the ways they get implemented. This chapter is 
concerned with the technological and organizational changes that 
companies have initiated since the mid 1980s in response to these new 
conditions. Based on the findings of our research, the assumption is made 
that these changes point to a new thrust in technological and organizational 
rationalization measures. What is decisive for these rationalization 
strategies is that they are no longer directed toward individual production 
sections or individual companies, but toward the production and 
distribution process as a whole. These developments are analytically and 
theoretically interpreted as a 'new type of systemic rationalization'. 
INTRODUCTION 
Given the reality of rising competition and the push to produce more 
efficiently, companies no longer confine their strategies for increasing 
productivity to the manufacturing area. Assisted by computer-aided organi-
zation and control technologies, system-oriented integration measures 
representing a new dimension in rationalization are being introduced. 
This 'new type of rationalization' entails the integration of company-
wide and inter-company production processes by means of information 
technology networking and the strategic use of technology as a way to 
secure flexibility. Present approaches in industrial sociology are inadequate 
for assessing this new kind of rationalization strategy. The changes likely 
to result from the 'new type of rationalization' and their effects on the 
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structures of personnel, skill and decision-making within companies are 
presented in this paper, using typical cases. The theoretical and empirical 
analysis of these rationalization processes and their implications give rise 
to new questions and point to new areas of research. An important focus of 
our research is the new division of labour and the reorganization of intra-
company and inter-company networks arising through systemic 
rationalization processes. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION 
New rationalization strategies geared toward the integration of 
company processes 
A first characteristic of the 'new rationalization type' is that rationalization 
increasingly occurs at a level of the reorganization of overall company 
processes. It is directed toward gathering company subprocesses in data-
based systems, rearranging them organizationally, and integrating them 
into an information technology based network. Of great significance in this 
process is the development of computer technology, both as a precondition 
for and consequence of systemic rationalization. 
Until now, rationalization has been directed mainly toward particular 
work processes or subprocesses; rationalization effects were primarily 
sought in the area of processing costs, especially with respect to (direct) 
personnel costs. Accordingly, rationalization measures usually focused 
only upon single processing stages, on increases in performance of 
individual or subprocesses, often even only on individual tasks, machines 
or equipment (e.g. on increases in processing speed). In cases where 
rationalization was directed toward increasing the technological avail-
ability or capacity of processing equipment, breakdowns and downtimes 
(induced by delays, faulty components, search processes, etc.) emanating 
from downstream or upstream processes (e.g. storage, transport, organizing 
orders) were only made objects of rationalization to a limited extent. 
Indeed, even processes of assembly-compatible product design played a 
negligible role. 
Systemic rationalization measures, on the other hand, aim at a computer-
based linkage and integration of each individual subprocess. If the 
company's rationalization measures are still largely applied one after 
another, in an isolated and piecemeal fashion, their intended effects are 
increasingly designed to encompass the overall company production 
process. This orientation is of central importance, even given that real 
integration potential is presently only latent and will only take effect in the 
course of time. 
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Systemic rationalization is directed primarily toward the control of 
sequential dependencies of various subprocesses, toward the organization 
in each individual subprocess of concrete technical, material and informa-
tion technology (IT)-based interfaces, and their data-based interdependence 
to other subprocesses in production and administration (e.g. planning, 
design, inventory, shipping). The new rationalization type thus aims at 
increasing the performance of the overall production system by way of 
integrating and optimizing coordination of each individual subprocess. In 
concrete terms, this entails, for example, reduction of total throughput time, 
increase of capacity for several operating stations within the framework of 
overall company production flows, and reduction of overall company 
inventory through an integration and flexible organization of inter-
departmental processes. The most important rationalization instruments for 
purposes of organizational and computer-based networking are the new 
information, organization and control technologies.2 
Of course, company organization has hitherto mostly been oriented to 
process-specific and product-specific forms of production organization. 
These traditional forms of rationalization were predominantly based on 
material requirements (related to processing, means of transportation, 
product type, etc.). A consideration of the determining factors of inte-
gration themselves (pattern of time management, data processing, etc.) was 
considered a subordinate task vis-à-vis the organization of concrete manu-
facturing operations in individual subprocesses. 
New rationalization strategies incorporate inter-company linkages 
The 'new rationalization type's' systemic character does not stop 'at the 
factory gates'. Rather, rationalization measures of this type incorporate 
company-external delivery, processing and distribution activities. The 
data-based integration of company-external processes (relating to, for 
example, suppliers' manufacturing processes or purchasing departments of 
trading partners) imply changes in the inter-company division of labour and 
inter-company relations hitherto shaped primarily by market mechanisms. 
In this way, the societal consequences arising from the use of computer 
technologies grow: The specific organization of inter-company relations do 
not only have indirect effects for employees (e.g. of other companies), but 
touch upon the very basis of free-market societies (e.g. competitive mech-
anisms). 
Also, measures aimed at optimizing overall company processes by 
integrating company subprocesses, lead either to the removal of non-
integratable company subprocesses or to the inclusion of processes previ-
ously organized externally. However, decisions of exclusion and inclusion 
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are no longer primarily based on the company's potential for performing 
certain tasks (the capacity to process certain materials or to apply certain 
technological processes), but on whether, considering process technical or 
cost criteria, certain administrative and manufacturing processes should be 
integrated at an intra- or inter-company level. The issue for the centres of 
capital accumulation is not merely one of productivity increase of the entire 
system. Rather, it must be ensured that control is not endangered by 
complications generated by greater recourse to external resources. In this 
way, know-how and exclusive access to the heart of company-specific 
technology for reasons of securing innovation and (thus also) market 
positions is crucial. 
The new quality of inter-company relations comes into effect when these 
become an object of strategic purchasing decisions ('make or buy') and are 
carried out within the framework of a computer-based supply, production 
and distribution system. The increased inclusion of supplier firms allows 
buyer companies to shift market-induced flexibility requirements to them.3 
Thus, the relationship between companies gradually extends beyond the 
determination of characteristics of goods to be supplied (material, quality, 
supply schedules, etc.). The technological and organizational structure of 
suppliers' processes (machines, methods, means of transportation, etc.) also 
gets included into the rationalization measures. With the trend toward com-
puterization growing, this can lead to direct data-based linkage of individual 
subprocesses between companies. This means that other dependencies 
between companies, between manufacturing and retailing companies etc., 
(for example, through rules concerning the nature and application of quality 
control methods, determination of material sources, direct control of com-
pany facilities, etc.) ones that could not be constituted within the framework 
of conventional market relations, are coming into effect. 
New rationalization strategies concentrate on the elastic potential of 
technology 
The 'new type of rationalization' pursues contradictory goals: the increase 
of flexibility in company administration and manufacturing processes in 
order better to fulfil constantly changing market requirements with respect 
to quality and quantity, and the achievement of a more cost-effective 
production system under conditions of fiercer competition. Coping with 
market requirements through qualitative and quantitative product vari-
ability on the one hand and through standardized and cost-effective mass 
production on the other has been largely irreconcilable until now given 
conventional technology and organization. Companies had to choose 
whether to follow a strategy of mass production or flexible craft production. 
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New information and communication technologies offer a rationali-
zation instrument which makes it possible to resolve conflicting company 
goals. The strategic orientation of rationalization measures is no longer 
primarily concerned with the elastic potential of human labour (as was still 
valid for the 'New Forms of Work Organization' in the 1970s - see chapter 
13 - and as is still often asserted as the dominant principle behind 'new 
management concepts'). Rather, these strategies are directed toward the 
utilization of technology's flexible potential, especially computer-based 
control and networking of company and inter-company processes.4 
The increasing application of computer-based technologies as the new 
central instrument of flexibilization has also brought about new strategies 
of economization'. the increase of the share of fixed capital induced by the 
increased application of technology has further pushed companies toward 
measures aimed at a better utilization of its fixed capital investments. This 
is also the case for rationalization measures that are predominanüy directed 
at reducing inventories and increasing rates of turnover. 
Within the framework of systemic rationalization, all strategies sum-
marized under the term 'economization' are directed toward company cost 
factors, all of which belong to constant capital and therefore do not directly 
aim at reducing elements of variable capital. This is also valid - at least in 
terms of company goals - for flexibilization strategies in which the appli-
cation of computer technologies is central. Even if productivity increases 
are effected through savings in labour, this is normally not the decisive 
strategic goal but more of a secondary effect. Of course achieving this 
effect is part of the vision of every rationalization measure; there is even a 
tendency for indirect labour to enter the picture. Also, reductions in labour, 
when they do occur, can be used as a legitimizing factor for costiy rationali-
zation investments. 
ON THEORETICAL POSITIONS 
Orientation on structures, not concepts 
With the form of systemic rationalization sketched above, we have 
described a trend we presume will increasingly assert itself. The 'new type 
of rationalization' thus does not depict the present transitional situation in 
companies; rather, based on present trends, the term attempts to sketch the 
outlines of future developments. The term means to suggest neither a 
conscious, directed, systematic plan nor an inevitable realization (see DOhl 
et al. 1989; DeiB etal. 1989; Altmann, Sauer 1989; Bieber, Sauer 1991). 
It is decisive that such rationalization is, of course, not sweepingly and 
systematically planned, but, that it ultimately does act upon all sub-
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processes of company-wide and inter-company production flows. We thus 
distance ourselves from an approach contending that processes of systemic 
rationalization are thoroughly planned and then instituted in one sweep 
(Baethge, Oberbeck 1986). In industrial production, the case seems to be 
that the effects of systemic rationalization enforce themselves, as it were, 
behind the backs of the actors. They derive from a process in which 
intended and non-intended effects of individual rationalization measures 
are gradually linked together to form a consistent pattern of systemic 
rationalization. Saying that a tendency exists to implement this new type of 
rationalization does not exclude the possibility that very different forms of 
rationalization can arise concurrently in different industrial sectors or com-
panies, and that these different rationalization forms can be increasingly 
linked with one another in terms of the implementation of comprehensive 
production systems including both upstream and downstream production 
stages (suppliers, distribution outlets). This thesis, which stresses that the 
common moment of differing forms of the new rationalization type is their 
systemic integration in a comprehensive production system is what 
differentiates our position to those which see the future of rationalization 
strategies as theoretically open. These positions largely disregard the trend 
toward intercompany rationalization strategies (see chapter 3). 
Of major significance in the approach presented here is that we do not 
deal with management concepts of personnel and labour policy. On the 
contrary, our task is to analyse the integration potential embedded in new 
organization and control technologies as well as their often hidden 
structural effects. Also of central importance is the analysis of power 
relationships and influence within companies - such as the role of 
engineers, their technology-oriented organization concepts and their im-
portance as a key group in rationalization (see chapter 24). 
New forms of dependency and domination 
For us, the most crucial aspects of new rationalization strategies point to a 
vision of the future of company rationalization and its effects that is 
distinctly different from those currently being propagated: in contrast to 
ideas connected with the end of Taylorism or division of labour (Kern, 
Schumann 1984), and the crisis of mass production (Piore, Sabel 1985), and 
the hopes of positive societal changes connected to them, our perspective 
produces a more differentiated picture of future developments. 
In our view, Piore and Sabel underestimate the opportunities that mass 
production companies have to establish a system of flexible mass 
production by using new organization and control technologies. On the one 
hand, they misjudge the fact that the restructuring of traditional 
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organization and production structures as well as the transformation of 
supply and distribution structures make it possible for large-scale mass 
production companies to respond to a flexibilization of demand. On the 
other hand, they overestimate the autonomy and stability of smaller com-
panies, whom they view as the primary agents of flexible production. What 
is misunderstood in this context is that, in many sectors, the observable 
trends toward decentralization of company organization, autonomy for 
certain company units, and reduction of in-house manufacturing, also 
means that smaller companies are used by large-scale enterprises through 
the incorporation and direct control of their economic, technological and 
organizational structures (see chapter 21, 22; see also Semlinger 1989; 
Mendius, Wendeling-Schroder 1991, and Brandt 1990: 315). 
We can also not support positions that attribute the extensive transfor-
mation of company rationalization strategies to technology developments 
and new management philosophies which no longer view labour as an 
adversary, but rather perceive workers as a source of previously unused 
skills (Kern, Schumann 1984; for a critique see Malsch, Seltz 1987). For 
one, it is not clear what is new about the 'new production concepts'; forms 
of using broad skill profiles have always existed in certain areas of industry. 
Also, just in the 1970s a company performance policy based on a wide 
utilization of worker potential - even for those with few skills - (without 
however, corresponding compensation) became popular (see chapter 24; 
also Altmann et al. 1982,1982a; Altmann 1984). 
The question also arises as to how far the generalization made by Kern 
and Schumann, who, after all, forecast the 'end of the division of labour', 
is actually backed up by their own findings. Our own empirical research, in 
any case, concludes that one cannot speak of a paradigm change in 
rationalization strategy, at least not in the sense of Kern and Schumann's 
visions of 'reprofessionalization' or even 'requalification' of industrial 
work (see chapter 15). The question also arises as to whether the en-
lightened managers' influence can be assessed to be as high as Kern and 
Schumann do, or if the previous structures of industrial production do not 
in fact strongly influence the strategies of labour utilization. 
There is no dispute that skill demands of selected key positions in the 
company will increase. This is especially so where adjustments need to be 
made in quasi permanent implementation processes, in order to utilize the 
structurally available potential of new technology. Such key positions are 
to be found particularly at the intra-company and inter-company interfaces 
of various production processes. According to our empirical findings, 
however, both the efforts of producers of manufacturing technologies and 
the demands of companies intending to use them concentrate on replacing 
workers with technology, or on reducing the comprehensiveness of 
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workers' skill profiles with the aid of various computer aids (not to mention 
an overall savings in personnel). 
The new form of systemic control of production processes, which we are 
seeing as a result of the strategies of reorganizing company structures and 
processes that have developed in companies signifies, in the final analysis, 
a reorganization of capitalist industrial structures. It is characteristic of 
systemic rationalization - as explained above - that it is not oriented to the 
direct production process alone, but incorporates other functions within and 
outside of a company (QA, R&D, controlling, logistics) into the rationali-
zation process (see Bieber, Sauer 1991). In this context we can observe a 
tendency toward the declining importance of the direct production process 
for company decision-making centres, while other processes, namely those 
directed at more abstract value calculations (organization and finance 
departments, marketing, controlling), gain in significance. 
Data-based integration of company subprocesses developing in the 
wake of new rationalization strategies increase the transparency of com-
pany processes and enlarge possibilities of centralized control. However, 
both new forms of decentralized organization and company-internal 
processes mediated by the market develop in accordance with the need to 
react more flexibly to market demands. We see both factors as belonging 
together. Centralized versus decentralized forms of company organization 
cannot be regarded as merely alternative lines of development: only the 
growth of opportunities for central control (in company-external spheres as 
well) creates - within a company perspective - the necessary prerequisites 
for the establishment of decentralized modes of organization. 
The application of new computer technologies has strengthened the 
trend away from the material qualities of company production toward 
greater abstraction: its unspecificity with regard to product, process, com-
pany, and economic sector, and, therefore, its vagueness with regard to 
specific application in concrete production processes, has the effect of 
standardizing production processes among companies and sectors with 
respect to both their structure and to forms of process control. This 
computer-mediated abstraction from company and material qualities of 
production also explains the plurality of forms in which the new rationali-
zation type manifests itself. What these forms have in common, though, is 
their strong a priori orientation toward company and company-external 
process integration. 
No general upgrading of workers 
In contrast to Piore/Sabel and Kern/Schumann, we see a trend toward the 
reduced importance of workers within company rationalization strategies. 
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Especially in new, predominantly technology-based flexibilization 
strategies, the work-force is no longer management's primary reference 
point. 
This thesis should not be misunderstood to mean that problems of labour 
are becoming irrelevant or that the 'unmanned factory' and the age of 
complete control over company processes is dawning. On the contrary, the 
contradictions within systemic rationalization make the work-force less 
relevant, but also generate problems that require skilled workers in key 
positions. Therefore, the implementation of new production technologies 
and the more acute interface problems in the wake of systemic rationali-
zation further - and in part increasingly - necessitate the application of 
skilled workers in certain stages of the production process. However, 
labour does not direcdy serve as the means of securing flexibility within the 
process of systemic rationalization. Rather, it predominantly serves to 
implement and utilize the flexible technology. For this reason, we regard 
hypotheses which assert the existence of a general trend toward higher 
qualification and a reduced division of labour as rash as those which 
anticipate a future predominance of small firm forms of work organization. 
Complementary to the growing importance of skilled production work 
in some key areas, changes are occurring for the majority of workers in 
direct production. These can, for instance, lead to the integration of func-
tions which were traditionally excluded from direct production processes 
(quality control, logistics). The resulting effects of the organizational and 
data-based integration of different production (and distribution) stages 
which cause an increasing abstraction of labour, make their mark on the 
structure of working conditions and the skill profile. And, because of the 
growing proportion of product and process-neutral manufacturing and 
organizational structures arising in the wake of the establishment of 
systemic rationalization, a worker's product and process-related skills are 
also becoming less important. This, in turn, has effects upon the ex-
changeability and mobility of remaining workers. We are not postulating a 
comprehensive deskilling of those workers not in key positions or not 
installed at particular interface areas in the production process; they too are 
forced to become familiar with the new organization and control tech-
nologies. However, we stick to the term polarization, commonly applied in 
German industrial sociology, to describe the drifting apart of skill require-
ments. Also, we do not see the opportunities of lesser skilled workers 
improving on the labour market because there is a trend toward the removal 
of company-specific and sector-specific skills (see chapter 15). 
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Market and integration 
We have described the tendency toward data-based integration of 
company-internal and company-external processes as a special feature of 
the new rationalization strategies. We posit that this also infers changes in 
the inter-company division of labour and in the structure of inter-company 
relationships traditionally mediated by the market. 
In our conceptualization, systemic rationalization is characterized 
strongly by its double effects: within a company, the various functions as 
well as the individual manufacturing and service processes are reorganized 
according to comprehensive company objectives; between companies, the 
structures of their traditional division of labour change, and, therefore, the 
forms of their mutual reference points. From the viewpoint of the individual 
companies, both aspects of systemic rationalization form a whole. They are 
the reflection of a new and changed orientation of company strategies: the 
focus turns to the coherence of entire production lines or chains in terms of 
material characteristics. Under conditions of stronger competition, it is no 
longer sufficient to merely increase profitability through direct productivity 
increases within an individual company. Rather, it is necessary to influence 
and utilize upstream and downstream manufacturing, service, or sales 
processes in such a manner, that they, indirectly, generate increases in 
profitability for an individual company. By exploiting their market 
position, large companies then attempt to control increasingly large 
sections of the manufacturing chain, without directly undermining or 
destroying the autonomy of the supplier firms. 
The novelty of these company structures is, however, not the goal of 
controlling upstream and downstream stages of production; rather, the 
novelty lies in the manner and the extent in which control takes place. At 
the same time, computer integration between companies (for instance, 
between production companies and suppliers on the one hand and 
marketing companies on the other, but also between goods producers, or 
equipment or machine manufacturers, etc.) makes the functional areas and 
work processes of the involved companies transparent, opening spheres 
that were previously out of bounds for reasons of competition. 
The reduction of in-house manufacturing in large companies goes hand 
in hand with a broader view regarding the control of processes not taking 
place inside their company any longer. For such purposes, the new infor-
mation and communication technologies are important tools: control and 
domination are no longer only mediated by the market and by economic 
dependency, but also through various forms of direct and permanent tech-
nological and organizational control. Various production processes formed 
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at the company level seem to melt together on a technological and organiz-
ational plane without actually touching upon the formal economic autono-
my of respective companies on the market Thus, market and competition 
appear as societal modes of organization which seem to be inadequate in 
dealing with integrated production processes. A contradiction thereby 
comes to light: due to the new rationalization strategies, the accumulation 
of capital expands and focuses on several stages of value creation or on the 
whole logistic chain, while, in organizational form, it remains bound to the 
individual company and to mechanisms mediated by the market. 
CHANGED FORMS OF INTER-COMPANY DIVISION OF 
LABOUR AS A TOPIC OF RESEARCH IN INDUSTRIAL 
SOCIOLOGY 
The supply industry as a symptomatic case 
Today, changes in the inter-company division of labour, particularly the 
transformation of relations between manufacturing and supplier firms, play 
a central role worldwide. It is precisely these developments which cannot 
be grasped using conventional analytical and theoretical research 
approaches oriented to rationalization concepts of individual companies. 
Based on the characteristics of systemic rationalization laid out above, 
the following can be said: in many cases, companies react to aggravated 
marketing problems and the resulting demands for flexibility and 
economizing in their production structures by attempting to transfer those 
heightened demands to suppliers, thereby freeing their own production 
process of such burdens. In principle, the strategy of transferring demands 
to upstream production stages is not new; its massive occurrence in the past 
several years, however, has led to considerable restructuring in the supplier 
industry. Such transfers are not merely strategies for unloading insecurities, 
but are an important adjustment of supply to the changed internal company 
manufacturing structures of purchasing companies. 
The data-based integration of both purchasing and supplier companies' 
functional areas is not only a prerequisite - it is also a consequence of this 
process. Data-based integration, mediated by processes of coordination and 
standardization, grow into large-scale networks (as can be already evi-
denced in the automobile industry). They fundamentally alter the structure 
of previously market-based relations between companies. They affect not 
only dependencies between individual companies, but touch upon further-
reaching structures of competition and the market. However, it is not only 
the case that market relations are to a large extent cancelled out by (mutual) 
dependencies, or that the autonomy of independent (supplier) companies is 
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eroded by company-external control. Parts of companies are re-exposed to 
the market and 'released' to (international) competition through, for 
example, reductions in in-house manufacturing or the reorganization of 
company-internal supply commitments. 
Complexity of factors as a research problem 
The analysis of this process of integration requires the inclusion of a chain 
of influences. In doing this, the complexity and range of these factors point 
to new problems with which research in this area is confronted (see chapter 
1). Here, we would like to point out several interrelated factors, which must 
be considered in order to make general statements about rationalization 
processes. 
1 In accordance with their specific standing in (sales) markets, manu-
facturing companies follow widely differing rationalization strategies. 
Demands upon suppliers and respective consequences for workers can 
thus only be adequately understood and evaluated when the specific 
situation of manufacturing companies is analysed with regard to their 
industrial sector, their outlet markets and their ensuing rationalization 
policies (see Dóhl 1989a; DeiB 1989). 
2 The increasingly systemic design of rationalization strategies in manu-
facturing and supplier companies has induced the development of 'en-
compassing solutions' of machine and equipment manufacturers. These 
concepts are especially demanded by those companies, which possess 
only negligible engineering and systems engineering know-how and 
appropriately qualified personnel. In this regard, systems engineering 
has experienced a significant growth of influence. The application of 
integrated systems and the technological and organizational models 
incorporated within them have important consequences for the form of 
the division of labour between marketing and supplier companies, for 
the form of integration and networking, and, of course, for respectively 
affected groups of workers (see Dóhl in Chapter 6). 
3 Foreign organizational models or production concepts and the influence 
of foreign companies play a significant role in the trend toward new 
forms of supplier integration. Due to international competition, Japanese 
organizational models as well as organizational and integration concepts 
(Kanban, Just-in-Time, etc.) have attained special significance. In part, 
these concepts are rejected outright, and in part they influence company 
activities in a haphazard and unreflected way. Thus, despite widespread 
knowledge of these models' social preconditions and (side-)effects 
(upon skill, wage structure, labour deployment, representation of 
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interest, etc.), the latter are afforded only negligible consideration -
whether in a positive or negative sense - by those carrying out rationali-
zation in the company. 
4 At present there is a growing trend toward the globalization of supply, 
particularly in the automobile industry. The use of location advantages, 
leads to changes in the international division of labour which have 
significant effects on national structures of inter-company divisions of 
labour. Also, the enhanced potential for international companies' head-
quarters to influence decentralized branches or subsidiaries has signifi-
cant effects upon national supply industries and their employees (quality 
standards, cost competition, etc.). 
5 Along with the trend of the globalization of supply, there are discernible 
tendencies toward a growing utilization of regional resources and a 
regional concentration of supply companies. In international competi-
tive struggles, the consolidation of regional industrial structures, i.e. 
networks of regional supply companies grouped around a purchasing 
company - seems to be gaining significance. Research must also take 
into account the fact that regional and structural policies by the state are 
a vital factor in this process. 
6 A large number of suppliers that are to be integrated into a com-
prehensively rationalized logistics network are small and middle-sized 
companies. Their personnel structure, their know-how, their investment 
potential, etc. differ widely. Thus, widely differing preconditions as to 
their ability to fulfil purchasing companies' demands exist (regarding 
supply quantities, time schedules, quality, computerization, etc.). 
Rationalization strategies and concomitant tendencies toward com-
puterized networking as well as toward the reorganization of supply 
(single sourcing, internationalization, location change) will therefore 
radically transform the traditionally mid-sized structure of national 
supply industries (concentration, selection, hierarchical processes, etc.). 
In order to grasp the nature and consequences of their integration into 
logistics networks, it is necessary to analyse the structure and adjustment 
potential of suppliers (see chapter 22). 
7 Al l of the above listed factors refer to crucial aspects of change in the 
inter-company division of labour. At the same time, they are crucial 
variables of research seeking to analyse the diverse indirect, and thus 
also hidden, effects of purchasing companies' rationalization measures 
upon working conditions in supply companies (see chapter 15). Employ-
ment, employment status, the structure of working hours and skill seem 
to be the central dimensions in which a transformation of working 
conditions is to be expected. 
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8 In addition, there is the separate problem of the changed conditions of 
interest representation in supply companies. Their different and often 
reduced opportunities to influence working conditions bring to the fore 
the question of new forms of interest representation within industrial 
structures which are organized into networks (see chapter 23). 
To understand new rationalization strategies, it is necessary to grasp the 
central importance that the restructuring of inter-company divisions of 
labour has for fundamental social and economic transformations in 
capitalist industrial societies. Social science research seeking to adequately 
address the new developments and forms of rationalization needs to orient 
itself to rationalization's increasingly systemic character. 
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5 On the History of NC-Technology 
- Different Paths of Development1 
Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen 
This chapter compares the development of NC-technologies for machine 
tools in the USA and Germany since their inception at the end of the 1940s 
to the beginning of the 1950s. Shortly after their introduction, clear differ-
ences in development paths arose between US and German NC-machines 
especially with regard to potential for shop-floor programming. It is argued 
that the US controls' centralistic orientation compared to the increasingly 
greater significance of workshop programming in the German case can be 
traced to social factors rather than technological conditions. The factors 
pointed out here are the very different conditions in industrial structure, 
labour market and systems of occupational training and science 
characterizing the two countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that technological development is not determined by tech-
nological forces alone, but to a great extent determined by social processes, 
is relatively well-established. Quite clearly a great deal of choice exists in 
technological development between different alternatives. These choices 
open up a number of possibilities for the influence of economic, political 
and social structural conditions and factors on the design of technological 
systems. These connections were repeatedly exhibited in the past, 
especially for large technical systems in the areas of transport or com-
munication (see for example Mayntz, Hughes 1988). D.F. Noble (1979; 
1984) provides one of the few instructive examples of development 
processes in the area of production technology in standard systems, in 
contrast to large technical systems, with his investigation of the develop-
ment of the NC-controlled machine tool industry in the United States. He 
shows that the development of this basic industrial technology did not 
proceed in a single direction. Rather, NC-technology displayed quite 
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diverse paths especially at the beginning of its development, around the end 
of the 1940s and in the 1950s. 
According to Noble, differences between paths of development are not 
only found in the performance, complexity or technological flexibility of 
various control systems, but also in their programming potential. The 
possibilities range from programming confined exclusively to the office, to 
control systems that can be programmed on the shop-floor. As Noble goes 
on to show, the developmental path of NC-technology that quickly became 
dominant was that of office programming. For Noble this meant that the 
fundamental interest of engineers and scientists to control and dominate 
technological development was the driving force behind the choice of a 
particular path. It is the case that office level programming meant in 
principle that through the introduction of NC-technology a large share of 
planning work would have to be removed from the workshop and placed in 
the office area. This had the further consequence that the elements in 
relatively self-contained tasks that allowed for some autonomy were taken 
away from machine workers. Through this, operators' functions went one 
step further under the control of engineers and managers than before. 
However, in contrast to Noble's analyses and interpretations of Ameri-
can NC-development, it is impossible to ignore that NC-development in 
Europe, especially in Germany, has proceeded quite differently. A range of 
empirical evidence, mostly information from research engineers and re-
searchers of company practices, but also a few passing observations from 
Noble, shows that NC-development in the Federal Republic was not so 
clearly directed toward office programming. Rather, the development path 
that made workshop programming possible played a relatively large role. 
These differences in development and their social origins will be ex-
amined more closely in the following chapter. The first step will be to 
compare and trace the development of NC-technology in the United States 
and Germany. The second step concerns an analysis of the effects of social 
factors and conditions on technological development. These sections will 
argue that it is not so much interests for domination and control that explain 
NC-technology development as nationally specific constellations of insti-
tutionalized development interests, which are embedded in specific 
industrial and social structures. 
FOCUSING ON AUTOMATION (USA) 
From a historical point of view there can be no doubt that the most 
important path of NC-development aims for the extensive and complete 
automation of processing sequences carried out by machine tools. This 
approach is found mainly in die United States and right up into the 1980s 
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has been almost exclusively oriented to the concept of enhancing the 
'inherent capacity' of machine tools by making maximum use of available 
control technology. Such a technological concept reduces human work at 
the machine tool to a factor of merely marginal significance. 
In 1952 the first prototype of a NC-machine, a vertical milling machine, 
was presented to the public at MIT near Boston. This unit typified the 
on-going development of NC-technology in the United States which is 
dominated by relatively complex and extensive control concepts. In the 
early days, NC-technology consisted mainly of continuous path control for 
the milling of parts with a particularly complicated geometrical design. The 
first NC-machines were employed in the aeronautics and defence in-
dustries, where manufacturing problems such as the machining of spatially 
curved surfaces of high performance aircraft could not be adequately dealt 
with by conventional control technology. 
The programming of the sequences of the machine operations and the 
machine functions for these processes was extremely time consuming and 
complex. What this amounted to was a new type of work process set off from 
the machines on the shop-floor in terms of both time and space. This paved the 
way for forms of work organization based on a division of labour and strongly 
determined by technology. For the machine operators few possibilities re-
mained for intervention into the pre-programmed machining process. 
In order firmly to establish and increase the efficiency of automation and 
centralization of programming, the computer-based programming system 
APT (Automatically Programmed Tools) was developed from the mid-
1950s on. The utilization of this system was dependent on the use of a 
mainframe and was strongly oriented to the machining problems of the 
aeronautics industry. Moreover, during the first developmental stages the 
system could only be used by programmers with mathematical skills 
(Noble 1984: 142). 
Initially NC-technology was rather slow to spread in the United States 
because of the great complexity and expense of the systems. Yet from the 
1960s on, increased efforts were made to expand the chosen course of 
NC-development. As a result some of the obstacles of technology and work 
organization were overcome - an example being the introduction of 
inexpensive point-to-point numerical control position systems to the mar-
ket (Hough 1975: 352). Another factor consisted of introducing selected 
control types that had limited intervention potential for machine operators 
so that they could use NC-technology for manufacturing jobs that were not 
completely programmable in advance. As Noble demonstrated by using the 
case of a Bendix-control system (Noble 1984:215), the control systems had 
overrides for varying some of the technological parameters of the pro-
grammed machining process such as tool forward feed and cutting speeds. 
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In no way, however, did this represent a major departure from the course 
of automation-oriented NC-development in the United States This is par-
ticularly evident when one regards the later development of CNC-control 
systems. Microprocessors and LSI-technology offered greater potential for 
the design and layout of controls than the NC-technology of the 1950s 
based on pipe and relay technology or the transistor and semiconductor 
technology of the 1960s. Nevertheless, the potential offered by micro-
electronics for direct programming of control systems was slow to find use. 
It was only at the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s - under 
the pressure of Japanese and European competitors on the US market - that 
many, yet by no means all US manufacturers, followed suit and offered 
control systems allowing the relatively easy direct input of program data 
via operator elements. Exemplary in this context are elements such as key 
pads for manual data input relating to subprogram technologies and deter-
mined cycles involving repetitive machining operations, or alphanumeric 
data displays. 
Even in the light of these developments, the majority of US-
manufacturers adhered to their complex control concepts and continued, in 
many instances, to build them on APT computer-based central pro-
gramming. As a result, possibilities for shop-floor programming held, and 
continue to hold, a merely subordinate and complementary function to 
central programming operations. 
F L E X I B L E AND COMPREHENSIVE UTILIZATION OF 
NC-TECHNOLOGY IN GERMANY 
In Europe a course of NC-development emerged which deviated con-
siderably from the development in the United States. This can be seen 
primarily in the German and Swiss machine tool industry, but also in 
Scandinavia and partially in France and Italy. This path is more strongly 
oriented to rationalizing machining processes under widely differing 
manufacturing technological conditions. As in the United States the attempt 
to automate machining processes is of paramount importance. However, 
greater priority is given to control systems which can be utilized with a 
higher degree of flexibility, both in terms of technology as well as organi-
zation. Apart from the appropriate design of technology, direct human 
interaction with the program sequence is absolutely indispensable. In this 
system labour is not reduced to a subordinate and secondary factor, but 
instead is regarded as being a factor fulfilling an important, complementary 
function to automation. Direct intervention into the program sequence is 
necessary to cope with machining situations which cannot be calculated or 
programmed in advance. 
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This form of technology crystallized as the main path of NC-
development in central Europe relatively quickly despite an initially strong 
orientation to the concepts pursued in the United States. Since the begin-
ning of the 1960s a number of characteristic differences to the American 
path of development have emerged. 
More technology than geometry 
The first characteristic was the early development of simple and compara-
tively easy to use point-to-point controls and line motion control systems. 
On the one hand this can be attributed to the limited amount of technical 
know-how that existed in Germany at that time, a necessary prerequisite for 
the development of complex control systems such as continuous path 
control. On the other hand there was the undisputed interest in designing 
easily employable control systems for various areas of application in metal-
working, i.e. not just for drilling and milling as in the United States, but also 
for turning, for example. 
In comparison with the United States, the interest in such applications 
resulted in a stronger orientation to different cutting operations. Thus the 
focus remained less on geometrical problems than on technological prob-
lems of machining, such as the determination of tools or the specification 
of material properties and the resulting machining data for machine forward 
feed or running speeds. 
Open systems 
The above-mentioned orientation was associated with another develop-
mental characteristic, namely the creation of programming languages and 
programming systems which were closely related to manufacturing con-
ditions and which could be utilized on a broad basis. As opposed to the 
United States, very different programming languages with differing 
processing and technology orientations were developed at the beginning of 
the 1960s in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The programming language EXAPT (Extended Subset of APT) which is 
still in widespread use today, is a typical example (Grupe 1974): using the 
formal and syntactic basis of the American APT system, EXAPT, created 
in 1965-6, represented a technology oriented programming system which, 
after a number of developmental problems and initial running-in diffi-
culties, finally resulted in three processing oriented system variations. 
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68 Application of new technologies 
Alternative data input 
Lastly, these particular characteristics point toward a third and central 
distinction in the comparison of NC-development in the United States and 
Europe. In the Federal Republic attempts were made at a relatively early 
stage of development to allow direct data input at the control systems level 
in order to increase organizational flexibility. Although early standard 
control systems were basically designed for central programming and data 
input via punched tape, and the automatic program sequence, especially for 
the first systems in the 1960s could not be influenced, it did not take long 
before a number of control types were available that had a limited scope for 
operating the NC-machine tools on the shop-floor. 
Clearly such concepts went a lot further than similar steps in the United 
States - the position control systems of various large NC-developers such 
as AEG or Philips, for example, had already been fitted with manual data 
input via switches and keys as alternatives to punched tape operating at the 
beginning of the 1960s (Werkstatt und Betrieb 1961: 874). While the 
above-mentioned systems were designed for relatively simple machining 
processes, subsequent line motion control systems, and even later complex 
continuous path control systems, were generally provided with possibilities 
for modifying and augmenting the programs directly at the control system 
on the shop-floor. 
This main path of Federal German, and in part West European, NC-
development which emerged in the 1960s was pursued throughout the first 
half of the 1970s, particularly in the continuous optimization of 'hardwired' 
{fest verdrahtet) NC-control systems. The gradual transition to freely 
programmable CNC-control systems did little to change this basic direction 
of development. In the continuing process of development it is clear that 
this main path is evolving towards a third path of NC-development. 
Work process-oriented path of NC-development 
The third path of development of NC-technology can be called work 
process-oriented (arbeitsprozeftorientierter Pfad) since it offers a lot of 
possibilities for shop-floor programming. Central programming is either 
not contemplated at all, or fulfils only a complementary function. Although 
the objective remains the rationalization of machining processes, the skills, 
empirical knowledge and know-how of human labour form the foundation 
of this path of development. The basic concept itself opens up a greater 
degree of technological-organizational flexibility and seeks to avoid a 
multitude of obstacles and typical problems of NC-utilization. 
Initially work process-oriented NC-technology emerged as a minor side 
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line in the course of NC-development: in the United States sporadic, yet 
repeated attempts were made with different types of directly programmable 
control systems. The best known of these systems was the so-called 
playback method with which the first experiments were made as early as 
the mid-1940s. Although they proved flexible in use and were apparently 
also employable for relatively complex machining processes - as long as 
these could be coped with manually - the playback method and other 
methods of shop-floor programming remained, in comparison with the 
main path of NC-technology virtually without significance for a long 
period of time in the United States (Noble 1984: 143). 
In the Federal Republic of Germany work process-oriented NC-
technology was pursued in a far more systematic manner than in the United 
States. In Germany the first experiments with playback methods and 
mechanical control took place back in the 1950s. These initial models were 
continuously developed during the 1960s. Notable in this context are not 
only the further development of the playback method in the form of 
playback control as a comparatively cheap 'semi-numerical' control 
(Stromberger 1966), but also the increase of manual input control systems. 
Mechanical storage components such as decade switches, plug boards etc. 
allowed direct data input, whereby in some cases punched tape operation 
was offered as a complementary function. In the Federal Republic these 
concepts were apparently pursued by a number of manufacturers of control 
systems, particularly in the machine tool building sector. In some instances 
there were also control system developments, such as those opted for by the 
Swiss company Dixi for high-precision jig-boring machines, which made 
possible data input as well as playback methods, and tied to that, the 
generation of punched tape directly at the control system (Simon 1971). 
Manual data input as option 
At the latest, from the mid-1970s on, the work process-oriented path of 
NC-development in the form of manual data input indisputably became the 
basis of a highly successful development surge of NC-technology in 
Germany. Manufacturers of machine tools and control systems recognized 
the new possibilities offered by microelectronics and put them to use for an 
extensive ongoing development of existing shop-floor programming con-
cepts. With the introduction of work process-oriented CNC-control systems 
the deviation from American NC-technology was immense: with this new 
course of development manual data input became - as interviewed experts 
put it - a European, if not a 'German invention'. 
By the beginning of the 1980s those programming aids which are still in 
use today had clearly emerged, such as dialog-oriented programming 
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languages, methods of operator and programming guidance, extensive 
subprogram methods and later the possibility of simulating the machining 
processes at visual display units integrated into the control systems. The 
NEF-turning machine concept launched by the turning machine manu-
facturer Gildemeister in 1975-6 played a pioneering role in this leap in 
development, which in the opinion of many experts was instrumental in 
securing acceptance of the work process-oriented path of NC-develop-
ment, which had previously held a measurably subordinate position. 
These developmental tendencies are continuing today. There is no 
question that, as before, extreme differences exist between various types of 
control systems, differences which can be categorized by the well-known 
differentiation between control concepts which are computer specialist 
oriented and those geared to skilled workers (Corbett 1985; Weber 1988). 
These differences lie behind the various developmental paths of NC-
technology described above and they remain of great importance for the 
question of work design and the potential and operational scope of skilled 
machine work. 
It is true, however, that there has been a certain amount of convergence 
of NC-technology paths across countries in the last few years. Whereas for 
West German NC-manufacturers the development of control concepts has 
been strongly directed toward work process-oriented solutions, it is only 
recently that American manufacturers of control systems, partially with 
Japanese support, have been trying to catch up on this development, on the 
European, as well as their own domestic market. 
ACTORS TAKING PART IN DEVELOPMENT: THE R O L E OF 
THE MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY 
The question of which conditions and factors have been responsible for the 
different developmental trajectories of NC-technology leads us initially to 
consider the institutions, enterprises and individuals involved in the 
development of technology. 
The predominance of military influence in the USA 
In the United States NC-development proceeded during the Second World 
War through the growing network of interests between government and 
military, and large scientific-technological research institutions and certain 
sectors of industry, particularly electrical engineering. The machine tool 
building industry was represented by a few large enterprises cooperating 
closely with government and research institutions. Military-influenced 
control and computer technologies based on specialized and standardized 
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machine tool concepts for series and mass series manufacturing formed the 
foundation of American NC-technology. 
The application interests of American NC-developers were initially 
directed exclusively toward the military aeronautics industry, where it was 
possible to work with the new technology with a substantial degree of 
independence from considerations of economic efficiency and the risks of 
the private market. Therefore the interests and orientations of the NC-
developers were more strongly geared to scientific and technological 
criteria for the most comprehensive and perfected utilization of computer 
technologies possible, while economic development requirements played a 
subordinate role. As Noble (1984) has extensively documented, these tech-
nology concepts were supported by computer specialists and engineers who 
had specific interests in maintaining and enhancing their position and 
competency over the shop-floor. 
This constellation in the Unites States was absolutely characteristic of 
NC-development right up into the 1960s. Although a greater degree of 
market orientation did set in around the mid-1960s, the original concept has 
been basically adhered to up to the present. For many years NC-machine 
tools were almost exclusively developed for use in large-scale enterprises; 
initially in the defence industry, yet later also for applications in the automo-
tive and electronics industry as well as in machine building: all of which had 
comparatively standardized manufacturing conditions (Schultz-Wild, Weltz 
1973). It was only very much later that the broad field of general metal 
processing, consisting also in the Unites States of a large number of small 
and medium-sized companies, began to use NC-machines, a development 
which was mainly initiated by the offer of more flexible and universally 
applicable control systems, mosdy of German or Japanese origin. 
Europe: oriented to the market 
In the Federal Republic of Germany and in other European countries, 
particularly in Switzerland, the machine tool building sector in general 
played a far more meaningful role in NC-development than in the United 
States. This was already apparent in the 1960s and in the first half of the 
1970s. From the mid-1970s on, however, the machine tool industry became 
a major innovative and decisive factor in NC-development. Due to the 
strong position of this branch as a purchaser of control systems for their 
manufactured machine tools, the machine tool builders also exerted a 
strong influence on the electrotechnical companies as well as on computer 
manufacturers. 
Therefore NC-development in Europe was strongly oriented to market 
requirements right from the very start. It was determined by pragmatic, 
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manufacturing-technological criteria which were directed toward 
achieving the broadest and most problem-free utilization possible -
especially through a high level of organizational flexibility in the use of 
NC-technology as a means of rationalization. The sales market aimed for 
by the Federal German, and by the Swiss NC-developers in particular, 
consisted of the domestic and foreign metal processing industry char-
acterized by its generally diverse processing requirements. NC-technology 
was based on machine tooling concepts which were only partly scien-
tifically derived and which most likely to this day are based on a high 
degree of empirical and practical experience. The concept of the universal 
machine tool formed the general point of departure for NC-development in 
German-speaking countries - a good example in this context is the 
universally utilized centre lathe, designed in a German-speaking country, in 
contrast to the specialized turret lathe used in the United States. 
SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES: HIGH-TECH 
VERSUS M E C H A N I C A L ENGINEERING 
The different courses of NC-development have also been influenced by 
social and industrial structures. In the United States industrial structures 
have been particularly affected by the economic weight of the aeronautics 
and defence industries, which are part of the high-tech sector that in turn 
plays a central role in US industry as a whole (Junne 1985). Supported by 
traditionally high government support, particularly in the form of defence 
and aerospace programmes, these sectors absorb tremendous develop-
mental resources - which as a result are lacking in other areas (DiFilippo 
1986). Moreover, they present the image of perfection and complexity in 
manufacturing technology development. 
It is in these branches that we find a high and expensive level of 
automation compared with the metal processing branch. The fact that these 
industrial sectors are to a large degree shielded from market influences and 
can also operate free of the competitive conditions of the world market, has 
played an important role in this respect. This meant that there was little 
pressure to bring about comprehensive and cost efficient rationalization of 
manufacturing procedures. Right from the very beginning, American NC-
development has been integrated into these basic structures. 
No pressure toward rationalization 
Up until the 1980s large areas of the metal-processing industry, and par-
ticularly the mechanical engineering sector in the United States, showed 
little inclination for innovative change. The majority of the companies had 
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a relatively low level of automation, while moderate technological 
demands were made on the production process. The reason for this can be 
found in the large American internal market which remained very stable for 
a long period of time. At the same time there was a very low degree of 
orientation to the world market. The resulting manufacturing structures 
consisted of series or mass production systems which could easily be 
controlled by various forms of the so-called 'Detroit-automation' 
(Fordism), so that up until recent times there was little need for a reorien-
tation of rationalization strategies. Currently, however, the American metal 
processing branch has experienced an increasing need to rationalize 
because of the poor economic growth of various markets since about the 
middle of the 1970s and the emergence of new competition from Asia 
(Piore, Sabel 1984). This can be regarded as one of die reasons for the 
considerable sales success of Japanese, Federal German and Swiss machine 
tools on the American market (Rauner, Ruth 1988). 
The lack of skilled workers 
In accordance with the manufacturing structures found in US industry there 
has been a predominance of mainly large-scale manufacturing processes in 
the United States along with forms of organization characterized by a high 
degree of division of labour and manufacturing personnel with a low skills 
average. This applies to large areas of the metalworking branch as well as 
to the aeronautics industry. The highly standardized manufacturing pro-
cedures distracted attention from the new processing problems arising in 
small batch manufacturing and custom production. Instead the emphasis 
continued to remain on the inherent potential of technical facililities and on 
the marginalization of labour. The typical American NC-path was indeed 
well adapted to existing conditions. 
These conditions in US companies were supported by specific labour 
market structures in the United States. The labour market provided a very 
limited supply of qualified skilled, or technically competent workers. 
Training skilled workers takes place to a highly restricted extent, and then 
is mainly tied to in-house company measures. General occupational 
training in the US is based on on-the-job training within rigidly hierarchical 
mobility structures. It would be difficult to imagine the acceptance of 
relatively flexible job structures with few hierarchical grades an organi-
zational precondition for shop-floor programming. 
The predominance of computer science 
In the end, these conditions refer back to the influence of the scientific 
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system in the United States, where there is no such thing as the 'culture of 
mechanical engineering' (Maschinenbaukultur) such as exists in the 
German speaking countries (see chapter 17). By comparison, there is a 
much sharper dividing line in the United States between the practical 
application of technology and the development of technology at die theo-
retical level. There is a tendency to immediately regard problems of manu-
facturing technology from the standpoint of computer science and subject 
them to corresponding instruments and methods. Computer science plays a 
dominant role in scientific systems and there are close links between the 
personnel in the computer and defence industries (Kreibich 1986). 
Machine building as a key German industry 
The industrial and social conditions surrounding NC-development in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland are of a completely different 
nature. With its comparatively diversified industrial structures, the capital 
goods industry has traditionally held a great deal of significance for the 
economy, in which machine building has played a key role (see chapter 10). 
Because of this industrial structure, the machine building industry is not 
only a manufacturer, but also the largest user of manufacturing equipment 
Therefore NC-machines must be designed to cope with manufacturing 
conditions which are difficult to calculate in advance, and must display a 
high degree of technological-organizational flexibility. In order to achieve 
this kind of flexibility it is necessary to be able to engage in programming 
of the control systems themselves at the shop-floor level. 
Meeting the requirements of the world market 
Traditionally a large share of Federal German and also the Swiss machine 
tool production has been exported throughout the world. This has meant 
that the demands and requirements of the worldwide NC-market have had 
a very direct effect on NC-development. It is only recently that the 
aeronautics and defence industries - with their specific manufacturing 
conditions which deviate from those in general machine building - have 
begun gradually to play a more important role in Germany and Switzerland. 
Up to now these industries' requirements have had little effect on the 
development of manufacturing technology. It is therefore no coincidence 
that the European aeronautics and defence industries use manufacturing-
technological equipment and systems either designed according to 
American specifications or that originate from there. 
Al l in all the German machine building sector not only represents an 
extremely heterogenous area of application for manufacturing technologies 
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and methods, but also exerts considerable pressure to innovate in the 
development of flexible forms of technology due to its orientation to small 
batch and custom production and its wealth of diversified interconnections 
with the world market. The central problem of this branch is its inherent 
'rationalization dilemma', namely bridging the gap between cutting pro-
duction costs while maintaining or increasing flexibilization of its produc-
tion processes. 
A broad foundation of qualified, skilled workers 
Linked to this rationalization dilemma is the fact that in machine building, 
medium and small size firms which have a relatively low division of labour 
predominate. In most cases the work on the shop-floor is in the hands of 
well trained and qualified skilled workers. The process engineering de-
partments often have had very restricted means for planning at their dis-
posal in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, in the past, rationalization in 
the German machine building sector did not lead to the disintegration of 
qualified production work. On the contrary, given actual operating con-
ditions, the control systems in work process-oriented paths proved to be a 
highly suitable means of rationalization. 
Practical nature of training and studies 
Interacting with these circumstances are the unique features of the German 
system of vocational training whose main characteristic is the close 
relationship between classroom studies and practical occupational training 
in the company. This system brings about a situation in which workers with 
a relatively high level of qualification get trained and an ample supply is 
available on the labour market (see chapter 16). The high availability of 
qualified production workers in Germany is one of the main requirements 
for the continued existence of labour processes that are relatively 'open' 
with a low division of labour. These processes, in turn, are a central 
reference point for the development of work process-oriented NC-systems. 
Moreover, this system of vocational training is closely linked to the 
specific German system of manufacturing. The system of manufacturing 
sciences can be regarded as a continuation on a higher level of the insti-
tutionalized interaction of theory and practice which characterizes the 
system of vocational training. The relatively close relationship to actual 
manufacturing practice is reflected by the special characteristics of the 
study of engineering science in the Federal Republic and Switzerland. In 
the Federal Republic there is a particularly close exchange of personnel 
between engineering sciences and the manufacturing companies. Career 
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patterns of engineering scientists, which in most cases proceed exclusively 
via the companies, as well as the company determined cooperation between 
science and enterprises, play an essential role in this context. 
A SOCIALLY DETERMINED PROCESS 
Looking back on NC-development in an international comparison, we may 
say in conclusion that a number of very different social and economic 
conditions and factors contribute to technological development. If we 
followed Noble's reasoning, we would have to consider the 'ideology of 
control' of managers and engineers as the overriding driving force behind 
technological development. However, with this approach it cannot be ex-
plained why NC-development in the Federal Republic, despite the same 
extreme technocratic orientations and controlling interests of technical 
personnel and engineers (see Bergmann et al. 1986), followed a different 
course. Even given the assumption that domination and control play a 
greater role in industrial relations in the United States than in Germany, 
Noble's explanation fails to see that the centralization of programming in 
American NC-technology - and inversely workshop programming in the 
Federal Republic - is part of a technically, socially and economically 
determined process. 
Due to the complexity of the outlined inter-relationships, the develop-
ment of production technology seems like an entangled, almost inadvertant, 
process running its own course. A better awareness of the determinants of 
technological development makes it possible to use their influence in a 
more desirable economic and social direction. 
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6 The Role of Manufacturing 
Technology Markets in Systemic 
Rationalization Processes1 
Volker Dohl 
INTRODUCTION 
The application and design of technology are often dealt with from the 
perspective of performance policy or the humanization of work in German 
industrial sociology. In these contexts, the processes underlying the 
development of technology and technological concepts have also been 
studied. However, the way in which they get diffused in user companies is 
rarely touched on. This process is precisely the subject of this chapter. 
Using machine manufacturers of companies in the consumer goods in-
dustry, the very complex relationships of dominance and dependence on 
the technology market are analysed and the consequences for manufacturer 
and user companies oudined. 
THREE THESES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
MANUFACTURERS AND USERS OF TECHNOLOGY 
The first thesis posits that if particular manufacturing technologies are to be 
successful (whatever their form or purpose), their development, production 
and supply have to be oriented to enterprise applications. These appli-
cations are largely determined, in turn, by the measures pursued by the user 
companies for the design of their own products and processes. This means 
that altered market and sales strategies of the user companies and the 
resulting product and process innovations generate new technology 
requirements. Indeed, in the final analysis, it is these new requirements 
which determine the direction that manufacturers take in the development 
and production of technology, and thus the technologies that are available 
on the market. According to this thesis, user application processes dominate 
the processes involved in the development and production of technology. 
Thus the user/manufacturer relationship is characterized by a dominance of 
the user over the manufacturer. This means that the user obtains the 
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techniques and technologies needed to pursue his goals and fulfil his 
purposes, in the bounds, of course, of what is technologically feasible. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility that difficulties and 
problems could arise in the course of implementation. 
The second thesis states that the users of techniques and technologies are 
largely dependent on what the manufacturers place on the market. The 
possible applications and uses of technologies are largely predetermined by 
the concrete design of the technology marketed by the manufacturer. This 
means that the general direction of product and process innovation for the 
user is closely linked to the technology available, which can strongly 
restrict the user's potential for strategic action. According to this thesis, the 
technology manufacturing process dominates the application process; thus, 
the user/manufacturer relationship is characterized by the domination of the 
manufacturer over the user. In concrete terms, this means that the user has 
to take what he gets and what he is able to afford in terms of technology and 
is forced to adjust his measures for product and process innovation 
accordingly. 
Although it is evident that these theses are fundamentally contradictory, 
the validity of both has been confirmed by the empirical findings that have 
been carried out to date. This fact leads, in turn, to a third thesis. The fact 
that companies have to react to changes in market conditions leads them to 
develop rationalization strategies. These strategies are taking on an in-
creasingly systemic character, i.e. they are moving more and more towards 
both intra-company and inter-company integration and networking. The 
manufacturers of technology adapt their products to these various systemic 
rationalization strategies by basing their own product and sales strategies 
on the intentions of the user companies, which leads to a growing (and 
market-dominating) supply of technologies which incorporate an in-
creasingly systemic character. These technologies have a profound effect 
on the production structures of the users and influence the further course of 
product and process innovation in these companies. What follows from this 
systemic character of technology is that certain groups of users end up in a 
position of dominance over other users, due to the sales strategies pursued 
by the technology manufacturers. In other words, the dominance of certain 
large and/or market-controlling user groups over the manufacturers of 
technological systems is extended to other usually small, not very market-
dominating user groups, who experience it, however, as manufacturer 
dominance. According to this thesis, both forms of dominance exist simul-
taneously. 
We will now examine some of the aspects of this complex relationship 
in closer detail. 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
THE PRODUCT AND PRODUCTION STRATEGIES OF USER 
COMPANIES 
In discussions by scientists and practitioners on issues concerning industry, 
one question has always been of central importance: How can companies 
cope with intensified price competition and expand their product range and 
service functions at the same time? In other words, how can companies deal 
with the drastic increase in flexibility demands and the increasing com-
plexity and difficulty of production and administration while simultane-
ously producing in a more economical manner? What role do new 
technologies play in this process and which role could they play (i.e. in the 
form of flexible automation). The assumption usually is that diverse market 
and consumer demands affect all companies and their production and 
administration structures alike, and so all companies, without exception, 
are forced to find ways to deal with these demands. 
Our investigations showed, in fact, that companies try to develop tar-
geted sales strategies for their products in accordance with their respective 
structures and conditions. In this way, they seek to come to terms with the 
contradictory market demands which expect product differentiation on the 
one hand and price and cost reductions on the other. The possible response 
to these demands varies, but falls basically into two categories which have 
been typified here for analytical reasons: companies react either by con-
centrating production on low-priced mass products or by offering indi-
vidualized, expensive and exclusive products entailing a number of 
variants. In this way, companies try to divide the sales market into two 
extremes in order to tackle the demands of cost reduction and increased 
flexibility independently of each other and thus ward off demands that 
cannot be mastered. This division of the sales market, which probably goes 
beyond national boundaries, is to be found in most sectors of industrial 
production, especially in the consumer goods industry. In some circum-
stances, both strategies are pursued within a single firm or conglomerate.2 
Which direction a particular company takes depends not only on its sales 
expectations, but also on its basic situation, for example, its technical 
capacity, personnel, skill structure, the existence of a well-established 
brand name, and whether it is firmly positioned on regional and national 
sales markets, etc.3 
It should be pointed out that many companies do not manage to secure 
such sales strategies for themselves and are thus unable to limit their 
activities to one particular option. As a result, their position on the sales and 
purchasing markets is extremely unstable and insecure. 
Implementation of either of the two extreme options necessitates the 
introduction of respective innovations in company production and admini-
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stration processes which determine the direction and form of rationali-
zation, as well as demands made on the techniques and technologies to be 
used. The question that arises is how do technology manufacturers react to 
such specific user needs and how does this bring about the dominance of a 
particular form of technology on the market? Moreover, what conse-
quences does this have for companies who are not in a position to pursue 
one of the two sales options? Before we can answer these questions, it is 
necessary to briefly outline the general thrust of the rationalization strate-
gies followed by the two different (ideal-typical) kinds of user companies. 
The producer of low-priced, mass produced and standardized products 
primarily pursues one goal in his rationalization policy: the drastic 
reduction of costs. In doing so, he places emphasis on two main points. 
The first consists of increasing the level of utilization and productivity 
of the existing or planned production techniques (including manpower of 
course). These measures are generally directed toward specific tech-
nological systems or areas of production and work operations in which 
underutilized capacity and performance can be tapped. The measures do 
not deviate greatly from classical forms of rationalization, and their effects 
on cost reduction are not impressive because the unused potential they seek 
to develop has usually been exhausted by previous rationalization 
measures. 
It is for this reason that the second point of emphasis obtains greater 
significance. In this case, the manufacturer departs from his preoccupation 
with isolated areas of production and the technological systems (including 
manpower) in them and seeks to rationalize the production process as a 
whole instead. Toward this end, he bases his strategy on the expansion of 
existing data processing systems in order to optimize his administrative and 
organizational structures. In doing so, his general goal is to increase the 
degree of integration of production and administration in order to reduce 
unproductive time and costs while intensifying the production process of the 
entire company. At the level of production this means the integration of 
processing, handling and transport functions by means of machine and 
technological control systems both within individual production areas, and 
more importantly, across different areas, thus achieving a reduction of 
throughput times (horizontal integration). There is the simultaneous attempt 
to implement an information and control system to accelerate the transfer of 
data and information between the individual areas of production and enable 
centralized access to production and administration processes (vertical 
integration). Administration processes, such as resource management, sales 
and purchase order processing, accounting, etc., are also increasingly subject 
to rationalization measures and are more and more integrated into the 
reorganization of all processes through data processing systems. 
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In this way, a process of systemic rationalization (see chapter 4) which 
seeks to achieve control of planning, managing, and implementation pro-
cesses is set in motion early on, for the purpose of cost reduction. This 
system is oriented to centralized control of an entirely integrated production 
process. Generally speaking, these systems are usually suggested and 
pushed forward by central administration or data processing departments 
which possess the know-how and also the power to implement new 
measures of this kind. The fact that central administration departments are 
the driving force behind these measures has an effect on the design and 
control of the technological systems in production. The main effect is the 
limitation of possibilities for intervening into the system at the level of 
production as well as the fostering of a strict division of programming and 
operating tasks with a correspondingly high functional division of labour, 
etc. 
The producer of individualized and exclusive products, on the other 
hand, pursues a rationalization policy which aims to improve the flexibility 
of his production and administration processes in order to cope with the 
increased demands being made in his segment of the market. The activities 
associated with this process are primarily concerned with the production 
process, especially assembly. In approach, the strategies are typified by the 
attempt to achieve the closest possible link between reorganization of the 
production process and the intensified application of flexible, NC-
production-technology. 
Organizationally, this approach seeks to cluster those production tasks 
which are particularly subject to flexibility demands into separate areas of 
production (in other words, to disconnect them organizationally from areas 
of mass production). An example is the concentration of all pending special 
order-related work tasks into or close to the final assembly area. While this 
reorganization and integration of flexibility-relevant functions into desig-
nated production areas allows the formation of concentrated areas for 
flexibility measures, it also creates production bottlenecks, making flexible 
automation technology in these areas even more of a necessity. From a 
financial standpoint, (flexible) mechanization or automation in new, highly 
consolidated production areas is now getting feasible. 
Thus the companies try to concentrate on a few areas of production in 
which flexibility demands can be brought under control with new flexible 
processing and assembly technologies. This growing utilization of flexible 
technologies and the increasing outfitting of machinery and facilities with 
computer-aided control technology in other areas of production (such as in 
series production) make new demands on companies. Defined interfaces 
have to be set up, gaps in mechanization and automation have to be bridged 
over or eliminated, etc. This means that at the production level the 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
companies have to achieve an extensive network of processing machines, 
handling systems and transport facilities as well as a comprehensive inte-
gration of different production areas (horizontal integration). At the same 
time, the new potential for flexibility can only be adequately utilized when 
sales order handling processes and production planning and control 
processes are also made more flexible. This, in turn, generates additional 
pressure to implement integrated technologies that control the production 
process in a comprehensive manner (vertical integration). 
There is also growing pressure for all enterprises to invest in systemic 
oriented technologies in order to deal with increasing flexibility demands. 
Nevertheless, our findings have shown that the producers of exclusive 
products take a different approach in their efforts to implement comprehen-
sive planning and control system processes from the one pursued by mass 
production companies. In the mass production of simple and inexpensive 
standard products, the significance of (especially skilled) work in the areas 
of manufacturing for adjustment and quality control tends to decline, 
replaced by a (centrally controlled) computer-aided manufacturing and 
control technology system which oversees the entire process. The manu-
facturers of exclusive products, however, at least given the present state of 
planning and control technologies, tend to rely much more on the direct 
intervention of (skilled) workers in the manufacturing and assembly 
process in order to secure the necessary flexibility. In particular, the know-
how and power position of supervisors involved with the production 
process and job planning and scheduling departments still play a significant 
role. They also have a decisive influence in the implementation process of 
the planning and control systems. Unlike mass producers, they aim to 
implement decentralized systems. However, our investigations have 
revealed that the 'decentralized' systems are not situated at the direct 
manufacturing or workshop level, but in areas that precede the production 
process. 
These differing strategies of horizontal and vertical integration which 
are pursued in concert with systemic rationalization policies in both kinds 
of user companies have an effect on the requirements, collaboration, and 
design options of the respective manufacturer of technological systems. 
HOW TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURERS RESPOND TO USER 
DEMANDS 
The West German machine building industry sees its success as depending 
on its ability and willingness to produce innovative and high-quality 
products and, whenever possible, to provide customized solutions to the 
production technology problems of its user companies. Thus, its global 
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sales strategy is more oriented to products than prices. Intensified com-
petition among machine building companies has led to an even more 
concentrated pursuit of this production strategy, at least on the domestic 
market. The cornerstones of this product-based strategy have grown in 
significance with the following results: first, the rapid developments taking 
place in (potential) areas of application in the user companies demand a 
rapid response in innovation; second, the competitive situation enables 
market leaders among the user companies to have technological inno-
vations designed specifically for their own particular production problems. 
This sales strategy, which is characterized by the close relationship 
between 'innovation' and 'adaptation', means that the manufacturer's 
product range and service-related functions are oriented to the special 
demands of both mass and flexible producer companies. As for the user 
companies, they themselves develop and implement aggressive 
rationalization strategies and corresponding innovations in technology and 
organization. They see themselves as being confronted with clear-cut 
problems and tasks that have to be dealt with in order to pursue their 
production and sales strategies. Therefore, the demands they make of the 
manufacturers are defined in a fairly explicit form. Users at both 
'extremes', namely the mass producer and the manufacturer of exclusive 
products, play a leading role in shaping technology precisely because they 
take the initiative for tackling the especially troublesome problems for their 
industrial branch. In this way, they define paths of future application and 
utilization and thus open up new possibilities for ways to link techniques 
and technologies for which the manufacturers develop products in response 
to present and future needs. For these reasons, it makes sense for the 
machine manufacturers to orient their innovations and sales policies 
towards the problems and the development of just these kinds of user 
companies in order to secure long-term sales opportunities. 
However, this leads to a change in the range of products and system-
related functions that the manufacturer provides. In the past, the 'custom 
tailoring' of technical solutions, their 'adjustment', was traditionally 
concerned with aspects of particular machines and technical procedures 
that corresponded to functions and performance needs in concrete areas of 
application. At present, however, new demands are being made on the 
manufacturers due to the increasingly systemic character of rationalization 
strategies being implemented by user companies. This prompts the manu-
facturers to offer a range of product and system-related service functions 
and innovations that far exceed their accustomed spectrum. They are no 
longer expected to supply simply high-performance machine systems 
especially designed for concrete applications. Rather, the expectation is to 
provide comprehensive and innovative solutions which are oriented to 
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concrete application problems in production technology and also in pro-
duction organization. Thus, depending on the rationalization strategy 
pursued by the user, differing demands are made on the manufacturers. 
The first question is what effects the rationalization strategies of mass 
producers have had on the development of technological systems. In these 
kinds of user companies, the most important impulses for systemic 
rationalization originate at high levels of the company hierarchy, in the 
administration or data processing departments, whose interest it is to imple-
ment planning and control systems which facilitate centralized control of 
the entire production process. Toward this end, cooperation with large 
software and hardware houses plays a large role, since, in many cases, these 
firms have already been involved in the installation of commercial data 
processing systems in the administrative departments. The influence and 
potential involvement of machine manufacturers in determining the basic 
course of integration pursued by these user companies is relatively small. 
For this reason, the user companies generally fall back on the kind of 
manufacturers who provide technology which supports centralized 
processes. This means that the technological systems required by the users 
and developed by the technology manufacturers have to fulfd two basic 
requirements. First, they have to bring about a cost-effective increase in 
performance, which is primarily brought about by networking the various 
processing, handling and transport functions and equipping them with 
efficient control systems. Secondly, and of greater importance, they have to 
be capable of being integrated into centralized planning and control 
systems. What this basically means is that the new machinery and their 
control systems have to be extensively adjusted to meet the configurations 
of data processing and control systems which are already in place in the 
company. Thus, in many cases, the machine manufacturers have to inte-
grate systems developed by other technology suppliers into their machines 
and facilities. There is also the possibility that, from the start, only machine 
manufacturers who have built up long term relationships with the respec-
tive system suppliers are considered. In such cases, the manufacturers and 
system suppliers support each other in promoting their machine and 
machine control systems and the planning systems and organizational 
structures that go along with them. 
The result is as follows: the demands made by the users and the tech-
nological steps carried out in accordance with the machine and control 
systems' manufacturers lead to the development and at least partial imple-
mentation of integrated, comprehensive technological and organizational 
systems with orientations toward centralization which are generally brought 
onto the market by large, market-dominating data processing system suppliers 
or by machine manufacturers working in close cooperation with them. 
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Quite different are the demands made on machine manufacturers by user 
companies who base their rationalization on flexible production strategies. 
In these cases, the innovations for achieving flexibility are linked directly 
to technological and organizational changes at the manufacturing level; 
without the early involvement of the machine manufacturer, their reali-
zation is not possible. Also, for processes involving the conceptualization 
and implementation of systemic forms of rationalization based on changes 
at the production level, the machine manufacturers are involved at an early 
stage and in a comprehensive manner. 
The measures mentioned above for rationalizing production processes 
and making them flexible are characterized by the fact that, from the very 
start, they link the organizational and technological aspects of process 
innovation to each other. As a result, the companies seek solutions in which 
organizational changes are realized in the context of particular types of 
technological systems. Manufacturers are expected to develop tech-
nological systems which combine (in a new way) various process functions, 
and moreover to integrate all of the functions. In this way, the user seeks 
technical solutions which enable him to implement new organizational 
structures. Conventional forms of technology, which make it possible to 
detach technology and organization, are abandoned in favour of a concept 
in which the technological design of the system establishes certain organi-
zational choices. This means that the manufacturer, since he is developing 
his product for specific user applications, has to consider given 
organizational structures and the changes the user hopes to achieve. Also, 
as integration proceeds, the manufacturer has to create the machine and 
control technology necessary for a reorganization of the user's entire pro-
duction process in accordance with the processes of integration. 
The development of new technologies aimed at mastering the 
production tasks and problems of the respective users, as well as realizing 
particular organizational structures by means of the specific arrangement 
and linkage of various processing, handling and transport functions on the 
basis of new data processing technologies, makes it necessary for the 
manufacturer and the user to overcome the usual, market-mediated buyer/ 
seller relationship in order to cooperate as closely as possible. In this way, 
systemic solutions can be developed and implemented that respond to the 
concrete flexibility needs of the user as well as to his special manufacturing 
and procedural requirements while taking the various structural conditions 
of the user company into consideration. 
However, the increasing linkage and integration of production functions 
both within and between individual production areas, the new delineation 
of entire functional areas and the increase in the number and complexity of 
functions to be integrated into technological systems all make new 
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demands on the manufacturers. These can only be fulfiled on a long-term 
basis when the manufacturers themselves are prepared to set up cooperative 
relationships with each other. In other words, there is a need for a new and 
close connection between the manufacturers of machine and control 
systems on the one hand, and the manufacturers of diverse machines and 
machine components on the other. This leads to a growing concentration 
among the manufacturers and thus a fundamental process of restructuring 
on the manufacturing market. 
When flexible NC-technologies were first implemented, many medium-
sized machine manufacturers from various sectors of the machine building 
industry and small, up-and-coming control systems manufacturers par-
ticipated in the development and customizing of machine and control 
technology systems. They generally cooperated as equal partners, despite 
occasional problems and conflicts. The processes of manufacturer 
concentration, discussed above, however, change these relationships. For 
example, either financially powerful and technologically advanced 
machine manufacturers build up their own capacity to develop control 
systems, and develop the necessary control technologies for their systems 
themselves; or they take over independent software companies and adapt 
them to their own purposes. At present, there is a clear trend for these 
manufacturers to use their accumulated know-how of control technology to 
develop comprehensive planning and control systems. In doing so, they try 
not only to extend their range of products and service functions on the 
market, but also to improve the sales chances of their machines and equip-
ment. 
Under such conditions technological solutions take on a more and more 
systemic character, yet they are still strongly oriented to production 
problems. In principle, the opportunity remains open for control and inter-
vention at the manufacturing level or for intervention from the production 
planning departments. The extent to which these possibilities are made use 
of largely depends on the interests and tactics pursued by the departments 
and groups advocating the implementation of these systems in the user 
company. In contrast to mass production technology users, these groups or 
departments tend to be closely connected to production, such as production 
planning. 
At the same time, market leaders among data processing and control 
systems' suppliers press for cooperation with machine manufacturers to 
have their systems integrated into the machines and facilities. This gives 
them the opportunity to offer comprehensive integrated (machine and data 
processing) systems to users that are connected with existing systems for 
planning and control of production and administrative processes that have 
already been installed at the user companies. As pointed out above, there is 
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a strong relationship between the trend towards centralized concepts and 
the growth of large suppliers' influence. 
Processes of concentration are also becoming apparent in the relationship 
between the manufacturers of machines and machine components due to the 
fact that the traditional areas dividing up technology application have been 
broken up and newly structured through new distributions and clustering of 
functions. This has made it necessary for the manufacturers to concern 
themselves with integrated machine structures involving a variety of 
machining processes that were previously run separately. Thus the techniques 
and technologies which, until now, were produced by different groups of 
manufacturers, are now being developed and sold by one manufacturer. The 
integration and networking of various functions, such as handling and 
transport, in addition to machining, encourages the tendency for supply to 
come from a single-source as well as increasing the demand for it. This 
tendency is encouraged by users for reasons of compatibility, service, liability, 
calculability of performance, etc. Manufacturers, too, increasingly base much 
of their sales strategy on single source supply because it facilitates the 
implementation of comprehensive control systems, solves adaptation and co-
ordination problems and helps prevent system disturbances, etc. Cooperation 
between manufacturers can take on a variety of forms: direct company 
acquisition or fusion, contractual regulation of the cooperative relationship, or 
the establishment of joindy owned, but autonomously acting, firms which take 
over the organizational development and planning services that the users 
require and charge for them separately. 
Within the general context of the development of marketable tech-
nology, these processes have had various consequences. First of all, since 
they involve the synthesis of technical and organizational solutions, they 
have increasingly taken on a comprehensive and systemic character. 
Secondly, since they are developed on the basis of close cooperative 
relations, they have become more and more related to the specific needs 
and technical and organizational problems of given users. This means that 
they can only be optimally applied in the companies for which they were 
originally developed. At the same time, the groups of market-dominating 
and influential manufacturers, which have formed as the result of 
increasing concentration, push forward the general dissemination of these 
types of systems and thus their diffusion into user companies for which they 
were not developed. 
EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
The development presented above results in a two-way polarization of the 
technology market: 
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1 The first polarization consists of machine manufacturers who are in a 
position to develop and offer systemic solutions and those who are not, 
the latter then continuing to develop and offer simple technologies and 
components. It is our contention that the companies who cannot 
themselves develop integrated systems either enter into cooperative 
associations with other manufacturers or merge with them in order to 
succeed in developing systemic solutions. Otherwise they are forced into 
the role of component suppliers or have to retreat from a particular 
market niche due to the competitive price strategies of foreign manu-
facturers of standard technologies and may even disappear from the 
market altogether. 
2 The second polarization consists, on the one side, of machine manu-
facturers who cooperate with large scale suppliers of production-related 
data processing systems in a more or less dependent relationship and 
who deliver the building blocks for manufacturing technologies and 
processes. At the other extreme are manufacturers who use their 
accumulated know-how of control systems to extend their range of 
products and service functions toward planning and control systems and 
in doing so succeed in developing global integration concepts. 
Both of these forms of polarization entail two differing consequences: the 
first is product-related in that systemic solutions, which have been 
developed with the specific needs of certain users in mind, become the 
predominant form of technology on the market. The second is related to the 
structure of the manufacturer market and the changing market position of 
the users in that ever larger and more powerful manufacturers and manu-
facturing groups supply a number of medium-sized customers. This puts 
the users in a comparatively weak position in relation to the manufacturers, 
with regard to market position, technological capability, the ability to 
implement innovations and limited material resources. The chances that 
this type of customer's particular wishes will be taken into consideration by 
the manufacturers are extremely low, leading to a situation of almost 
complete manufacturer dominance. 
The manufacturers dominance is only 'almost complete' because they 
have regarded many of these medium-sized companies from the very 
beginning as potential customers for their products and have thus always 
hoped that their technological solutions would cover the needs of these 
companies. At the same time, however, they dominate in the sense that they 
install products which were developed mainly for other user companies. 
Because these medium-sized companies have limited options with 
regard to market strategy, they are highly exposed to the demands of the 
market. Therefore, they have to make use of the machinery and equipment 
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developed to solve cost and flexibility problems, and of course, the organi-
zational structures associated with them, even if these systems do not 
correspond to their operating conditions and the companies cannot exert the 
pressure to get the technology adjusted to optimally meet their specifi-
cations. The question is which concrete problems arise for medium-sized 
companies as a result of this situation. 
Adopting a given technology in the form of a 'systemic solution' means 
that the flow of material and information in manufacturing subprocesses, in 
areas preceding and following up manufacturing, and in management and 
planning departments, are all fixed to a great extent. Thus, the company's 
work organization, personnel structure and training conditions are all 
affected. The consequences this entails are difficult to foresee, both for the 
companies and for the in-plant employee representatives. Yet, changes 
after the fact are problematic and involve much effort and time, thereby 
restricting potential reactions. 
Another problem is that the manufacturers try to transfer the hardware 
and software structures developed for systemic solutions to other uses; this 
results at best in modifications in terms of some kind of modular design. 
Due to the costs involved, fundamental changes are rarely possible, 
meaning that programmes originally developed for other fields and con-
ditions of application are implemented, making it impossible, or at least 
extremely difficult, to achieve an optimal adaptation for specific user 
conditions. 
Systemic solutions incorporate a level of production, planning and 
control technology, and organizational know-how to a far greater extent 
than was ever the case with traditional technologies. This becomes an 
integral aspect of the respective manufacturer's product range and service 
functions. The result is that design knowledge passes out of the hands of 
user companies into those of the manufacturers, meaning that the users 
gradually lose the kind of competence needed to plan new kinds of pro-
duction systems, especially integrated ones. Furthermore, once it has been 
lost, companies are no longer able adequately to build up this capacity and 
know-how again - a factor which is of great significance for middle-sized 
companies. Al l of this leads to a restriction of available options for system 
design and ignorance of potential alternatives. 
The growing necessity to utilize and implement systemic solutions as the 
definitive technology plunges many user companies into a hopeless 
dilemma; on the one hand, they are no longer able to implement traditional 
procedures and approaches, yet, at the same time, they lack the pre-
requisites and conditions for integrative and comprehensive computerized 
production systems. 
In the old days, the process of technological development was carried 
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out in small steps; new technologies were mainly confined to single areas, 
especially in critical areas of production, and the technology employed was 
insular in character in that it only entailed isolated machines or facilities. 
The integration of these machines or facilities into the total production 
process took place within the context of work organization measures, but in 
many cases was also the result of a worker/machine relationship that 
developed slowly and over a period of time. This meant that technology did 
not determine the measures and alternatives for organizational design. This 
was and still is of particular significance to medium-sized companies 
because: 
1 their limited financial scope does not allow them to carry out com-
prehensive forms of innovation entailing the long and difficult 
implementation phases that are usually involved when complex systems 
have to be adapted to specific company conditions; 
2 due to their limited technical and technological know-how and their 
skills structure, they are generally dependent on the gradual introduction 
of new forms of technology into the production process; only in this way 
can they develop or obtain the necessary skills; and 
3 process and system-specific skills generally exist to a sufficient degree 
in these companies. Up to now, this guaranteed a comparatively high 
degree of flexibility and made it possible to keep open design possi-
bilities that lie outside the realm of technology. However, drastically dif-
ferent forms of technological innovation and integrated systems which 
are quickly implemented endanger these types of skills. Such systems 
require a different set of skill which can only be built up with the help of 
comprehensive and expensive training measures. However, the capacity 
for this sort of retraining does not always exist. This plunges the com-
panies into a further dilemma. On the one hand, skills that exist and have 
worked well in the past are losing their significance, but new skills are 
not yet sufficiently available. Disadvantages such as these often cause 
medium-sized companies to choose centralized solutions. 
The growing integrative character of technical solutions not only makes it 
more difficult to implement them in small, successive steps, but in time 
makes it more difficult to restrict their utilization to particular functions and 
certain areas of application since they usually bring about the implemen-
tation of a comprehensive computer-aided information flow system. A 
rationalization of subprocesses, which would be suitable to the financial 
and personnel capacity of these companies, becomes difficult, if not im-
possible. Thus, the companies are constantly being pushed to the limits of 
their capacity. As a result, their dependence on manufacturers, who have to 
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assume training, financing and other services in addition to their usual 
technological and organizational services, grows. 
This dependency enables the manufacturers to force the user companies 
into adopting systems that correspond best to the manufacturer's own 
production, development and financing conditions. This does not mean to 
say that such systems are ineffective as a means of solving flexibility and 
cost problems, for they are developed with precisely these ends in mind; 
however, it cannot be denied that the user companies have to pursue their 
rationalization strategies with techniques and technologies which do not 
fully correspond to their conditions and needs and which, above all, prevent 
them from trying out other alternatives. Moreover, the difficulties and 
problems that the user companies experience in attempting to master these 
suboptimal solutions increase their dependency on the manufacturers, due 
to the continual need for their intervention when difficulties arise and the 
assumption of almost all service functions by the manufacturer. This leads 
to a further weakening of the user company's position, for example in terms 
of their skill potential. 
As a result of this state of manufacturer dominance, systemic solutions 
are now being implemented in user companies at an increasing rate. Com-
panies which do not possess or which are unable to create the necessary 
conditions for systemic solutions, or which are unable adequately to cope 
with the outcomes, have little chance of long-term survival. 
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7 Thinking Machines, Dreaming 
Engineers? Towards Applied 
Expert System Technology1 
Manfred Moldaschl 
When dealing with expert systems, researchers, engineers and manu-
facturers tend to stress the advantages of new technologies whereas social 
scientists often concentrate on the risks. This paper too will concentrate on 
risks, my position being that the potential benefits of these new tech-
nologies can only be exploited to their fullest extent when we are aware of 
the risks and develop ways of avoiding them. My central thesis is that these 
risks are not so much the direct result of Al-technologies, but are far more 
the outcome of the overestimation of their performance capacity. This leads 
to inadequate forms of application which neither make the best use of the 
technology's potential nor of the personnel involved. 
INTRODUCTION 
Every social scientist is faced with the task of acquiring knowledge in 
order to master the present and of creating ignorance in order to design 
the future. 
J. Kuczynski 
Knowledge which has not been acquired by the senses can create no 
other truth than one which will be harmful. 
Galileo 
These two statements were not made with 'artificial intelligence' in mind 
and yet they touch on two aspects of a central problem: the significance of 
practical and sensory experience and the role of human ignorance in the 
further development of human knowledge. In other words, the central 
problem in the use of expert systems (XPS) is the production and repro-
duction of human knowledge and human experience. 
In the following my basic premise is that the above-mentioned problem 
can be posed in very different ways, depending on company objectives and 
expectations in the use of XPS and the possible forms of utilization which 
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are opted for. It is important to clarify this view, because in the current 
discussion on XPS the potential effects are often directly regarded as 
stemming from technology 'per se'; this holds true for such negative effects 
as the loss of empirical knowledge, as well as for positive effects including 
that of creating a 'more human society' (see, for example, Schank 1984). 
Moreover, even in those cases where it is accepted that the effects can 
only be interpreted in the context of the conditions and objectives of 
technology utilization, the discussion usually tends to focus on the direct 
effects and consequences of an intended form of utilization. It is a common 
experience, however, also within companies, that things often go quite 
differently from the original intentions of a given company, or what tech-
nology assessment has anticipated. In my opinion, this is because the 
unintentional and the systemic effects are often underestimated and in fact 
are so diverse, that it is impossible to anticipate them all. 
In the following considerations I will first specify some of the basic 
conditions of XPS and subsequently will outline some of the unintentional 
effects and feedback mechanisms. The effects of XPS are felt at every level: 
society, company, individual employee. This chapter concentrates on the 
employee level, specifically the risks associated with the introduction of 
XPS. 
CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES OF COMPANY UTILIZATION 
The risks of jeopardizing the generation and preservation of human expert 
competence, are likely to vary according to the type of company problem 
which is dealt with by the use of XPS. These include: 
1 problems of company performance capacity: coping with increasing 
flexibility requirements and complexity (for example, the rising number 
of product variants, greater integration, JIT); 
2 increased cost pressure in certain areas: for example, when a dispro-
portionately large number of employees are to be found in planning and 
service departments (while personnel in the manufacturing departments 
is shrinking); and 
3 problems of having experts available for important tasks (shortage of 
experts). 
It is understandable that in the first case XPS would be used more for 
solving technical and organizational problems. It remains open, however, 
as to whether this would be brought about by supporting the experts or by 
establishing the greatest degree of automation possible. In the second and 
third cases, problems of personnel management are in the forefront. In the 
third case it is uncertain whether the solution will lie in systems supporting 
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the experts or in replacing them by less qualified users of 'smart' systems, 
the latter is likely to be the objective in the second case scenario.2 
The manner in which the rationalization potential of Al-applications is 
utilized also depends on general patterns of organizing and utilizing human 
labour. For the last few years 'paradigms' or 'philosophies' of work design 
were often referred to. The range of existing rationalization strategies can 
be grouped around two opposite poles: the approach determined by Taylor-
ism and the Human-Centred Approach. 
'COMPUTER-AIDED TAYLORISM' AND 'COMPUTER-AIDED 
C R A F T S M A N ' 
What is referred to as 'Taylorism' has been the dominant pattern of work 
design in the past few decades in Europe. This 'traditional' pattern of 
rationalization is characterized by three basic features: the first is the pro-
cess of simplifying tasks by establishing a maximum degree of division of 
labour, the characteristic most often identified with Taylorism. The second, 
more important feature, is the transformation of work planning into 
scientific terms: this means extracting the empirical knowledge held by 
workers, eliminating its subjective component and feeding it back to the 
workers in the form of standardized work instructions (compare Volpert 
1985). The primacy of technology has emerged as the third feature, a point 
of view which regards man as a basically unreliable, subjective source of 
mistakes to be replaced to the greatest extent possible by the use of exact 
algorithms and technology. It should be pointed out that these basic fea-
tures of Tayloristic approaches may very well continue to exist even when 
Taylorism is declared to have been 'overcome' in the course of a partial 
reduction in the division of labour. 
There is a great deal of evidence that the Tayloristic rationalization 
approach is particularly predominant in those areas where mass production 
and a low level of employee skills prevail (see Part IV). Company size also 
plays a role (see Part VI). 
In those enterprises where high quality products are manufactured in 
small and medium-sized series and a sufficient number of skilled em-
ployees are available, Tayloristic principles have not been able to establish 
themselves to a very large extent. The German machine building industry 
is a good example of this. The supply of skilled workers is provided by the 
'dual system' of vocational training,3 a system which is a prerequisite for 
the success of machine building as well as other branches of West German 
industry.4 The type of work organization found under these conditions is a 
low degree of division of labour in terms of skills and hierarchical structure 
and a high degree of employee participation (see chapters 10 and 11). On 
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the management side, there is a pronounced awareness of the central 
significance of skilled personnel. This type of work organization has been 
termed 'professional organization' (Kerr 1954). The work design focuses 
on human labour and its tasks, and selects technology according to its 
capacity for supporting human skills in the best possible way (as evidenced 
by the concept of the 'Computer-aided Craftsman', Jones 1984). In 
practice, this approach continues to be an exception. At present the so-
called 'Human-Centred Approach' is more a target concept, or a basic 
'design philosophy' (see Rosenbrock 1983 and Corbett 1986) than a reality. 
Al l evidence points to the continued prevalence of the Tayloristic ap-
proach in the ideas, expectations, objectives and concepts expressed by 
manufacturers and potential users of XPS application at present. This is 
clear from the following commonly voiced objectives: 
1 the reduction of the dependency on experts by 'conserving' their 
knowledge; 
2 the imminent potential for accessing, using, and distributing expert 
knowledge; 
3 the relief or replacement of experts by automating the processes of 
judgement and decision making; 
4 the elimination of 'inconsistencies' between expert opinions; 
5 the reduction of training expenditures through the use of XPS tech-
nology (the so-called explanatory component) and by reducing the 
number of experts required. 
It is likely that this approach of objectification and standardization will 
continue to prevail due to the fact that it is just as deep-seated in en-
gineering circles as the 'Man-is-a-Machine-View' is among AI-experts. 
The fundamental concept behind this approach is that human thought and 
action are basically identical to computer procedures and can therefore be 
automated. 'Skills' are regarded as a huge accumulation of facts and rules, 
and 'learning' as the progressive amassing of facts and rule bits. 
A R E A L AND CURRENT RISK: THE OVERESTIMATION OF AI 
In our opinion the main danger in the application of XPS lies in 
overestimating their performance capacity which is a result of the above-
mentioned overly mechanistic outlook. Expert systems extend the limits of 
what is technically feasible, yet they are confined by the general limits of 
formalizing human competence and the fundamental limits of the 
feasibility of planning all company processes and sequences (Moldaschl 
1988; Lutz, Moldaschl 1989). 
The first limit which is systematically underestimated is the extent to 
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which human competence can be formalized. 'Professional Qualification' 
is not the same thing as knowledge, and 'knowledge' is by no means 
identical to knowing elementary facts and rules. In that case it would 
suffice to read a book or undergo theoretical instruction in order to be able 
to ski, drive a car or learn how to operate a printing machine. The capacity 
for thought is not restricted to the application of knowledge formulated as 
rules and you will find that Al-experts rarely have much to say about the 
individual's scope for taking action. It is not my intention here to criticize 
AI at a psychological level. However, it should be pointed out that the 
'mastery' achieved by experts is based on practical experience, on the daily 
sensorial experience of dealing with materials, machines and human 
beings. It is only through taking practical action and through sensorial 
experience that knowledge becomes that which the German word Können 
denotes, a term which is somewhat inadequately translated as skill and 
which refers to a certain achievement of mastery. The 'feeling for material' 
or 'intuitive feeling' for taking the right course of action which is based on 
a certain degree of mastery can, for the time being, not be reproduced by 
technological means because it is corporeal, experience incorporated in the 
human body (see chapter 8). Gilbert Ryle, the almost forgotten critic of 
rationalism, introduced the distinction between 'Knowing That' and 
'Knowing How' to accentuate the role of the body, although it is so often 
misunderstood as merely a distinction between kinds of knowledge (Ryle 
1949). 
With these thoughts in mind, try and think of something you are par-
ticularly capable of doing, such as giving a critical assessment of a 
scientific paper or driving a cross-country motorcycle over a difficult 
course. Could you imagine that just by talking to someone you could 
explain these things in such a way that the other person would be equally 
capable of doing them? Or what about writing down some of the relevant 
rules on a sheet of paper? How could the inexperienced person understand 
this knowledge which has been extracted from its empirical framework, in 
a way that would make it possible to act in an effective manner? This is 
indeed the situation of the XPS user who does not happen to be an expert in 
the particular area. 
A second, fundamental restriction which the methods of artificial in-
telligence are confronted with, is the limit to which company operational 
sequences can be planned. Open systems and complex processes which are 
typical for modern companies, have a multitude of potential sources of 
disturbance which are impossible to anticipate fully and thus possess a high 
degree of incalculability.5 
There is no means of planning that is perfect or system-complex enough 
to anticipate fully all of these factors. Also, the more complex systems 
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become, the less scope they offer for flexible control and the more prone 
they become to failure through technical defects, coding mistakes (two 
'Mariner' probes, for example, were lost because a period instead of a 
comma was written in the program: Valk 1987), or also due to human error 
(such as with the Exocet incident in the Falkland War where the British 
system could not identify the attacking missile as unfriendly because it was 
coded as belonging to the NATO arsenal). 
However, the very nature of human intelligence includes the capability 
of dealing with unclear and contradictory information and to cope with 
open, uncertain and new situations. The capacity of human intelligence for 
handling ambiguous content and gaps in knowledge is based on our innate 
potential for learning. This means people can transform deficits in infor-
mation into knowledge by taking action and by experimenting. Thus lack 
of knowledge can be used as a source of acquiring new knowledge. 
Human competence remains indispensable for complex technical 
systems. But the question remains open as to how it will be integrated. 
Instead of developing software which would be able to give human beings 
the best possible support for doing what they can do better than computers, 
current developments are directed towards achieving a technical simulation 
of such competence, in order to replace6 those persons holding expert 
knowledge. And this is happening at a time when the individual within the 
company is playing an increasingly central role: fewer and fewer workers 
are confronted with increasingly complex machinery. Therefore, over-
estimating the self-regulation capacity of technology poses a serious danger 
to productivity, process safety, and mental health. It is the technology-
oriented, 'Tayloristic' approach which tends to succumb particularly 
strongly to an overestimation of technology's potential. 
INTENTIONS AND UNINTENTIONAL EFFECTS 
So far we have pointed out two sources of risk that have to be considered 
with the implementation of XPS. The first is the effects resulting from the 
performance and rationalization potential of XPS; the other is the effects 
stemming from the overestimation of technological potential. In the 
following I will briefly outline some of the possible unintentional effects 
which result from an incorrect assessment of human competence and the 
overestimation of technical performance capacity. In doing so I will restrict 
myself to a description of direct and counterproductive effects at the 
company level. 
1 Companies want to become independent of experts yet make themselves 
dependent on a form of technology which is only capable of handling 
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routine operations. At the same time, as automation increases, special 
situations and disturbances become more and more common. 
2 Companies want to overcome the shortage of experts yet they are 
exacerbating the shortage by dispensing with the training or recruitment 
of human experts. 
3 Companies seek to reduce their training expenditures, yet are generating 
a lack of skill, due to the fact that the 'explanatory component' of XPS 
is not capable of replacing either practical experience or vocational 
training; it is also not capable of providing explanations in the true sense 
of the word because the computer has no genuine 'understanding' of the 
field for which it is being used. 
4 Companies would like to eliminate the inconsistencies between different 
expert opinions, yet they invariably induce inconsistencies between 
model and reality - inconsistencies which users are subsequently con-
fronted with and cannot handle adequately. 
5 Companies are trying to avoid mistakes and disturbances by objectifying 
human knowledge and in doing so are inviting what they would like to 
avoid because the system is only capable of partially reproducing the 
complex interrelationships. 
There are, of course, less technology-centred approaches which are in 
danger of losing the potential benefits of XPS through an inadequate use of 
technology and personnel; for example, when they: 
1 try to take an excessive work load off the shoulders of experts and at the 
same time expect them to make more decisions in less time and addi-
tionally monitor the conclusions the system has arrived at, 
2 try and take the 'burden' of routine work off their hands and at the same 
time cut off their source of potential practical experience - such as the 
case of a supervisor in a power plant who is only supposed to intervene 
in the case of an emergency, but who does not know how the system 
reacts to intervention. 
These are only a few of the problematic effects which may directly result 
from the use of XPS unintentionally. The question of what other possible 
indirect effects, both intentional and unintentional, could arise (for example 
on departments and employees not at all involved with the use of XPS), 
should be considered. And finally it would be very interesting to investigate 
how companies are reacting to these effects. Before going on to the 
question of how companies might react to the problems looming on the 
horizon, the risks associated with XPS which touch the employee in par-
ticular, such as those affecting qualification (and acceptance), should be 
mentioned: 
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1 The present job held by an expert is subdivided into that of a knowledge 
engineer and one or several data suppliers for the system or system user, 
associated with a loss of status and dequalification of experts - or an 
overburdening of poorly qualified users. 
2 The expropriation of expert knowledge takes place. Individual 
knowledge does not actually disappear altogether, but it no longer 
belongs to the individual and that means an increased danger of loss of 
status and control, or of job loss. 
3 Expert knowledge is lost through lack of use in the case of extensive 
automation ('use it or lose it'). 
4 Expert knowledge stagnates due to the loss of possibilities for gathering 
experience and learning (also due to the necessity of having to adhere to 
system guidelines under time pressure). 
5 Qualification is reduced to man-machine 'interaction', associated with a 
loss of communication and social support in learning situations and the 
danger of deficient and solely machine-based qualification. 
These risks relating to employee skills are associated with severe stress 
factors for personnel: 
1 Loss of status and control, or the fear of such loss both cause emotional 
stress, as does overstrain. 
2 So-called users are left alone with the system during the learning period, 
resulting in overstrain and a feeling of insecurity. 
3 Although skills waste away, stagnate and are no longer specifically 
developed, they are still called for in emergency situations in order to 
avert serious consequences of disturbances. (Stress is caused by con-
tradictory work requirements - emergency dilemma, or Harrisburg 
syndrome; see Hirschhorn 1984). 
4 Although neither experts nor lesser qualified personnel are able to verify 
data provided by the system under time pressure, they are nevertheless 
responsible for the results if bad comes to worse (anxiety and stress 
caused by the dilemma of responsibility). 
While these effects are hypothetical with regard to XPS utilization, they are 
by no means new. They are typical for highly automated systems, although 
not XPS-specific. By increasing the degree of automation and technical 
mediation they serve to intensify problems. In our investigations of FMS 
(Flexible Manufacturing Systems) or of PPS (Production Planning 
Systems) we frequently encountered discrepancies such as those between 
the anticipated effects and reality as well as between the demands made on 
employees and their scope for taking effective action. Thus, these dis-
crepancies are by no means the never-ceasing pessimistic apprehensions of 
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social scientists, but are widespread facts which affect productivity and 
cause 'inexplicable' failures, or failures which are explained away as being 
'human'. 
CORRECTING THE MISCALCULATION - OR 'CORRECTING' 
REALITY? 
Up to now our main concern has been the risks which arise through an 
overestimation of Al-technologies, on the grounds that the effects have less 
to do with the technology itself than with the way in which it is used and the 
objectives which are pursued. If it is true that overestimation of this kind 
causes such grave problems one might anticipate that the expectations 
would soon be corrected by practical experience. In agreement with 
Mertens et al. (1988) one should assume that the expectations held by the 
companies and society concerning this new technology may follow a quasi 
natural curve: overestimation - frustration - realism. 
Investigations concerned with other applications of information tech-
nology in the manufacturing and office sector (Moldaschl 1989; Weltz 
1988) have shown, however, that this expectation curve is not necessarily 
an inevitable consequence. An attitude of overestimation may remain 
despite frustration and may lead to the attempt to solve the problems 
through an increased use of technology. The reasons for the frustration are 
either looked for in the wrong area or are not recognized at all. 
Some of the reasons for this blindness to the above-mentioned problems 
and risks could be: 
1 the compensatory efforts of employees by which the discrepancies 
between formal requirements and actual conditions are covered up as far 
as possible at the cost of considerable additional effort, personal risk and 
strain (such efforts help to sustain further the illusion of complete 
control); 
2 the reversal of the cause and effect principle, for example when the lack 
of employee motivation or competence is held responsible for the dis-
crepancies between planning and execution. 
3 when the Tayloristic approach has become so firmly entrenched in 
engineering structures that it is no longer perceived as a paradigm, that 
is as one of a number of possible approaches. 
A curious, but typical, example of the last mechanism is exemplified by the 
following incident, encountered in one of our field studies (see Moldaschl 
1990). A software engineer built up a highly centralized and automated 
control system for an FMS. The system never worked because of the new 
problems - whether organizational, technical or social - which con-
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tinuously arose. So the engineer revised the system again and again, until it 
was a completely new and in fact worker-oriented system. But he did not 
seem to be particularly aware of the fact for he told us: 'The system was 
perfect, but the circumstances were lousy.' Meaning there was nothing 
wrong with the model, it was reality that was flawed. 
This implies that all the pleas in favour of the expert and assertions of 
not wanting to replace him, are not worth very much in practical terms, 
because we are lacking the ways and means of pursuing a better course of 
action. It also means that a supervisor, for example, can derive no feeling 
of safety from 'knowing' that he is basically not replaceable, (as Boden 
1988 points out). Nor should we rely on the Mertens-curve. The image of 
an oscillation being continuously re-excited might be more apt. Moreover, 
the current discussion on Parallel Processing and Neuronal Networks is 
adding fuel to the fire to the concept of omnipotence harboured in AI-
circles. 
Whichever way the level of expectations may turn the present discussion 
gives us more reason to fear that the company's reality will have to adapt 
to the restrictions set by expert systems, rather than hope that XPS-
technology will be adapted to the reality of work, to human potential and 
thus to a humane, low-risk and future-oriented organization of work. This 
is indicated by the highly optimistic forecasts voiced by promoters, manu-
facturers and potential users of AI-products who rarely mention risks or 
brush them aside as a minor issue (see Scheie 1988). 
Deeply concerned and worried, yet not without hope, two influential 
AI-critics concluded a paper with the warning: 
Should calculative rationality triumph, no one will notice that something 
is missing. 
(Dreyfus, Dreyfus 1986: 206) 
POLITICAL OPTIONS 
There are two basic requirements for political control measures and 
research policies: first is the need for policies which will promote technical 
and organizational alternatives to the predominant Tayloristic course of 
development. There have been a number of practical efforts in this direction 
in several companies. Similar efforts in other areas in which information 
technology is applied have been receiving government support in the 
Federal Republic. 
Explosive government support of technology development in the AI-
sector must be augmented by a massive promotion of theoretical and 
methodological alternatives such as the 'Human-Centred Approach' (for 
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example Corbett 1986) and 'Contrastive Work Analysis' (Volpert 1987). 
'Contrastive Analysis' means: see what people need to do their work and 
what man can do better than the computer. Ask in what way these functions 
and human competence could be granted optimal support by system design. 
These concepts also form the foundation of a 'forward assessment' with 
regards to desirable and undesirable future developments. 
Second there is a need to control and substantiate the effects of pro-
motional measures by evaluating Al-systems where such measures were 
employed and those which did not receive such support ('backward assess-
ment'). The discussion has reached a point where further policies cannot be 
developed without feedback from empirical assessments. 
SUMMARY - SIX THESES 
1 It is impossible to speak of 'the' effects of the use of expert systems. It 
is only possible to investigate their effects together with the company's 
basic conditions and the rationalization strategies directed towards these 
specific conditions. Therefore scenarios concerning the effects of expert 
systems must include the above-cited factors as central components. 
2 Rationalization paths and scenarios display a range of variance between 
the two poles of 'Computer-aided Taylorism' and the 'Human Centred 
Approach'. So far Tayloristic solutions have predominated. 
3 The Tayloristic paradigm (production knowledge is expropriated, 
formulated in scientific terms, and 'returned' to the manufacturing area 
as highly standardized instructions; human labour is regarded as a distur-
bance factor to be excluded, and top priority is given to technology) is 
likely to prevail in companies when Al-systems are employed, as it 
conforms with the mentality usually found in Al-circles. Hence XPS act 
as 'trend amplifiers'. 
4 Expert systems increase the gap between the reality of planning and the 
'actual reality'. The discrepancy between the formal planning models 
and the restricted calculability of complex manufacturing processes - as 
evidenced by the use of information technology to date - is certain to 
increase with the spread of formal models. Therefore XPS act as 
'failure-amplifiers'. 
5 The greatest danger in the use of expert systems is the fact that their 
performance capacity is overestimated and the discrepancies are not 
recognized. It is very likely that expert systems will not be primarily 
adapted to complex reality, but that reality will have to adapt to fit the 
expert systems. Reality will be reduced to that which can be formalized 
and fit into the expert system. 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
6 Consequences: The limitation of the generation and reproduction of 
knowledge and skills must not only be determined for the individual 
employee, but also for the company and society. This is particularly 
necessary due to the fact that the significance of the individual employee 
grows along with the rising degree of automation and decreasing number 
of persons involved in the ongoing manufacturing process. 
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8 Computerized Manufacturing and 
Sensory Perception - New 
Demands on the Analysis of Work1 
Fritz Bohle, Brigitte Milkau, Helmuth Rose 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces an approach which broadens the scope of sensory 
perception analysis and its significance for the work process. We discuss 
phenomena such as the individual's feeling for certain materials and the 
way workers allow themselves to be guided by the sound of certain 
machines. The concept of 'subjectifying action' is the central focus and will 
be explained in depth using the tasks performed by skilled workers in 
mechanical engineering industries. This chapter also deals with changes in 
work which occur in connection with the application of new technologies 
and which have received little systematic examination up to now. We also 
probe the causes of new forms of mental and nervous stress as well as 
factors which endanger the continued maintenance of workers' skills and 
qualifications. 
THE LIMITS OF EXISTING CONCEPTS 
The idea that the application of new technologies involves changes in 
sensory perception during the work process is generally accepted among 
social scientists. The changes come mainly from the increasing 
technological intervention in the relationship between workers and their 
work tasks on the one hand and production processes on the other. The 
element of technical mediation is by no means a new one, yet with the 
utilization of new technologies it is attaining new quantitative (more fields 
of application) and qualitative (data processing, progressive automation) 
dimensions. Existing work analysis concepts, however, are inadequate for 
grasping, let alone assessing, the resulting changes occurring in sensory 
perception. To date, the sensorial components involved in the work process 
have only been considered in terms of their implications for imposing 
physical strain on the individual (noise, heat, demands made on physical 
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endurance). When sensory perception is seen in connection with its effect 
on the work process, then concepts come to the fore which are primarily 
oriented to the cognitive, rational model of receiving and processing infor-
mation. A characteristic of this model is that without cognitive, rational 
interpretation, whatever is perceived sensorially remains at the level of 
simple, physiological 'stimulus-response processes' and more or less auto-
matic motor sequences. This is particularly evident in the category of 
'sensory motor skills'. The 'theory of action regulation' (Hacker, Volpert) 
places this category at the lowest level of action regulation that is shaped 
and controlled by cognitive, rational processes. Without rational thought, 
action takes place purely on the basis of primary physiological and 
mechanical processes or the remnants of what used to be governed by 
cognitive, rational processes (habitualization).2 Such an interpretation is in 
keeping with the theories of sensory perception developed and accepted in 
general (psychological and physiological) research on perception, par-
ticularly since the turn around to the domination of cognitive psychology 
has taken place.3 With this approach, however, the tendency is to greatly 
belittle the practical significance of sensory perception for actions and to 
describe it in biased terms. 
If one examines actual work actions, one runs into a number of 
phenomena that are difficult to fit into the currently accepted analysis of 
sensory perception. Examples of this are, for instance, the frequently 
mentioned 'feeling for the material' or such work practices as being guided 
by the sound of a machine during its monitoring and inspection. Similarly, 
there are reports of skilled workers engaged in the monitoring of highly 
automated facilities having (or indeed requiring) a 'sixth sense' that antici-
pates what the instruments are going to indicate or do not indicate at all. 
Important decisions are often made - particularly by skilled workers - on 
the basis of feelings, without rational grounds. 
Another example is 'technical sensitivity',4 a category with a firm tradi-
tion in industrial sociology. More recent discussions refer to skills of this 
type in such terms as 'tacit skills' and 'empirical knowledge' (Wood 1986; 
Polanyi 1985; Malsch 1987). However, here too, one finds only a rather 
vague reference without a precise explanation of what is really meant5 
In view of the increasing utilization of computer-based information, 
control and communication technologies, it is becoming increasingly rele-
vant to subject such phenomena within the work process to a systematic 
analysis especially since these phenomena seem to be affected by changes 
in the work process that are currently emerging. Moreover, they play an 
important part in debates about the differences between man and the 
computer and about the limits of artificial intelligence.6 
In the following, we shall present our findings on this topic. Our studies 
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are aimed at broadening the analysis of sensory perception. This means that 
sensory perception is not viewed in isolation but in its relations with other 
components of work-related actions.7 Within the framework of industrial 
sociological research there are connections to research approaches in which 
'subjectivity' is discussed as a constitutive factor in the human capacity for 
work. Within the framework of research into the psychology and science of 
work there are links to approaches aimed at a 'contrastive analysis of 
work'.8 
We shall proceed by describing some theoretical concepts for an 
extended analysis of sensory perception; then, we shall present the findings 
of our empirical studies and, finally, point out some consequences for 
further research. 
SENSORY PERCEPTION AND SUBJECTIFYING ACTION 
For our investigation it is expedient to distinguish between objectifying and 
subjectifying action. The category of 'objectifying action' refers to forms 
of action which - in correspondence with the predominant consensus - are 
performed according to rationally grounded action (see, for example, 
Habermas 1981). The basis for this form of action is a specific shaping of 
sensory perception, of the relationship to the (social and physical) environ-
ment and in the dealings with it, and the role played by feelings. It is 
characterized by a distance between the subject and the environment which 
is seen as being different from and independent of the subject doing the 
action. Moreover, there is the assumption that the environment displays 
generally valid, and in this sense, objectifiable characteristics and 
properties. To recognize these characteristics and properties and use them 
in practical action is the key aim of objectifying action. Thus sensory 
perception of this kind occurs based on the exact and reliable collection of 
(objective) information. Furthermore, it is a sensory perception which leads 
to a far more adequate understanding of the environment and appropriate 
forms of action if it is guided and interpreted by the intellect (compre-
hended, categorized, etc.). Knowledge that derives from scientific method 
and action based upon it are prototypical for such objectifying action (at 
least in theory). This coincides with the separation of sensory perception 
from subjective feeling. From this perspective, feelings are primarily an 
intra-psychic occurrence in the sense of individual states of experience 
(well-being/ill-being, happiness/unhappiness). They are thus wrapped in an 
aura of 'subjective introspection'.9 Feelings either precede or succeed 
practical action; however, in the course of action itself they tend to 'disturb' 
and cause subjective distortions.10 The predominant concepts of sensory 
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perception and the analysis of work are both oriented primarily towards 
objectifying action. 
By contrast, the concept of 'subjectifying action' describes forms of 
action in which not only sensory perception, but also feelings, the rela-
tionship to the environment and the way one deals with it attain a different 
quality and significance in terms of practical action. Using the concept of 
'subjectifying action', an attempt will be made to show the various 
components of an action, e.g. intuitive action, sensory perception, and 
associative and intuitive thought, in their interactive context as elements of 
specific forms of practical action. In doing so, we shall adopt findings from 
a wide range of interdisciplinary research and apply them to this analysis.11 
We start with forms of sensory perception that can be described as a 
perceptiveness based on feelings and senses. The basis is a sort of partici-
patory perception in which the subject experiences the environment not as 
something separate, but rather as a part or even an extension of himself. 
This is, for instance, like a hearing which 'listens to itself. This use of the 
senses is commonly referred to as 'sensing' or 'feeling'. This sort of 
sensory perception does not take place in a fragmented and isolated way via 
individual sensory organs; it is all-embracing and is connected to the entire 
body.12 
The basis for this kind of sensory perception is a relationship with the 
environment which can be termed 'sympathetic'. The subject doing the 
acting experiences the environment (things and people) not as unfamiliar, 
external objects, but as belonging to himself or herself; in the process of 
taking action they form a 'unity'. While in action the person seeks to 
synchronize his/her action with the environment. In this way, non-human 
things are made quasi 'human'. This does not mean that human qualities are 
projected onto them. The crux is that in performing an action, the subject 
identifies with characteristics and properties of the environment so that the 
person acting and the object being acted upon draw closer together and 
become more similar. In this sense, the environment becomes a subject. 
Also characteristic of sensory perception are ways of acting in which the 
fundamental elements are empathy and subjective involvement in the sense 
of 'getting involved'. The mimetic, identificational reproduction of 
motions as well as dialogical ways of acting in which the subject neither 
influences nor reacts to his environment one-sidedly, but rather strives for 
a certain result through a process of mutual exchange, and 'shared en-
deavour' are vitally important. A constitutive element is the receptiveness 
to the possibilities inherent within and offered by both objects and persons 
which only come about or are developed by coming into contact with them. 
Action is therefore characterized by the union and simultaneousness of 
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action and reaction; the effects of one's own action are experienced directly 
and at the same time have the effect of directing action. Planned action is 
no hindrance to proceeding in such a way, provided enough space is left for 
the unity of active and reactive action. 
Sensory perception and feeling cannot be separated in the ways of acting 
described here. The relationship of feeling to the object is fundamentally 
important. It is the medium in which the connection between subject and 
environment gets produced. In conjunction with sensory perception, feeling 
is an important factor in the recognition of properties and qualities in the 
environment as well as for the regulation of action. This kind of intuitive 
recognition has its counterpart in an intuitive, empathic way of thinking in 
which feeling, thinking and sensory perception are various aspects of the 
same process. Such intuitive recognition is based essentially on experiences 
which in this context should be understood as 'getting involved' and not 
merely as practice versus theory. 
As described here, subjectifying and objectifying action are not hier-
archically related, nor can they be reduced to nor substitute one another 
because each does something different. The fundamental point is the 
proposition that both subjectifying and objectifying action can focus on 
gaining knowledge about the environment which is relevant for action and 
on organizing that action in a suitable way.13 The relevant insights and rules 
governing subjectifying action could be 'supra-individual' - that is, shared 
and effective at the collective level. What is crucial is that they are inte-
grated into concrete actions and can only be experienced, imparted and 
learned in this way; they cannot be isolated and in this sense 'objectifying'. 
We do not, therefore, consider it a correct scientific premise to attribute 
subjectifying action only to certain social areas, e.g. to the so-called cultural 
sphere or processes of interpersonal interaction and communication. 
Rather, it is our thesis that subjectifying action is indeed significant in the 
work process, particularly in dealing with things, i.e. work materials, tools 
and machines. Such a thesis cannot, of course, be grounded on only theories 
and concepts (although in this area, too, a number of further studies are both 
possible and necessary). Rather, an empirical base is also necessary. In our 
opinion, two things need to be accomplished in this area: first to demon-
strate how the forms of sensory perception and ways of acting as defined by 
the concept of subjectifying action are essential aspects of practical work 
actions. Second - and this was our initial point of departure - it has to be 
shown that important changes in the work process after the introduction of 
information, communication and control technology can only be identified 
and analyzed when the concept of subjectifying action is adopted. In the 
following, we shall present examples of empirical findings which fulfil this 
twofold objective using a selected area of industrial production. The focus 
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will be on skilled workers' activities at conventional and CNC-machine 
tools in the mechanical engineering industry.14 
A N EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF SUBJECTIFYING 
WORK-RELATED ACTION - SKILLED WORK AT 
CONVENTIONAL MACHINES 
Taking the example of skilled workers' activities at conventional machines, 
we shall demonstrate that working practices such as going by the sound of 
a machine or the feeling for materials are based essentially on a subjec-
tifying type of action.15 In conventional manufacturing processes this kind 
of work action is an important part of the worker's skill and the way he does 
his work. The following section discusses the essential characteristics of 
work-related action.16 
Sensory perception mainly takes place via several senses simul-
taneously, i.e. the eye, the ear, hand, and the body and movements of the 
body. Manual movements, such as turning a handle or mounting a work-
piece are not isolated, individual manipulations that exist by themselves. 
Seeing and hearing, too, are directly connected to movements of the body 
which change angles and distances. If one takes a closer look at the use of 
the senses, it becomes clear that an important part is played by precisely the 
perception of those circumstances that cannot be identified and defined 
objectively, rationally and unambiguously. It is, for instance, imperative 
that skilled workers check and identify defects and disturbances using the 
sound of the machine and the various processing operations. What it is 
exactly that skilled workers hear and how they recognize whether 
'everything is running smoothly' during operation, 'cannot be precisely 
described and measured', to quote one skilled worker. It is clear that 
'feeling' plays a particularly important role. This becomes evident when 
workers describe how they can recognize faults by the sound of the 
machine. Comments are made such as: 'You have to hear, to feel if its 
running smoothly'. The same is also true for tactile contact to work equip-
ment, for example, in the use of the hand: 'You feel it in your hand. The 
hand recognizes something. To mount a work piece, you need that feeling 
in your hands. You couldn't do anything with just a gauge. A gauge is only 
important in confirming what your hands feel and tell you.' And in the case 
of visual perception: besides having to read off measured values and scales, 
you have to have the 'right eye' for material properties and tool wear and 
tear. Here, too, it is emphasized that, 'only a skilled worker with a feeling 
for it would see that.' 
Sensory perception is closely connected to a specific relationship to the 
machine and the materials. Skilled workers have not only an objective and 
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impersonal relationship with their machines, but also an extremely 
'personal' one. One hears of skilled workers being 'fused with' or 'married 
to' their machines and that 'man and machine make up a unit'. Neither the 
skilled workers themselves nor their superiors see this merely as an ex-
pression of some kind of personal need. They stress quite emphatically that 
this kind of relationship to the machine is necessary because each machine 
has its 'bugs', and even two identical machines each have their own 
peculiarities. For this reason it is necessary to have an 'intimate' knowledge 
of the machine. 
It is characteristic for the skilled worker's handling of machines and of 
the way he works that he does not work 'on' the machine inasmuch as he 
sets certain work processes in motion or operates the machine. Instead, he 
works 'with' the machine as if it were a tool. For this way of working it is 
essential for the skilled worker to believe that the machine only executes 
the desired processes because he is operating and controlling it. The object 
of the work process is not the machine but the particular workpiece being 
processed by the machine. Correspondingly, the processes being executed 
by the machine become a part of the worker's own operations and are 
directly connected with them - the same as with a tool. Here are some 
typical statements to corroborate this: 'The machine is like a tool to me. 
After all, on their own, conventional machines cannot do anything at all, so 
the machine is like a tool'. Tools in this sense are seen as something 
belonging to one's person, representing a sort of extension of one's own 
'organs'. In this connection it is essential to be 'able to handle' the machine. 
An important basis for this is manual control, i.e. control via knobs and 
handles. As one skilled worker expressed it: 'With the knob in your hand, 
you have the machine under control. I can feel what I'm doing in my 
hands'. By proceeding in this way, the worker is adding a subjective 
dimension to his execution of the machine operations. This means he has to 
'get fully involved' with his machine - or in the words of one skilled 
worker: 'That is, so to speak, getting into the machine. It hurts when the 
machine is running badly'. Even though work with the machine proceeds 
according to a strict schedule, workers execute the individual machining 
operations step by step. Typical is a way of working which displays the 
characteristic dialogical or interactive action: each step in a process builds 
on the one before it by taking into account the preceding results. This means 
that in a sense the material's 'response' to a processing step is taken into 
account. Experimenting with the machine and thus gradually finding out its 
full capacity for performance plays an important part in this regard. 
Feeling plays a part in this way of working not merely in the sense of 
affective satisfaction or job motivation. Instead, it is an important basis for 
perceiving, recognizing and assessing the properties of materials and 
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machining operations and for regulating the execution of jobs. This is par-
ticularly clear in the case of the sensory perceptions described above. What 
is perceived and the way in which it is interpreted takes place to a large 
extent on the basis of feelings. Examples of this are to be found in such 
statements as: 'What you hear or don't hear depends on whether you have 
a feeling for it or not.' Similar statements are heard in the case of visual, 
optical perception: 'Everyone sees things differently and if someone 
doesn't have a feel for it, then he simply can't see it; it's a matter of feeling.' 
What is most significant here is the fact that 'intuitive perception and 
judgement are not in any way seen as being 'just a feeling' which would 
lead to uncertainty and only tentative assessments. On the contrary: it is 
precisely the intuitive assessments which lend certainty and confidence in 
handling both machines and materials. Therefore, feelings are assessed as a 
necessary prerequisite for carrying out a task in the same way as theoretical 
and expert knowledge. This becomes particularly clear when theoretical 
knowledge is compared with feelings. Seen from the point of view of the 
skilled worker, technicians and engineers often lack the right feeling: 'An 
engineer knows an awful lot, but he has no feeling for it. Only the skilled 
worker has that' - is one of many typical statements. 
We should not jump to the conclusion that such a way of working can 
be explained by the skilled workers' inability to proceed according to the 
criteria and findings of technical, scientific rationality - in the sense that 
they lack the qualifications. On the contrary, it is clear that if they con-
centrate exclusively on such criteria, they would not be able to fulfil the 
tasks and challenges that face them. Points that should be stressed in 
particular are: peculiarities of the material, i.e. different material 
properties that are influenced by a number of factors which cannot each be 
identified and measured individually; variations within basically similar 
work processes as well as deviations from the norm; peculiarities of 
individual machines ('bugs') and the necessity to improvise and take into 
account the unpredictable, particularly with new products and when 
correcting errors. 
Our empirical findings suggest that such ways of working are far more 
than a preliminary stage on the way towards scientific analytical thinking, 
or indeed, basically inferior to such thinking. They tend, rather, to be an 
independent and - in this sense - qualitatively different form of 'grasping' 
reality which is needed to complement the technical, scientific way of 
getting to the bottom of the production process. 
USING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
The following sections will show in what way those elements of work 
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based on subjectifying actions are effected when computer-based infor-
mation and control technologies are introduced. 
Our studies centred on activities at CNC-machines. According to our 
investigations, the most important technical and organizational changes 
when using CNC-machines as opposed to conventional production tech-
nology are: 
1 Control over the machines ensues from a computer program by which 
the actual production runs and individual machining steps on the 
machines are directed. 'Manual control' is also changing as the result of 
electronic control equipment. 
2 The creation of programs can be organized along various lines. 
Centralized programming in the planning or technical departments and 
the so-called 'shop-floor' programming directly at the machine roughly 
represent the two poles of work organization solutions. 
3 Individual machines are more complex, i.e. several machining oper-
ations are being performed on single machines (especially machining 
centres). 
4 Machines are increasingly enclosed. 
5 As a rule the use of CNC-machines goes hand in hand with flexible 
assignment of personnel and a proliferation of shift work. 
Our studies concentrated on activities that can be termed skilled work. For 
the most part the creation of programs in this area takes place centrally (i.e. 
not at the machine), but the skilled worker is still left with important 
functions to perform, such as: optimization of programs, i.e. their adap-
tation to the actual conditions of the machines; running in of the programs; 
inspecting and monitoring the performance of machining operations; cor-
recting malfunctions. This is why activities of this type are also referred to 
as skilled work tasks with 'de facto competence to act'. Studies show that 
activities of this kind currently predominate in the production of small and 
medium-sized series.17 
In existing studies in industrial sociology, these developments are 
assessed mainly positively, especially when viewed in contrast to a 
lowering of skill requirements toward semi-skilled production.18 However, 
our investigations reveal that the subjectifying coming to terms with job 
requirements is affected in several - partially contradictory - ways by these 
developments. It is under these working conditions where you will find 
some major reasons for a number of new problems and risks in the work 
process. There are signs in particular that: 
1 The subjectifying execution of job requirements is being repressed, 
undermined and impeded, yet at the same time 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
2 new requirements are arising for subjectifying work activities, but the 
necessary technical and organizational foundations are lacking. 
These two developments are interactive in the actual work situation. After 
they are described briefly, attention will be drawn to the associated stresses 
and risks for workers. 
Repression of subjectifying work-related action 
The key to this change does not lie in particular factors, but is more of a 
syndrome, in which changes in the control system and in the outer 
appearance of the machine (notably its casing), the flexible assignment of 
personnel and greater integration of on-the-machine activity within the 
overall production sequence are mutually reinforcing. These developments 
are leading to a complex change in work overall. 
Skilled workers and their superiors share more or less the same opinion 
with regard to the relationship to machines: 'Of course, there isn't the same 
kind of relationship with the new machines as there was with the con-
ventional ones.' At the same time, it is always stressed that: 'Intimate 
knowledge of the machine isn't important anymore. You don't need to be 
intimate with the machine any more.' Some superiors and management 
representatives no longer think it desirable for skilled workers to have such 
a close relationship to the machine, because: 'It must be possible for the 
CNC-worker to rely fully on the proper functioning of the machine . . . 
What's important for the person at the machine is what comes out of the 
machine. He doesn't need to be interested in the machine's inner work-
ings.' Flexible assignment of personnel is yet another obstacle to the 
development of a machine-worker relationship of the type described above. 
Use of electronic controls is resulting in an important change for the 
handling of machines (way of working). The manual control that remains is 
restricted essentially to pressing a button or activating a switch to trigger 
the desired operations. The possibility of regulating machining operations 
directly (as the worker experiences it) is thus limited. Skilled workers 
emphasize that they have to rely on 'the machine doing the right thing', 
without being able to exert a direct influence on it. A typical comment in 
this regard is: 'You used to have the machine under control, especially 
when moving the spindle up to the workpiece. This used to be done by 
hand. With the CNC-machine the skilled worker has to rely on the machine 
moving up to the workpiece at high speed and stopping at the right point.' 
This is why infinitely variable speed control is considered a major advance 
in the design of control systems. The man at the machine, so it is stressed, 
'has nothing left in his hand'. These changes are often illustrated by the 
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example of driving a car. You have to imagine driving a car that is con-
trolled by just buttons and switches and no steering-wheel. Then imagine 
the situation where you are sitting in such a car approaching a house at a 
speed of 100 km/h, and you have to rely on it stopping two meters in front 
of the house or reducing speed in good time to drive around a bend -
whichever is programmed. Everything has to be planned in advance. In the 
actual execution of machining operations you have to 'trust' both the 
technology and the programs. On a CNC-machine it is no longer possible 
to perform the various machining operations 'step by step' and with each 
step succeeding from the last as with conventional machines. For workers 
the consequences are: 'It used to be possible to watch and make decisions 
during the machining operation with the intention of delaying tool wear by 
lowering the cutting rate. You can't do this any more. You have to decide 
and plan everything in advance. Direct reactions to changes in the work 
process are impossible. The most you can do is switch off prematurely.' 
The change in sensory perception in light of these developments makes 
it clear that the loss of direct 'graspable' control and influence of the 
machine is a central point. One of the main differences between a CNC-
machine and a conventional machine is emphasized thus: 'There aren't any 
handwheels any longer on a CNC-machine.' The important thing here is 
that the skilled worker used to be able to 'sense in his hand' what he was 
putting into effect. Even the visual perception of the machining operations 
is being obstructed and impeded. The main factors here are: higher speed; 
complexity of the machining operations, making it impossible to view 
everything 'simultaneously'; encasement of the machines, obstructing 
access to the machine and impairing visual contact. These changes are 
mutually dependent. High speeds, for example, necessitate the use of 
coolant, and lead - in the event of tool breakage - to a higher risk of 
accident. Therefore, the machines must be increasingly encased. But: 
'One's view of the machining operation is reduced by the encasement.' In 
an extreme case this means: 'If you can't see anything any longer, you have 
to rely on the program, and that's very unsafe.' And finally, there is also 
impairment of the worker's acoustic perception. Certainly, the greater 
protection against noise and dirt provided by the encasement is viewed 
positively. But this also 'makes it more difficult to set up and run-in the 
machine, because you can no longer hear and see as well as you used to'. 
For skilled workers, a major factor in the impairment of visual and 
acoustic perception is the (poor) accessibility to the machine. It is no longer 
possible, or at least not to the same extent as it was with a conventional 
machine, for a worker to arrange and alter his distance and angle of vision 
to the machine - to suit requirements - by moving the whole body. To use 
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the skilled workers' own words, you can no longer 'go straight up to' or 
'walk around the machine'. 
Finally, the worker's intuitive judgement and discernment are impeded 
in various ways by these developments. Far more than on conventional 
machines it is necessary to set up the 'empirical processes' in objectifiable 
scientific and technical data and in (mathematical) relationships. The 
development of intuitive judgements is getting impaired to an even greater 
extent. This finds clear expression in a skilled worker's assertion that: 'In 
the long run, CNC-workers are losing their skills by working on machining 
centres. They no longer come into contact with the workpieces in these 
situations. Part of the worker's skill, namely his sense of precision, is 
vanishing.' 
The need for subjectifying work-related action remains and is 
developing new forms 
CNC-machines place requirements on workers, which - according to our 
analyses - they can only fulfil through subjectifying work action. In spite 
of the changes mentioned above, companies stress that the most crucial 
factor in the optimization of programs and the monitoring of machining 
operations is the skilled worker's special knowledge of the practical 
situation.19 A machine company owner's comment is typical in this regard: 
'The skilled worker continues to be important because of the unpredictables, 
it isn't possible to plan for everything. Nothing can be planned 100 per 
cent.' And this tallies with a skilled worker's assessments: 'The skilled 
worker's contribution is his knowledge of practicalities in the CNC field. 
The skilled worker contributes his practical experience as a supplement to 
the program during optimization. This is the point where the skilled worker 
is vital.' Skilled workers and their superiors also share the opinion that it is 
as important now as it ever was for the skilled worker to be able to 'hear' 
tool wear - when monitoring the machining operations - so as to be able to 
intervene in time or at least prevent consequential damage. The resultant 
situation is thus a contradictory one for skilled workers. On the one hand, 
the technical and organizational bases for subjectifying interaction with his 
work are impaired, but on the other hand, these actions are necessary at 
CNC-machines. In the actual work situation this means that skilled workers 
try to engage in subjectifying work actions - in a sense - against the flow 
of changes dismantling such actions. A few examples of this follow. 
1 Skilled workers try to acquire 'trust in technology', even at CNC-
machines. Here it is important - as is partially the case with some newer 
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control systems - for the speed to be direcdy regulatable when running 
in the machine and when optimizing the program. The following com-
ment is typical in this regard: 'You feel safer with a switch you can keep 
pressed down than with one you just turn on and off. I know that what 
I'm doing at that moment, the machine is doing, too.' If this is so, you 
have the feeling - at least to a limited extent - of 'having a grip' on the 
machine, even if it is a CNC-machine. 
2 To improve visual perception - especially during optimization and 
running in of programs - the worker will try to open the machine casing 
or enter into the encased machining operation. 
3 One response to impeded visual monitoring is to shift to the sense of 
'hearing'. In the words of one skilled worker: 'When you can't see and 
can't get a look inside, you've no option but to listen.' An assertion 
typical in this regard is: 'I monitor 60 per cent by ear and at most 30 per 
cent by sight. For the remaining 10 per cent you can't do anything.' 
4 Skilled workers on CNC-machines develop an ability that may be 
termed 'abstract perceptiveness'. What this means is creating a mental 
image of processes and operations, independent from direct sensory 
perception. It is important when operating buttons and switches, for 
example, to imagine which operations are being triggered on the 
machines and what the machine is doing. To quote a skilled worker: 
'Only when you have an idea of what the machine does will you be able 
to reconstruct the action.' Skilled workers describe it in these terms: 
'You used to feel it in your hand when turning the crank. Today you have 
to sense whether the machine is doing something, without touching 
anything.' The same is done when checking the program: 'With compli-
cated parts I drive the program step by step. I imagine in my mind what 
the machine is doing.' 
5 Finally, skilled workers, when monitoring machining operations - in the 
so-called 'down times' - try to behave in a way that is not just 'passive 
and reactive'. Even when they seem to have 'nothing to do', they are 
trying to reconstruct the machining operations and 'stay on the ball'. 
Secondary activities such as reading the newspaper, doing crossword 
puzzles or chatting with colleagues are not a contradiction, but actually 
make possible or support the work. These secondary activities, in fact, 
create a situation in which the workers can 'immerse' themselves in their 
work and - as on conventional machines - 'be on the ball with all five 
senses'. A foreman's comment was: 'Reading a newspaper doesn't have 
a negative effect on work. On the contrary. People want to have some-
thing to do to stay attentive. It's funny and strange - but the work doesn't 
suffer from it.' 
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New types of strain 
Skilled workers need to employ their 'old' skills on CNC-machines, too, 
but - as has been shown - their attempts to do so are simultaneously 
obstructed and impeded in numerous ways by changes in technology and 
work organization. Our findings show that it is precisely this contradictory 
situation which contains important catalysts for a number of new sources of 
strain and risk for workers.20 Here, these can only be summarized briefly as 
follows: 
1 Skilled workers feel overtaxed and under pressure, because on the one 
hand they are responsible for the machine, but on the other they 'don't 
have it under their control any longer'. It is notable that demands on the 
workers' responsibility are tending to increase rather than decrease due 
to the higher costs of the machine, increasing down-times and defective 
piece production. The following summary drawn by a foreman can be 
taken as typical of this situation: 'The greater stress arises because the 
skilled worker has more responsibility for the products than before, but 
is less and less able to influence and control the machine.' 
2 Skilled workers are subjected to mental stress because they have to 
concentrate more and always keep their minds on their work. This stress 
does not arise because the workers are unable to concentrate or think in 
mathematical terms and programming rules. They are caused more by 
the fact that the skilled worker's task - as opposed, say, to a programmer 
- is to consider the practical conditions on the machine at the same time 
as the theoretical ones. For them it is not only important that a program 
be correct. It must also prove successful in actual practice on the 
machine. Even a perfect program can prove deficient if certain par-
ticulars of the machine and the material were not taken into account. Yet 
precisely this is what is difficult to calculate in advance, and is, in any 
case, possible only to a limited degree. The skilled worker is under 
pressure, therefore, always to think of 'what might happen.' and 
'whether they've thought of everything.' He is never certain of himself 
because his questions cannot be answered until the machine is running. 
And in most cases it is no longer possible to prevent the defects that then 
arise. This uncertainty means that the skilled worker is unable to 'switch 
off in his spare time. To quote one skilled worker: 'You have to have 
everything in your head. And if you're having to think all the time 
whether everything's o.k., whether you've made a mistake or forgotten 
something, you simply can't switch off after work. You keep running 
mentally in top gear - and that's stress.' 
If skilled workers try to transfer the working methods customary on 
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conventional machines to a CNC-machine, they will feel more secure on 
the one hand, but they will also end up with new problems. If the casing is 
opened when the machine is being run, or if the workers enter the 
machining space, there is a greater risk of accident. If they try to be guided 
by the noise of the machine, this is all the more difficult because of the 
overall higher noise level - not to mention the effect of removing the 
machine casing - and requires a higher level of 'concentration'. Attempts 
to listen to the 'right' noise results in a higher sensitivity to other sources of 
noise and thus to higher stress on the psyche and nerves. 
If skilled workers try to fill their down times with secondary activities, 
they find themselves in conflict with job discipline. There is also the risk 
that these secondary activities will be used as a reason to give them extra 
jobs to do (especially operating several machines). 'Side jobs' of this type, 
however, make it difficult to have the necessary attentiveness. It is possible 
simultaneously to monitor a machine by ear and read a newspaper, but not 
both to monitor one machine and optimize another. Workers are forced, 
therefore, either to forgo secondary activities, such as reading a news-
paper, or else to keep them secret In the words of one skilled worker: 'The 
skilled worker used to be on his toes. Today he just needs to pretend to be 
on his toes. 
Problems arise even when skilled workers adapt to the new situation. For 
workers this means they have to reconcile themselves to no longer being 
able to influence and control the new machines in the same way as con-
ventional machines. This means you just have to 'grin and bear the in-
creasing problems'. More than anything else this entails 'having to become 
thicker skinned and trying "not to be so sensitive about the work any more'" 
- in either the positive or negative sense. But not only does this make the 
work less interesting and satisfying, skilled workers also run the risk of 
being considered unreliable, irresponsible, disinterested and unskilled. In 
other words, they are putting into question precisely those qualifications 
and working practices on which a company's interest in the use of skilled 
workers is essentially based. 
Finally, there is the risk when working on CNC-machines of forgetting 
or of no longer being able to learn and develop that special 'empirical 
knowledge' of the skilled worker. The prevailing opinion is: 'You can't 
learn these essential basics on a CNC-machine. If you had only CNC-
machines - it wouldn't work out' In the skilled worker's eyes, 'Work on 
conventional machines is important for getting a feel for what a machine 
does and can do.' It is, above all, the experience which is acquired on 
conventional machines and transferred to die CNC-machine that plays an 
important part in precisely this capacity for 'abstract perceptiveness'. But 
how is such 'empirical knowledge' to be acquired in future if production -
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particularly in conjunction with a more extensive interlinkage of data 
systems (CIM etc.) - is converted increasingly to CNC-machines. This is a 
problem that is just beginning to emerge, and one which appears to be 
intensifying. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR FUTURE ANALYSES OF WORK AND 
OPEN QUESTIONS 
It is a common opinion that the problem outlined in this paper is only a 
question of short-term adaptation and transition. Our findings, however, do 
not speak for such an assessment. More investigations have to be carried 
out to see to what extent such developments occur in other areas of 
production and whether the results of this study can be generally applied to 
the use of information and control technologies. 
On the basis of our results up to now it is clear that the repression of 
subjectifying action as well as the contradictory demands made on workers 
have to be investigated more closely. The question involves developments 
which cannot merely be limited to dequalification as in the case of 
Tayloristic work forms. The greater weight placed on objectifying actions 
at work could result in a maintenance, and even the creation of 'qualified 
tasks', as well as an expansion in the scope of job discretion and decision-
making for workers. The main issue here, however, is the qualitative 
changes in the qualifications necessary in the work process. Therefore, it 
does not make any sense to put these changes in categories such as 'more -
less' or 'higher - lower'. For future investigations it is necessary to clarify 
in what ways the skilled worker tasks described here appear in other areas 
of industrial production, especially in process industries. 
The repression of subjectifying actions does not lose any of its power 
just because in practice it turns out that such work actions are still neces-
sary. On the contrary, as our findings show, even though 'empirical 
knowledge' is expected from workers as before, the foundations and pre-
conditions for the necessary (subjectifying) work actions are endangered. 
The design and development of the technical system are overwhelmingly 
oriented to the objectification of work actions. 
Our investigations demonstrate that subjectifying actions at work are an 
important part of what the worker can contribute to the work process. A 
central question surrounding this issue is what effects, both within and 
outside of the company, can be expected if the development and application 
of subjectifying work actions are endangered. Future studies will have to 
clarify not only how this leads to new problems in the production process, 
but also what deep-seated changes could occur in dealing with life outside 
of the workplace. 
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In terms of the design of technology and work organization, we are not 
trying to portray work forms for the skilled worker on conventional 
machines nostalgically. It is impossible to ignore the existing strains and 
restrictions that have characterized conventional tasks in industrial pro-
duction up to now. The question is not one of a return to 'old' technology. 
The decisive point is to discover whether it would be possible and which 
practical approaches might exist to set up future developments in tech-
nology and organization systematically so as to facilitate the use of 
subjectifying action at work. 
Social scientists have the challenge to take the analyses of work outlined 
here and develop them further both at a theoretical and conceptual level as 
well as at an empirical one. There is no doubt that this research issue is one 
which extends beyond the boundaries of industrial sociology. This topic 
can only be dealt with 'collectively' through interdisciplinary research. We 
hope that the analysis presented here will act as a stimulus for this future 
research. 
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Part III 
CIM and Organizational 
Change in the Mechanical 
Engineering Industries 
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9 Diffusion of CIM-Technologies -
Dynamic Dissemination and 
Alternative Paths of Innovation1 
Rainer Schultz-Wild 
INTRODUCTION 
The CIM trend appears to be well under way. Discussions and debates on 
the 'factory of the future' have given rise to speculations concerning the 
present use of computer-integrated automation technology which are, in 
many respects, exaggerated and overdrawn. A survey in the West German 
capital goods industry reveals that there is still a long way to go towards the 
realization of fully automated and computer-integrated manufacturing. 
However, we are currently experiencing a dynamic diffusion of CIM-
components, but without the emergence of a uniform model of future 
factory and work structures. Therefore the effects accompanying the appli-
cation of this type of technology reported by companies are varied and 
partly contradictory. 
TOWARDS THE FACTORY OF THE FUTURE: A NEW TYPE OF 
RATIONALIZATION 
Discussions on the 'factory of the future' refer almost exclusively to the 
new technologies of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM). One major 
approach within the field of engineering sciences is that material tech-
nology and information technology will merge to form a new type of 
production technology, namely 'an information machine oriented to pro-
duction technology, or a production machine with integrated information 
technology' (Spur 1986: 7). Such perspectives still reflect the old ideal 
upheld by engineering sciences of the fully automated factory. It might 
appear that there were few alternatives to this development. 
In the 1970s initial attempts were made by pioneering companies to 
extend the integration of computer and control systems which had been 
utilized up until then in a more selective and insular manner. In the early 
1980s such projects not only gained significance in engineering science 
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circles, but also in industrial practice. In view of the success in innovation 
and rationalization being reported on all sides,2 one might wonder whether 
a company without CIM-technologies could survive. 
Examples of this can be seen in the introduction of DNC systems or the 
integration of CNC-machines with transport and information systems to 
form flexible manufacturing cells and flexible manufacturing systems.3 But 
above all it is the functional expansion of production planning and control 
systems (PPC) as well as computer integration processes, starting with the 
design sector and developing in the direction of process planning and 
machine control (CAD/CAM), which seem to be playing an increasingly 
important role (see figure 9.1).4 
Thus the outlines of a new kind of rationalization process are currently 
being observed. This pattern can be termed 'systemic rationalization' (see 
chapter 4) because the implementation of CIM components and CIM 
systems encompass individual job shops and departments and tend to be 
oriented to the company as a whole. 
In view of the significance which these new innovation and 
rationalization patterns are thought to hold for economic and industrial 
development, it is surprising how little is actually known about the ways in 
which the companies are approaching computer integration, at what speed 
it is being accomplished and what the effects are on the design and structure 
of production tasks and work organization. 
CIM-COMPONENTS LESS WIDESPREAD THAN EXPECTED 
The results of our survey of about 1,100 companies of the West German 
capital goods industry (with the machine-building, electrical and 
automobile branches as its largest subgroups) provide some information on 
the following issues: the present diffusion of computer systems used in 
manufacturing processes and related services such as planning, control and 
monitoring; the extent to which company functions have been integrated by 
computers; and the speed of diffusion processes in this field of innovation.5 
The use of modern, computer-based technology is not as widespread as 
one might assume from the ongoing discussion among engineering 
scientists or the information provided by hardware and software manu-
facturers, for example at trade fairs (see figure 9.2). 
1 While most companies utilize computers in one form or another, they are 
only widespread (more than 70 per cent) in administrative areas such as 
financial and general accounting and payroll accounting, i.e. fields in 
which computer systems have been developed and available on the 
market for a long time. 
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Figure 9.1 Computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM). ISF 1991 
CNC-machine tools and other numerically controlled machines are 
fairly widespread (in about half of all companies and in approximately 
two-thirds of the machine-building companies). However, less than 4 
per cent of companies have installed more modern and complex machine 
and control systems, namely flexible manufacturing cells (FMC), 
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) or DNC-systems. 
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Figure 9.2 Computer-based technologies -1986/7 implemented or planned -
utilization rates in the West German capital goods industry (N = 1,096). ISF 1991 
3 Other CIM-components, such as industrial robots/automatic material 
handling systems (8.6 per cent), computer-based assembly systems (5.1 
per cent), storage (4.8 per cent) and material flow systems (0.7 per cent) 
still have rather low diffusion rates (in terms of the application of at least 
one system per company). 
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Less than one-fifth of the companies currently use computers in areas 
which can be termed collectively as production-related services, or for 
company functions such as planning, control and monitoring, which in 
many cases are regarded as being the key functions of future 
CIM-structures. A total of 15 per cent to 17 per cent of all companies 
employ PPC-, 6 CAP- 7 and CAD-8systems, while PDA-9systems are used in 
10 per cent of the companies and only 8 per cent use computer-aided quality 
assurance (CAQ). 
However, the application of computers and CIM-components is 
increasing in some administrative areas as well as in production-related 
services: according to the planning intentions of the companies, diffusion 
rates in areas such as design, process planning, manufacturing scheduling 
etc. will approximately double by 1990, which means that about one-third 
of the companies can be expected to fulfil these functions with the help of 
computers by the beginning of the 1990s. 
Regarding all functions, computer applications are more widespread in 
large companies than in small ones. This implies that relatively larger 
numbers of employees are potentially affected by these new technologies 
than would be indicated by the company diffusion rates. However, an 
increasing number of medium- and even small-sized companies are about 
to introduce new technologies such as PPC-systems. Viewed from this per-
spective, there will be an increase in the use of computer technology 
starting with large companies, and extending through the medium-sized 
companies right down to small companies. Thus, for example, there is a 
remarkably high rate of medium-sized companies (with 100 to 500 
employees) planning to venture into computer-based process planning/ 
programming (CAP, see figure 9.3a) or production planning and control 
(PPC, see figure 9.3b) from 1988 to 1990. 
Computer integration, in the sense of on-line computer networks 
connecting various functional areas of a given company, is just beginning 
to spread. By 1986-7 only 9 per cent of the companies had established at 
least one integration link between different functions. An increased pace of 
development can be expected in this area also. More than one-fifth (23 per 
cent) of the companies are engaged in establishing computer integration 
links such as CAP/PPC, CAD/PPC and PPC/CAM (see figure 9.4). 
DYNAMIC DIFFUSION RATES IN THE MACHINE-BUILDING 
SECTOR 
Although discussions on computer integrated manufacturing are by no 
means restricted to the machine-building industry, this sector does occupy 
a central position with regards to development and considerations 
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Figure 9.3 CAP and PPC by company size (number of workers) - utilization 
rates in the West German capital goods industry (N = 1,096). ISF 1991 
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(10.8) 
1986/7 at least one computer link implemented: 9.0% of companies. 
1986/7 at least one computer link implemented or planned: 22.9% of companies. 
The figures refer to the number of companies (in %) with computer integration between two 
functional areas, independent of whatever other integration lines may exist; the percentages 
of companies planning such integration is stated in brackets. 
Figure 9.4 Computer integration - in 1986/7 implemented or planned - West 
German capital goods industry (N = 1,096). ISF 1991 
concerning future production structures. Apart from the significance of this 
sector within German industry, this is also because the demand made for 
flexibility in scheduling and production, and in manufacturing quality, is 
particularly high. At the same time this sector is significant in terms of 
labour policies because production structures which require a high per-
centage of skilled workers still play an important role within the often 
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smaller or medium-sized machine-building companies.10 By contrast, big 
companies in the automotive and electrical industry are more strongly 
oriented towards large-scale or mass production and employ larger shares 
of unskilled or semi-skilled labour. 
To what extent do diffusion rates of computer and control technologies 
in mechanical engineering differ from the capital goods industry as a 
whole? 
The general pattern of computer diffusion is similar to that of the capital 
goods industry: mainly administrative functions are being fulfded with the 
help of computer technology. A smaller number of companies have com-
puterized production related services or are utilizing modern, complex 
machine and transport systems (see figure 9.5). Thus more than three-
quarters of machine-building companies are currently using computers for 
financial and general accounting (77.7 per cent) or for payroll accounting 
(79.3 per cent), while only about one-fifth of the companies are using 
computers for process planning/programming (20.6 per cent), engineering/ 
design (18.3 per cent) and/or production planning and control (18 per cent). 
The use of CNC-machine tools and other numerical-controlled machines 
is far more widespread in mechanical engineering than in the capital goods 
industry in general: approximately two-thirds of the machine-building 
companies (as opposed to less than half of all the other companies) have 
already had some experience with this technology; rising growth rates 
through new first-time users cannot be expected in this sector.11 
While in 1986-7 the diffusion rates of computer systems in production-
related services in the mechanical engineering industry were only slightly 
higher than the overall rates, the number of companies in this branch 
planning to implement such systems for the first time is well above average. 
According to company plans, there will be relatively more users in this 
sector than in the rest of the capital goods industry within a short period of 
time, particularly in the areas of process planning/programming (CAP -
approximately 43 per cent), production planning and control (PPC - 43 per 
cent), design and engineering (CAD - about 39 per cent) and production 
data acquisition (PDA - approximately 34 per cent). It would appear that 
machine-building companies expect that the new products for these types 
of control technologies or control systems will provide attractive solutions 
to their problems. 
Machine-building companies are increasingly attracted by computer-
based systems in production planning and control functions. This is shown 
by an analysis of diffusion according to company size. Provided the 
planned projects are carried out, about nine out of ten machine-building 
companies with 500 employees upwards will be using computer systems in 
the areas of CAD, CAP and PPC by the beginning of the 1990s (see figures 
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Figure 9.5 Utilization rates of computer-based technologies in machine-building 
industry (N = 572) and other branches of the capital goods industry (N = 524). 
ISF 1991 
9.6 and 9.7(a)). In companies with 100 to 500 employees, two-thirds are 
expected to use computers in the PPC area in the near future. The same also 
holds for CAD and CAP systems as well as for the application of PDA. 
Even in companies with less than 100 employees, increases of between 20 
and 40 per cent in the rates of computer application are anticipated. 
However, the introduction of computer-based quality assurance systems 
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Figure 9.6 CAD and CAP by company size (number of workers) utilization rates 
in the West German machine-building industry (N = 572). ISF 1991 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
a) PPC 
1-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000 + 
b)C 
Planned in 1986/7 
Implemented by 
1986/7 
1-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000 + 
Figure 9.7 PPC and CAQ by company size (number of workers) - utilization 
rates in the West German machine-building industry (N = 572). ISF 1991 
(CAQ, see figure 9.7(b)) is apparently of lesser interest for the majority of 
machine-building companies.12 
An above average rate of computer integration of production related 
functions is notable in mechanical engineering.13 A total of 12 per cent have 
realized at least one internal network (as opposed to the 9 per cent average 
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in the capital goods industry), whereas 31 per cent are planning or realizing 
an on-line network (as opposed to an average of 23 per cent). Also many 
machine-building companies are investing in these computer-integration 
technologies for the first time (compare Schultz-Wild et al. 1989:69). 
The types of integration lines which have been established in 
mechanical engineering so far are mainly between the functions CAP/CAM 
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1986/7 at least one computer link implemented: 12.1% of machine building companies. 
1986/7 at least one computer link implemented or planned: 31.2% of machine building companies. 
The figures refer to the number of companies (in %) with computer integration between two 
functional areas, independent of whatever other integration lines may exist; the percentages 
of companies planning such integration is stated in brackets. 
Figure 9.8 Computer integration - in 1986/7 implemented or planned - West 
German machine-building industry (N = 572). ISF 1991 
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(5.3 per cent), PPC/CAP (4.9 per cent), PPC/CAM (4.4 per cent), CAD/ 
CAP (3 per cent) and CAD/CAM (2.8 per cent, see figure 9.8). As far as the 
types of networks planned are concerned, the most favoured are CAD/PPC 
(15 per cent), CAD/CAP (15 per cent) and PPC/CAP (14.7 per cent). 
Vertical and horizontal types of networks are planned equally often where-
as the integration of quality assurance systems still lags a long way behind. 
These survey findings indicate clearly that, for the entire capital goods 
industry as well as for mechanical engineering, while the process of factory 
automation being discussed under the term CIM is still in its infancy, there 
are changes under way in precisely those areas which are being focused on 
in labour policy debates concerning 'new production concepts' (Kern, 
Schumann 1984; chapter 1 of this volume), i.e. (re-)skilling of industrial 
work, etc. 
ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF INNOVATION 
More comprehensive and detailed analyses of company innovation pro-
cesses reveal, contrary to the impression often gained from engineering 
science circles, that in mechanical manufacturing of small- and medium-
sized series, no uniform model of technology application and computer-
based integration is evident (Hirsch-Kreinsen, Schultz-Wild 1990,1990a). 
Technical CIM components or systems and developments observed in user 
companies can be differentiated according to the main points of departure 
of innovation policies and the work concepts inherent in technology. 
The predominant points of departure and prime objectives of 
introducing computer-based integration technologies differ according to 
criteria, such as: 
1 more office-oriented versus workshop-oriented concepts of technology 
and innovation; 
2 the predominance of 'horizontal' integration strategies centred on PPC-
functions versus the option of 'vertical' integration oriented toward 
CAD/CAM-networks; 
3 the prevalence of technological data processing versus business data 
processing in the company implementation and rationalization process; 
and 
4 the scope and degree of the desired computer-networking within and 
beyond the company. 
The influence technological systems available on the market exert on the 
design of company and work organization, and the use of skills, particularly 
on the shop-floor, differ according to two fundamental concepts in tech-
nology: 
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1 Most technology systems and components contain implicitly defined 
'Tayloristic'-oriented design rules which are 'ready wired' and exert a 
strong influence in the direction of centralized planning, controlling and 
supervising functions, increased division of labour and - at least in the 
long run - an erosion of skilled production work on the shop-floor. 
2 Apart from these standard products on the market, there are technological 
concepts which cannot be said to 'contain' alternative, skill-oriented and 
more comprehensive forms of work, but can be implemented with such a 
degree of versatility in job design and work organization, that they allow the 
user company to either pursue the course of computer-based Taylorism or 
to form structures for skilled production work. 
Differences of this type have long been observed and discussed in the 
context of NC technology (compare chapter 5). They become even more 
important with the development of computer integrated systems. Various 
CIM-components can serve as examples for these alternative concepts of 
technology14 (see figure 9.9). 
Systems of production planning and control (PPC) directed at an overall 
regulation of complex manufacturing processes in terms of time schedules, 
production flow, etc., can be designed in different ways. 
P P C Shop-f loor DNC C A D / N C 
Schedul ing 
Figure 9.9 Alternative organizational concepts inherent in CIM-components. 
ISF 1991 
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Many well established PPC-systems are designed to achieve detailed 
total planning of all work processes. On the basis of complex algorithms 
and comprehensive production data acquisition, such systems are oriented 
towards establishing the most exact planning, control and monitoring of the 
work process possible. In such cases there remains very little scope for 
making decisions on scheduling, job sequences and capacity on the 
shop-floor. Within such PPC-systems, production workers are supposed to 
refrain from handling any orders which have not been pre-planned in detail 
and which cannot be controlled and monitored from a superordinate posi-
tion. The functions of planning and coordination which were formerly 
carried out by personnel, have now been rendered into an 'objective' form 
within the computer system. Such centralistic PPC-systems have long been 
offered on the technology market, as well as used in many companies. 
Primarily by transforming certain components into modular units, such 
systems are being further developed toward achieving a greater degree of 
flexibility, while retaining their inherent concept of work organization. 
By comparison, PPC concepts which only provide for framework 
planning (Manske 1987) are far better suited for supporting skill-based 
forms of production work. Systems of this kind dispense with precise and 
comprehensive pre-planning; instead they intentionally provide 
'loopholes' for planning and scheduling at later stages of the process. In this 
case the system remains restricted to roughly pre-calculating and stating 
certain essential and intermediate dates for defined steps of the manufac-
turing process, and also periodically assembles a pool of orders for defined 
production areas. Detailed planning, i.e. the exact scheduling of order 
sequences, the coordination between different machining stations, service 
functions etc., can be carried out in a number of different ways by 
shop-floor workers. Thus the design of the system technology fulfils the 
essential precondition for integrating important planning functions such as 
scheduling, capacity planning etc., into shop-floor operations, which in turn 
forms a crucial aspect of skill-based production work. 
In the Federal Republic, such alternative PPC concepts with a modular 
design have been developed for some years - not least of which is due to 
government support. These concepts display a high degree of flexibility in 
regard to work organization and are suitable for various forms of frame-
work planning. 
In the last years an increased number of systems for shop-floor 
scheduling have been making their appearance on the technology market -
either as independent systems or as modules of PPC-systems. The inherent 
concepts of such components are strongly oriented to centralistic PPC 
systems in terms of their hardware and software design, so that they 
represent little more than modules within total planning systems which 
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have been made somewhat more flexible. Due to their complex hardware, 
a range of functions which are to a large extent automated, and oriented to 
man-machine interfaces which in many cases do not meet shop-floor 
workers' needs, the use of these systems depends on specialized personnel 
in an office-like environment Particularly in connection with compre-
hensive and detailed production data acquisition systems, these systems 
amount to a centralistic type of shop-floor control. Compared with tradi-
tional systems of total planning, they offer considerable advantages in 
terms of flexibility, and thus efficiency, yet allow shop-floor personnel 
little scope for further planning. 
As opposed to these concepts, there are recently systems on the market 
and partially in use which support decentralized decision making. They 
display a type of operator logic similar to the conventional planning board 
(Jackson, Browne 1989; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990a). This type of 'shop-
floor control centre' (Leitstand) is well suited for use in job shops and 
specially in production islands due to simple hardware, its limited auto-
mation of planning functions and its potential for interactive planning along 
a number of criteria. Particularly due to their specific, object-oriented 
man-machine interface, these control centres can be used by shop-floor 
workers as computer-based information aids in decisions concerning 
scheduling, work sequences, machine-operation planning etc. 
DNC-systems, which essentially allow the computer-based control of 
several NC-machines, also display some widely differing concepts. There 
are a number of systems based on the integration of office-oriented NC-
programming systems with a DNC computer and NC-machine tools on the 
shop-floor. Together with a more or less automatic and often integrated 
machine or production data-acquisition system (PDA), these systems aim 
to to make centralistic NC-organization more efficient to cope with some of 
the shortcomings it has in many cases. Therefore these systems would 
oppose the formal transfer of programming functions to the shop-floor. 
Moreover, by achieving more rigid formal organization and improving 
pre-programming, these systems seek to reduce the necessity for improvi-
zation on the shop-floor, thus restricting the scope for planning at this level. 
For some years there have been a number of DNC-systems developed 
which are open with regard to work organization and therefore are com-
patible with a retention or increase of shop-floor programming. Their main 
design characteristic consists of a NC-programming system which is 
neither dependent on an office environment nor on the qualifications of 
specialized technicians. Here we find programming systems in various 
versions with forms of operator logic and hardware design which, associ-
ated with the appropriate configuration of other system components, allows 
shop-floor operation. Together with the interaction with CNC-machines 
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which can be programmed on the shop-floor, these concepts form the 
technical preconditions for flexible, shop-floor-oriented DNC operations. 
Finally, the interlinkage of CAD-sytems in the design department and 
NC-programming systems to form CAD/NC-jystems, is recently a rapidly 
spreading CIM component. As far as can be presently estimated, almost all 
CAD-NC concepts on the market today are office-oriented and amount to 
increased division of labour between planning and programming on the one 
hand, while restricting shop-floor workers to operative functions on the 
other. The reason for this is that the possibilities of interlinking CAD-
systems in various forms generally only encompass NC-programming 
systems, which suggest office oriented operation for reasons of system 
costs as well as those of information technology. These systems tend to 
transfer programming functions to the design departments. 
There are a number of open concepts emerging, which avoid such effects 
and also allow shop-floor programming under the conditions of CAD/NC 
integration. First of all there is an increase in systems being offered which 
are simpler in terms of hardware and functions. These CAD/NC-systems 
are available in the form of compact work-stations which can be utilized in 
close vicinity of machine operation on the shop-floor, even in small com-
panies. Secondly, there are concepts presently in the phase of development 
which involve linking CAD-systems directly to CNC-machine tools (Beck 
et al. 1990; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990a). On the basis of the input of 
geometrical data from the CAD-system into a machine control unit pro-
gramming will be carried out exclusively on the shop-floor. The successful 
development of such CAD/CNC-systems to the stage where they are ready 
to go into operation would thus represent a major technical precondition for 
a shop-floor-oriented utilization of CAD data. 
While the various types of CIM components available on the technology 
market and in operation in user companies do not necessarily determine the 
actual forms of work organization and work design, they must be regarded 
as important factors which may either facilitate or obstruct certain forms of 
work organization and concepts of production work.15 
A MULTITUDE OF RESULTING EFFECTS 
In view of the many different technological solutions on the market and the 
varying objectives and forms of innovation policies pursued by companies, 
it is no surprise that management reports manifold and diverse effects on 
company and work organization, as well as on manpower issues. The five 
points below summarize managers' judgements regarding existing or 
expected effects associated with the introduction of computer-based tech-
nologies in the capital goods industry. The percentages (see figure 9.10) 
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refer to number of companies who responded positively to the appearance 
or anticipated appearance of each effect. According to the survey res-
ponses, most companies which use computer-based technologies experi-
ence considerable change: the percentage witnessing no effects (6 per cent) 
is relatively low. 
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Figure 9.10 Effects of the implementation of computer-based technologies -
West German capital goods industry (N = 1,096). ISF 1991 
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1 The company's organization often needs to be altered. Approximately 
one-third of all companies experience organizational problems, while a 
similar number report the creation of new or additional departments. In 
nearly one out of ten companies, former departments are dispensed with. 
2 In many companies individual jobs are changed; in many cases there are 
reports of new (45 per cent) or additional (18 per cent) jobs being 
created, where as job losses occur in approximately one quarter of cases. 
3 Division of labour has increased in 27 per cent of the companies, 
whereas 13 per cent have recorded a reduction. 
4 The effects on employees also vary. The percentage of companies in 
which routine work has been replaced or is expected to be replaced by 
more creative tasks as a result of implementing new technologies (55 per 
cent) is about as high as the percentage of companies in which the 
potential for monitoring and supervision has increased (57 per cent). 
5 Changes in skill requirements are apparent in many cases, with reports 
of new or increased skill requirements (59 per cent and 56 per cent, 
respectively), far outnumbering those of reduced requirements (2.5 per 
cent). 
These few examples suggest that the changes taking place in the context of 
CIM implementation cannot be adequately grasped by concentrating ex-
clusively on the technological-managerial problems of investment, and the 
choice of hardware and software. The emerging, dynamic dissemination of 
new technology, especially in the economically important machine 
building industry, makes it necessary to arrive at a better understanding of 
the related risks and opportunities for industrial work.16 
These results illustrate that there is at present no uniform structural 
pattern of computer-integrated manufacturing and no genuinely predomi-
nant image of the 'factory of the future' emerging either from the few 
solutions realized thus far or the larger number of planned ventures into 
computer-based integration. By the end of the 1980s, the process of appli-
cation of CIM-systems in West German industries had not yet progressed 
very far. But a remarkable tendency towards dynamic diffusion, 
particularly in medium and small sized metalworking companies, is being 
observed. As far as the restructuring of industrial work goes, there is also 
no clearly pre-dominant concept. Efforts to make traditional Tayloristic 
forms of work organization more efficient by means of new computer-
based technologies is the path still taken by many companies, while others 
are seeking ways and means of maintaining or revitalizing forms of skilled 
production work on the shop-floor. 
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10 Technological Innovation -
Organizational Conservatism?1 
Christoph Köhler, Klaus Schmierl 
INTRODUCTION 
During the post-war period, German industry has been dominated by 
Tayloristic rationalization strategies. However, this rationalization strategy 
has not asserted itself equally in all branches of industry. In the field of 
machine-building, for instance, complex products, small batch sizes and 
complicated production sequences, together with constantly changing 
market requirements for company flexibility and quality, have created 
obstacles to imposing an extreme separation of conception and execution. 
Nevertheless, even in this industry the last 40 years can be described as a 
process of progressive standardization and specialization of functions and 
skills. 
This chapter investigates the ways in which work organization in the 
West German capital goods industry is changing with the utilization and 
integration of CIM-components. Our central question is: will conservative 
Tayloristic rationalization strategies continue to dominate in central 
branches of West German industry? Or are new ways of integrating func-
tions and tasks being tested on a broad scale? 
THE CAPITAL GOODS INDUSTRY 
The capital goods industry plays a decisive role in the economy of West 
Germany. In 1988 it employed approximately 3.8 million employees (about 18 
per cent of all West German employees in the FRG) and it had a turnover of 
about 713 billion D M (Statistisches Bundesamt 1989). The capital goods 
industry is a very heterogeneous part of the economy, including, among other 
branches, machine-building, the automobile industry, shipbuilding, the 
electrical industry, office machine manufacturers and the aerospace industry. 
Within this industry, machine-building is the industrial branch which 
employs the most workers, followed by the electrical industry. These 
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industries are superseded in turnover by the automobile industry, which, 
however, takes third place in the number of workers employed. Thus, 
somewhat more than three-quarters of all workers employed in the capital 
goods industry are employed in these three branches. The other branches 
follow only at a vastiy inferior magnitude regarding both the number of 
employees and turnover. 
In terms of product complexity, series size and the dominant forms of 
production organization, the capital goods industry can be characterized as 
displaying a continuum in which the machine-building industry represents 
the one extreme (high product complexity, small series and job shop 
manufacturing of discrete parts) and the production of iron, sheet metal and 
other metal goods represents the other extreme (low product complexity, 
high-volume mass production and sequential line production). 
DIFFERENT WORK SYSTEMS 
There are roughly three groups of functions distinguishable in the 
manufacture of durable goods in the capital goods industry. The first 
comprises production tasks in a strict sense. The dominant technology can 
be stand-alone machine tools (e.g. NC/CNC-boring or milling machines, 
lathes, etc.) or more complex and interconnected facilities such as transfer 
lines, flexible manufacturing cells and systems, and processing centres, etc. 
Tasks directly related to this first group of functions are machine-setting, 
loading/unloading, and monitoring. The second group of functions in-
cludes service tasks such as pre-setting of tools, maintenance and repair, 
quality assurance, as well as cleaning and transport The third group of 
functions comprises all aspects of production planning and control, shop-
floor scheduling, process planning, and NC-programming (see figure 10.1). 
Production 
loading, unloading 
monitoring 
Process and Production 
Planning 
scheduling 
NC-programming machine setting 
Service 
quality assurance 
transport 
maintenance and repair 
tool pre-setting 
Figure 10.1 Functions and tasks. ISF 1991 
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The way in which these functions and tasks are divided decides the job 
structure of a given plant The term 'functional division of labour' describes 
the differentiation of functions such as process planning, quality control 
etc. into independent organizational units. The term 'division of labour 
according to tasks (skills)' means the extent to which tasks are divided up 
within the organizational units both in a horizontal and a vertical 
(hierarchical) dimension. Skill requirements for individual jobs are directly 
linked to the complexity of the demands of a job. This complexity is in turn 
dependent upon the way in which the division of labour is organized 
according to functions and tasks. 
Job structures are tied to forms of recruitment, training and remuneration 
and therefore constitute an integral part of work systems. Two ideal-types 
of work systems can be distinguished in the the capital goods industry of 
West Germany today (see figure 10.2): skilled worker production and 
semi-skilled worker production. 
The job structures in systems of semi-skilled worker production are 
marked by a high degree of both functional and task specialization (see 
chapter 11; Köhler, Grüner 1990). The technical offices dealing with 
process and production planning as well as the service departments for 
maintenance and quality assurance, etc. play the decisive role in the 
planning, control and supervision of the production process. The majority 
of production workers are mainly semi-skilled machine-operators whose 
skills are not only specialized in specific production techniques (such as 
drilling, turning and milling), but also in certain types of machines and a 
narrowly limited spectrum of parts. This horizontal specialization is 
supplemented by a clearly defined vertical division of labour, ranging from 
unskilled labourers to machine-operators of various levels of skill and 
experience, to reliefmen, job setters, group leaders and foremen. The 
division of labour between job setters and operators is not clearly 
delineated. In routine jobs experienced operators may set up their machines 
themselves, whereas more complicated tasks are carried out by job setters. 
The work is organized in such a way that newly hired workers can be 
highly productive without comprehensive training. Paths of mobility from 
less skilled to more challenging jobs makes gradual on-the-job training 
possible, a process which takes place with little support in the form of 
instruction by superiors or classroom training. 
In systems of skilled worker production, the division of work according 
to functions and tasks/skills is less pronounced. The machine operators take 
on small tasks of the planning and service functions. Thus, to a certain 
extent they determine themselves the job sequences on their machine, read 
process plans and decide about processing steps, and can carry out less 
complicated maintenance tasks. Also the vertical and horizontal division of 
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Figure 10.2 Job design in alternative work systems. ISF 1991 
labour according to tasks/skills within the production departments is less 
pronounced, compared to systems of semi-skilled worker production. 
Skilled workers (Facharbeiter) carry out all necessary production tasks 
themselves - including as a rule the job setting for complicated parts and 
machines. They are often capable of working with a variety of machines 
involving a number of different processing methods. 
The two systems of work are related to a certain extent. Often, they can 
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be found side by side in one enterprise which has differentiated production 
processes according to series size and product complexity. Systems of 
skilled worker production dominate in custom and small batch production; 
systems of semi-skilled worker production dominate in series production. 
This tendency towards a product group related, area specific differ-
entiation of systems of work extends up to the industry wide level in 
accordance with dominant product and manufacturing structures. Figure 
10.3 shows a close relation between the individual branch and the 
dominance of a particular work system. 'Skilled worker plants' are defined 
as companies in which the share of skilled workers out of all blue-collar 
workers reaches at least 60 per cent. 'Semi-skilled worker plants' are those 
machine steel and electrical iron, steel capital 
bulding light metals industry metal and goods 
industry industry metal goods industry 
industry (total) 
(N=270) (N=75) (N=162) (N=133) (N=927) 
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Figure 10.3 Work systems in selected branches of the capital goods industry. 
ISF 1991 
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in which the share of semi-skilled and unskilled workers among all blue-
collar workers is at least 60 per cent. 'Mixed plants' show no clear 
dominance of either of the two dichotomous qualification forms. The 
skilled work system clearly dominates in the machine-building industry 
and in the steel and light metal industry, in which the product range consists 
of mainly complex and small batch products (this applies in roughly one 
half to two-thirds of such plants). At the other end of the spectrum, where 
semi-skilled worker plants dominate, we find the iron, sheet metal and 
metal goods branch with its large production series and rather simple 
standard products as well as the - in terms of the product structure -
extremely heterogeneous electrical industry. 
Both systems of work are relatively new from a historical point of view 
(see chapter 3). Their history can be described as a process of a growing 
differentiation of functions and tasks and an increasing narrowing of skill 
profiles in production work. This is definitely true for systems of semi-
skilled worker production which were generalized after the Second World 
War (in contrast to the development in the United States). It is also true for 
the systems employing predominantly skilled workers whose jobs just a 
few decades ago, had included a wide variety of tasks of the planning and 
service functions next to production tasks in the narrow sense, and at this 
time could be characterized as traditional forms of craft production. 
This development is an expression of company strategies to separate 
conception and execution, differentiate functions and tasks, and eliminate 
human labour to the greatest extent possible through technology and auto-
mation. We call such strategies Tayloristic in accordance with the defini-
tions by the field of business administration (mainly related to functional 
differentiation, see S cheer 1988) and the social sciences (mainly related to 
task specialization, see chapter 3). 
TRENDS IN WORK ORGANIZATION - BETWEEN 
CONSERVATISM AND INNOVATION 
The problems that have arisen in the German capital goods industry (market 
saturation trends, sensitivity to economic cycles, strong international com-
petition) combined with drastically sinking prices for computer technology 
have created a push to rationalize which is just in its first stages. The results 
of our study on the dissemination of CIM technologies (see chapter 9) 
demonstrate that German industry has only just embarked on its journey 
towards the 'factory of the future', especially in the fields of flexible 
automation and the integration of computer systems. High rates of distri-
bution have, however, already been reached in the case of certain CIM-
components (such as CAD-systems, PPS-systems, and CNC-machines), 
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and high rates of growth are to be expected in the integration of computer 
systems. Moreover, the process of rationalization encompasses more and 
more the company as a whole, giving it the character of a 'systemic 
rationalization* (see chapter 4). 
If one follows the international discussion about the future of work, one 
gets the impression that the application and the integration of new tech-
nologies are linked to a rejection of Tayloristic rationalization strategies on 
a large scale. Our question was whether such statements hold up to scrutiny 
for a central area of German industry. 
In order to investigate these questions 60 case studies in companies with 
a high rate of computer utilization and integration were carried out.2 
Following the trends in the division of labour and the dominant rationali-
zation strategies, we can distinguish three types of companies (figure 10.4): 
1 Companies with a conservative strategy seek to stabilize or indeed 
extend the existing division of labour according to functions and skills. 
In this sense Tayloristic rationalization strategies predominate. 
2 Companies with an experimental strategy operate similar to their con-
servative counterparts with Tayloristic rationalization principles. 
However, in some areas of production they are prepared to experiment 
with structures integrating functions and tasks. 
Figure 10.4 Companies according to their dominant organizational strategy (60 
cases out of West German capital goods industry). ISF 1991 
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3 Companies with an innovative strategy deviate completely from the 
Tayloristic rationalization paradigm in central areas of their production 
and work organization. 
Conservative strategy 
At least half of the 60 cases can be classified as the conservative type of 
company. Tayloristic strategies of the differentiation of functions and tasks 
predominate. In these companies the highly differentiated and centralistic 
organizational structures in place are maintained or indeed further con-
solidated after new technologies are introduced. These forms of work and 
production organization, in turn, influence the selection and utilization of 
CIM-components. Centralistic CIM-structures back up the more or less 
marked degree of division of labour and, part, reinforce it.3 
An example of this is a company in the iron-, sheet metal and other metal 
goods branch whose entire spectrum of products consists of one-piece or 
simply structured steel and plastic parts, manufactured in mass production 
with batch sizes of between 500 and several million pieces. The production 
structure is reflected in the work system. The company has 200 employees. 
The highly differentiated work organization can be roughly subdivided into 
two areas: mainly unskilled or semi-skilled workers are engaged in the 
manufacturing process (pressroom, injection moulding shop), supported by 
a few skilled workers for more complex tasks; service departments, e.g. 
toolmaking, mouldmaking or quality control are filled almost 100 per cent 
by skilled workers. 
Management's major concern is the transparency of all company oper-
ations. For this reason, great importance is attached to integration by means 
of Production Planning and Control Systems (PPC). For the past two years, 
the company has been operating two CNC-milling machines and ten robots 
for simpler insertion and sorting activities. There are plans to install CAD, 
CAP, CAQ and PDA systems within the next two or three years. These 
kinds of automation technology all lead to an explicit centralization 
strategy for all planning and control activities. The purpose is to be less 
dependent on the skills and discretion of the machine operators. The 
already insignificant NC-programming on the shop-floor will therefore be 
shifted to the process engineering department when the CAD system is 
introduced. With the aid of a PDA system, existing knowledge of break-
down susceptibility in the manufacturing process and individual operation 
times will be input into computer systems for future reference in work 
scheduling. This strategy results in a further, deliberate development of the 
functional division of labour supported by CIM-components, while main-
taining a high degree of division of labour according to tasks and skills. It 
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also increases the potential for supervision and displacement of workers. 
In our sample, conservative rationalization strategies could also be 
found in machine building companies with small and medium-sized batch 
production. One enterprise in this category manufactures cylindrical and 
rectangular moulded parts with a large number of variants and adaptations 
tailored to specific customer requirements in sequential line production 
(1400 employees). The firm has been expanding steadily for many years 
and utilizes a broad spectrum of CIM-components. Flexible manufacturing 
systems are utilized almost throughout; even transport between the systems 
is to a large degree automated. Process control and shop-floor scheduling 
are handled by a highly differentiated and centralistically structured 
computer hierarchy. The NC-programs for controlling the machines are 
compiled in the office and transmitted to the machines via DNC. 
Production and work organization is based on a high degree of division 
of labour, although the company can rely on a well-trained body of skilled 
workers. Thus, not only planning and control, but also maintenance, tool 
presetting, etc. are all carried out by specialized departments. Moreover, 
there is a marked degree of division of labour within the FMS. Semi-skilled 
workers handle the mounting of parts. Specialized skilled workers are 
responsible for setting the pallet fixtures or individual machines. Spare men 
serve to bridge personnel gaps. A next step in automation will probably do 
away with the palletizers' jobs. There is no discussion of reintegrating the 
highly differentiated tasks or for introducing forms of group work. 
Experimental strategy 
Tayloristic methods of differentiation, specialization and control also play 
a predominant role in at least another third of the companies: those char-
acterized as experimental. In contrast to the conservative type of company, 
this group of companies tends to experiment with alternative structures. 
These experiments can go into the direction of integrating functions and 
tasks in new forms of skilled production work ('computer-aided Drucker'; 
see chapter 3).4 They can also mean the decentralization of functions to the 
shop-floor accompanied by an increased polarization of skills ('computer-
aided Huxley'; chapter 3). However, the search for alternatives is limited to 
individual departments or lines of technology. 
Experimenting companies usually initiate the changes of production and 
work organization in manufacturing areas with special requirements; for 
instance, on the shop-floor where either extreme precision or speed and fast 
reactions are required of the work-force. These experiments are frequently 
so successful that they are gradually extended to other parts of the manu-
facturing process. 
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The presence of differing concepts of work design within one and the 
same company is particularly clear in the case of two German plants of a 
large European producer of electronics. In plant A, with 1,200 mostly 
semi-skilled employees, the detailed planning and shop-floor scheduling by 
technical offices reflects a strong centralistic philosophy. However, in the 
same plant, on a highly automated system for assembling circuit boards, a 
new type of work organization has been realized. In order to facilitate the 
re-integration of repair, maintenance and set-up jobs into group work, a 
hybrid type of skill has been created in which the knowledge of mechanics, 
electronics, hydraulics and pneumatics has been combined. By contrast, an 
identical assembly system in plant B functions with a fairly high degree of 
division of labour. 
A further example of the experimenting group is a machine-building 
company with 700 employees in which complex machines for the textile 
industry are manufactured by a skilled work-force in small batches with 
variations to fit customers' specific requirements. Frequent, rapid changes 
in market requirements force this company to attempt to reduce throughput 
times and to meet short-term deadlines. Toward this purpose, decentralized 
shop-floor control centres are equipped with interactive terminals so that 
the schedule supervisors can call up workshop orders and assign them to the 
machine operators themselves. 
In order to increase flexibility in several areas of production (e.g. in 
CNC-sheet metal processing, in assembly and in a flexible manufacturing 
cell), a start has been made to restructure work organization towards 
semi-autonomous groups. These groups are given the opportunity to sche-
dule their work independently within a certain time frame. Also, quality 
circles are planned for the near future. In other areas within the company, 
however, there is a tendency towards centralizing areas of authority: for 
example, the Production Planning and Control System (PPC)) stipulates 
detailed sequences of production orders for the shop-floor. 
Innovative strategy 
The remaining tenth of the cases studied belong to the innovative type of 
company. These are companies which not only experiment with alternative 
forms of work organization in individual departments, areas or functions, 
but who are restructuring the entire manufacturing area towards non-
Tayloristic, skill enhancing forms of work ('computer-aided Drucker'; see 
chapter 3). Production work is reskilled as a consequence of a (re-inte-
gration of planning and other functions which were in the past performed 
by the technical offices. Furthermore, it involves the utilization of shop-
floor and skilled worker-oriented CIM-technologies such as those which 
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are already being offered in the area of CNC-programming or interactive 
scheduling (see chapter 9). 
Examples of these kinds of reorganization measures can be found par-
ticularly in cases where planning and decision-making powers have been 
decentralized to production departments. In this respect, companies with 
generalized structures of 'manufacturing islands' or 'cellular manu-
facturing' (sometimes discussed as the 'factory within the factory') are 
exemplary (see Brodner 1987). In these cases, changes in the organization 
of production, such as the transition to 'group technology', are combined 
with experiments in work organization towards skilled group work. 
Reductions in divisions of labour were also found in companies with more 
classical forms of job shop and sequential line production. The impulse for 
such 'radical' changes often stems from dramatic crises in a corporation 
due, for example, to excessive overheads. 
A typical case in this regard is an electronics company, a manufacturer 
of special high-performance semiconductors and complex components, 
covering a market niche, where a few years ago the economic situation was 
so disastrous that without comprehensive changes there was no hope of 
survival. The manufacturing process in this company with 600 employees 
is characterized by two different sections: the manufacture of chips in a 
continuous production process is highly automated; subsequently, the chips 
are integrated into the corresponding components in an assembly line with 
mostly manual work. 
There are two reasons why the company cannot achieve a high degree of 
automation in its assembly process: on the one hand, the automation tech-
nology necessary is at present too expensive and inefficient and is likely to 
remain so in the foreseeable future; on the other, it is frequently necessary 
to fulfd customers' specifications. In order to be able to meet such market 
requirements, the firm, whose labour system might best be characterized as 
semi-skilled production, relies mainly on the human potential for flexi-
bility. In accordance with this philosophy, the company pursues a training 
and restructuring policy whereby the - mainly unskilled female - assembly 
workers are given systematic training with the goal of establishing a work-
force with a homogeneous level of skill. Thus the female workers are to be 
given the opportunity and the skills necessary for a relatively free hand in 
the distribution of tasks among themselves. They will also be able to carry 
out additional tasks on their own which hitherto had been delegated to other 
departments, such as the setting of measuring systems, transport jobs, 
quality assurance and maintenance work. 
A similar case to the one just described is that of a manufacturer of 
complex machines for road construction with 550 mostly skilled workers. 
Prior to the reorganization of manufacturing it was suffering a severe 
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economic crisis mainly due to high overheads and almost landed in bank-
ruptcy court. Under the guidance of a charismatic and decisive managing 
director, production of complex programme products for road construction, 
manufactured in small batches, was fundamentally reorganized with the 
purpose of reintegrating conception and execution and achieving a flexible 
utilization of manpower. Due to high overheads, the production planning 
departments and technical offices were reduced and some of their functions 
shifted to the shop-floor. By 'pulling out the plug from one day to the next' 
the deterministic PPC-system was dispensed with, since, according to our 
interview partner's statements, it had never adequately reflected company 
reality and had produced only 'rubbish'. 
Functions such as NC-programming, tool-presetting, servicing, quality 
control and process planning, which had previously been removed from the 
shop-floor, were partially reintegrated into the production departments. In 
future an interactive graphic NC-programming system will aid shop-floor 
personnel by transferring geometric data from the CAD system. Restruc-
turing led to a reduction in the division of labour. The more repetitive 
auxiliary functions such as deburring and transport are integrated in 
machine operators' scope of duties. The same is true for NC-programming, 
tool setting, minor repairs etc. The workers were given such broad training 
that within a very short time they could be transferred and deployed in 
many areas of production and even in assembly operations. 
A L A R G E NUMBER OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
A large number of external and internal contextual conditions contribute 
the direction that technological and organizational change takes in a com-
pany. Since there are several, frequently contradictory, constellations, it is 
not possible to demonstrate unequivocal causal relationships between parti-
cular conditions and a certain type of rationalization strategy. However, to 
a limited degree one can indicate the direction in which a given variable 
takes effect. 
Developments on the product market can be important in two senses. 
Taken over a longer period of time a given company's product market will 
be reflected in the structures of its manufacturing process. Product range 
and product structure suggest corresponding production technologies and 
organizational solutions. If product market requirements begin to shift 
toward greater product diversity and shorter delivery times, incongruities 
may arise. Increasing process complexity may induce a re-evaluation of the 
flexibility potential of the work-force as a productive resource and en-
courage experiments in the area of job design and manpower management. 
Product market developments are also significant in terms of a 
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corporation's profit situation. Profitability crises may cause shifts within 
in-house power constellations - strengthening top management - and pro-
voke new ways of designing the organization of production and work. Thus 
a characteristic of all the innovative companies in our sample was the fact 
that a more or less dramatic crisis situation was what initiated the 
company's reorganization process. 
A further significant factor is the labour supply5 of the internal labour 
market. In companies with a predominance of semi-skilled workers, the 
transition to new work structures generally implies intensive and compre-
hensive training processes. In contrast, in companies with predominantly 
skilled workers, the skills and motivation required for reintegrating the 
conception and execution of certain tasks are more likely to be available. 
The predominance of either semi-skilled or skilled workers corresponds 
closely to the industry the company belongs to and its inherent complexity 
of products and processes. 
The labour supply on the external labour market has a similar influence. 
When skilled workers are available there is a greater chance of reorganizing 
manufacturing operations towards alternative work forms, while a lack of 
skilled workers is more likely to reinforce trends to conservative 
procedures. Two electronics plants we studied, for example, both manufac-
turing comparable products with almost identical technological facilities, 
set out in opposite directions to restructure their work organization. The 
decisive factor for the realization of skilled group work established in one 
plant was the particularly favourable situation on the regional labour 
market. 
The role played by the level of automation cannot be ignored. The case 
studies show a relationship between the degree to which technology is 
utilized and the reduction or increase in division of labour. There are 
several reasons for this. The majority of CIM-components and their system 
architecture are oriented towards centralization and are utilized accor-
dingly. Also the vision of the 'unmanned factory', prevailing in some of the 
highly automated companies, may play a role in the pursuit of Tayloristic 
rationalization strategies. It is striking that three of the five innovative 
companies pursue a slow and cautious CIM-strategy. This corresponds 
directly to managements declared strategy of achieving flexibility and 
productivity by means of a sensible and efficient combination of human 
labour and technology and not by eliminating the human factor from the 
production process. 
The size of the company also appears to play a part. Interestingly, most 
firms with experimental or innovative strategies are to be found among 
companies with 500 to 1,000 employees, while they are more seldom seen 
in companies with fewer than 500 or more than 1,000 employees. This trend 
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is all the more significant because four of the five innovative companies are 
within this medium-sized range. It may be that such companies are 
sufficiently large to develop and implement new concepts; on the other 
hand, they are not too large in the sense that the centralization interests of 
middle management (e.g. production and process planning which is 
traditionally geared toward controlling the manufacturing process) could 
effectively block alternatives. 
Dependence on large customers or corporation headquarters can also 
influence the development of rationalization strategies. In our sample we 
found that in some individual cases, the decision to purchase technical 
systems was enforced on the grounds of demands made by large customers, 
yet against the interest of the company's management. To what degree such 
stipulations concerning specific technology or a certain system also have 
implications for work organization depends, among other things, to what 
degree the technology concerned favours more centralistic solutions with a 
high degree of division of labour, or instead shows a preference for shop 
floor or user oriented solutions. If such systems are geared to structures 
with a high degree of division of labour, as a rule centralistic organizational 
concepts find their way into the companies concerned. 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES OF PARTICULAR 
IMPORTANCE 
The stated set of external and internal context variables must not be inter-
preted in a deterministic way. These conditions and factors should instead 
be seen as impulses, urging in one direction or another, but which can be 
contravened by other sets of circumstances. A crucial point is that the 
different strategies found in conservative, experimenting, and innovative 
companies cannot be satisfactorily explained by the internal and external 
contextual conditions alone. In the cases of comparable constellations of 
context variables, one frequently finds entirely different solutions for 
problematic situations within companies. Undoubtedly, implementation 
processes of CIM-components and -systems play an important, and indeed 
quite autonomous, role in determining the direction of the company's 
rationalization strategy and thus also the development of production and 
work organization (Hirsch-Kreinsen, Schultz-Wild 1990). Most significant 
seem to be the following dimensions: planning concepts (technology, or-
ganization, personnel), planning agents (production, planning departments, 
top management, external advisers); planning resources (skills, time, 
money); and participation (rank and file, shop stewards, shop committee). 
With regard to these dimensions, certain sets of conditions can be 
identified in conservative, experimenting and innovative companies. Not 
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every firm has all, but every company possesses some of the characteristics 
named below. 
In conservative companies there is a high incidence of the following 
constellation of characteristics: 
1 the formation of project teams, particularly from the staff of the tech-
nical offices and the process engineering departments, for whom the 
decentralization of functions into the manufacturing area could be dis-
advantageous (loss of personnel, power, process control, etc.); 
2 the project team members consist mainly of representatives of middle 
management who frequendy have to handle the work parallel to day-to-
day operations and whose limited resources force them to plan and 
implement along conventional lines; 
3 the predominance of purely technical considerations when selecting and 
installing new technologies; a total concentration on such questions as 
the technically optimal coordination of the components, hardware and 
software design and the problems of interfaces, etc.; 
4 particularly in the case of small companies, there is often a corre-
sponding predominance of a large, all-powerful computer system manu-
facturer, whose concepts are basically geared to large-scale companies 
and with structures involving a high degree of division of labour; 
5 strong priority of the following objectives: high level of automation, 
central process control and the selection of corresponding technologies; 
6 traditional methods of cost/benefit-analyses, excluding factors which 
are only indirectly quantifiable such as flexibility and skills, which 
therefore favour structures with a high degree of division of labour and 
are oriented to cutting costs of production personnel; 
7 the employees concerned, their immediate superiors, shop stewards and 
members of works councils are as a rule excluded from the planning 
process. 
In the case of experimenting companies, different constellations of char-
acteristics were found: 
1 project teams with a broad representation of all departments affected 
directly or indirectly by the project, and with more or less compre-
hensive, but at least, as a rule, sufficient resources in terms of technology 
and time; 
2 problems of work organization included in planning concepts from the 
outset and various alternative solutions considered; 
3 system manufacturers and users cooperate on the basis of detailed per-
formance and program specifications; 
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4 the main emphasis in the utilization of CIM-components is in the manu-
facturing area, sometimes with explicitly shop-floor-oriented computer 
concepts; 
5 the predominant goals are: 'meeting narrow deadlines' and an 'increase 
of flexibility'; 
6 the more or less marked participation of employees concerned and their 
representatives in the planning and implementation process. 
Innovative companies as a rule demonstrate additional characteristics over 
and above those already mentioned for the experimenting group. The most 
important are the following: 
1 the continuous participation and dominance of top management in the 
implementation process, which in some cases has to be pushed through 
against the opposition of other in-house interest groups; 
2 explicit strategies of holding open options, particularly by means of 
planned improvements in the company's skills and flexibility potential; 
3 anticipation of long-range problems (the lack of skilled workers, for 
example) and initiated early counter-measures; 
4 full involvement of workers affected by changes, their representatives 
and superiors. 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POST-TAYLORISTIC 
RATIONALIZATION CREATE POLITICAL OPTIONS 
By categorizing the companies surveyed, we came to the following 
findings: the majority of the companies continue to pursue traditional 
Tayloristic rationalization strategies in order to consolidate or indeed 
further develop the division of labour according to functions and tasks and 
simultaneously seek to automate to the greatest extent possible. The next 
largest group of companies is experimenting with new possibilities in 
certain areas and only a small minority has implemented alternative 
structures throughout production, or indeed the company as a whole. 
A closer analysis of our sample shows that there is a large number of 
factors effecting the development and design of the company rationali-
zation strategies. These include the external conditions of a company (sales 
and labour markets, for example) as well as in-house structures (product 
and process complexity, level of automation etc.). It seems, however, that 
different strategies of technological and organizational change cannot be 
adequately explained by the internal and external contextual conditions. 
Thus we find quite different strategies applied to solve company problems 
in cases showing a similar set of contextual conditions. There can be no 
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doubt that the implementation processes of CIM-components and -systems 
play an independent role in determining the direction that technological and 
organizational change takes in companies. Of importance are planning 
concepts and strategies of the change agents, as well as power con-
stellations and resources. 
These findings are somewhat surprising. Labour economics as well as 
industrial sociology have provided a multitude of evidence over the last 
thirty years of how macro- and micro-economic forces determine the struc-
tural development of systems of work. The classical variables typically 
applied are the sales market, company size and series size, the level of 
automation, and the company's internal and external labour market. 
Our assumption is that the shift from economic to 'political' factors is 
grounded in the erosion of the 'Tayloristic syndrome' characteristic of the 
post-war period (see chapter 3). This syndrome was determined by the 
following macro- and micro-economic forces: the expansion of sales 
markets, economies of scale, standardization and automation of production, 
and a corresponding technology market as well as a large labour force 
reserve. Tayloristic strategies were an expression, as well as a component, 
of this constellation. They were adapted to the different economic, 
technical, and social structures of particular branches and types of plants 
and thus created distinctive patterns of work systems like the ones 
described above as skilled worker production and semi-skilled worker 
production. 
However, this constellation seems to have dissolved during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Now markets are tending towards product variety and smaller 
batch sizes, while at the same time, the pressure to increase productivity 
through processes of automation is increasing. The increasing capital 
intensity demands process continuity, yet production's susceptibility to 
technical failure is growing in a causal relationship to the increasing com-
plexity of technical systems. The availability of skilled and motivated 
workers prepared to take on industrial production jobs is becoming a 
problem. Micro- and macro-economic forces which were moving together 
in the past, developed in the 1970s and 1980s into a multidimensional force 
field, whose vectors are directed in various and partially contradictory 
directions. A new equilibrium is not yet in sight. Strategies, coalitions, and 
activities on the part of management and employee fractions can be of 
decisive influence in this situation. The current disunity in the development 
of rationalization processes can only be understood in this context. 
If the conservative, (neo-)Tayloristic strategy succeeds in becoming 
dominant, the destruction of the remaining skill-based systems of work in 
Germany can be expected in the long run. (see chapter 3; Hirsch-Kreinsen 
et al. 1990). The distinction between skilled and semi-skilled worker 
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production, which still exists today, would probably dissolve in favour of a 
sharper polarization of skills within both systems. If a generalization of 
innovative strategies emerges, a new form of skill-based systems of work 
will develop. Which of the strategies will be dominant in the long run 
remains at present unclear. 
These results differ in two ways from the more optimistic statements 
made by the proponents of the 'new production concepts' (Kern, Schumann 
1984,1987,1989): our empirical analysis shows the conservative forces as 
being substantially stronger; our prognosis is that various paths of develop-
ment are possible. 
Different and divergent patterns and strategies have been revealed in 
case studies. An analysis of the forces influencing the development of work 
systems shows a high degree of openness. This leads to the conclusion that 
various outcomes are possible in the process of restructuring industrial 
work in the capital goods industry of West Germany. Competing and 
contradictory economic and social forces are creating opportunities for a 
more humane and socially acceptable design of work systems and for 
political action. 
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11 Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
and Work Organization1 
Marhild von Behr, Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen, 
Christoph Köhler, Christoph Nuber, Rainer 
Schultz-Wild 
INTRODUCTION 
Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) can be seen as a new stage in the 
automation of small batch production. The prevailing manpower approach 
to these systems is characterized by concepts of a hierarchical and differen-
tiated job structure. An alternative is to develop new forms of skilled group 
work. The latter approach increases problems and costs of implementation 
processes; however, it may be in the interest of companies because of 
higher utilization times, more flexibility, and better quality. It also meets 
worker interests in challenging and rewarding work. This chapter analyses 
experiences with new forms of skilled group work in a flexible manu-
facturing system. 
SETTING THE SCENE: THE COMPANY 
The FMS was developed and installed in the main plant of a company 
specializing in the production of transmission equipment for the auto-
motive industries. The plant is located in the south of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and has approximately 7,000 employees, the majority of whom 
are semi-skilled production workers. 
The plant mainly produces gearboxes for trucks, buses and special 
vehicles in medium- and large-scale series. Therefore, it is dependent on the 
ordering behaviour of its customers, most of them being large-scale 
companies from the heavy vehicle sector, and is thus sensitive to business 
fluctuations. For this reason, the company is under considerable pressure in 
the following areas: 
1 First, product development has to be continually pursued in order to 
satisfy specific demands and growing requirements and to minimize the 
danger of customers undertaking the production of aggregates 
themselves. 
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2 Second, there is constant pressure to automate and rationalize in order to 
remain competitive, not only with other suppliers, but also with 
customer self production. 
3 Third, there is considerable pressure to keep the production system 
flexible because the ability to deliver a relatively small number of 
products with different specifications has to be maintained at all times, 
along with the ability to change specifications (for example, specific 
auxiliary drives for transmissions) up to two weeks before delivery. 
Production is divided according to product groups and production methods 
and thus mainly organized along the principle of job shop manufacturing. 
In spite of the variety of different products, not to mention their parts and 
components, the company has tried to utilize the advantages of standard 
production in large series and lots to the greatest extent. In some fields the 
employment of transfer lines has proved to be economical. However, 
stand-alone machine-tools (some of them equipped with robots or parts 
magazines) that can be adapted to differing demands still represent the most 
important means of production. Comparatively long production through-
put times (of up to six weeks) from the raw material to the finished part 
ready for assembly have to be tolerated, as well as the respective costs for 
storage, intermediate storage and capital tied up in semi-finished products. 
The job structure in production is characterized by a relatively strong 
division of labour according to functions and tasks, typical for semi-skilled 
work systems in West Germany (see chapter 10). Figure 11.1 shows the 
wage and occupational structure of a typical gear production department. 
As a rule, the workers continuously operate one and the same machine tool 
and help out at two or three other machines of the same type. Reliefmen 
take over in case of illness or holiday; they are usually responsible for 
equipment of the same method (e.g. turning) in one workshop. At one level 
higher are the job setters, who are also normally responsible for only one 
group of machine tools. Above this are the group leaders and foremen 
(Meister). Labourers or material handlers, who transport workpieces, load 
and unload magazines and fulfil other auxiliary tasks, are located at the 
bottom of this hierarchy. 
Because of the high functional division of labour this staff alone is not 
in a position to carry out all necessary tasks. The technical services of other 
units of the plant have to intervene to a greater or lesser extent, especially 
with regard to programming, maintenance, repairing of breakdowns, 
presetting tools, quality assurance, etc. 
About one third of the company's blue-collar workers are classified as 
'skilled'. The majority of them have completed apprenticeships in the metal 
trades and/or have long-term experience on jobs with high skill demands. 
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Wage Group (skills level) 
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Figure 11.1 Wage structure in a gear production department by occupation 
(1982). IFS 1991 
They work mostly in typical skilled trades departments such as tool 
making, maintenance and repair, etc. A smaller proportion of the skilled 
workers are assigned to complex production jobs in the capacity of relief-
men, job setters and foremen. 
Two-thirds of the blue-collar workers are classified as unskilled or 
semi-skilled. Many of them have received vocational training outside of the 
metal trades (to become butchers, barbers, bakers, etc.), and being unable 
to find attractive jobs, have ended up as factory workers. Most of them 
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work on jobs in production and assembly, whereas a minority are assigned 
to service departments such as quality assurance, transport, etc. 
The social structure of the work-force has changed dramatically over the 
past 30 years. The proportion of foreign workers has increased from almost 
zero in the early 1960s, to about one-third of all blue-collar workers in the 
1980s. They are under-represented in the skilled trades departments and 
over-represented in production departments where, in many cases, they 
comprise more than 50 per cent of the work-force and have penetrated all 
levels of the job hierarchy (see Köhler, Grüner 1990). 
Women represent less than 10 per cent of the blue-collar work-force. In 
production departments their percentage is even lower, and they work 
mostly as labourers, helpers and machine operators in low skilled jobs 
involving lightweight pieces. 
SETTING OBJECTIVES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
During the 1970s, the market for heavy vehicles became increasingly 
turbulent and the company came under considerable pressure. One of their 
reactions was to increase investments during the second half of the decade. 
The decision to design and install a flexible manufacturing system was part 
of this increased effort, whereby several objectives were pursued: 
1 Production optimization was to play a major role. This meant productivity 
gains through automation as well as high flexibility. It was felt that a 
reduction of throughput times would increase delivery capacity while help-
ing reduce storage costs and capital requirements for in-house inventories. 
2 There was also an interest in developing a new line of products. The 
design of manufacturing equipment and handling technology that could 
be applied to other plants was to help investigate the chances for a 
venture into a new market sector. 
After a two-year preliminary planning phase, the design and construction of 
the FMS was started in 1977 with a grant supplied by the Federal Ministry 
of Research and Technology (BMFT). In 1981, the first machine tools were 
installed; 1982 saw the first test runs of parts in the system, and from the 
autumn of 1984 on, the system began to attain normal running conditions. 
Investment appraisals carried out at an early stage of the project showed 
that the innovation could not be legitimated with conventional methods 
alone, because the costs saved on staff and stock reduction were countered 
by high investments in machine technology, handling technology and con-
trol engineering. In the second half of the 1970s there were no established 
means of evaluating factors such as flexibility and scheduling effectiveness 
due to short throughput times, etc. 
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In spite of these problems, the decision to carry out the project was taken 
by the managing board. Strategic considerations concerning the possibility 
of taking the first step towards flexible automation played a major role in 
this decision, because the company wanted to start gaining experience with 
new forms of technology at an early stage. The decision was facilitated by 
the prospect of financial support from the Ministry for Research and 
Technology, and by plans eventually to market the results of the project. 
The system was conceived for the metal cutting of gears from three 
families of parts in small to medium-sized batches. It was intended to 
handle the entire 'soft machining' process, that is, all necessary operational 
phases that are carried out before the workpieces are hardened. A total of 
fourteen machine tools were grouped into thirteen machining cells, each 
containing one robot and three stations for workpiece carriers. A fourteenth 
cell was designated as the central loading and unloading station with 
component carrier stations and a robot. As far as material flow was 
concerned, the cells were concatenated by means of a gantry crane and 
central workpiece storage facilities; in terms of information flow, the cells 
were interlinked by a super-ordinate control unit by means of a mainframe 
computer (see figure 11.2). 
The development of system technology did not aim for total automation, 
since a system of this size and complexity would demand the presence of 
several operators. While a reduction of staff compared with the previous 
production process was intended, a system team of about six persons per 
shift was opted for from the start. 
The difference in terms of manufacturing structures between conven-
tional production with stand-alone machines and the new system consisted 
primarily of the interlinkage of the processing stations by automating the 
transport and handling operations. The system team was left with the 
following work tasks: 
1 Their main task was to set up the machine tools and robots, to read in and 
optimize NC programs, to exchange tools and adjust clamping devices. 
2 A further task, which was comparatively undemanding in terms of skills 
yet physically strenuous, was the manual feeding of the system with 
workpieces and the unloading of the processed gears at the system's 
central loading and unloading station. 
3 Finally, there was a whole series of controlling and monitoring tasks 
pertaining to the operation of the entire system as well as tasks involving 
individual machining cells. 
Apart from these functions, there were also a number of additional tasks 
ranging from simple service jobs, such as clearing away chips in the turning 
cells, to more demanding jobs such as quality assurance or tool presetting. 
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166 CIM and organizational change 
MANPOWER POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
The discussion of manpower policy issues focused on three problem areas: 
1 the employment of manpower from the company versus manpower from 
the external labour market; 
2 the choice of a low or high degree of division of labour; and 
3 special training for the respective jobs versus immediate selection of the 
best suited workers for the FMS team. 
External versus internal recruitment 
In the case of implementing production equipment that is complex and 
highly innovative compared with conventional production equipment, it 
would seem an obvious policy to recruit persons who have the necessary 
skills and experience from the external labour market. This course of action 
was not seriously considered, however. This was due partly to the influence 
of the works council and the union, and partly to the project's pilot 
character. Instead, the project management decided to staff the new jobs 
with suitable workers from within the company, thus allowing the staff to 
benefit from the planned improvement in working conditions. 
For the same reasons, the possibility of simply dismissing workers from 
the traditional production area who were displaced by the new system was 
not given much consideration. For the members of staff who could not be 
provided with jobs within the new system, in-house transfers took place. In 
this way the works council was able to make use of its right of co-
determination and safeguard the interests of affected workers. 
High versus low degree of division of labour 
In designing work organization within a flexible manufacturing system, 
that is combining the remaining tasks into defined jobs, there were, ac-
cording to the experience that had been gathered to date, two basic courses 
of action that could be pursued (see figure 11.3). 
The first case can be characterized as the traditional Tayloristic 
approach to job design (see chapter 10). The work organization is based on 
a high division of labour according to functions, tasks, and hierarchical 
levels. The system staff consists mainly of a number of specialized machine 
operators with a medium level of skill who have the task of monitoring and 
setting up several machine tools of the same or similar type. Additionally, 
there are one or two unskilled workers who perform the strenuous task of 
loading and unloading the parts as well as other auxiliary functions. There 
are also one or two shift leaders who have to be qualified technicians with 
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additional special knowledge. Their job is to control the entire system, 
manage the scheduling and coordination, supervise the system's workers 
and take care of all tasks requiring communication and interaction with 
other company departments. This type of system team cannot fulfil all 
necessary functions itself, which means that personnel from other depart-
ments have to intervene to a greater or lesser extent in order to preset tools, 
and carry out quality assurance, programming and program adjustment as 
well as repair and maintenance tasks. 
The second case represents an alternative to the Tayloristic model. The 
work organization is based on a low division of labour with respect to 
functions, tasks and hierachical levels. The entire system group consists 
exclusively of skilled workers who are capable of performing all of the 
system's metal-cutting processing techniques and who have additional 
knowledge of electronics, robotics and programming, etc. Each of these 
system operators is capable of performing all or most of the relevant tasks. 
The operators form a group which is responsible for the system as a whole. 
Apart from direct production functions, personnel of this type are able to 
take on additional tasks - naturally in varying degrees, according to the 
amount of work to be performed and staffing levels given - which in the 
first case described have to be handled by other departments. Only com-
plicated programming jobs and repair and maintenance tasks requiring 
extensive or special skills and qualifications (for example, in the electronics 
sector) are performed by system-external specialists. 
Obviously, these two types of work organization are both extreme cases. 
Yet, while mixed forms are most likely to be found in actual company 
practice, they always tend to a greater or lesser extent towards one extreme 
or the other. In the case examined it was expected that the organization of 
work within the flexible manufacturing system would tend towards the first 
type of work organization based on a distinct division of labour. Turning 
the FMS tasks into a number of jobs with different tasks and differing skills 
requirements would have accorded with the hierarchical job structures 
prevailing in the area of conventional production. However, after con-
siderable discussion between members of management, the works council, 
union representatives and external consultants and researchers, it was 
decided that all tasks should belong to the operating realm of the system 
group to the greatest extent possible. The aim was to establish the lowest 
degree of fixed division of labour possible; in other words, to avoid the 
permanent assignment of specific tasks to individual workers. This meant 
that the tasks that had to be dealt with at a given time were performed 
according to a task rotation scheme while adapting to the varying amounts 
of work and personnel availability. 
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Personnel selection versus training 
The decision to use internal recruitment and skilled group work within the 
FMS made two alternative courses of action for filling the new jobs with 
suitable personnel possible: 
1 The first solution amounted to minimizing training expenditure and 
implementation costs by selecting those members of the work-force who 
were best suited for the new tasks and who already possessed relevant 
know-how and experience. 
2 The alternative solution involved giving production workers with 
average skills, such as those from the respective sectors of conventional 
production that were to be partially closed down, practical and theo-
retical training for the new tasks within the FMS. 
Most companies pursue the 'creaming off alternative, particularly in cases 
when technological innovation is introduced in small steps. Such a policy, 
however, is inadequate when extensive innovations with new job structures 
are to be carried out, and in our case, would have placed the workers under 
considerable stress. 
In accordance with the special conditions of the project, a course of 
action was chosen in which comprehensive on- and off-the-job training 
measures played an important role. All in all, the decision ensured that the 
introduction of the FMS installed not only innovative technology, but also 
manpower policies of an equally innovative nature. 
SKILLED GROUP WORK IN THE FMS 
Both traditional and newly developed principles and methods were com-
bined in designing and implementing the FMS organization of work. 
Work organization and skill requirements 
Compared with the traditional job structures of the plant, the job design 
chosen reduced the division of labour in three respects: 
1 The hierarchical division of labour as traditionally given between un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers, machine operators, reliefmen, job-
setters, group leaders, and foremen, which is differentiated according to 
managerial authority and skills levels, was more or less dissolved. 
2 The division of labour by task, particularly between the different 
machining methods and machine jobs (such as turning, milling, 
broaching), no longer existed. 
3 Lastly, there was a reduction of the functional division of labour 
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between the production workshop and the technical offices and depart-
ments (such as shop-floor scheduling, presetting of tools, programming, 
and quality assurance). 
This reduction in the division of labour corresponded to the way the 
technical equipment was structured and resulted in a new form of skilled 
group work: the tasks to be performed were not rigidly assigned to indi-
vidual members of the staff, but were handled by the group of workers as a 
whole and were subsequendy divided up according to the given work 
situation. 
Workers' interests were well represented in this form of work organiz-
ation. Jobs were created that had balanced work tasks with a high amount 
of diversity, requiring a certain level of skill while offering reasonable 
working conditions without overtaxing physical work burdens. This 
structure also complied with various company interests: use of manpower 
was able to adapt flexibly to changing requirements for intervention (for 
example, job setting, or loading and unloading tasks that occurred 
irregularly), while vacancies caused by illness, holidays, etc. could be more 
easily compensated for. 
By the very nature of its structure and content, this work organization 
made new demands on the skills and qualifications of the FMS operating 
group, since skills of a relatively high level are called for when all group 
members have to perform diverse work tasks according to a rotation 
system. Basically, this resulted in a new profile of skills and knowledge: 
1 First, there were a number of processing techniques and machines which 
system workers had to be able to operate. These different metal cutting 
production methods were also found in conventional production; there 
however, a machine operator was usually specialized in one type of 
machine and a job setter would normally have to deal with only one or 
two related processing methods. 
2 In addition, a command of robotics was required as well as competency 
in a number of technologies and methods (tool presetting, programming, 
quality assurance, etc.), which in other systems were normally handled 
by specialized service departments. 
3 Finally, a certain knowledge of the overall system was required, 
including a knowledge of the system's integration into super-ordinate 
company structures (such as production planning and scheduling, 
material and workpiece supply, repair and maintenance, for example). A 
grasp of such comprehensive information, which went far beyond the 
usual demands made on production workers in conventional production 
processes, was an essential precondition for the system group's capacity 
for taking responsibility for the overall running of the system. 
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Therefore, a new type of production worker was called for, one who would 
combine the skills common to semi-skilled machinists as well as skilled 
craftsmen, and moreover some of the skills and know-how held by tech-
nicians and foremen. At the time these innovations were being 
implemented, there was no institutionalized trade in the metal industries for 
production workers of this type, nor did any respective regular vocational 
training scheme exist in the Federal Republic of Germany. A new occu-
pational system in the metal trades was not introduced until 1985 (see 
chapter 12). Given the inadequacy of the existing system of industrial 
occupations and vocational training, and the lack of further training 
measures within companies, innovative training policies were developed 
during the course of FMS implementation. 
Personnel selection and training 
The new jobs were advertised within the company and more than fifty 
workers subsequently applied. Two pilot groups of ten persons each were 
then chosen. The selection criteria were contradictory in part: on the one 
hand, the objective was to get the new and complex system running as 
efficiently as possible, thus requiring experienced and well-qualified 
personnel, particularly in view of the fact that there was no fixed training 
program. On the other hand, there was an intention (particularly on the part 
of the works council) to use the experience gained in FMS training for a 
general extension of in-house further training, meaning that production 
workers with average skills (semi-skilled workers) should be selected. 
In the end the persons chosen for the first pilot group were predomin-
antly workers already possessing a certain level of relevant skill and, in 
some cases, many years of practical experience. The second selection 
criterion actually played a somewhat greater part in the formation of the 
second pilot group which started training at a later date than the first group. 
Only one-third of the selected twenty workers had completed vocational 
training in the metal trades. 
The manpower structure of the pilot groups did, however, deviate from 
that of the plant's average production workers, and in particular from that 
of machine operators in the respective area of production in conventional 
production. On average, the FMS workers were younger, had been em-
ployed within the company for a shorter period of time, and above all, had 
better training. Several foreign workers were included, but in comparison 
to corresponding areas of conventional production, their participation in the 
FMS groups was decidedly low. 
Due to its status as a large-scale development project with a long 
planning and running-in period (and moreover being government supported 
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and accompanied by researchers and other company external experts), the 
FMS became something of a learning workshop. The following elements of 
FMS training differed from traditional on-the-job training as well as from 
the regular further training measures within the company: 
1 The trainees were released from work while continuing to receive full 
pay and thus given the comparatively favourable chance of learning 
without the immediate pressure of an ongoing production process. 
Phases of on-the-job training in the system were followed by modules of 
classroom courses which lasted from one to several days. 
2 On- and off-the-job learning within one and the same group was con-
tinued for a long uninterrupted period. In this way cooperation and 
mutual support could develop. 
3 The courses, some of which had been specially developed, comple-
mented the practical knowledge and experience gained in FMS oper-
ations, thus enabling a somewhat experimental mixture of theoretical 
learning and learning by doing. 
These relatively positive learning conditions were certainly responsible for 
the fact that there were no dropouts in the training program and that even 
the workers with average qualifications and experience (including the 
foreign workers) completed the course successfully. 
Al l in all, this comprehensive FMS training scheme, which included 
basic theoretical knowledge, led to the same skills level as that held by 
skilled industrial craftsmen. The courses dealt with several production 
methods (not in the same depth, however, as in the apprenticeship programs 
for lathe operators, milling workers, etc.) and also included programming, 
technical drafting, basic information on control technology, etc. 
The FMS training ended with a two-day examination. The certificates 
could not be recognized as regular trade certificates because the training 
program did not correspond to any classification in the metal trades at this 
time. 
HOW THE NEW SYSTEM WORKS 
In March 1984 and June 1984, the first and second pilot groups successfully 
completed their FMS training with an in-house examination. During the 
second half of the year, the groups were reduced to the planned strength of 
six workers per shift, and production conditions increasingly approached a 
normal state. 
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System operation 
Several alterations were made concerning the originally planned range of 
workpieces; the demand for certain parts had dropped off significantly, so 
the decision was made to concentrate on manufacturing heavy workpieces 
with the FMS in order to relieve the workers employed in conventional 
production. This resulted in a partial reorganization of the system: in one 
cell, a machine tool was exchanged in order to adapt the capacities of the 
various metal-cutting methods to the altered requirements. The experience 
with the adaptation proved the system's modular design worthy with regard 
to demands on flexibility. 
The actual design of the system's overall control unit (with the DNC and 
scheduling functions) deviated considerably from what had been originally 
planned. The development of the software required far more time than 
anticipated. The control system was initially designed to allow a high 
degree of automation, which, however, proved inadequate in view of the 
system's complexity and the great number of possible system failures. 
Therefore a system with a lower level of automation was realized which 
allowed the FMS workers more means for intervention through interactive 
communication with the control system (mainly for the scheduling and 
DNC functions). 
By mid-1985, the system had reached its 'normal' capacity and was 
processing mostly heavy gears of different shapes (50 parts from one parts 
family) in lot sizes of between 50 and 500. Monthly production averaged 
about 12,000 pieces, which represented a high percentage of the overall 
capacity for this parts family but a small percentage of the company's total 
gear production. The system operated in two shifts. Unmanned production 
took place in the third shift but was limited by machine breakdowns and the 
need for manual set-up. 
Throughput times were down from the four to six weeks necessary in 
conventional production to two to five days in the FMS. The short-run 
flexibility (indicated by the parts range that could be processed without 
changes in the hardware and software) was high and never fully utilized. 
The long-run flexibility (indicated by the feasibility of system alterations 
for new types of parts) was also high; due to the modular structure of the 
system, it was relatively easy to change machine tools and adjust to new 
demands. 
A comparison of the FMS to conventional production with regard to the 
man hours required to produce the monthly average of 12,000 gears showed 
a productivity increase of about 70 per cent and savings in manpower of 
approximately 40 per cent. In conventional production, it took the capacity 
of about 17 direct workers and five indirect workers to produce the FMS's 
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output of gears, whereas the FMS was operated by two groups of six 
workers and one foreman. The productivity gap slowly decreased over time 
because of the continuous modernization of the machine park in con-
ventional production (resulting in productivity increases of 3 - 5 per cent 
per annum). 
Several factors impeded higher capacity utilization. Some of the 
machine tools, most of them newly developed prototypes, proved to be 
highly susceptible to failure; the lack of service personnel, particularly in 
the electronics sector, could not be fully compensated for, and the inte-
gration of the FMS into the respective area of production was not realized 
for reasons of cost Experience gained from the new system cannot be 
generalized without considering these factors. 
Training and job structures 
Al l in all, the training measures proved successful. The efficient running-in 
of the system with its many newly developed components, the level of 
capacity utilization achieved and the system's overall performance would 
not have been possible without the comprehensive training programme. 
The FMS workers played a considerable part in overcoming the numerous 
faults and breakdowns which occurred during machine testing and the 
instalment of the system; working instructions and operator manuals were 
lacking and had to be compiled, and programming and program optimi-
zation of the NC-machines had to be carried out by means of trial and error, 
etc. 
The principle of keeping the division of labour as low as possible and 
preventing individual workers from strongly specializing in a restricted 
number of tasks within the overall system proved its worth. However, a 
completely open structure of assigning tasks according to immediate 
requirements was not established. Instead the following changes were 
brought about: 
1 The system leaders constituted an independent job category; both groups 
now had their own system leader and a substitute. These workers 
(having been selected out of the two pilot FMS groups) were responsible 
for controlling the entire system by means of interactive communication 
with the data-processing control system; they also took over tasks at 
other work stations (including loading and unloading the system). The 
system leaders were graded one level above the rest of the group. 
2 The division of labour was organized along different lines within the two 
system groups (figure 11.4). On the one shift three workers were 
deployed to each side of the system; task assignment was relatively open 
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and was determined by immediate requirements. After eight weeks the 
workers changed system sides. On the other shift, the entire system was 
subdivided into four areas. The responsibility for each one of these areas 
was held by one worker and the positions were exchanged according to 
a four-week rotation scheme. 
3 A foreman who worked on the normal shift and who was primarily 
concerned with administrative functions (such as ordering materials and 
tools and maintaining contact with other departments, etc.) was addi-
tionally assigned to the system. This foreman, to whom the two groups 
had to report, had many years of experience in conventional production, 
but did not have any particular knowledge of the special control, 
handling and other technologies relevant to operating the FMS. The 
foreman acted primarily as an interface between the FMS and the 
surrounding departments. 
In the operation of the FMS, the division of labour according to functions 
was kept low in comparison to traditional structures in the plant, but did not 
disappear entirely. The generation of new NC programs was relatively rare 
and took place, when it did, in the process engineering departments. The 
task of program optimization and administration was assigned to the 
workshop. 
It was not possible to achieve the integration of a maintenance specialist, 
as requested by both shifts, into the group. Small disturbances were 
generally dealt with by members of the groups; larger ones by maintenance 
specialists. Quality assurance and tool presetting were almost exclusively 
carried out by the system groups. The system leader was responsible for 
scheduling in the FMS operational area. 
Although a higher degree of division of labour had been established than 
originally intended, there were nevertheless strong differences to the far 
more differentiated, traditional organization of work in the area of conven-
tional production. The FMS workers were able to step in and take over tasks 
when and wherever it was necessary. In the case of resetting and retooling 
and other tasks that arose periodically, this kind of flexible manpower 
utilization was of great significance for the entire system's performance 
level and allowed substitution problems due to illness, holiday, etc. to be 
dealt with more easily. 
Moreover, this type of skilled group work complied with workers' 
interests in having diversified jobs and enabled the integration of tasks that 
would be unduly strenuous by themselves, such as the loading and un-
loading of the system. The union demand to include the system leader's 
tasks in the group's responsibility was mainly opposed by members of 
lower and middle management and would have posed wage-grading 
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System of Job Rotation in the First Shift 
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Figure 11.4 Systems of job rotation. ISF 1991 
problems which would have been difficult to solve. On the other hand, a 
return to the specialization of individual machine tools and machine types, 
which appears advantageous in terms of utilizing existing know-how of 
certain metal-cutting methods, was not regarded as an adequate solution as 
it would have stood in contradiction to the system character of the pro-
duction equipment implemented. The resulting organization of work was a 
compromise; it was capable of coping with the many-sided and complex 
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demands made on the system while avoiding unbalanced, one-sided or 
unduly strenuous jobs. 
PROS AND CONS OF THE NEW SYSTEM 
As has been explained above, getting high and fast returns on investment in 
the FMS was not the main goal in setting up the project; instead, develop-
ment strategies and the desire to gather experience with flexible automation 
processes at an early stage were the major considerations. 
At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, high develop-
ment costs had to be accepted. This not only applied to the individual 
components of the system (many of the machines were prototypes) and to 
the control systems (CNC, DNC, PDE, etc., and the overall systems 
control), but also to the development of work organization and manpower. 
Technology 
The company had both positive and negative experiences with the new 
technology. The consistent utilization of modular, autonomous production 
cells proved worthwhile although they involve more detailed planning and 
some redundancies. This structure makes it possible to run individual 
production cells in an autonomous manner, if desired, and to limit the 
consequences of disturbances in the system. It also facilitates adaptation to 
parts changes and, in the case of small-sized companies, step-by-step 
adoption of FMS. 
FMS based on complementary machinery did not prove very successful. 
Flexible manufacturing systems run with complementary machines entail 
the basic disadvantage that the capacity utilization of individual stations 
(except the bottleneck station) is significantly dependent on the product 
mix. Also chain reactions are likely if breakdowns occur. Production 
carried out mainly with substituting machines enables far-reaching 
possibilities of capacity alignment within and between different flexible 
manufacturing systems. The time needed for parts transfer between the 
individual flexible systems is of little importance due to automated trans-
port and storage systems. 
The size of the system turned out to be disadvantageous. In spite of the 
modular structure, disturbances in individual components were passed on 
throughout the system and reduced overall availability. This is one reason 
why primarily small flexible manufacturing systems were installed during 
the 1980s (Fix-Sterz et al. 1990; Martin et at. 1987). 
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178 CIM and organizational change 
Development of organization and personnel 
In view of spiralling investment costs - in some cases an exponential rise -
connected with the integration of production and information technology, 
there are three variables which are decisive for the economic efficiency of 
alternatives of work organization: investment costs, system availability and 
the short and long term flexibility of the system. Other factors such as 
manpower costs and the costs of implementing organizational innovations 
also have to be considered. 
The use of skilled workers helped to save planning and investment costs 
for the FMS since the level of automation could be kept low in problem 
areas and complex tasks could be left for human intervention. A prime 
example of this could be seen in the functioning of the overall control 
system (mainly for the scheduling and DNC functions). Due to their 
production knowledge and company experience, the workers were able to 
recognize the 'childhood diseases' of the new technological system and to 
solve these problems in cooperation with engineers and mechanics from the 
plant and the system manufacturers. 
In view of the high costs of the FMS it was of particular importance that 
the group be capable of achieving a considerable reduction of the risk and 
duration of breakdown times. The workers themselves could prevent a high 
number of breakdowns by immediate intervention and deal with many 
system failures themselves. In other cases, they were capable of diagnosing 
the causes for failures and calling for the required specialists. Competence 
of this kind was especially valuable when maintenance workers were not 
immediately available such as when specialists were engaged in other 
departments, or outside of normal working hours when maintenance 
personnel was considerably reduced. 
The conversion of production facilities could be performed very fast and 
thus changes within the planned product range (short-term flexibility); 
resetting did not depend on the specialized knowledge of a job setter who 
might be occupied elsewhere, but could be carried out by the FMS group 
itself when and where required. As far as long term flexibility was 
concerned (system alterations), the workers who were familiar with all 
aspects of their system were able to support the implementation of changes 
to a considerable extent. 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned advantages, namely the re-
duction of investment costs and an increase in system availability and 
flexibility, it was necessary to plan personnel levels according to maximum 
requirements. Despite this, the chosen structure of skilled group work did 
achieve savings effects in comparison with alternative job and manpower 
structures. First there were savings in direct manpower. The fact that all 
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group members could replace each other allowed lower personnel levels 
than would have been the case in an organization with a greater division of 
labour. Second, cost savings were made in indirect manpower because 
many of the indirect tasks were carried out by the FMS group. This resulted 
in a direct savings effect in technical service departments and an indirect 
increase in efficiency - particularly due to improved communication. 
The advantages offered by the new job structure have to be seen in light 
of disadvantages resulting from the particular costs and problems involved 
in introducing and stabilizing organizational innovations that deviate 
significantly from the predominating structures of the plant. The decision-
making processes for organizational and personnel development required a 
lot of time and personnel resources. The main decision making body, a joint 
commission of management, works council and outside experts (see 
below), accompanied all stages of the project. Training of the FMS groups 
amounted to up to 5 per cent of the total investment cost for the system. 
This included the wages for the two pilot groups as well as expenditures for 
infrastructures like training programs, manuals and teachers. The control 
technology of the system had to be adapted to the capabilities of production 
workers. In particular the overall control unit required a lot of additional 
programming for developing an acceptable interface. Finally frictions 
between the different production departments have to be pointed out. Wage 
levels within the FMS were higher than those for skilled jobs in other 
departments, which caused expectations for wage increases and thus 
conflicts. 
In our case the short-term disadvantages resulting from implementation 
problems and costs arising from organizational innovations were out-
weighed by the long-run advantages of the system's economic efficiency. 
With hourly costs of more than 1,000 DM for the FMS, the costs for the 
development of personnel and organization seem somewhat insignificant. 
In other cases, however, the immediate costs and risks involved in the 
implementation of organizational innovations can, depending on the initial 
situation of the company involved, bear more weight in management's 
decision-making process than the benefits gradually incurred by the new 
organizational structures. It is difficult for individual companies to estimate 
whether models of skilled group work are profitable in the final analysis. 
The effects on factors such as system availability and flexibility are diffi-
cult to quantify; also, the various cost factors tend to converge. In some 
circumstances, the advantages are confronted with strong disadvantages in 
the form of special costs and problems arising from the introduction and 
stabilization of structures that differ from predominant forms of production 
work. These problems have probably helped contribute to the fact that such 
alternative job structures are frequently discussed but rarely implemented. 
1 
I 
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THE PREREQUISITES OF INNOVATION 
Although new technologies and new organizational patterns are the subject 
of much discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany, Tayloristic 
rationalization strategies still dominate in the everyday reality of company 
life and only a minority of companies have started to experiment with 
alternative structures (see chapter 10). Which factors, then, explain the 
far-reaching technological and organizational innovations achieved in the 
company examined in this study? 
Studies on technological and organizational change in West German 
industry show that a large number of external factors, such as the sales 
market, manpower supply in internal and external labour markets, the 
degree of automation and integration of production processes, company 
size, etc., can influence the design and development of rationalization 
strategies. These factors alone, however, do not sufficiently elucidate the 
organizational processes involved in adopting new technologies. Imple-
mentation structures and processes involved in the adoption of CIM 
components and their integration play an important and quite autonomous 
role in determining the development of the organization of production and 
work (Hirsch-Kreinsen, Schultz-Wild 1990). 
In the company under study, a number of factors were particularly 
relevant. These include agents and networks, resources and planning 
concepts. 
Agents and networks 
Normally the process engineering departments are the main agents for the 
selection and implementation of new technologies. Since these departments 
exist from the differentiation between conception and execution and a 
strong control over production processes, they tend to adopt new tech-
nologies conservatively, using Tayloristic concepts. 
Because of the unusual costs and the strategic importance of the FMS in 
our case study, the network of internal and external agents deviated signifi-
cantly from the norm. Top management was willing to take risks for 
technological and organizational innovation, and observed and backed the 
implementation process. All layers of production management, down to the 
foremen, participated in the planning and implementation process. Some 
members of this group became advocates of the concept of skilled pro-
duction work. Many years of experience have shown that complex 
production equipment never runs the way that process engineers think it 
should and that, in the end shop-floor personnel have to come to terms with 
the inevitable problems. 
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The works council and the union also played an important role in the 
implementation process. Both parties feared large job losses, as well as 
deskilling and downgrading tendencies. Both expected the pilot installation 
to be a starting point for a rapid diffusion of FMS technology within and 
outside the company and therefore attached a high importance to the 
project. Because of public subsidies, the works council was in a strong 
position and negotiated a plant agreement on training, job structures and 
wages and the formation of a joint commission for the planning and 
implementation process. 
A number of engineering and social science research institutes also 
became involved. The external experts exerted a significant influence on 
the technological and social aspects of the FMS. Their contribution derived 
not only from their competence, but also from their independent status. 
Al l of these parties participated in the above-mentioned joint com-
mission with an equal number of representatives from management and 
members of the works council. This commission was given a lot of 
authority on all questions concerning organizational and personnel matters. 
The commission, which met at regular intervals, played a significant role 
by clarifying questions involving labour management and problems con-
cerned with the integration of the new production system in the company; 
it also acted as the central contact for the supporting technological and 
social research that was being carried out. 
Two working groups consisting of both in-plant and external parties 
involved in the project were set up to investigate and report on the subjects 
of 'training' and 'job structure and organization'. Various departments, 
such as production, operations scheduling, training and manpower were 
represented in these working groups, which also included those responsible 
for the technological development of the project and the works council. 
Outside parties, such as a representatives of the national IG-Metall (trade 
union) and social scientists carrying out supporting research, were also 
involved in a great number of these meetings. 
Planning concepts 
In addition to the constellation of agents and networks described above, the 
planning process was of importance in the successful implementation of 
technological and organizational innovations. As is the case with most 
companies, social considerations and manpower policies did not originally 
play a major role in the decision-making processes concerning technol-
ogical innovations; thus, for a long time there was such a preoccupation 
with the numerous technological questions of system design and determin-
ation of the spectrum of parts to be processed and the selection and design 
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of machine tools, robots, etc., that questions concerning personnel policies 
were given little consideration. It was more or less implicidy assumed that 
the usual mechanism of personnel adjustment (by muddling through) which 
had proven successful during previous innovation processes and the appli-
cation of tried and true principles of organizational development based on 
the differentiation of tasks and functions would ensure an unimpeded 
implementation process. 
At a relatively late stage in the project, but not too late to have an effect 
(about a year before the system started to operate), planning of the 
organizational and manpower structures began, thus leaving enough time 
for discussions on alternative policies with respect to recruitment, the 
design of the job structure, and training policies. Technical planning was 
complemented by a policy of consciously taking human factors into con-
sideration. 
In the course of this process, new methods of investment appraisal were 
considered. Conventional methods are mainly concerned with the ratio of 
quantified output and factor input and thus favour structures that are 
strongly oriented towards the division of labour and savings in direct 
manpower costs. In our case additional factors which are difficult to 
quantify, such as the effects of alternative job structures on system avail-
ability, flexibility, etc., were also evaluated and taken into consideration in 
the decision making process. 
Resources 
Resources of time, manpower and finance that were made available were of 
great importance for the implementation of technological and organi-
zational innovations. Due to the length of the project, many discussions and 
learning processes that would not have occurred had the participants been 
pressed for time, were able to take place. Also the project's significance for 
the company made generous in-plant personnel resources available, 
meaning that expert knowledge from all departments, whether their in-
volvement with the FMS was direct or indirect, was mobilized for the 
project. Finally, extensive financial resources were made available; in this 
respect, the provision of government subsidies was no doubt important. 
Government programmes 
Government programmes have played a significant role in fostering wide 
public discussion on the subject of new technologies and work organi-
zation. The programme 'Humanization of Working Life', which was 
initiated by the social democratic government in 1974, played a crucial role 
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in the discussion and critique of Tayloristic work forms and generally 
brought the topic of improvement of job design to public attention (see 
chapter 13,23). 
Of particular importance for the case study presented above is the 
government programme on 'Manufacturing Technologies', out of which 
the FMS project was subsidized. This programme was started in 1980 and 
extended in 1984 and 1988 with an overall financial volume of about 1.4 
billion D M for twelve years. It supports technological development, tech-
nology transfer, and technology applications for the German capital goods 
industry. One focus is small and medium-sized companies (more than 90 
per cent of the firms in this sector have fewer than 500 employees). 
The main objective of the programme is to support technological in-
novations in research, development and practical applications. Human 
factors have, however, been both directly and indirectly taken into account 
from the start (BrOdner 1987; Martin et al. 1987): 
1 Many CIM-components, such as PPC and DNC systems, are geared 
towards organizational structures of large companies with a strong 
separation of conception and execution between the process engineering 
and the production departments. Often hard- and software of this type 
have built-in centralistic organizational concepts that are quasi passed 
on to the user companies (see chapter 9). The project management 
organization of the programme (PFT) developed several projects involv-
ing groups of producers and users to support the development of manu-
facturing technologies open to alternative organizational structures. 
Among them were projects for CNC and PPC systems. 
2 Many individual projects with far-reaching technological and organi-
zational innovations in user companies have been supported if not 
initiated. Among them were pilot installations of manufacturing systems 
with group technology and group work (production island) (see BriJdner 
1987) and the FMS project presented above. These projects draw a great 
deal of attention from politicians, employers, engineers, unions and 
social scientists. 
3 The so-called 'Initiative Technology Transfer' is designed to transfer 
existing knowledge on CIM technologies to the German industry. 
Sixteen engineering institutes have developed model applications for 
demonstration purposes and comprehensive training programmes. The 
project management of the Manufacturing Technology Programme 
ensured that the initiative was not reduced to technological questions, 
but also encompassed information and concepts on the development of 
organization and personnel. 
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184 CIM and organizational change 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to assess the significance of the FMS-case presented above for 
the further development and dissemination of group-oriented job structures 
in the Federal Republic. The project has had a pilot function and has served 
as a means of orientation for other companies with similar problems. The 
concept of skilled group work implemented in the FMS case is no longer a 
singular occurrence; similar structures have been tried out in many com-
panies. In the automobile industry, for example, it has been possible to 
introduce far-reaching forms of local control on all processes within areas 
with flexible cells and systems. 
The project has certainly given a boost to discussions on 'alternative' 
factory structures that have been gaining momentum over the past few 
years on both a national and international level. In the meantime, the 
discussion in the Federal Republic not only involves industrial sociologists 
and psychologists, but also scientists concerned with ergonomics, oper-
ations research and engineering. The fact is more or less widely accepted 
that traditional Tayloristic factory structures will not be able to cope with 
the economic and social demands made on companies and that considerable 
changes will have to be made in setting up the organization of the factory 
of the future. In this context, the FMS case that has been outlined here is of 
considerable value as a model for change. 
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12 Bringing Skills Back to the Process1 
Rainer Schultz-Wild 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes some of the findings presented in Part III of this 
volume from a German as well as a European perspective. It argues that the 
development of future factory structures is not only a question of new CIM 
components and systems but is also influenced by a company's organi-
zational concepts and structural conditions. Many factors point towards 
reducing the division of labour and making use of skilled workers on the 
shop-floor. Certain conditions in the technology and implementation pro-
cesses have to be met when the concept of process-related use of skills and 
qualifications is to be realized. The educational and training system plays 
an important role in determining the availability of manpower for industrial 
work. 
FUTURE FACTORY STRUCTURES AND INTERESTS IN 
PROCESS-RELATED USE OF SKILLS 
In the light of the imminent European unification and the increasing ex-
pansion of computer-aided advanced production technologies, the issue of 
future structures of work in the factory in European industry is becoming 
increasingly significant for politics and science. In all likelihood uniform 
structures of work in the factory will not develop in Europe in the near 
future: the differences in existing conditions and developmental perspec-
tives between regions, countries, economic branches and market conditions 
are too great. Problem areas and potential solutions in the area of 
production technology, the availability of labour and skills, etc. also vary 
considerably between countries. Even if the available production tech-
nology becomes more uniform due to market conditions and/or inter-
national standardization efforts, and differing working conditions begin to 
converge due to national and international compensation policies, and 
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lastly, even if certain adaptation processes take place within education and 
vocational training systems, it, nevertheless, remains highly unlikely that 
the use of technology, work organization and the division of labour within 
and between companies will reflect a uniform structural pattern, regardless 
of whether it is a small company with a narrow regional market in one of 
the industrially developing countries of the Common Market or that of a 
large scale mass production enterprise in one of Europe's industrial centres. 
At the same time it is widely agreed upon among experts that there are 
only limited chances of realizing the concept of the so-called 'unmanned 
factory' within the near future and that this concept is, at best, suitable only 
for certain marginal areas of highly standardized manufacturing. There are 
also numerous voices stressing the limitations of the long prevailing 
Tayloristic or Fordistic model of production and work organization, which 
is strongly centralized and based on a strict division of labour. These 
limitations become particularly important within the context of the use of 
modern CIM technologies and the necessity for adapting to rapidly 
changing market conditions (see for example Brodner 1987; Piore, Sabel 
1984; Warnecke 1985; Warner et al. 1990). 
In view of these factors, particularly with regard to European industry, 
factory structures are being advocated which reduce rather than extend the 
division of labour according to functions and tasks, decentralize decision-
making, and make use of skilled workers on the shop-floor (see Wobbe 
1990). Such concepts are less oriented towards maximum use of computer-
based automation technology including the total exclusion of human labour, 
but on the contrary aim for a combined use of technology and labour 
whereby the production knowledge and experience held by workers closely 
involved in the manufacturing process is systematically integrated. 
Strategies and structures of this type can - in accordance with traditions of 
organizational theory - be termed 'computer-aided Drucker' (see chapter 3). 
The integration of functions and tasks on the shop-floor and the process-
related use of skills and qualifications offers companies a number of advan-
tages,2 particularly when strategies of so-called 'hard' automation which 
require standardization of product and labour run into limitations and 
strategies of flexible automation are pursued instead: 
1 Process-related use of skills can keep down planning costs and invest-
ments in hardware and software for extremely expensive automation 
technologies when workers instead of machines are able to take over 
complex tasks and functions. 
2 Process-related use of skills permits savings in implementation costs and 
allows a comparatively rapid application of technological and organi-
zational innovations in the manufacturing process. When extensive 
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basic skills already exist on the shop-floor, the introduction of new 
technology components will result in fewer skill deficits. This will lead 
to both a considerable reduction in training expenditures and a shorter 
running-in period since parts of the implementation work can be per-
formed by the user company's skilled work-force. 
3 In view of the prevailing high costs for hardware and software 
components of computer-aided flexible automation, it is of particular 
significance that process-related use of skilled labour can reduce the risk 
and duration of system failures. Skilled workers familiar with the 
specific manufacturing equipment can increase availability and relia-
bility; first, they can prevent disturbances by intervening in the ongoing 
production process and second, breakdown times can be shortened 
because of their ability to perform certain repairs by themselves, thereby 
reducing the need to call on or wait for specialized maintenance 
personnel. 
4 Moreover, the process-related use of skills increases the operational 
flexibility of manufacturing equipment for various products or product 
variants within a given technical range and also in terms of coordinating 
machine schedules and/or production capacity with the requirements of 
the ongoing production flow. 
5 Finally, the process-related use of skilled workers in the production 
process can also result in lower labour costs. Savings arise in the area of 
technical (support) services such as process planning, programming, 
shop-floor scheduling and control, maintenance and quality assurance, 
since costs are higher under more centralistic forms of production or-
ganization. Also, fewer workers are needed than in forms of work 
organization with highly discrete functions using a minimum of skills, 
because broadly skilled workers are able to replace each other and fill 
vacancies caused by illness or other reasons. 
Al l these factors point to a company interest in integrating functions and 
tasks on the shop-floor and in employing skilled workers in the immediate 
proximity of the production process. Within this strategy many variations 
are conceivable according to the type of product, the level of automation, 
the organization of production (job shop manufacturing or 'production 
islands'), national characteristics of sales markets, technology markets, 
labour markets, and educational institutions, etc. The forms of work or-
ganization and the division of labour can vary, for example between the 
following two basic models: 
In the first case the traditional forms of job classification and hier-
archical division of labour are largely dispensed with and, instead, a 
homogeneous group of equally qualified production workers are employed. 
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The group shares the different and changing work tasks within a given 
manufacturing area according to internal agreements and also shares the 
responsibility for the fulfdment of the assigned jobs (see the FMS case 
study in chapter 11). For example, employees such as the German skilled 
worker (Facharbeiter), with their practical and theoretical production 
knowledge and experience are suitable for this form of group work, after 
they have had some further training in the field of information systems and 
control technology. 
The second model adheres more to the traditional form of functional and 
hierarchical division of labour and the job specialization resulting from it. 
The work-force is differentiated according to area and level of quali-
fication; the use of personnel is based on cooperation between skilled 
workers and workers performing specific tasks. In this case, mixed staffing 
of a production team is conceivable consisting of semi-skilled and skilled 
workers, technicians and even engineers, based on individual job assign-
ments, however, with close cooperation and overlapping skills (see the 
companies with an innovative strategy in chapter 10). This model, in 
contrast to the first, involves a more strongly hierarchical distribution of 
responsibility with a considerably restricted capacity for employees to 
replace one another. 
International comparisons show distinct patterns within this range (see 
chapters 14, 19). Both models, between which numerous variation and 
concrete forms of design are imaginable, are suited in varying degrees to 
different forms of technology use and production process requirements. 
The first model, for example, makes greater use of the potential range for 
the design of work organization in modern manufacturing technology when 
the coupling of work tasks to the machine's operational cycle is reduced 
due to the automation of workpiece handling and transport. The second 
model possesses more advantages in those cases where gaps in automation 
must be bridged by routine jobs or where the use of specialists is imperative 
for one reason or another. However, the second model holds higher risks of 
a polarization of skills and the creation of permanent barriers between 
different employee groups. 
PRECONDITIONS FOR A PROCESS-RELATED USE OF SKILLS 
A common characteristic of the two models of work structuring described 
above is their increased 'shop-floor autonomy' by means of a process-
related use of skilled labour. They reduce the significance of planning, 
control and supervising departments outside of the shop-floor as opposed to 
the more centrally oriented Tayloristic/ Fordistic factory structures. Both 
models correspond to a concept which is currently being discussed in 
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Europe as well as the United States under the heading of The Factory 
within the Factory'3. This concept's intention is reflected by the challenge: 
'Computer Integrated Manufacturing only with Human Integrated 
Manufacturing (CIM only with HIM)'. 4 The realization of such forms of 
production structures and work organization depends, however, on a 
number of preconditions. In making clear what these preconditions entail, 
we shall briefly outline (a) market developments of CIM-components and 
-systems; (b) the implementation processes of new manufacturing tech-
nologies taking place within companies; and (c) the availability of different 
skills for production work as well as the question of compensation systems, 
career patterns etc. 
Alternative CIM-components 
In the 1980s the spectrum of products offered on the market for CIM-
components and -systems expanded considerably. This holds true for 
design and process planning functions (CAD, CAP) as well as for pro-
duction planning and control (PPC) and manufacturing functions such as 
machine control, tool management, workpiece handling and transport, as 
well as quality assurance (CAQ).5 
In many cases the use of CIM-technologies is characterized by a kind of 
pioneer situation in which the technology suppliers adapt the systems' 
actual design to meet specific customer requirements. At the same time, 
however, there is also an increasing development of marketable, more 
standardized products requiring the system users themselves to adapt if 
considerable costs for tailor-made solutions are to be avoided. Moreover, in 
many areas in which CIM-technologies are applied one can safely say that 
it is the technology suppliers who control the market. This is the case for 
special types of products due to the high development costs of complex 
software solutions as well as the lack of user competency in information 
technology. Therefore, it is particularly important to consider which pro-
duction and work organization concepts are quasi passed on to the user 
companies by the technology they install.6 
CIM-components on the market can be classified by those which are 
more open in terms of production organization and work structuring, or 
those which contain strongly centralistic concepts which aim for a definite 
division between work executed on the shop-floor and planning, control 
and supervision functions.7 
Results of our analysis point to a market dominance of CIM-components 
of a centralistic-deterministic nature which are exerting a strong influence 
on a consolidation or increase of the hierarchical-functional division of 
labour between conception and execution. Such solutions are usually 
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developed and offered by large computer companies which have a strong 
market position and are backed by years of cooperation with the users of 
their systems. But it remains doubtful if these solutions meet the special 
needs of small and medium-sized companies (see chapter 6). 
Alternative systems are usually offered by small software houses or by 
machine-tool producers. These systems are more open in terms of work 
organization and do not restrict their users to pursuing specific solutions as 
far as manufacturing and work organization are concerned. Therefore these 
systems are more compatible with forms of decentralized planning, control, 
and monitoring, and a process-related use of skills. 
Although in the case of more centralistic-deterministic systems one 
cannot say that the user companies are bound to certain forms of organizing 
manufacturing and work, it is undeniable that the logic inherent in such 
solutions will influence the decisions concerning the implementation 
process within the company. A process-related use of skills is easier to 
realize or maintain when hardware and software components are designed 
to be easily accessible to shop-floor workers.8 
The role of the implementation process of CIM-technologies 
In spite of the constraining factors built into the CIM-components offered 
on the market, user companies still have considerable scope for the design 
of their production and work organization at their disposal. However, the 
question remains as to whether, and in what way, this scope for decision-
making is actually utilized during the course of the implementation 
process.9 Although the discussion among managers and engineers con-
cerning the importance of 'human factors' for the successful introduction 
of new technologies has been given more emphasis during the past few 
years, on the basis of present experience, it can hardly be assumed that the 
development of work organization and manpower will enjoy the same 
careful preplanning which is given to decisions concerning technical and 
economic factors. 
Many implementation processes are characterized by a step-by-step 
introduction of new technology components, whereby the existing manu-
facturing structures and forms of organization are retained as much as 
possible. For the most part, changes are limited to what is imperative from 
a technological point of view. This means a sort of structural conservatism. 
On the other hand, empirical evidence demonstrates at the same time that it 
is technical innovation which often initiates or is the medium of a reor-
ganization of work processes, which may be more far-reaching than the 
actual innovation case. Changes of a slower and more subtle kind which 
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lead to a gradual undermining of dominant forms of work may occur as well 
as real structural breaks. 
The probability of more radical changes in job structures increases: 
1 with the extent of the leap to automation of a given technological 
innovation, thereby necessitating a reorganization and extensive 
redistribution of work between machinery and manpower; 
2 with the degree in which step by step modernization is deviated from or 
must be abandoned, for example due to the more system-oriented 
character of the new CIM-technologies being installed (e.g. flexible 
manufacturing systems - FMS); and 
3 according to the extent in which the new technologies contain concepts 
of work organization contradictory to prevailing principles. 
Process-related use of skills can hardly be implemented in cases where 
technology control systems of a centralistic-deterministic type are 
integrated into company structures based on a high division of labour. 
Centralistic control systems strengthen the planning and supervision 
departments outside of the manufacturing area and lead to a further 
reduction in autonomy on the shop-floor. The introduction of these tech-
nologies in companies where skilled shop-floor workers still enjoy a con-
siderable scope for decision-making can result in a gradual undermining of 
shop-floor autonomy and can, at least in the long run, lead to a gradual 
erosion of skill-based work systems. 
It is also conceivable, however, that due to the functional deficiency of 
centralistic control systems, alternative strategies will be pursued from the 
start of the innovation process. In this case, the preconditions in terms of 
organization and skills have to be systematically planned and subsequently 
realized during the implementation process.10 In this context it is important 
which in-plant groups plan and implement technological innovations and 
what their specific interests and aims are. The realization of company 
structures based on the model of process-related use of skills is, for 
example, more likely to occur when shop-floor managers directly 
responsible for the manufacturing process have more influence than 
members of central departments for process planning or production control. 
Availability of a skilled work-force 
Apart from the structures of technology supply and the specific interests 
which come into play in the course of implementing CIM-technologies, the 
supply of personnel with different skills and qualifications is certainly 
significant for shaping and designing manufacturing organization and work 
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structures. Forms of process-related skills use are easier to realize or 
maintain in those companies which already have a work-force with broad 
and relevant skills or where skill deficits can be eliminated with relatively 
low training expenditures. 
In cases of stagnating or sinking overall employment in a company, the 
skill structure of the work-force is particularly decisive. This is so because 
an extensive exchange of personnel via the external labour market (dis-
missal of insufficiendy trained workers, recruitment of adequately skilled) 
would certainly meet with resistance from worker representatives and 
unions and is therefore unlikely to occur. 
Those companies that have centralistic, Tayloristic organizational struc-
tures and have mainly employed semi-skilled workers in narrowly defined 
jobs in their production departments are likely to have more problems and 
higher expenditures in carrying through a reorganization to permit process-
related use of skills compared to companies whose production work has 
traditionally been largely in the hands of skilled workers. This holds true for 
skilled group work as well as work structures on the shop-floor based on a 
certain degree of division of labour. Reintegrating certain planning, control 
and monitoring functions with production work when computer-aided inte-
gration technology is used, results in new types of jobs and job require-
ments. These cannot readily be fulfilled by workers previously employed 
within more centralistic structures based on a high degree of division of 
labour and narrowly defined jobs. 
Although the skill structure of the given work-force will certainly have 
an effect on the choice and introduction of new technologies and resulting 
reorganization of work processes, this factor can only be regarded as 
invariable from a short term perspective. Changes can be brought about 
rapidly by further training and retraining carried out by the companies 
themselves, or also - in the medium and long term - by shifts on the 
external labour market and within the educational and vocational training 
system. 
The role of education and training in the development of future 
factory structures 
Trends in technological innovation in industry are linked with varying 
degrees of affinity to work-force structures that facilitate a process-related 
use of skills. While certain deviations in the difficulty or ease of 
introducing a process-related use of skills exist within nations, i.e. across 
different industrial branches, or between companies with different manu-
facturing, organizational and work-force structures etc., they are likely to 
be greater across countries. The educational and vocational training 
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systems, which are conditioned by specific national norms and traditions, 
are significant in this regard because of their central mediating function in 
determining the size and skill structure of the work-force available for 
industrial work.11 
The expansion of educational opportunities and the opening of schools, 
universities and colleges for sections of the population which previously 
pursued other courses of education has encouraged many young people to 
remain within the education system for as long as possible. They may then 
strive for positions outside industry, particularly those outside manu-
facturing with its adverse working conditions (noise, dirt, shift work etc). 
This may cause risks in manpower supply for production jobs. The problem 
of having an adequately skilled industrial work-force cannot simply be 
reduced to the question of appropriate training and functioning control 
mechanisms in the schools and training programmes. The problem has also 
to do with working conditions and career chances offered in industrial jobs. 
Thus, the chances for recruiting workers for production jobs must be 
viewed, in the long run, in the light of alternative working conditions, 
earnings, career patterns etc. (see chapter 17). 
The issue of the content skills and qualifications must be regarded in 
terms of educational and vocational training policies. There are many 
indications that in the course of computer integration processes the lines 
traditionally drawn between existing trades and occupations will become 
obsolete and that new qualifications and skills will become significant. The 
type of work involved in process-related use of skills seems advantageous 
to companies from many points of view and pushes towards a dissolution 
of traditional job classifications and demarcation lines between occu-
pations (see chapter 11). While technical knowledge and skills related to 
specific products and manufacturing methods obviously remain important, 
data processing know-how, control technology and related technological 
knowledge necessary for monitoring, controlling and maintaining complex 
manufacturing systems are becoming increasingly important. At present no 
general solution exists for how such skill requirements should be grouped 
and combined to form new jobs and trades. Apart from the long time 
periods required for establishing reforms within the educational and voca-
tional training systems, this is also related to the fact that the application of 
modern control and manufacturing technologies has not yet advanced 
beyond the pioneer stage in many factories (see chapter 9). Therefore, 
company experiments concentrate on the reorganization of existing work 
functions. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, after more than ten 
years of planning and discussion, a bill concerning the reorganization of the 
industrial metal working trades within the German dual system of voca-
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tional training12 was passed at the end of 1984. This resulted in the number 
of state-recognized skilled trades being cut from 42 to six, with the possi-
bility of specializing in 17 areas (see figure 12.1). In the first year of 
vocational training, all trainees share a broad-based basic education 
covering the entire vocational field of metal-working occupations. The 
commonly required basic technical knowledge of various subjects was also 
increased and knowledge of data processing, system control and general 
process engineering were more strongly integrated into the training pro-
gramme (compare Buschhaus et al. 1984). 
A similar problem exists concerning the combination of theoretical and 
practical aspects of knowledge and skills. Very few of the European 
countries have a tradition similar to the German industrial skilled worker 
(Facharbeiter) who, in the usual 37* years of vocational training in his 
trade, combines theoretical and practical skills as well as a considerable 
potential for adaptation and further learning on the job. This type of 
qualification profile certainly offers favourable conditions for the 
realization of work structures based on the model of work groups with a 
homogeneous level of skills, especially if there is a wide range of common 
technical knowledge shared by all workers. However, when theoretical and 
practical knowledge and skills for different careers are taught in different 
educational and training courses and in different environments (such as 
school and company), then more differentiated forms of work structuring 
are likely to occur (see chapter 17).13 
The form in which higher and advanced technical knowledge is taught at 
institutions such as technical colleges and universities as well as the training 
patterns and the subjects emphasized will be significant for the development 
of future industrial structures. There are several reasons for this: 
1 First, technicians and engineers have a considerable influence on the 
development process of new control, monitoring and manufacturing 
technology. Research traditions and forms of logic pursued will have an 
effect, perhaps indirectly in many cases, on the patterns of hardware and 
software that are developed (see chapter 5). 
2 Second, the presence or absence of technicians and engineers from 
different professional fields, with differing orientations within company 
management, will be reflected in the definition of company problems 
and in the technical solutions developed. Higher flexibility demands, for 
example, can be met by different reactions, so that solutions will be 
sought in the area of production and control technology in one instance 
or in the field of work organization in another. 
3 Finally, the engineers and technicians themselves constitute an impor-
tant part of the company's total work-force and their supply on the 
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external and internal labour market effects the development of company 
hierarchies and job structures. 
There is also the problem of communicating the relevant technological, 
organizational and managerial knowledge for the use of modern computer-
aided technologies, especially in smaller and medium-sized companies and 
in less industrially developed areas of Europe. In the past, the producers of 
CIM-components have made some effort to offer not only hard- and 
software, but also the relevant 'teachware'. Also, at least in the FRG, a great 
number of intermediate, independent institutions for knowledge transfer 
and retraining have emerged in this field. But especially with the 
perspective of European integration there is still a broad field of action for 
policies in research, development, education and vocational training. 
When the introduction of modern control and manufacturing technolo-
gies evolves from the pioneer phase and becomes more widespread, and 
particularly when forms of process-related use of skills are realized, then 
the problem of adapting the skills of the existing work-force must be dealt 
with in companies. When the initial introduction of new technologies only 
affects a few workers directly, qualification problems can be avoided and 
training expenditures reduced by creaming off the best suited workers for 
the new jobs. Such a policy of creaming off cannot, however, solve the 
problems that arise when larger areas of a plant are affected by innovations 
in technology and organization. The capacity and efficiency of in-plant and 
public training institutions and/or vocational retraining becomes decisive. 
In particular, those companies with a large number of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers will be confronted with the necessity of considerable ex-
penditures and training capacities (in-plant and/or company external) in 
order to achieve adequate further training suited to adult workers. The fact 
that further training measures can lead to remarkable achievements in 
skills, when certain preconditions are met, has been proved in numerous 
cases.14 
Finally, it must be pointed out that forms of process-related use of skills 
within complex manufacturing systems necessitate new forms of cooper-
ation, particularly when a hierarchical distribution of responsibility is 
rejected and more open and less rigid forms of job assignment are practised. 
The capability and willingness to cooperate are specific requirements, 
which, in part, contradict traditional emphases on individual learning and 
individual work performance. It is not sufficient simply to demand that 
educational and vocational training systems place a greater emphasis on 
collective learning processes. New forms of cooperation require the support 
of adequate wage and compensation systems within industrial companies. 
If group work is to be implemented, this also means that new career patterns 
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must be developed or other ways and means must be found of ensuring that 
manufacturing work will, in the long run, continue to offer sufficientiy 
attractive opportunities for earning and reasonable working conditions. 
More differentiated observation and analysis is necessary to establish in 
detail how the problems mentioned here could be solved in the light of the 
different traditions and conditions in education and employment in the 
European countries so that favourable conditions will be created for the 
development of future factory structures. 
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Part IV 
Restructuring of Work in 
Mass Production Industries 
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13 Work Structuring and Company 
Performance Policies1 
Norbert Altmann, Peter Binkelmann, Klaus Dull 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concerns itself with forms of work organization which were 
introduced in the 1970s, particularly with regard to mass production and 
semi-skilled work, under the headings 'new forms of work organization' 
and 'work structuring'. They continue to play a considerable role in areas 
in which manual labour predominates. Moreover, they can be viewed as the 
forerunners of solutions in work organization during the introduction of 
'new technologies'. The main purpose of this chapter, however, is to show 
that in their time 'new forms of work organization' not only served to solve 
problems of highly Taylorized work organization in the interests of workers 
(Humanization of Work), but entailed significant performance policy 
interests of the companies. This made the consequences for the workers 
necessarily ambivalent and potentially negative. This aspect of perfor-
mance policy was never seriously dealt with in the discussions on new 
forms of work organization and it is one that still plays an important role 
today (e.g. see Parker, Slaughter 1988). 
INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND STATEMENT OF THE 
P R O B L E M 
We set out with the thesis that enterprises adopt new forms of work 
organization (or 'new work forms'), which can potentially improve the 
work situation for the workers involved, once the utilization of labour in the 
production process has become problematic for the enterprise. The word 
enterprise is not to be understood here in its legal or organizational sense; 
rather, it is used to express the general interests that are pursued in the 
deployment of labour and the utilization of capital in the actual production 
process (see chapter 1). Our assumption is that problems for the repro-
duction of labour at the enterprise level are a microcosm of problems for the 
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reproduction of labour in society. In society, problems get expressed in the 
form of politically articulated pressure to reduce stressful, overly strenuous 
and restrictively organized work; in the enterprise problems manifest them-
selves in the form of skill and performance deficits caused by the design of 
technical and organizational structures in the production process and in-
sufficient provision of in-plant training measures, or as a growing lack of 
motivation on the part of the workers and decreasing acceptance of existing 
working conditions. Although problems for labour at the enterprise level 
have consequences for the reproduction of labour at the larger societal 
level, the strategies that an enterprise pursues with the introduction of new 
work forms are not intentionally directed towards dealing with the larger 
social problems for labour. The enterprise is interested in solving problems 
specific to the enterprise in as much as the individual and collective 
problems for the reproduction of labour (such as physical wear and tear, 
dequalification, demotivation) limit the extent to which the enterprise can 
fully utilize the labour at its disposal. Thus new work forms basically 
represent an enterprise's solutions to its problems, and although they 
contain a certain potential for improvement in specific work situations, they 
also represent new risks for the individual and social reproduction of 
labour. 
When an enterprise introduces a new work form, it does not do so solely 
in order to solve problems involving the utilization of labour. Solutions to 
the problems of the market, production and time management are also 
considered. These problems arise whenever the production process, the 
organization of work, or demands on labour have to be adapted to market 
induced flexible production requirements and can also occur when attemp-
ting to gain control of the technical and time management aspects of the 
production process, irrespective of the dictates of the market. However, the 
problems involved in utilizing labour and controlling the production pro-
cess are strongly interrelated. Once installed, technical and organizational 
structures determine how labour is used or deployed in the production 
process, which aspects of labour capacity are to be utilized in the 
production process, and which performance reserves can be mobilized in 
order to react flexibly to changing market conditions or to achieve the most 
optimal production and time management conditions. 
In the light of these initial considerations, we will now turn our attention 
to an examination of the interests and objectives pursued by the companies 
in the implementation of such new work forms. We will evaluate the 
potential effects that these new work forms entail for the individual and 
collective reproduction of the workers involved and then examine the 
ambivalent nature of these effects. 
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Company performance policies 203 
THE MEASURES INVESTIGATED 
In deciding on which concrete measures for change to examine, we pro-
ceeded with the most important area in the discussion on new work forms: 
namely, with new structures in sequential production processes.2 This area 
subsequendy became the main focus of our investigation. The new work 
forms that we observed fell basically into five different categories, des-
cribed below: 
1 The first type consists of 'traditional' group work. This form of work is 
mainly characterized by discretionary and cooperative work arrange-
ments for skilled workers especially in assembling machines. We 
decided to include group work in our investigation in order to be able to 
analyze the conditions and limits the company puts on 'self-controlled 
group work'. 
2 The second type consists of the modification of work stations in 
sequential production processes by restructuring the use of labour at 
assembly-line work stations. This form of work is characterized by the 
combination of certain aspects of group work with a high degree of 
division of labour organized according to the principles of sequential 
production processes. The decisive modification in this form of work 
organization lies in deploying labour to achieve systematic job rotation, 
job enlargement, job enrichment and the creation of more comprehensive 
training for semi-skilled workers. Restructuring measures of this kind are 
also based on concepts and models of the 'semi-autonomous group'. 
3 Type three consists of the modification of sequential production 
processes in the form of jobs that are released from assembly-line-
determined cycles. The basic organization of sequential production is 
maintained, but manual jobs are uncoupled from mechanical or auto-
matic machining stations and transport systems and various types of 
buffer systems are implemented, thus allowing greater worker discretion 
with regard to the time taken to perform certain tasks. Combinations of 
this work form with number two type measures are also possible. 
4 The fourth type consists of the elimination of sequential production 
processes through the creation of individual work stations. This work 
form is characterized by the consolidation of previously discrete job 
tasks into a single job with a corresponding increase in the scope of work 
and in cycle time. The establishment of parallel work stations requires 
the installation of special devices or transport systems in order to 
provide the workers with material and work pieces. The job enlargement 
and job enrichment (where applicable) aspects of this work form enable 
workers to have more room for discretion in terms of both the content 
and time required to perform their jobs. 
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5 Type five consists of technical means of eliminating restrictively organ-
ized work in sequential production processes by replacing manual jobs 
with mechanized and automated machining processes. These measures 
were only of interest for the investigation in that they demonstrated the 
limitations of new work forms in extreme situations (such as assembly 
tasks with an extremely high degree of division of labour and short 
cycles) and will not to be included in the following analyses. 
Although the concrete forms that measures take in an enterprise are de-
pendent upon the varying conditions of a particular company and process, 
the characteristics that we attribute to a particular type of work form are 
also basically related to company problems and strategies, i.e. to company 
interests. In this respect, we can make heuristic use of the various work 
forms to reveal significant relationships between company interests in the 
utilization of labour and the introduction of new work forms. 
THE STRATEGIC INTEREST OF COMPANIES IN NEW WORK 
FORMS 
Generally speaking, the results of our investigations made it clear that the 
enterprise's strategic interest in utilizing labour more fully and extending 
its spectrum of demands on performance gets concretely expressed in new 
performance policies. Of course, the external conditions of the enterprise 
(especially the market situation), structural characteristics (such as the 
personnel structure and investment potential, etc.), as well as the con-
stellation of company problems (as defined by company decision-makers) 
determine the general thrust and which instruments an enterprise will use to 
pursue its interests in making more intensified demands on performance. 
Our study's findings and the knowledge and experience gathered from 
company practice in 'work structuring' revealed the following basic 
strategies. 
On the one hand, new work forms enable an enterprise to harness 
individual performance in as comprehensive a manner as possible while 
utilizing the capacity for cooperation of its workers. The most effective way 
of pursuing this strategy is to introduce group work. By utilizing the 
worker's capacity for cooperation, this work form can allocate labour in 
response to ever-changing market conditions and can prevent the occur-
rence of friction, disturbances, and losses caused by coordination problems. 
At the same time, the availability of a broad range of qualified labour which 
works cooperatively can secure high quality results. 
On the other hand, new work forms are also oriented towards a design of 
workplaces, in which individual performance can be utilized to the greatest 
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extent possible, both in terms of scope and intensity. Demands on indi-
vidual performance are kept independent of the work process as a whole -
its technology, organization, and cooperative elements - the worker is, so 
to say, freed from the ties to the other parts of the production process. This 
strategy accommodates both the elimination of traditional forms of se-
quential production processes and the integration of formerly divided tasks 
into complete work cycles at individual work stations. This isolated use of 
individual performance not only enables a higher degree of flexible labour 
deployment, but also makes it possible to cope with technical and organi-
zational disturbances, bottlenecks in production, and material shortages in 
such a way that they do not effect the overall output of a subprocess. In 
other words, objective coordination problems in the production process can 
be solved through demands on individual performance. The enhanced 
access to an individual's performance - for instance, in the interest of 
quality assurance - enables the execution of more effective error control 
procedures and intensifies the worker's sense of responsibility with regard 
to existing quality standards. 
In their differing ways, both of these strategies support the interest of the 
enterprise in pursuing the advantages of production economy and time 
management found in traditional (i.e. tasks involving a high degree of 
division of labour) forms of assembly production processes. The enterprise 
tries to combine both of the work forms described above in order to achieve 
a cooperative orientation simultaneously with individual performance 
maximization. In this way, new work forms are primarily designed to 
absorb the problems or deficiencies of forms of sequential production 
processes by enabling the enterprise to make more comprehensive or more 
flexible demands on performance. Thus, on the one hand, labour deploy-
ment in sequential production processes can make it possible to use labour 
cooperatively, in the form of group work. On the other hand, the establish-
ment of systems divorced from the rhythm of the machine cycle can make 
it possible to break the individual worker's ties to overall performance so 
that, within limits, his or her work can be used in 'isolation'. In this work 
form, the enterprise is mainly interested in compensating for the effects of 
fluctuations in individual performance on total output as well as utilizing 
extra individual productivity in order to improve overall output results. At 
the same time, self directed cooperation (such as helping, teaching, filling-
in) can also be achieved. 
Company strategies and the ambivalent consequences of new work 
forms for the workers 
The introduction of new work forms can have positive effects on the 
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reproduction of labour, as demonstrated by numerous studies and experi-
ments (see the comprehensive literature on 'The Humanization of Work' 
and 'The Quality of Working Life', e.g. DFVLR/Projektttagerschaft, 
numerous volumes since 1981). However, as our investigations have 
shown, the possibilities for improving the work situation and the way 
labour is reproduced continue to be hindered by the strategies and con-
ditions of demands on performance. The positive potential inherent in these 
new work forms has still not been fully realized and the consequences for 
workers are ambivalent 
From an analytic perspective, we can differentiate between the effects of 
particular factors on the reproduction of labour {discrepancies) and varying 
effects for different groups of workers {disparities). The ambivalent 
character of the effects of new work forms also derives, to a significant 
extent, from the partial or complete lack of company supporting measures 
when new work forms are introduced {deficiencies). 
Discrepancies always arise when the potential for improvement in the 
work situation lies in just those structural characteristics of new organi-
zational forms which make it possible for the enterprise to pursue its 
interests by demanding a greater range or intensity of performance on the 
part of its workers. This is the case, for example, when an enterprise 
develops a work form which allows it to utilize individual performance to 
a broader extent, in other words, through the maximized performance of the 
worker. Work forms such as individual work stations with complete 
assembly cycles or work stations uncoupled from the assembly line enable 
greater worker discretion with regard to use of time in the production 
process and thus improve the possibility of establishing individual vari-
ations in working rhythm and reducing stress. In almost all cases, however, 
the workers end up straining themselves from having to maintain perfor-
mance standards or by pushing their performance to the limit in order to 
benefit from wage incentives. 
Discrepancies also occur in work forms that utilize cooperation in per-
forming jobs. For example, on the one hand, workers carry out tasks and 
deal with stress situations more cooperatively and develop more collabora-
tive forms of behaviour. On the other hand, the risk of intensified com-
petition between individual workers due to differences in performance 
ability and social pressure from the group is also present. The positive 
potential of group work only comes to bear if skills are homogeneous or of 
a high level and if the group is able to negotiate (even if informally) the 
performance standards of the enterprise with supervisors. 
The effects of new work forms create disparity among workers when an 
enterprise tries to utilize heterogeneous skills or existing differences in 
performance for its own purposes. For example, a worker's position in an 
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enterprise is determined by the kinds of demands that are made on his or her 
skills or performance. This becomes especially clear when new forms of 
work are based on a polarized division of work, which divides the workers 
into core and marginal groups (e.g. into working groups consisting of 
skilled and non-skilled workers or workers who perform simple tasks 
versus complex tasks, such as maintenance, setting, etc.). 
Disparity also occurs in connection with company strategies that are 
oriented towards the isolated use of individual performance. This happens, 
for example, through the pre-selection of workers to new individual jobs, 
thereby forcing some workers into worse or marginal work situations rather 
than setting up a retraining programme, or by deliberately making differing 
demands on performance for jobs detached from the assembly line (thereby 
pushing the individual worker to overtax himself). Once again, this kind of 
situation tends to divide workers into core and marginal groups, with the 
danger that members of the marginal groups become redundant if the 
personnel is reduced. The same can also occur when the enterprise imple-
ments technical means of eliminating restrictively organized forms of 
work, thus creating a latent labour displacement situation which generally 
affects the members of marginal groups. 
Deficiencies become apparent: 
1 when measures concerned with the design of jobs and the work environ-
ment are insufficient; 
2 when there is a lack or complete absence of the possibility of adapting 
skills to the requirements of the new work forms; 
3 when payment policies and methods are not adapted to the new work 
forms; and 
4 when forms of company hierarchy do not change with the introduction 
of new work forms. 
Thus the ambivalent effects of new work forms for the reproduction of 
labour are also caused by deficiencies in company design measures. 
The deficiencies that occur with the introduction of new work forms can 
be principally ascribed to the fact that an enterprise is only interested in 
changing the design of the workplace once worker performance has begun 
to suffer from the negative effects of physical and mental strain and the 
stress caused by the work environment results in productivity decreases. 
This implies that companies do not generally take indirect factors that 
endanger the reproduction of labour (such as physical strain caused by 
executing the work or the work environment which can result, for example, 
in a long-term drain on health) into consideration in their design measures 
unless legally required. The result is that only partial aspects of the dangers 
to the reproduction of labour are considered in a very short-sighted manner. 
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Our investigation revealed the following findings: in the machine-
building and metalworking enterprises, measures concerned with the 
design of the workplace and the improvement of the work environment 
were, without exception, insufficient High levels of strain caused by the 
work environment and, for the most part, physical strain, continued to exist 
in those work areas in which new work forms had been introduced. In motor 
vehicle plants, the introduction of new work forms brought about eco-
nomical improvements in the design of the work place, but the stress 
exerted by the work environment remained. The ergonomical improve-
ments that were carried out in plants from the electrical and precision 
engineering/optical industries generally consisted of extended M T M 
procedures and were less than optimal from the point of view of union 
demands and knowledge available from scientific research findings. 
An especially grave deficiency in company design measures when new 
work forms were introduced was the lack of attention given to training 
workers in the face of increasing skills and performance requirements. We 
were able to observe four different means of adapting skills to the require-
ments of new work forms which occurred in various combinations. 
In the first strategy type, the effort for securing additional training is 
passed on to the group or worker and basically consists of 'learning by 
doing'. According to our findings, this was the most widely applied form of 
adapting skills to the requirements of new work forms. It basically consists 
of assigning newly recruited or unskilled workers to experienced em-
ployees. However, the core workers have neither the experience nor the 
ability to train others, nor are they paid accordingly. The effort required to 
train the inexperienced colleague leads to additional stress and also disturbs 
the work process (and therein lies the difference to 'on-the-job training'). 
In another version of this method, lower-level supervisors provide minimal 
guidance on a succession of work stations until a 'broad' range of training 
has been obtained. This form of adapting skills to the requirements of new 
work forms is the one mainly chosen when an enterprise seeks to utilize a 
diverse range of performance at a relatively low level or when workers are 
to be utilized flexibly by moving them to different work stations. Generally 
speaking, an enterprise can only implement this strategy when it is able to 
draw on skill reserves (usually in the form of workers certified in another 
industry or in crafts) of its workers. For the workers, this generally means 
that the enterprise makes higher demands on their performance without 
providing recognition in the form of in-plant requalification and suitable 
pay. 
The second strategy consists of avoiding the necessity of providing the 
training required by new work forms by selecting the best-qualified 
workers to perform the jobs in question (creaming off). It is always pursued 
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when higher skills or performance requirements are demanded of the 
workers due to the introduction of individual work stations, new forms of 
technology, or work stations uncoupled from the line. In such cases the 
enterprise selects workers with a high level of skill or experience from 
either the working area in question or other areas and assigns them to the 
new tasks. This strategy generally depends on the enterprise's use of excess 
skills that are not normally required in the work process (a typical situation 
in Tayloristic work processes that is frequendy overlooked). Most of the 
workers who are not chosen in this selection process are either placed in 
peripheral jobs or their former positions are rationalized and they are 
moved somewhere else if they cannot be dismissed. 
The third strategy concerns the differentiation of company demands on 
performance and the segregation of duties. In this variant, only the contents 
of certain jobs are enlarged and enriched and these are then coordinated 
with jobs of very restricted content and skill requirements. Here again the 
enterprise makes use of available skills in the work process in a very 
deliberate way. This variant is closely linked to polarized assignment of 
workers, in which low-skilled workers are combined in a stable core group 
(in group work or floating assignments at sequential production process 
stations). 
The fourth strategy consists of the training of skills according to the 
specific plant and process involved. In this variant, the contents of the skills 
conveyed to the workers are closely linked to the requirements of the 
working process. More complicated forms of training (for example, by 
means of special training workshops, professional instructors, teaching 
programmes, control systems and longer training periods) are only carried 
out when very high quality and performance standards cannot be achieved 
without a more systematic training. In addition to conveying knowledge 
and skills connected with the process in particular, this form of training is 
mainly concentrated on developing speed and 'exactitude' (awareness of 
errors and mistakes). 
These strategies of skill adaptation have the following effects on 
workers: workers feel they have to push themselves in order to perform 
adequately; they undergo mental and emotional stress and pressure ('in 
trying to reach the performance standard during the training period'); social 
conflicts erupt within groups and there is increased strain caused by the task 
of training 'weaker' workers or newcomers; the segregation of duties 
destroys any feeling of solidarity and replaces it with group egoism; mar-
ginal groups are soon faced with the increased risk of unemployment and 
less capable workers begin to experience a sense of 'personal inferiority'. 
Another form of deficiency consists in the fact that wage policies ob-
struct the potentially positive effects that new work forms could have on the 
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reproduction of labour and aggravate the discrepancies and disparities 
inherent in the work forms. 
For the moment, it should be borne in mind that we found no direct 
connection between the various kinds of new work forms and payment 
policies. Group work was remunerated with both group and individual 
methods of payment in the form of group and individual bonuses, group 
piecework and hourly wages; the same also applies for the newly created 
individual work stations and production jobs uncoupled from the assembly 
line in that they were remunerated with both individual and group piece-
work payment. 
When group-related incentive payment (in the form of group bonuses or 
group piecework) is used to control cooperative performance, it creates a 
state of competition between the workers in a group and increased pressure 
to maintain a high level of performance. Thus cooperative relationships 
which are of benefit to workers can only come into existence when they are 
able to influence the wage/performance ratio according to individual per-
formance and balance out wage differences with the help of informal 
arrangements or wage accounting forms. 
However, when an enterprise institutes 'individualized' piecework as an 
instrument of control over individual levels of performance, the workers 
have the possibility of influencing the amount they earn, but they also run 
the risk of overperforming in order to earn as much as possible, once again 
a cause of social conflict. Also control of performance by supervisors is 
only reduced to a very slight degree with this form of payment. 
If, in the reverse case, the enterprise seeks to neutralize the relationship 
between performance and pay by making cooperative or individual per-
formance independent of wages (by paying standard 'frozen' group or 
individual piecework wages, for example), increased job intensity, fewer 
pauses and extra efforts to perform in a cooperative manner are no longer 
compensated for by the possibility of earning higher wages. The 
enterprise's interest in keeping its increased demands on performance 
independent of bonus systems also gets expressed when workers are not 
moved up into higher wage grades upon the introduction of new work forms 
entailing higher skill and performance requirements. (In this respect, the 
West German categories of analytical work evaluation are especially un-
suitable as a means of dealing with new performance requirements, see 
chapter 2.) 
Finally, deficiencies in company work design measures also occur as a 
result of unchanged forms of company hierarchy. In most cases, the role of 
the lower-level supervisor is not affected when new work forms are intro-
duced. This causes deficiencies because the positive effects such as greater 
worker discretion that the companies have sought to realize with the help of 
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group work and other new forms of work in sequential assembly production, 
as described above, are obstructed by the intervention of lower-level super-
visors who continue to carry out their traditional functions. The same 
applies to individual work stations and production jobs detached from the 
assembly line in cases where individual performance is not controlled by 
pay. Here the lower-level supervisors exert pressure on workers because 
they are responsible for the achievement of set production standards 
(numbers of pieces). This obstructs the possibility for workers to have 
greater freedom in deciding how to divide up their time in carrying out 
work and taking breaks according to personal preference. From the lower-
level supervisor's point of view, his or her task becomes more difficult 
under new work forms. For example, additional attention has to be paid to 
jobs detached from the machine cycle to ensure that idle periods do not 
occur due to empty buffers. For several reasons, supervisors also do not 
provide the additional information that is necessary to carry out new work 
forms effectively. In short, they continue to act very much the way they did 
before the introduction of new work forms. 
It should also be pointed out that companies with new work forms often 
attempt to keep hierarchical structures and disciplinary functions concealed 
through the use of new work forms by placing the emphasis on cooperative 
relationships between the workers. For example, group control of 
performance can translate into 'cleaning house', i.e. getting rid of less 
productive members, meaning that the task of pressuring others to perform 
and evaluating performance gets reallocated to the group. Another example 
of hidden control relationships is the company's use of the position 'group 
speaker'. The group speaker is supposedly representing an autonomous 
group, but in reality he or she acts as both the conveyer of company 
directives and group problems, thereby encompassing a leadership position 
without the recognition or the pay. 
In contrast, in the case of individual work stations, in which a more 
direct access to individual performance and thus an increased monitoring 
and control of performance is possible, it is easier to legitimate explicit 
control relations by using so-called objective criteria (meeting the company 
quality standards or the allowed error frequency, etc.), thereby putting 
direct pressure on an individual's performance without the need for, or the 
intermediation of, a foreman (Meister). 
One final point that should be made is that the ambivalencies for workers 
deriving from new forms of work organization limit the ability of these 
work forms to increase productivity. In the short term, they prevent the full 
utilization and development of human capital; in the long run, they bring 
new problems to the enterprise such as strain on skilled workers and both 
lack of motivation and flexibility.3 
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14 The Future of the Mass 
Production Worker1 
Günter Bechtle, Klaus Dull 
INTRODUCTION 
The current debate on the future of work focuses in part on the future of the 
mass production worker. Flexible standardized manufacturing systems are 
calling for a changing worker profde. How is this demand being met and 
what consequences does this have for the mass production worker? Using 
information gathered in three different countries at production sites all 
belonging to the same multinational company, this chapter shows that the 
answer to these questions must consider the different institutional and 
historical structures that make up the context in which future forms of mass 
production work develop. 
There is consensus in the social sciences that the historical constellation of 
mass production, mass consumption and widespread prosperity, including 
political and institutional arrangements of the welfare-state in Western 
Europe, has been in a state of transition since the 1970s. This is commonly 
seen as stemming from the new international division of labour, growing 
competition in world markets and from the availability of so-called new 
technologies (information processing and control technologies). The 
question with which we will be concerned here is: what will happen to 
Tayloristic forms of labour deployment and to the historical figure of the 
'mass production worker' when their macro-economic preconditions be-
come highly unstable? Phrased differently: if barriers to uses of technology 
in the production process can be principally overcome by the 'new tech-
nologies', then what forms of labour productivity increases by way of 
Tayloristic forms of labour deployment remain possible and necessary?2 
We will approach this question in three steps: first, we will determine the 
historical-sociological location of the 'mass production worker'; his/her 
position will be circumscribed within a historical societal configuration 
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whose structure is formed by the Tayloristic-Fordistic syndrome. We will 
then introduce some results emanating from an empirical research project, 
which was concerned with rationalization processes in a multinational 
company in the consumer electronics field. The findings deal with 
changing labour forms arising from the transition from highly Taylorized 
manual assembly work to automated assembly. On this issue, we con-
centrate on the national differences in solutions of company personnel 
policies as they are carried out in the multinational company's French, 
Italian and German production sites. Finally, we will touch upon the issue 
of generalizing about the future of the mass production worker from 
nationally specific solutions. In this regard, we will focus especially upon 
characteristics of national education and industrial relations systems. 
The study begins its analysis at the macro-level, examining charac-
teristics of a societal configuration from an historical perspective, continues 
at the empirical micro-level of company case studies, and returns to the 
macro level of historical and theoretical interpretation. 
THE TAYLORISTIC-FORDISTIC SYNDROME AND THE 
LOCATION OF THE MASS PRODUCTION WORKER 
The emergence and shaping of the mass production worker as a type was 
constituted through a historical, societal configuration which came to the 
fore in Europe after the Second World War and at whose centre lies the 
'Tayloristic-Fordistic syndrome' (see chapter 3 for an explanation of this 
term). Characteristic for this configuration are the growing reciprocities 
between the macro-level of economic cycles, social milieus, political-
institutional processes, and the micro-level of work and production 
structures within companies. Without being able to refer in detail to the 
inner workings of such interrelationships (see chapter 3), three systematic 
repercussions of the Tayloristic-Fordistic syndrome can be named: 
1 The neutralization of the contradiction between wage as a cost factor 
and wage as a demand factor. Cost decreases in the piece rate or 
increases in labour productivity through the scale effects of mass pro-
duction enable cost-neutral wage increases that - via growth in mass 
purchasing power - quickly effect an increase in demand; under con-
ditions of a higher market profile, an increased volume of sales can be 
realistically expected, keeping the whole cycle in motion. 
2 The permanent self-mobilization of additional labour reserves. 
Increasing wages and decreasing prices gradually displace traditional 
modes of production (the agrarian subsistence economy, artisans and 
small businesses). On the other side we have the pull-effect of a 
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relatively attractive transition to wage labour. Taken together, both 
tendencies provide a supply of new, quickly deployable labour for 
industrial production processes. 
3 The social-political compensation principle. Indeed, increases in the 
work intensity of Tayloristic production do continuously endanger the 
reproduction of labour power. But, on the other hand, performance 
intensification and production increases create margins used to finance 
the costs of social security. 
On the material base of these cycles of mass income, mass consumption, 
labour productivity, cost decreases, rising wages, mobilization of addi-
tional labour power reserves and the accompanying socio-political com-
pensation for attrition induced by performance-intensity, we can determine 
the social location of the mass production worker with respect to his/her 
relevance for industrial rationalization processes and the accompanying 
ways that control in the company is stabilized: 
1 The use of the mass production worker is characterized by a sharp 
hierarchical and functional division of labour, a strict organization of 
material and work flows, and 'time management'; the aim is the greatest 
possible penetration of the 'time regime' in the production process (see 
Benz-Overhagee/a/. 1982; Sohn-Rethel 1978). 
2 An asymmetrical control by the company management underlies the 
mass production workers' wage-performance relation because of the 
way in which 'performance' is measured and recognized (and passed off 
as being scientifically objective). Performance defined in such a way 
cannot be 'negotiated'. 
The highly exchangeable labour power induced by the division of labour 
and the control of production through time management on the one hand, 
and the non-negotiable determination of performance on the other, are the 
decisive power resources needed to stabilize company control.3 This is the 
structure of labour deployment under Taylorism-Fordism and the dominant 
pattern in which rationalization interests get realized. 
It is possible to reach the same thesis - that company control gets 
stabilized through the use of mass production work - through another form 
of argumentation. In the historical phase in which the Tayloristic-Fordistic 
rationalization model was able to develop and spread on the basis of the 
above-mentioned interrelationships between the micro- and macro-levels, 
the industrial rationalization process created an independent structure, 
whose function was the rationalization of the company organization itself. 
In Germany, this 'meso' structure historically found its expression in 
company forms such as work planning, controlling, quality control and 
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electronic information processing. These forms are not solely oriented to 
the overall economic goal of the company: profitability. However, they 
simultaneously serve this 'meso structure,' and are bound to the 
Tayloristic-Fordistic rationalization model. The development of this struc-
ture goes a long way in explaining the many results of empirical social 
science which point to the persistency of social structures within the com-
pany and their 'conservatism of structure' (Bechtle, Lutz 1989). 
The early 1970s witnessed a gradual erosion of the preconditions of 
Tayloristic rationalization strategies. The interrelationships between micro 
and macro levels, upon which the Tayloristic-Fordistic syndrome is based, 
increasingly ceased to function. Without going into great detail, the result 
of this erosion process has had a two-sided effect on mass production. On 
the one hand, the world market has imposed changes in production 
behaviour. Under conditions of decreasing market shares, the production 
techniques characteristic of large-scale production do not allow a further 
realization of economies of scale, and cost reductions are unobtainable due 
to company size. On the other hand, the supply of flexible automation 
systems has steadily increased on the technology market. The application 
of these systems is an attempt to solve technologically the problematic 
relationship between flexibility and productivity increases based on econo-
mies of scale using new control and computer technologies. The principle 
here is to simulate complex processes consisting of a multitude of different 
technical parameters (qualitative as well as quantitative product differ-
entiation, interruptions in the production process, etc.) using computer 
technology. However, sweeping changes in the organization of production, 
especially in the way the various levels of planning and production are 
(interlinked are a precondition for the profitable application of the new 
technologies. 
ON CHANGES OF HIGHLY TAYLORIZED WORK FORMS IN 
FRANCE, I T A L Y AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
G E R M A N Y 
In the following section we will attempt to clarify the relationship between 
the crisis of the mass production model and its possible resolutions. For this 
purpose we will use results obtained from empirical research on strategies 
of 'flexible standardized mass production' in an international concern in the 
consumer electronics field. 
The company is a large multinational based in France with production 
sites all over the world. Since the middle of the 1970s, the company has 
been pursuing a policy of capital concentration, first by buying Italian and 
German firms, and more recently (end of the 1980s) US, British and Far 
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Eastern firms. The goal, as with many companies in the consumer 
electronic industry, is to obtain the size necessary for scale production 
within the confines of stagnating sales markets. 
Research was carried out at seven of the company's European pro-
duction sites using the method of 'intensive company case-studies' (see 
chapter 1). Research concentrated on television assembly. Four locations 
with a total of 3,500 employees were in the Federal Republic; two sites with 
a total of 2,500 employees were in France, and one site with almost 2,000 
employees was in Italy. Altogether, nearly 8,000 people were employed at 
the research sites.4 
First, we will describe the initial situation as well as the most important 
elements of the company's rationalization strategy. In a second step, we 
will look at the strategy's consequences for company personnel policy in 
different national contexts. 
The company's rationalization strategy 
First, we can recapitulate the initial situation in which the company 
gradually developed its strategy. Competition in the world market forced 
investment in systems of flexible automation. These, however, necessitated 
an extent of investment only attainable through high-capacity utilization 
and the expectation of increasing sales. As a result, the company pursued a 
typical and often encountered crisis strategy of 'sunset' industries in this 
phase: movements toward world-wide concentration of capital. The idea 
behind the strategy is to establish a presence in new markets, so that the 
high investment costs of new technologies can be amortized under con-
ditions of decreasing product life. 
The company also pursued a strategy of separating distribution and 
production and introducing flexible standardization to make for an easier 
handling of variable and unforeseeable market demands. Flexible stan-
dardization usually makes it possible to selectively apply various flexible 
automation technologies to obtain profitability. With an increasing piece 
rate, investment in automation is generally most profitable where the pro-
portion of manual labour has been high. This is especially so for assembly 
processes. New items offered on the technology market make it easier to 
transcend the traditionally strong limits to automation in assembly. 
However, the profitability of capital investment in assembly is increasingly 
risky because the additional productivity incurred by such investment -
with the already high total productivity (measured in work hours) in 
television assembly - has reached a critical limit. Also, the comparative 
advantage of manual assembly is still strong. Thus, the company had to try 
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and pursue a strategy which balanced the relative advantages of costly 
automation investments and the continued use of manual labour. 
The company strategy can be described in the following five steps 
which, although they overlap with one another, also strategically build 
upon one another. 
1 Obtaining additional market shares by purchasing European competitors 
active in the field of television assembly. This aimed at reaching a 
profitable economy of scale. 
2 Separating distribution (using the original brand names) from pro-
duction through the establishment of initially two, later reduced to a 
single production company, along with independent sales companies in 
the Federal Republic. This meant that parts for all brands could be 
produced, assembled, repaired, etc. at any company location. Production 
was thus protected from the demand elasticity of individual brands and 
could be better rationalized. 
3 The introduction of a standardized printed circuit board (PCB) which, 
when attaching different-sized PCBs to the electronic 'insides' of tele-
visions during assembly, can be divided and reassembled according to 
differing requirements. In fact, this standardization was nothing but a 
specific application of the world-wide practice of using a particular 
technological design (flexible standardization) to prevent end-product 
diversity from interfering with production flow. This both 
product-related and production organization rationalization created the 
preconditions for a far-reaching automation of PCB assembly. 
4 The productivity derived from a successful strategy of a combined 
market and production economy requires either a growing sales market, 
or leads to the inevitable reduction of excess capacities. For the 
company, the contradiction between economic profitability at high piece 
rate production and the limited capacity of the market was insoluble. 
The reduction of excess capacities led to considerable lay-offs, 
including the complete closure of production sites. 
5 Attempts were made to increase productivity further using computer 
technologies and organization techniques, as well as by using synergy 
effects to enhance the production economy: the solution was seen to lie 
in a 'simulated factory'. This strategy entailed the reorganization of the 
production flow from picture tube to final assembly 'as if we had a 
uniform European factory'. The slogan was: 'one production site - one 
product', which supplanted the original 'one production site - one 
brand'. Thus, there was one site for picture tube production, one for PCB 
production, one for PCB assembly, one for final assembly, etc. 
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These strategic elements and phases can be condensed into two basic 
theoretical arguments. The first argument refers to the crisis of mass pro-
duction: the various technological and organizational forms of rationali-
zation in assembly are elements of a comprehensive crisis strategy that 
seeks to flexibly standardize mass production. Achieving economies of 
scale through capacity utilization of increasingly fixed capital shares and a 
market-oriented production diversity are aimed at reaching the common 
denominator 'flexibilization through standardization'. 
The second argument takes up a basic idea from 'systemic rationali-
zation' (see chapter 4), but in modified form: rationalization measures of 
flexible standardization - with increasing automation - generate pressure to 
attain an integration of individual production processes by means of control 
technologies, and, in addition, a comprehensive systems integration of these 
individual processes in line with the model of a 'simulated factory'. 
However, this imminent pressure towards integration is difficult to cope with 
because limits and obstructions are of a both systematic and historical 
nature. They are systematic because the increase in production capacity 
induced by integration forces a broadening of the market in line with the 
laws of an economy of scale. The relevance of the market - as a system 
environment - is not only enhanced in temporal and material dimensions, 
but also, the uncertainties of market constellations react back upon the 
integration process, demanding new - sometimes immediate - adjustments, 
thus constantly calling into question systems integration along the lines of a 
'simulated factory'. The limits and obstructions are historical because 
barriers to integration arise from production and social structures developed 
over the years from formerly independent businesses and their surroundings 
(e.g. labour markets). For one, there are disjunctions between factories with 
regard to the level of technology and organization (e.g. different process 
speeds of technological equipment). Also, forms of social integration, i.e. 
processes of communication and information transfer aimed at achieving 
greater total transparency ('trust versus competition'), remain relatively 
precarious under conditions of the ongoing struggle for productivity, cost 
and market advantages within a company. Rationalization measures are 
always evaluated in terms of reciprocal (dis)advantage and, if necessary, 
blocked ('individual company egotism' or, better: interests). 
The strategy of flexibly standardized mass production, characterized on 
the one hand by a rationalization of the product, the process and the work 
organization, and the limits to an aspired inter-company systems inte-
gration on the other hand, are two lines of development central for the 
analysis of future demands upon assembly work. 
One line arises from the tense relationship between the (logically and 
technologically) desired systems integration and the simultaneously 
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emerging barriers and cleavages (e.g. inconsistencies in the organization of 
intra-company logistics, incompatibility of control systems, etc.). On the 
one hand, the systemic interdependencies between different assembly 
processes and upstream and downstream processes increase. This entails 
higher demands upon coordination and cooperation between the technical 
offices and the assembly area, as well as upon the production workers 
themselves. This is especially so when spatial and temporal buffers are 
largely eliminated through new logistics systems and altered flows of 
material. On the other hand, the above-mentioned barriers to integration 
raise considerable problems of controlling deviations in the production plan 
in terms of time, quantity, and quality. With systemic dependencies, the 
susceptibility of interference within complex production processes grows; 
deviations are carried over from one processing department to another in a 
snowball effect, and coordination requirements increase at an inflationary 
rate. The new division of labour calls for coordination through new 
company-wide organizational forms. 
The second line of development, closely bound up with the first, arises 
from the structural change of work deployment in the transition from 
Tayloristic to automated assembly processes. Traditional assembly 
processes follow a sequential, mechanic and continually repeating logic 
necessitating a materially and temporally determined and ex ante calculable 
work performance. This logic and this performance structure derives from 
the precise determination of the labour process by the production process. 
Work is concretely tied to a small number of isolated characteristics of the 
workpiece, and entails the repetition of identical operations in identical 
time intervals. This stands in stark contrast to automated assembly, where 
the technologically autonomous production process and the 'labour 
process' (human intervention in the production process) are decoupled (see 
Bechtle 1980; Dull, Bechtle 1988). However, the above-mentioned possi-
bility of interference between these processes under conditions of systemic 
interdependence, continually make renewed forms of interaction between 
production process and labour process (i.e. interventions) necessary. These, 
however, are neither calculable with regard to time, type, sequence, or 
duration, and are certainly not ex ante calculable. The work then necessary 
for a renewed interlinking of labour process and production process be-
comes - whenever possible - preventive trouble-shooting (Moldaschl 
1989). It is no longer aimed at isolated characteristics of the object (pro-
duct), but at the entire process flow or process continuity. It takes place in 
simultaneous coordination with other areas of deployment and rarely 
repeats itself in an identical form. 
Both lines of development taken together - one characterized by a 
growing, but systematically limited systems integration, the other charac-
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terized by a growing decoupling of production process and work assignment 
- raise new areas of uncertainty. These new uncertainties lead to work 
requirements which can in principle no longer be mastered by the traditional 
work tasks of manual assembly work and the skills of the mass production 
worker. Companies must thus meet the challenge of developing new forms 
of skill and skill use as well as new forms of work organization that deviate 
from Tayloristic models. Companies' solutions in the realm of personnel 
policy can and, indeed, must build upon very different, nationally specific 
structural conditions and resources, such as organized labour markets, 
education and training systems, and systems of industrial relations. 
Nationally specific solutions in the realm of personnel policy 
Below, we will briefly describe characteristics of nationally specific solu-
tions for coping with the new work requirements arising in automated 
assembly processes found at the French, Italian and German research sites 
of the multinational consumer electronics firm. 
At the French sites, the dominant approach is the systematic further 
training of semi-skilled female assembly workers. This further training 
reaches a maximum of 1,000 hours per worker upon which a state certified 
document (CAP) is presented to the employee defining him/her as a 'plant 
electronic worker'.5 In the French situation, this approach has a threefold 
meaning. First, further training serves to procure skills for production tasks 
on automated equipment: in French production sites, further training is 
considered to be an important instrument for mobilizing skill and skillable 
labour in the internal labour market, since skilled tradesmen usually refuse 
to work in production. Second, for semi-skilled workers who have under-
taken systematic further training, more demanding tasks in automated 
assembly are seen as an advancement. Moreover, further training is used as 
an element of an 'alternative' social plan design,6 the aim being to increase 
the chances of re-employment of semi-skilled workers in the external 
labour market. Third, further training in France is supported by a broad 
consensus in social policy. On the one hand, further training is seen as an 
important adjustment for the not very practice-oriented initial education 
and training; on the other hand, further training seems to be the only way to 
create the necessary preconditions for breaking up the restrictive work 
situation of semi-skilled workers in highly Tayloristic work processes. 
Our research showed that semi-skilled female workers in French 
production sites - after corresponding training - were in a position to carry 
out more difficult tasks at automated workplaces, tasks that in German 
production locations usually would have been carried out by skilled 
tradesmen. 
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But this approach has certain constraints. First, the possibility for further 
training is numerically limited, i.e. it is controlled and applied selectively 
by lower management. Second, the completion of further training is no 
guarantee for assignment at respectively skilled jobs. Even if such an 
assignment is forthcoming, the employee's status within the company wage 
hierarchy undergoes only negligible change. Third, further training courses 
do not dissolve the rigid and traditional segmentation between skilled 
tradesmen who have been trained at vocational (lycées d'enseignement 
professional) or secondary schools and who have been assigned outside of 
production (in maintenance), and semi-skilled workers deployed in 
production. 
In the Italian production site (picture tubes), the problem of process 
continuity and process optimization (i.e. the permanent coordination 
between different processing sections) is extremely important since the 
quality and quantity of output is dependent upon controlling these 
problems. In the Italian production location, the attempt is made to solve 
these problems by applying a particular model of group work. 
In this model so-called mixed groups (of on average 80 persons) are 
formed, in which the functions of machine operation, machine supervision, 
and machine adjustment are integrated and in which job tasks are distri-
buted autonomously within the group. Their new skill structure, consisting 
of specialized chemical, metallurgical, and electric-electronic knowledge, 
is characterized as a new 'professional matrix'. The group model's neces-
sary training measures are carried out in cooperation with company-
internal and company-external (schooling) agencies. Newly employed 
school graduates, for example, are trained on the job for a period of five 
months at 100 hours per head.7 
The company ties the enhanced opportunities for acquiring qualifi-
cations and the effective long-term employment guarantees deriving from 
this form of work with company performance policy. A concrete example 
of the exchange in advantages for both employer and employee in the 
Italian case was the negotiation of a 'social pact'. Company and union 
representatives reached a so-called productivity agreement which contains 
two instruments for the enforcement of performance policy - one regu-
lating working time and one determining wages. First, a three-shift system 
was introduced that extends annual working time to 291 days. The plant 
runs six days a week and 24 hours a day. This is compensated for by the 
reduction of weekly work to 36.5 hours and the introduction of a new shift 
model which limits individual workers' night-shift requirements (creation 
of a fourth shift-team); night-shift work is undertaken in a four-week 
rhythm on a total of six days. In this model, the maximum occurrence of 
night-shift work is twice a week on two consecutive nights; between 
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night-shift and day-shift a minimum one-day rest phase is required, as a rule 
it is a two-day period. These rest phases are important for a majority of 
workers, as many still pursue private agricultural work. However, the 
agreement stipulates that the necessary maintenance work is carried out on 
work-free Sundays. Finally, a so-called productivity wage has been agreed 
upon, which accounts for about 20 per cent of the basic collective wage and 
is paid out to all workers as a supplement regardless of their wage group. 
The ability to implement this agreement between the company and 
unions depended upon very specific conditions atypical for the other com-
panies of the multinational firm. The picture tube production site in Italy, 
in comparison to other areas in which the multinational company has 
production facilities, receives an above-average number of orders, and has 
an employment level that has been stable for the past decade, and has even 
risen in the past few years. 
The solutions that have been undertaken in German production sites of 
the company follow traditional patterns. Automated assembly lines are 
predominantly manned by skilled tradesmen (Facharbeiter), who often 
entered production in previously existing (tool)setter positions and now 
directly carry out production tasks as 'production mechanics' or 
'operators'. Even if the recruitment of skilled tradesmen for such tasks 
poses difficulties due to labour market shortages, it is not - as in France -
principally out of the question. In several cases companies manage with 
skilled tradesmen from related occupations who have gone through state-
financed retraining courses. 
Innovative approaches of coping with the requirements of automation 
work have been much less frequent in German production sites and also 
much less stable over time. They display features that are almost diametri-
cally opposed to the institutionalization of advanced education and training 
in France and the introduction of group work in Italy. 
One of the experiments was characterized by an attempt to fully utilize 
existing electrotechnical as well as other types of skilled personnel to 
supervise, control, and repair breakdowns in the automated PCB assembly. 
This had the double purpose of creating jobs for skilled tradesmen while at 
the same time fixing breakdowns quickly. 
However, this experiment was doomed to failure because it had practi-
cally no back-up measures for enhancing stability. First, for reasons of 
performance intensification, the experiment was undertaken with purpose-
fully tight staffing. Second, no accompanying training measures took place, 
so that the creation of a 'hybrid qualification' (i.e. mechanics plus 
electronics), which was deemed necessary, remained the exception. Third, 
the hierarchical levels were enhanced by institutionalizing a new level in the 
form of a group leader (Vorarbeiter) in order to avoid production back logs 
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and cope with unexplained down-times. Across the board, this measure 
generated resistance by work groups and endangered their cohesion. 
WHAT IS TO B E C O M E OF THE MASS PRODUCTION 
WORKER? 
If we sum up the current developments of how the mass production worker 
is utilized in company structures across all the countries in this study, the 
following results emerge: first, the mass is being removed from the mass 
production worker; the traditional, inner homogeneity is getting lost. This 
goes for the entire spectrum of what comprises work: requirements, skills, 
workload, job security, etc. The next step of this development is the 
concretization of various forms of polarization of the mass production 
worker. Workers are found at both extreme poles of work skills: at one end 
workers are formed either from those who have already been pushed out of 
the production process, or more typically by those who occupy residual 
jobs which have not yet been swallowed up by automation or that re-
peatedly appear because they are relatively cheap. Thus, what remains is a 
limited number of the classical mass production worker used as a stop-gap. 
At the other pole, there is a small minority of workers who succeed in 
reaching higher positions where new hybrid skills are needed and a broad 
spectrum of tasks are carried out. Between these two extremes, there is a 
third group which succeeds in making the jump to the automated jobs. 
These are higher level semi-skilled positions with high performance-related 
burdens (especially time pressure), which were also features of the classical 
mass production worker. This group is formed in a more or less Darwinist 
selection process, in which access is based either on semi-skilled workers' 
superior performance records or with the help of targeted training 
measures. 
The way these poles get distributed and weighted varies between 
countries. We explain this from the fact that the interrelationships between 
the micro and macro levels of societal production, as characterized by the 
Tayloristic-Fordistic syndrome, are strongly affected by historical and 
country-specific conditions which tend to lead back to differing industriali-
zation processes. We demonstrate this using two aspects of these processes 
which could be documented from the results of our cross-country study, 
so-called 'representatives' of the inter-relationship between the micro and 
macro levels: the educational system and the structure of industrial 
relations. 
In France, the method of coping with new processes by further training 
for semi-skilled workers derives from two sources: for one, from France's 
school-oriented occupational education and training which has a relatively 
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low quantitative output, and, for another, from the fact that skilled workers 
with an initial occupational training do not go into direct production - at 
least not into mass production assembly. Both developments produce a 
demand for further training if new production needs in mass production 
factories are to be met. As early as the mid-1960s, the Ouvrier professional 
de fabrication came into being, a type of worker that is formed by a mixture 
of both state and company education and training. Also, a law has been in 
existence since the early 1970s which requires companies to invest at least 
1.1 per cent of their payroll into training and further training; as a rule, 
investment in further training by large French companies by far exceeds 
this legal requirement. 
Finally, in the French case we must take into account that semi-skilled 
workers are often union clientele, and that their further training, besides the 
issue of work organization and workers' participation, is a political 
question raised by both the union representatives of large unions in the 
company and so-called education and training commissions {Comités 
d'entreprise). The political influence of these representative organs, 
however, is low and usually does not exceed union rhetoric and radical 
verbal demands.8 
In sum for France: a strong demand for further training of workers, state 
initiatives and union concern for the subject-matter of further training, with 
a simultaneously strong separation of production from so-called 
'decision-making' departments, which can be counted as part of the control 
mechanisms of company organization. 
The German approach's solution lies within very different structures. 
For really skilled tasks German companies use skilled tradesmen 
(Facharbeiter) - if they can be recruited from the labour market, which is 
less and less the case, especially in the mass production industry. Why 
aren't semi-skilled workers, utilized as in France? For one, semi-skilled 
workers both male and female, but especially non-German females, are the 
'stepchildren' of production in Germany. The German work council 
member gets involved where norms exist upon which he/she can fall back 
on and for which he/she has legal recourse; the further training of semi-
skilled female workers is not such a subject9 (see chapter 24). And where 
there is no skill, there can be no claim for one: about 90 per cent of the 
women we interviewed in our research locations had no plans for further 
training and did not know of any opportunities for further training. While 
wage, working hours, and individual dismissals are relatively well-secured 
through collective agreements, such issues as work organization, perfor-
mance intensification, etc. remain at the complete discretion of company 
management. The structural conservatism of the German model is further 
promoted by the traditional mode of company organization, i.e. the deter-
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ministic dictates of work planning departments and the attempt of technical 
offices to achieve planning perfectionism. 
In sum for Germany: the lack of further training for semi-skilled 
workers, traditional work council functions, permanent performance in-
tensification for highly skilled workers secured in particular by the 
traditional organizational structure, and maintenance of the segmentation 
between semi-skilled and skilled workers. 
The Italian case revolves around explaining the establishment of the 
negotiated productivity and social pact. On the one hand, this involves the 
historical particularities of the relationship between the educational and 
production system in the southern Italian labour market, and a distinctive 
corporate structure between company, union, and state on the other. 
Unlike in the French or German production sites, the Italian sites lack 
two groups of workers upon whose shoulders the fate of the mass pro-
duction worker has traditionally rested: women (because of night shift 
work) and non-Italians. This means that labour problems have to be solved 
'at home.' 
In the Italian case, we are dealing mainly with employees whose average 
age is low, and who have without exception completed a two- to three-year 
vocational school programme. After being presented with their technical 
diplomas - in contrast to the French case - they are immediately deployed 
in direct production. When the new vocational system was introduced in 
southern Italy, and produced these young, well-trained workers who 
entered the production area, they had difficulty getting along with the dense 
network of middle-level supervisors who had fewer school qualifications 
and had attained their position by rising through the ranks. The group work 
model made it possible to eliminate part of this chain of command, and 
relegate the superfluous foremen as 'advisors'. Promotion was then more or 
less determined by skill acquisition, rather than by supervisor selection. 
What is decisive and symptomatic in the Italian case is that structural 
reform was embedded in a model of 'political exchange' which became 
widespread in Italy during the mid-1970s, as a sort of aftermath to the 
workers' struggles that had taken place during the late 1960s. This model is 
based on exchange relations between political clientele embodied by three 
agents: the state, company management - represented in this case by the 
personnel department, which, in contrast to the German case, has a strong 
company-internal negotiating position - and the unions. In this triangular 
relationship, the company and the unions negotiated the so-called produc-
tivity and social pact (dated 1980). What was exchanged? Access to quali-
fied work for young workers against a successful company performance 
policy with shift work and performance premiums. The extremely 
'productivistically' oriented unions were able to legitimate this package, as 
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it corresponded to their policy - established in the early 1970s - of egali-
tarian professionalità (occupational professionalism) which was oriented to 
young, vocationally trained workers in particular (see Bechtle, Heiner 
1979). This pact guaranteed the maintenance and creation of employment 
in the region, and the government in Rome was thus willing to provide 
various subsidies and financial aid, a policy with returns in the form of 
votes. 
In sum for Italy: without women and foreigners and with the help of the 
state, the 'social partners' (employers association and unions) were able to 
come to an agreement on productivity-oriented structural reform. Whether 
this exchange is only successful under fair weather conditions remains to be 
seen. 
These three cases demonstrate that the mass production worker is not 
necessarily disappearing. Rather, the forms in which mass production work 
appear are getting restructured. In each country, mass production work is 
getting expressed through the use of a different type of worker within 
different types of organizational structures. This, in turn, derives from the 
existing and developing historical and institutional structures, such as the 
labour market, training and occupational system, industrial relations 
system, etc. found in the nationally specific context. 
Although the mass production worker is getting restructured, and the 
forms in which he/she appear are heterogeneous, the many classical 
burdens and problems belonging to mass production work have not been 
eliminated. 
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15 Towards a Polarization of Skill 
Structures1 
Manfred Deifi 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on the development of skill structures and skill requirements in 
industrial manufacturing, especially in light of the increasing dissemeni-
nation of new computer-based technologies and the changing nature of 
company rationalization processes, has yielded a number of findings, both 
complementary and contradictory. Some research on this issue has 
prompted the assessment that a reprofessionalization of industrial work 
structures will take place accompanied by a trend towards skill enhance-
ment. This chapter uses the furniture industry (as a representative case of 
production structures in the consumer goods industry in general) to provide 
a detailed description of the development of skill requirements and con-
clusions on work structures in industrialized manufacturing. This investi-
gation shows that, at least as far as the furniture manufacturing industry is 
concerned, there can be no mention of a reskilling of work, or of a far-
reaching enhancement of skills. 
With a turnover of 28 billion D M and 185,000 employees in 1986, the 
wood-processing industry (of which the furniture-making industry is the 
most important branch), is the most significant sector of the West German 
timber industry (with about 35 billion D M turnover, and 230,000 em-
ployees). Yet it only makes up 2 per cent of the total turnover of the West 
German manufacturing sector and is thus one of the smaller industrial 
branches in the economy. However, the furniture industry is similar in size 
to the comparatively well investigated and extensively discussed machine 
tool-building trade and is also characterized by a predominance of small 
and medium-sized firms. 
In the wood-processing industry (and correspondingly in furniture 
manufacturing) there are a number of different occupational trades: 
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traditional craft trades such as carpenters, new industrial trades such as 
'mechanics for wood processing', and experienced semi-skilled workers 
who are employed as 'skilled' workers. 
It should be pointed out here, in our study, that the majority of furniture 
manufacturers, especially those companies geared to the output of large 
series, possessed manufacturing structures with a high degree of division of 
labour and highly mechanized manufacturing structures in selected areas. 
As a rule, the percentage of unskilled and semi-skilled tasks amounted to 
more than half of all manufacturing jobs, and could reach up to 80 per cent 
and more of the manufacturing personnel for mass producers of standard 
furniture. Only the manufacturers of exclusive brand-name articles dis-
played a more favourable share of skilled tasks, particularly due to their 
initial expansion of special manufacturing departments as a reaction to the 
need for achieving increased product flexibility. A larger quota of skilled 
work could also be found among a certain number of the smaller manu-
facturers of furniture of average quality. Due to their comparatively smaller 
workforce and percentage of mechanized manufacturing, these firms 
depended more heavily on the flexible utilization of skilled workers. 
NEW RATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN T H E G E R M A N 
FURNITURE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the furniture manu-
facturing industry was struck by a severe and prolonged economic crisis 
which it only emerged from in the last few years. During this slump, the 
number of employees decreased by about a quarter while the number of 
companies dropped by approximately a fifth. Saturated markets and suffer 
competition for market shares confronted virtually all furniture manu-
facturers with the increasingly urgent need to achieve greater flexibility and 
reduce manufacturing costs. They reacted to these challenges with a 
number of sales strategies and rationalization concepts based on widely 
differing concepts that were either oriented to price competition and/or to 
product and quality competition (see chapter 6). 
The companies found that conventional rationalization measures and 
technologies, however, were no longer adequate for coping with the manu-
facturing problems that had arisen. On the contrary, they only made matters 
worse, for they were directed toward improving individual facilities or 
coping with bottlenecks in production, but were incapable of bringing 
about flexibility and cost reduction. With the help of computer-based 
technologies, some companies succeeded - within limits - in simul-
taneously achieving flexible manufacturing and lowering costs. However, 
the introduction of such technological processes in manufacturing and 
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administration gave rise to new and more extensive demands for cost 
effectiveness and the flexibility of production structures. Moreover, the 
utilization of computer-based technologies had the effect of speeding up the 
introduction of new and extensive control technologies and to continually 
integrate individual processes with one another through data technology. In 
this way it became possible to better exploit the potential for more 
productivity and flexibility inherent in these technologies. 
The rationalization strategies pursued in the course of this development 
tended more and more toward the 'systemic' type of rationalization (see 
chapter 4). These new forms of rationalization are directed towards the 
reorganization of the entire manufacturing process and tend to encompass 
a company's service and supply relations to parts suppliers, as well as the 
interaction with furniture retailers and the manufacturers of woodworking 
machinery and control technologies. 
This new rationalization drive manifests itself in different companies to 
differing degrees and rates of development, depending on their traditions 
and market orientations. It was the large-scale manufacturers of low-price 
standard furniture on the one hand, and of high-quality, exclusive brand 
name products on the other, which set the trends in product design and 
range, as well as in manufacturing methods and technologies. These com-
panies were also the ones which implemented new technologies on a large 
scale in the context of comprehensive rationalization strategies. Many 
small and medium-sized firms that manufactured furniture of average 
quality and which had less market power and less capacity for carrying out 
targeted strategies were also put under pressure to use new technologies, at 
least in certain areas. It was only in this way that they were able to attempt 
to meet the pressing flexibility and cost constraints they found themselves 
confronting. 
Changes in the technological and organizational structures in the 
furniture manufacturing industry seriously effected the development of 
skills in this industrial sector. The type and extent of relevant skill require-
ments and thus the skill structures in the companies, cannot simply be 
deduced from existing manufacturing facilities and the computer tech-
nologies available on die technology market, as has often been assumed in 
a somewhat short-sighted manner. Much more determining are: 
1 the traditional personnel and labour market structures which have 
evolved as a result of previous manufacturing modes (mass production 
on the one hand, handcrafted production on the other); 
2 the various rationalization measures that furniture manufacturers pursue 
in order to combine cost efficiency and flexibility objectives, and which 
are geared to various marketing strategies (price, quality, etc.); and 
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3 the product and marketing strategies of technology manufacturers which 
tend toward a 'prestructuring' of work assignments and qualification 
requirements. 
In general, the effects of systemic rationalization strategies on work and on 
employees are relatively indefinite, and, partially, contradictory. The 
effects usually remain unnoticed or only gain attention after a certain period 
of time has elapsed; in many cases, they appear in other work areas or even 
in other companies. Due to the fact that such measures are often carried out 
in a tentative and isolated manner, as gradual steps in the rationalization 
process, their integrative potential frequently eludes recognition and their 
' scope' only becomes apparent at a much later date. Therefore, many of the 
effects resulting from the introduction of new technologies within the 
context of systemic rationalization processes are not linked to the actual 
conversion measures, and are seldom attributed to them. The effects are 
also obscured by the protracted course of the implementation of new 
technology, as well as by ongoing processes of personnel adaptation and 
selection occurring concurrently, but mainly detached from the new tech-
nology implementation. 
Although there is a general consensus among social scientists that the 
application of new technologies entails a basic freedom and variability in 
design options for work content, our investigations found that design 
options are objectively restricted to confined paths, within which particular 
trends in the development of skill requirements and conditions of work 
organization are foreseeable; moreover, despite the fact that systemic 
rationalization strategies are just beginning to penetrate the furniture 
industry and despite the many mechanisms which obscure their effects, 
some trends can be identified. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SKILL REQUIREMENTS 
In the course of the restructuring process in the furniture industry, which 
has only been briefly outlined here, the companies found themselves in-
creasingly confronted with skill problems in their attempts to utilize new 
(manufacturing-) technologies and realize technological-organizational 
adjustment measures. This was the case for the manufacturers of mass 
produced furniture as well as for the exclusive manufacturers. However, 
their initial situations were different: the mass manufacturers had pre-
dominantly unskilled workers, while the exclusive manufacturers had 
mainly skilled workers. The skill deficits which furniture manufacturers (as 
technology users) and technology manufacturers both complained about -
as did others in the manufacturing sector - were regarded, rather indis-
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criminately, as posing a basic obstacle to the introduction and implemen-
tation of new technologies. Our findings reveal, however, that their concern 
was directed toward professional skills on the shop-floor to a very limited 
extent. 
Technology manufacturers (and especially the manufacturers of 
electronic control systems) reported deficiencies primarily in matters per-
taining to management, organization and logistics as well as a lack of basic 
knowledge of information technology on the part of members of manage-
ment and supervisors in user companies, a factor which they regarded as 
obstructing and impeding the adequate implementation and utilization of 
new technology. Furthermore, the technology manufacturers also criticized 
the lack of qualifications of service and maintenance personnel, which 
increased their expenditure for service considerably. 
From the user companies' standpoint, the problem was deficiencies in 
the more traditional woodworking skills and know-how. In their opinion, 
such deficits restricted the traditional amount of flexibility in the manu-
facturing process which enabled companies to cope with frequent calls for 
special and rush orders and also deal with the increasing number of product 
designs and variants. More than anything, the firms missed the general lack 
of worker character traits that manifest themselves as reliability, 
willingness to work overtime or fill in at another work station on short 
notice. Such qualities are necessary for a firm to achieve a trouble-free and 
optimal functioning of a highly organized and 'technicized' manufacturing 
process as well as for the ability to smoothly deal with system breakdowns. 
Another problem that was revealed was a lack of leadership skills at the 
foreman (Meister) level. It was found that the foremen had difficulties 
relinquishing their accustomed overseeing and regulating functions and 
taking over new tasks of precise planning and control of manufacturing 
sequences and personnel management specifically directed to the require-
ments of computer-aided manufacturing. Deficiencies in terms of specific 
occupational skills, especially with regard to familiarity with machine 
technology and electronics, were only detected in individual cases, for 
skilled workers assigned to central positions. 
In assessing problems of skills and qualifications, it is important to 
differentiate between the requirements arising during the phase of new 
technology implementation and the requirements of ongoing manu-
facturing. 
During the course of implementing new manufacturing facilities, a 
process which usually extends over several years, high demands are made 
on the personnel involved as far as specific occupational knowledge and 
familiarity with machine and information technology is concerned. Also 
included are demands on the workers' capacity to organize and improvise, 
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as well as their capacity to bear responsibility and make decisions. 
Therefore, only experienced and well qualified members of the staff are 
selected for these tasks; they generally do not come from the area of 
manufacturing undergoing conversion, nor are they woodworking crafts-
men, but are usually members of the repair or the electrical departments. In 
a number of cases, their high-level skills are not objectively required for the 
actual operation of the new facilities. The employment of such highly 
skilled personnel can largely be attributed to the company's security needs 
(coping with complications during the running-in phase and emergency 
situations). 
At the same time, the introduction of new technologies, taking place 
over a period of many years and which is geared toward achieving a 
systemic integration of operational sub-processes, leads to an expansion of 
the administrative section of the manufacturing area both in size and in 
enhancement of skills there. The companies require more personnel with 
specialized data processing skills for handling the tasks of design and 
control of computer-aided manufacturing systems. Usually this need can 
only be filled by recruiting outside of the company. 
Once new technologies are running normally, user companies tend to 
(once again) opt for the kind of personnel utilization which restricts skill 
requirements to the mere operation of manufacturing equipment (the 
feeding and monitoring of automated facilities). This creates less need for 
know-how concerning materials and specific machines. Tasks such as 
shop-floor programming, or jobs related to the organization of operational 
sequences are not included in such routine operating jobs. Thus, most of the 
workers with special skills who were needed during the implementation 
phase are withdrawn and at best find themselves acting as standby 
personnel in the case of breakdowns or minor repairs. 
The product design and marketing policies pursued by machine manu-
facturers lend momentum to this trend. They assume the existence of lesser 
skilled personnel in the user companies and seek to 'transfer' the intelli-
gence to the manufacturing equipment. Otherwise they presuppose the 
availability of specialized programming personnel outside of the 
manufacturing area, or, to the greatest extent possible, deliver their systems 
with completed programs. 
A similar development is beginning to emerge in the administrative 
areas, particularly in process planning and operations scheduling. Compre-
hensive or intensive demand for high-level skills only exists for few 
employees, while the large share of (routine) jobs are handled by relatively 
unskilled administrative personnel aided by computers or by employees 
overqualified for the jobs in question. 
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Under normal running conditions, specific developments have emerged 
regarding a shift in skill requirements. For a large share of manufacturing 
personnel, the installation of CNC-machines and data-processing 
technology has shifted the emphasis from process-related skills, to ones 
which concern the individual's character and willingness to perform and 
serve to guarantee the permanent system availability of the (integrated) 
equipment. These requirements are less the direct consequence of the 
technological innovations, than the result of new concepts in manufacturing 
organization which can be realized with the help of new technologies. The 
non-process specific worker traits are mostly expected of 'skilled workers', 
regardless of their training, which leads to frequent assignment to jobs for 
which they are overqualified, or, as is often the case with system operators 
(Anlagenfuhrer), the additional assumption of low-skilled tasks. These 
so-called 'increased skill requirements' often result in, or are accompanied 
by, intensification of work and increased responsibility in the performance 
of repetitive and monotonous tasks. More challenging tasks, such as 
machine control and the planning of operational sequences which were 
formerly carried out on the shop-floor by skilled manufacturing personnel, 
are now transferred to the administrative areas, or technical departments.2 
Therefore, cases in which the introduction of computer technology leads 
to higher skill requirements on the shop-floor tend to remain the exception 
(as, for example, is the case for some key positions or for CNC-controlled 
surface milling cutters). In the (final) assembly area, in particular, there is 
a marked increase in general tasks due to the extreme diversity of models 
and the necessity to gather pieces for individual orders. Here too, there is a 
tendency to transfer the machine-related skill requirements which arise in 
the context of new technologies to programming and repair departments 
outside of the manufacturing area. 
The utilization of computer-based equipment and information tech-
nology systems has been accompanied by the emergence of new concepts 
in manufacturing organization and performance policy which have been 
adopted by companies in the furniture industry. These concepts induce the 
skill developments outlined above, or add momentum to already existing 
trends. This occurs in the following way: forms of manufacturing which are 
oriented to individual customer orders and a certain daily output are linked 
with comprehensive and precise planning, controlling and monitoring of 
the manufacturing sequence which leaves little room for deviation. On this 
basis, a new kind of performance policy is put into practice which combines 
the conventional aspects of Tayloristic performance requirements with new 
forms which make broad demands on performance (see chapter 13). Com-
panies end up in the position to make more extensive and flexible use of 
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relatively low-skilled workers, or to assign overqualified skilled wood-
workers to a variety of different jobs or processes. At the same time, the 
latent skills held in reserve by the few trained workers, or the skilled 
workers in key positions, are only called upon occasionally. In the 
meantime, these workers may additionally be assigned to jobs which are 
relatively undemanding in terms of skill on a short-term, flexible basis. 
Al l in all, this has the effect of drastically reducing discretionary tasks in 
the manufacturing area, and transferring the functions of manufacturing 
control and capacity utilization, etc., to the departments of process planning 
and operations scheduling. In the long run, this results in a gradual erosion 
of skills and qualifications on the shop-floor that were once available and 
necessary. This loss can lead to considerable problems in manufacturing 
when future technological/organizational changes have to be made to the 
production process. It also creates immediate problems in dealing with 
machine breakdowns, special orders or compensating for faulty planning. 
This development also marks a gradual decline in the significance of the 
functions of the foremen. At present, this is taking place in the following 
way: companies expect lower-level supervisors who have been deprived of 
the discretion they formerly had, to nevertheless possess sufficient skills to 
deal with problems arising in the course of program-controlled manu-
facturing processes that have been planned outside the shop-floor area. 
High demands are made on skills within technical departments, at 
control posts (of automated storehouses, for example) or in the administra-
tive areas related to manufacturing. In the course of the developments 
outlined above, these demands either remain constant or increase somewhat 
when the departments take over the functions of repairing and maintaining 
new technical systems, or programming and control functions. In many 
companies, operations scheduling and manufacturing control become key 
departments. In such cases, lack of skilled personnel is coped with by 
recruiting professionals from the external labour market or by making use 
of the extensive service system offered by the machine and control systems 
manufacturers. It is evident, however, that companies in the furniture 
industry which are comprehensively organized in terms of information 
technology will reverse the increase in personnel which takes place during 
the implementation phase - particularly in administrative areas - at a later 
date. In the course of this development, greater demands are only made on 
a few selected employees, while the majority of trained personnel 
(Sachbearbeiter) are faced with tasks that are less demanding in content 
than their former responsibilities. Their jobs get more routine, at the same 
time that work intensity increases. (A similar 'reversal' of high skill re-
quirements can be expected to take place in the maintenance area as well.) 
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As a general point, it should be remembered that more or less deliberate 
personnel and performance policy concepts oriented to Tayloristic princi-
ples and an extensive division of labour underlie these developments in 
skills and qualifications. Some of the characteristic objectives pursued 
include the most extensive use possible of young, semi-skilled workers at 
CNC-machines, rigid division of labour between machine operating and 
machine control, and the separation of challenging additional tasks, such as 
job setting, maintenance and repairs, from machine operating. 
The personnel policies of the user companies conform to or complement 
the product and market strategic objectives of the machine and control 
systems manufacturers which endeavour to offer facilities that are 'user 
friendly' and 'easy to control'. This means that the parameters required for 
machining and operational sequences are either already integrated into the 
respective machines or have to be programmed by experts outside the 
shop-floor area. Accordingly, repair work can only be carried out by skilled 
maintenance personnel from the user company or the systems manu-
facturer. The objectives pursued by the product and service policies of 
machine manufacturers are of particular interest in this context: with the 
help of automatic (remote) diagnostic systems, they seek to cut back their 
cost-intensive service tasks, which have been extended for sales policy 
reasons. Thus, the tendency exists that the necessary training and ability 
that workers in the user companies should possess is assumed by the 
manufacturers of machines and control systems. In the long run, this means 
that lower demands are made on skills in the user companies and that the 
level of skills and qualifications in the repair departments also sinks. 
Our findings make it clear that there is little hope of achieving integral 
concepts of work design that reflect alternatives in work organization and 
the development of skills, let alone a general reprofessionalization process 
of manufacturing work in the furniture industry. 
In view of these developments, the occupation of the 'skilled wood-
worker' in its various forms (carpenter, mechanic for wood processing, 
experienced semi-skilled worker classed as 'skilled woodworkers', etc.) is 
in serious danger. Persons undergoing vocational training or working in the 
above-mentioned occupations no longer enjoy sufficient employment 
security or the chance to adapt to changing conditions. Craft and wood-
working skills either play a minor role when new technology is introduced 
or are confined to certain niches. Placing skilled workers in jobs beneath 
their qualification level causes a downgrading of wages and thus a loss of 
income and prestige. The highly skilled jobs and new key positions in the 
enterprise are filled with skilled workers from metalworking or the 
electrical professions. The manufacturers of machines and control systems 
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are also of the opinion that workers who have undergone the traditional 
training for woodworking occupations are not competent to control, main-
tain and repair the systems they supply. 
The emerging reality is that in view of the widespread dissemination of 
new technologies and the rather traditional personnel policies pursued by 
most companies, the qualifications held by skilled woodworkers are 
becoming increasingly inadequate in functional terms for employment in 
the furniture making industry. Moreover, the vocational training of 
carpenters and mechanics for wood processing no longer guarantees either 
an employment status that is commensurate with vocational know-how and 
skills or medium-term employment security. This development endangers 
the, at present rather strong, position of skilled woodworkers, not only in 
the furniture making industry, but also throughout the entire woodworking 
industry. In recent years, a number of new initiatives have been launched in 
training policies with the aim of reducing the imminent risks; however, it is 
not yet possible to assess their scope and effectiveness. 
The fact that very few furniture manufacturers carry out training 
measures naturally has an adverse effect on the developments outlined 
above. Problems arising due to employees' deficiencies in character traits, 
such as lack of reliability or the capacity for cooperation, are usually 
overcome by personnel selection (also in the context of personnel 
reduction). Despite the fact that almost all of the companies we examined 
complained that workers lacked sufficient technical know-how as far as 
electronics, hydraulics or machine handling was concerned, systematic or 
general retraining of skilled, or even more, semi-skilled workers is still 
virtually non-existent. Instead, most companies rely on the combination of 
user-friendly (simple) designs from the system manufacturers and on the 
short introduction to system operation provided by the manufacturer. 
Only after concrete and acute skill problems arise is further training con-
sidered and then only for carefully selected workers. Generally, the training 
courses are carried out by the technology manufacturers, and the instruction 
naturally focuses on their own machine and control equipment. The same also 
holds true for data-processing training for administration personnel. 
To a considerable extent, this situation can be explained by the fact that 
there are no adequate institutional facilities or financial means for the 
further training of skilled woodworkers and technical personnel in the 
furniture making branch - despite a number of initiatives on the part of 
respective training organizations. This deficiency makes itself felt all the 
more strongly due to the fact that there are no manufacturers of wood 
processing technology offering training measures which could be 
compared with the kind of further training offered by companies in the 
computer or the machine building branch. 
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SKILL CHANGES IN FIRMS SUPPLYING THE 
FURNITURE-MAKING INDUSTRY 
In the course of the technological-organizational transformation which took 
place in the furniture-making industry, the need to achieve greater 
flexibility and cost efficiency was thrust onto the suppliers of furniture 
components to a great extent This induced developments in these mostiy 
small and highly dependent companies which markedly changed the manu-
facturing processes and structures as well as the skill and qualification 
requirements of these companies. These developments consist of: 
1 a twofold process of polarization: the first is the existence of furniture 
manufacturers carrying out product planning and the assembly of their 
products while supplier firms only manufacture parts and components; 
the second is when the supplier market is split into two groups of 
companies, with suppliers of standard parts that are highly dependent on 
the purchasing companies forming one group, and the other consisting 
of firms that can be described as 'innovative problem solvers'; 
2 in a number of job areas, industrial manufacturing structures are 
replacing traditional carpentry handicraft methods; 
3 on the basis of computer-generated data, a tighter technological-organi-
zational integration of manufacturing sequences and supplier relations 
with the purchaser has been established; and 
4 the supplier firms' capacity for achieving flexibility and increased per-
formance, largely based on the versatile utilization of skilled personnel 
gets increasingly exhausted.3 
Two factors are exerting considerable influence on skills and qualifications 
in supplier firms, namely the emerging trend toward industrial-type manu-
facturing structures, and the technological and organizational integration of 
the buyer company's production processes with those of the parts suppliers. 
Even in those companies which still have a comparatively high share of 
skilled woodworkers, more and more skilled handicraft tasks are being split 
up into individual and unchallenging operations. Step by step, traditional 
carpenter tasks are being devalued by the insular introduction of new tech-
nologies. Handicraft skills, oriented to producing an entire product, which 
many workers still possess, are increasingly jeopardized. In all supplier firm 
groups the trend is toward a rise in the share of short-cycle, monotonous and 
repetitive tasks, already relatively high in the classical kind of supplier firm 
manufacturing semi-finished wooden parts. This will reduce the demands 
for skills and therefore markedly increase the number of semi-skilled 
workers in the manufacturing area. Traditional handicraft skills and compli-
cated or all-round knowledge of craftwork are losing more and more of their 
former significance. 
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The increased introduction of (partially manual) series production 
(when there is little product diversity), and/or just-in-time manufacturing or 
manufacturing to order of increasingly smaller batches generates require-
ments which are skill- or process-unspecific. Instead, increasing demands 
are made on the individual worker's reliability, adherence to schedule and 
personal flexibility. Thus, workers' ability to endure stress moves to the 
forefront ahead of 'mere' occupational skill. 
Intensified segmentation of job tasks is particularly evident for supplier 
companies which provide standard parts manufactured in series: those 
which basically serve as 'extended work benches' for the buyer companies. 
In such companies, there are more and more manufacturing processes 
organized with a high degree of division of labour; handicraft tasks are 
divided up into separate operations, leaving only tasks that are repetitive 
and monotonous. Even the suppliers of high-quality furniture components 
have begun to display Tayloristic production structures designed for 
industrial style manufacturing. The result is that a large share of the 
handicraft work (particularly that involving surface treatment) is divided up 
into relatively simple and/or specialized tasks that are repetitive and have 
to be performed over and over again. Indeed, an increasing number of 
skilled woodworkers are being assigned to jobs which underutilize their 
occupational skills. 
These developments result in deskilling, and far from slowing this 
process down, the increasing utilization of CNC technology lends 
momentum to it. In most cases, the CNC-machines consist of ordinary, 
stand-alone machining units for handling rather simple and one-sided tasks 
which require no specific machine or control system qualifications on the 
part of the machine operator. In order to achieve the desired degree of 
machining precision, however, what is most important is for workers to 
accumulate experience in machine use. This can only be acquired when 
employees are assigned to the same machine for long periods of time. More 
complex matters pertaining to machine technology or electronics are 
primarily carried out by the plant supervisor or by the, often, only all-round 
competent technician in the company who frequently have to consult 
experts from the machine manufacturers. Given the training process carried 
out in these companies, and in the carpenter trade, it is not possible to 
expect workers skilled in specific wood processing tasks to meet these 
sophisticated demands. Moreover, as in the industrialized furniture, manu-
facturing sector, the tasks that are performed in the areas up and down-
stream from machining operations consist of simple 'auxiliary functions' 
which hardly require woodworking skills, or let them be brought into play. 
A broader, more challenging demand is made on skills, especially on 
those pertaining to machine technology, in a few, particularly innovative 
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supplier firms whose products require the use of complex, multi-functional 
machine technologies. However, this does not imply that retrained wood-
workers will necessarily be assigned to such jobs; in many cases these 
suppliers also prefer to recruit skilled workers from other industrial 
branches with backgrounds in machine technology or electronics. 
Discovering isolated cases of increased requirements for skills and 
qualifications in companies supplying high-quality and innovative parts 
and components, cannot obscure the fact that being involved in producing 
the whole product - something becoming ever scarcer in the supplier firm 
sector - is also on the decline in these companies, despite the fact that they 
still employ a relatively large amount of skilled woodworkers. While it is 
true that all companies demand a great deal of flexibility and versatility 
from their workers, they usually only do so in order to make better use of 
capacity or to cope with urgent or short notice manufacturing orders and 
then only in the form of short-term assignments. The result is that well-
trained carpenters, who were employed as such, find themselves carrying 
out simple tasks more frequently - in many cases, over long periods of time 
- which make little use of their handicraft skills. This is becoming all the 
more the case due to the fact that the suppliers' scope for determining their 
own manufacturing sequences is getting increasingly restricted as a result 
of the tighter scheduling set down by buyer companies. 
These developments, which pose considerable problems for the skill 
structures in the supplier firms, are additionally aggravated by supplier 
dependence on the buyers. On the one hand, the flexibility and performance 
potential of the suppliers is exploited to an increasing degree, primarily 
because of their high dependence on their major buyers on the other hand. 
The problem is intensified by the fierce competition among and between 
supplier firms. This situation leaves the suppliers little scope to design their 
production processes autonomously and pursue their own interests in 
marketing, manufacturing and innovation. 
Due to the increasing utilization of simple CNC machines, similar trends 
in skill loss can be expected to occur in many firms in the carpentry trade 
(in which series manufacturing has already been introduced in a number of 
companies). In view of this fact and the developments outlined above, 
general skill and employment problems are likely to arise for skilled 
workers who are trained in supplier firms, mainly in the carpentry trade. 
Thus the occupational orientation of the skilled woodworker and, in par-
ticular, that of the skilled carpenter, are fundamentally endangered. This is 
a most undesirable development in view of the fact that these workers are 
currently found more frequently in supplier firms than in the furniture 
making industry and represent a large part of the supplier firms' flexibility. 
Existing skills, oriented to the entire product, are fading away through 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
insufficient and inadequate use. Another reason for the loss in skills is that 
specialized supplier firms and craft businesses are not in a position to 
provide comprehensive vocational training for carpenters or mechanics for 
wood processing, especially when it comes to the newest technological 
requirements for operating sophisticated machinery. 
For the companies, especially the suppliers and certain sections of the 
crafts business sector, this means that a shortage of skills could arise, skills 
which are of essential importance for achieving manufacturing flexibility 
and developing innovative product and processing concepts. But especially 
for the skilled woodworkers presently employed or undergoing training in 
these firms, considerable problems will arise in the future. In view of the 
severe employment decline of the past years and the limited number of 
vacancies in the craft business and the supply sector (due to persisting 
overcapacities), skilled woodworkers' chances of finding suitable work in 
the furniture making industry that is commensurate with their qualifications 
after completion of their training or upon changing companies will continue 
to decline. 
OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE SKILL DEVELOPMENTS 
Factors such as the comparatively low complexity of products and manu-
facturing processes, competitive pressure and a certain degree of economic 
recovery in parts of the industry point towards rapid propagation of new 
(systemic) rationalization strategies in the furniture industry and thus the 
implementation of new forms of organization and control technologies in 
areas of manufacturing and administration. This implies that the effects on 
skills discussed here, and which are now just beginning to manifest them-
selves in the companies, will make themselves felt to a far greater degree in 
the future. Expected developments are outlined below: 
1 Fewer employees will be required for purely auxiliary tasks (such as 
transport, etc.) as well as for handicraft work. 
2 For the entire work-force, the non-specific character traits possessed by 
workers will become more significant at the cost of vocational skills or 
knowledge of processes. At the same time, know-how related to wood as 
a material will become less significant in comparison to more abstract 
skills and knowledge pertaining to machine and information technology. 
3 High demands on skills and qualifications will be made on a small group 
of highly qualified technicians (particularly in the manufacturing and 
repair sectors) and on computer specialists (especially in administration). 
4 A change in functions and positions will take place affecting the role of 
the lower level supervisor. The change will not be managed through 
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training or retraining, but rather by replacing personnel and transferring 
the control of the production system to technicians with data processing 
knowledge, particularly in the process planning and scheduling depart-
ment. 
5 A new division of labour is emerging for maintenance and repair tasks 
(and tasks pertaining to systems planning) whereby a great deal of the 
necessary machine and control technology skills and qualifications are 
being assumed by the service departments of the manufacturers of the 
machines and control systems. 
6 An increase in Tayloristic principles for dividing up work tasks and 
organizing work will also be introduced into the small firm and craft 
sector (particularly the suppliers of furniture components). This will be 
necessary in order to master the specialized machining processes de-
manded by the furniture manufacturing companies and to adapt to their 
production sequences. 
7 Unless the present situation can be improved through the implemen-
tation of comprehensive training policies, the occupation and the 
position of the skilled woodworker will certainly lose significance in the 
long run due to the increasing importance of both technology-oriented 
skilled workers from the metalworking trades and semi-skilled machine 
operators. 
8 There will be an increasing polarization of qualifications between 
administration and manufacturing areas, as well as within the 
administration area itself. 
The technological design of production facilities and data-processing 
systems as marketed by manufacturers and as (usually) demanded by user 
companies (see chapter 6) and the concepts of the furniture manufacturers 
regarding personnel and performance policies lend considerable momen-
tum to the developments in skills and qualifications outlined above. Despite 
the fact that new technologies theoretically provide the potential for setting 
up other forms of work organization, future developments will doubtlessly 
be characterized by an attempt to integrate the know-how currently held by 
skilled workers 'into the machine' and to transfer decision-making 
responsibilities to manufacturing-related administrative areas. This means 
that, apart from a few key positions in the manufacturing area, there will be 
a tendency to reduce or do away with the skill requirements there. 
It is not possible to make forecasts on the numbers of people that will be 
affected. However, it seems that in areas that are numerically small, such as 
process planning and scheduling or production planning and control, skill 
requirements will increase in the long run. As far as the majority of jobs are 
concerned, (which will decrease in number due to cut-backs in unskilled 
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and semi-skilled tasks), demand for skills will tend either to decrease or 
remain constant. 
Due to the fact that the new manufacturing technologies make relatively 
few demands on machine operators, the need for training measures, or for 
creating new occupational categories, does not arise, especially in the case 
of the mass producers of standard furniture. Even the manufacturers of 
exclusive furniture, with their complex manufacturing facilities, end up 
displaying both enterprise-internal and -external polarization tendencies, 
mainly with regard to how high-level knowledge of machines and elec-
tronics gets structured (such as between shop-floor and technology depart-
ments, or between technology users and technology manufacturers). These 
trends stand in the way of any attempts to enhance the skills and qualifi-
cations of the shop-floor workers or technical personnel in a comprehensive 
or sustained manner. The manufacturing facilities and computer systems 
offered by technology manufacturers are largely determined by the needs 
of the dominant furniture manufacturers. Small and medium-sized com-
panies and the suppliers of furniture parts are too weak and have too few 
resources either to push through technologies geared to their manufacturing 
needs onto the market, or to enhance the skills and qualifications of their 
personnel on their own. 
Al l in all, it can be assumed that neither an enhancement of qualifi-
cations and skills nor a requalification of manufacturing work will take 
place on a broad basis within the branch of industrialized wood processing. 
Our findings contradict many other assessments and forecasts of a general 
improvement in the level of skill and qualification as both a prerequisite 
and a consequence of utilizing computer technology in industrial manu-
facturing. On the contrary, our findings, particularly with regard to the loss 
of position and function of the skilled woodworker, not only indicate a 
trend toward the employment of less skilled workers in areas hitherto 
unaffected by such trends, but also seem to reflect a drastic change in 
manufacturing work, at least in the consumer goods industry. The push to 
introduce new technologies within a systemic rationalization context is 
lending increased significance to abstract systems-technology knowledge 
over specialized vocational and process technology know-how. In the long 
run, this could lead to a generalizing of technical and organizational skills 
and qualifications above and beyond the scope of individual enterprises and 
industrial branches, bringing about, as of now, unforseeable consequences 
for the character and functions of skilled work in these sectors. Whatever 
happens, we can be sure not to expect any marked increase in the use of 
skilled craft workers over the long term. 
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PartV 
Job Structures and Skill 
Formation 
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16 Vocational Training, Job 
Structures and the Labour 
Market - An International 
Perspective1 
Werner Sengenberger 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter emphasizes important linkages between job and labour market 
structures, the type of skill and skill formation of the labour force, and the 
industrial relations system. Extensive standardized vocational training, 
regulated by law or collective bargaining, is seen as an important, though 
not exclusive, precondition for the development and prevalence of rela-
tively homogeneous job and labour market structures in Germany 
compared to Japan or other developed industrial market economies. The 
important impact of the vocational training system on the organization and 
restructuring of production is also stressed. It is argued that vocational 
skills facilitate a high level utilization of plant and equipment and ease the 
modernization of production processes. 
NATURE AND EXTENT OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Vocational training and the associated organization of business activity 
along occupational or professional lines has had a long tradition in a 
substantial number of countries. The medieval guilds were very much 
structured on vocational grounds and, also, responsible for and in control of 
vocational qualification of their members. There are modern remnants of 
these guilds, such as the craft unions in some of the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
However, they have vastly declined in importance and now account for 
only a minor portion of total employment. 
It is in the German-speaking countries where, at present, vocational 
training of workers is most widespread and pervasive. Two reasons may be 
responsible for this. One reason is that in the German-speaking countries 
(notably Germany, but also in the area of the former GDR, Austria and 
Switzerland) handicraft or artisan trades organized in small firms 
(Handwerk) are still in place to an unusual extent (see Part VI). They 
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constitute a significant and well-organized pattern of business activity even 
in areas which in other countries are either subject to more capitalist 
large-scale and industrialized forms of production and service, or in which 
unorganized competitive market systems based on unskilled work prevail. 
(Examples would be meat processing, bakeries and other food production, 
as well as many repair services.) Handwerk, next to industry, is still the 
largest producer of vocational skills in West Germany. 
The second major reason for the relatively high incidence of vocational 
training in Germany is its development in big firms which started in the late 
19th century and spread during the 20th century. After the First World War, 
vocational training was regulated nationwide by legislation as well as 
collective agreement with regard to the content, the curriculum, duration, 
quality standards, and financing. Major reforms of the legal regulation were 
introduced in the late 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s, under the 
Berufsbildungsgesetz (Vocational Training Act 1969) and the Bundesaus-
bildungsförderungsgesetz (Federal Training Promotion Act 1976), 
providing for a modernized legal framework of the organization and 
financial support to vocational training, respectively. 
Today there are hundreds of different occupations in West Germany in 
which state-regulated vocational training takes place. Roughly 100 of them 
have more than 1,000 workers being trained at the present time. There are 
two major institutional forms of vocational training. One, and definitely the 
most important form, is the apprenticeship of juvenile workers within the 
scope of the so-called 'dual system' of regulated, formal on-the-job training 
in firms or suprafirm training centres {Überbetriebliche Lehrwerkstätten) 
and part-time vocational schooling. Around 60 per cent of those in the 
16-19 years age bracket take such three to three-and-a-half year basic 
vocational training, for which the trainee, upon completion and exami-
nation, receives a certificate as a journeyman, or Facharbeiter. Of the 
remaining 40 per cent, a major portion undergoes university education or 
vocational training in special vocational or professional schools.2 
Vocational training, especially re-training and promotional training, is 
also taken by adult workers (with a concentration on those aged between 20 
and 40). This type of training is supported financially under the Labour 
Promotion Act {Arbeitsförderungsgesetz), partly through assistance in 
establishing training centres and partly by supporting trainees in terms of 
covering tuition and fees as well as family allowances. 
As a result of an imbalance between the volume of basic vocational 
training and the de facto demand in the various occupations, not all of the 
apprenticed workers are able to find employment in their occupation. Thus, 
a significant number of workers are employed outside their occupational 
field, largely in semi-skilled jobs. 
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VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND LABOUR M A R K E T 
STRUCTURE 
In an attempt to typologize the structure of the West German labour market 
we have identified three different categories of sub-labour markets exhibi-
ting three distinct types of allocational structure (Sengenberger 1987). 
First, there are markets for labourers with low-level general skills which 
may be characterized by a high rate of mobility across firms and industry, 
i.e. with little attachment to a particular firm or occupation. 
For workers with specific skills we have identified two types of market 
structure which coexist side by side, namely: 
1 firm-internal labour markets based on firm-specific skills and a mobility 
pattern of low inter-firm and high intra-firm mobility. In other words, 
the attachment of the worker is to a particular firm. 
2 occupational-type labour markets which rest on vocational skills. 
Workers are mobile across firms within their occupation. In other words, 
the workers' allegiance is to a particular occupation, not to a particular 
employer. 
It is this latter type of market structure which I shall concentrate on in the 
following. 
Standardized certified vocational qualifications on an extensive scale 
have been a crucial ingredient for the development of occupational-type 
labour markets in Germany. By international comparison, occupational 
labour markets stand out as a very important structural component in the 
labour market as a whole. 
Occupational labour markets may be characterized by their specific 
modes of adjustment of supply and demand. In the short run the mismatch 
between supply and demand in a particular occupation is adjusted through 
inter-firm mobility of labour; in the long run market clearing is accomp-
lished through adjustments in the volume of vocational training. 
Beyond the purely quantitative accommodation of excesses or shortages 
of labour in relation to demand there is a qualitative dimension for adjust-
ment. This works through revision, extension and innovation of the skill 
content provided by vocational training (see chapter 12) and, also, by the 
substantial overlap of skill content across adjacent occupational categories 
(such as metal trades like mechanics, fitters, turners, tool-and-die-makers, 
etc.). This overlap in competency permits the interchangeability of these 
trades for job assignment and worker deployment to a substantial degree 
(Mertens 1973; Kaiser 1982). 
However, whether the interchangeability of skilled workers is actually 
practised does not only depend on the breadth and division of skills. Rather, 
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it depends on whether there are any institutional limitations in the deploy-
ment of different occupations. In West Germany there is, with a few 
exceptions (mainly outside the blue-collar sector), hardly any regulation 
which would significantly restrict the exchange of workers in different 
occupations within the firm. There is almost a complete absence of the 
Anglo-Saxon type of craft organization or (competitive) craft unionism 
using occupational jurisdictions or demarcation lines as means of job 
control. Consequently, there is little significant occupational segmentation 
or compartmentalization in the German labour market in spite of pervasive 
occupational structuring. 
Job design, job assignment and manning levels, as well as the supply of 
trained labour, which in the Anglo-Saxon countries are firmly in control of 
craft unions, are predominantly subject to managerial discretion in 
Germany (for a comparison with the United States see Köhler, 
Sengenberger 1983; Sengenberger, Köhler 1987; Sengenberger 1987). 
There have been attempts by unions and works councils during the past two 
decades to win greater influence on these personnel policy decisions. Yet, 
they have not advanced very far. They have clearly trailed behind practices 
in many other industrialized countries.3 The connection between vocational 
training and occupational type labour markets is by no means an automatic 
one. A number of prerequisites have to be met to assure the functional 
affinity between the two. There has to be an approximate structural con-
gruency between the division of skills (in the training market) and the 
division of labour or jobs in the firms participating in the occupational 
labour market. Each employer must design his jobs or job demands in such 
a way that they correspond to the range of skills offered by a particular 
occupation. Conversely, the worker filling a particular job in a particular 
firm, must bring along the requisite skills for the job. In other words, there 
has to be structural compatibility between the firm-internal job structure 
and the external labour market structure. 
Any individual deviation from the structural coordination of firms and 
markets causes friction in the occupational market. Ideally, there are no 
transaction costs whatsoever, either for the worker or the employer. The 
employer has no information cost (because the trade is fully standardized 
and certified and, thus, serves as a complete signal as to the workers' 
abilities) and no training costs (since the worker is fully productive on the 
job upon his hiring). Moreover, there is - as a result of standardized training 
- no or litde differential in individual productivity among workers. Nor has 
the worker to bear any transaction cost in changing jobs. There are no 
seniority-related benefits or otherwise firm-dependent rewards that would 
create disincentives for the worker to quit the job to seek employment 
elsewhere. In short, any rule or regulation that would attach the worker to a 
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particular employer, or bind the employer to a particular worker, is likely 
to produce internalization of labour and, therefore, interfere with the proper 
functioning of occupational-type markets. 
So far I have portrayed an 'ideal-type' version of occupational markets. 
In reality, while there are - especially in the handicrafts sector - labour 
markets which approximate the pure model of an occupational market, 
many labour markets exhibit elements both from occupational and 
firm-internal allocational structures. (In the final section of this chapter 
some of the forces that tend to produce incentives for the internalization of 
training, allocation, and pricing of labour into the firm are discussed.) For 
now it may suffice to maintain that by international standards the 
occupational-type allocation pattern is fairly strongly entrenched in the 
German labour market as a whole. 
Occupational labour markets dominate in the small craft-business sector 
(Handwerk). Beyond this, occupational structuring principles also influ-
ence the fabric of firm and enterprise internal labour markets. In West 
Germany, internal markets are primarily characterized by a stable, 
permanent core-labour force well attached to the firm and protected from 
dismissal (albeit usually to a lesser degree than in big Japanese firms) and 
highly flexible internal allocation of labour. This is made feasible, as said, 
by the skill-based versatility of workers. Hence, the German internal labour 
markets are different from internal labour markets in other countries 
(notably in the US) which are primarily organized and shaped through 
extensive and rigid rules of internal worker allocation but less restriction on 
exit. 
VOCATIONAL SKILLS AND THE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Formal vocational training and the worker mobility which the training 
renders feasible, carry with them substantial sources of worker produc-
tivity, adaptability, and innovative capacity in the productive process. 
The worker competency acquired through vocational training, rests on 
the fact that, as a rule, the worker has at his or her disposal more skills than 
are actually required for a particular job at any point in time. Indeed, it is 
the purpose of the vocational training schemes to produce a wealth and 
affluence of knowledge and ability that go much beyond the skill require-
ments of particular jobs or even job areas. This is in contrast to informal 
on-the-job training which, as far as skill acquisition goes, is clearly con-
strained by a particular work-place. 
The built-in redundancy of the vocational qualification system enables 
the worker to master a wide variety of occupation-related tasks within and 
across firms and, also, to solve problems, and - within limits - transpose the 
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problem solving experience from one situation to another. In addition, 
vocational training may equip the worker to acquire more easily and readily 
skills demanded in the future by new products and processes, or, to put it 
differently and more generally, to iearn how to learn'. The learning 
capacity is, however, also dependent on the human resource management 
in the firm. It requires management to design work organization in such a 
way as to produce further skill and accumulate qualification. 
The principles of training by which the worker acquires such versatility 
and diversity, or 'polyvalence' as it is also called, is based on successive 
exposure of the trainee to different jobs and problem-solving tasks in an 
ascending order of difficulty and complexity. The guided exposure to a 
variety of tasks takes place during apprenticeship training as well as in the 
subsequent sequence of jobs held by the worker within the same occu-
pational category either within the same firm or in different firms. 
The skill versatility generated by the initial basic vocational training and 
its extensions through practice in different firms (usually during the first 
half of the worker's employment life) may be viewed to some extent as a 
functional equivalent to the systematic practice of job sequences and 
worker rotation in large Japanese firms with extensive intra-firm or intra-
plant mobility chains resulting from it. In both systems, there is the idea that 
the training process is not merely a direct function of the technical require-
ments of jobs; rather it is considered as having some autonomous function 
in the sense of producing a particular type of worker - the self-reliant, 
'polyvalent' worker with an orientation towards the factory (or the trade) as 
a whole rather than his present job only. 
Comprehensive skill may raise worker productivity in many different 
ways (see Part III). To mention just a few, it allows the broadening or 
enriching of jobs in terms of work tasks and the stepping up of worker 
motivation and job satisfaction. It allows the production worker to do minor 
repair and maintenance jobs or otherwise support the continuity of the 
production flow. In this way the machine down-time may be reduced, a 
phenomenon which is the key to a lot of productivity enhancement. 
Vocational skills tend to facilitate the introduction of technical change 
and structural reconversion in the economy. Not only do they help the 
worker to adapt to new job demands associated with change. They also 
widen the scope for the alternative deployment of each worker and, 
thereby, remove fears of job and earnings losses which often produce 
worker resistance to change. Here again, non-competitive industrial 
unionism is of great importance with regard to the transfer of workers to 
new employment. German unions have largely taken a positive attitude 
towards rationalization of production and the modernization of the 
economy. In comparison, under the British system of industrial relations 
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with its emphasis on the demarcation of jobs, the union organization itself 
has come to depend on the maintenance of job boundaries. This, of course, 
will make the modification of job content and the redesigning of jobs as 
well as the exploitation of the full productivity potential of new technology 
a much more difficult task to achieve. 
It goes without saying that, within German industry as a whole, the use 
of formally trained workers supplying pertinent skills is concentrated in 
particular sectors. It prevails in those sectors of capital goods manu-
facturing which are based on unit and small batch production (see Part III). 
There are other industries where production is based largely on semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers. But even there you will find substantial numbers of 
workers who hold a vocational skill certificate which, however, is not 
relevant to the particular job they now hold. Thus, typically, many workers 
with vocational training in a Handwerk occupation tend to take up semi-
skilled jobs in industry because they are not able to find jobs suiting their 
occupational training or because they are seeking higher earnings oppor-
tunities or other chances of improvement. Although they do not bring along 
pertinent skills to the new job, employers still clearly prefer them to 
workers without training since they are expected to exhibit some of the 
desired worker traits associated with formal training. 
Furthermore, industries with process production technology such as 
chemicals, steel, pulp and paper, which formerly had on-the-job-training-
systems, have created new occupations (see chapter 19) to gain flexibility 
and interchangeability in operations, as for example, between direct pro-
duction and maintenance. This tendency is to be considered as a departure 
from former tendencies towards generating specialised, semi-skilled main-
tenance workers (Asendorf 1979). 
Systematic worker versatility acquired through multiple and extended 
exposure to different work stations, in my view, goes a long way towards 
explaining the relatively high rates of productivity gains and the inter-
national competitiveness of both Japanese and German industry; a much 
discussed theme in recent years notably in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is 
important to note, however, that the productivity associated with extensive 
learning experience is not merely the property of the individual worker. It 
rests on a collective facet of common learning experience which may be 
called the 'technoculture' (d'Iribarne), a system in which both workers and 
managers are socialized through basic training or job experience. In Japan, 
the higher echelons in the firm hierarchy often start out their career in 
low-level jobs and rotate gradually up the hierarchy; in Germany a large 
proportion of managers undertake apprenticeship before they get higher 
degrees and assume managerial positions. Thus, they have been exposed to 
practical training and experience. In Britain, in contrast, production 
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managers have fewer engineering skills and more emphasis is placed on 
academic achievement (Sorge, Warner 1978). Having gone through basic 
vocational training allows managers to have a better base for communi-
cating with production workers and lowers the social distance between the 
two groups. 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
The system of labour relations in a particular country is very much con-
ditioned by the strategic sources by which the labour movement in general, 
and in particular the trade unions as the organizational centre of the labour 
movement, derive organizational strength and bargaining power. 
Ultimately, for the unions to gain bargaining power in the labour market, 
the opportunity for the employer to achieve unlimited or cost-free access to 
and substitution of workers must be curbed in some way. This can be done 
in two principal ways: either by restricting the free exchange of workers 
through institutional arrangements, such as limitation of access of par-
ticular workers to particular firms or jobs, or by restricting the employer's 
freedom of allocating labour within the firm (e.g. by seniority rules). Or, 
alternatively, it can be done by promoting the workers' capability for 
mobility across firms. In this case the employer faces a limited supply of 
labour as well, for he risks the loss of workers or faces difficulties in 
recruiting them. This possibility for inflicting damage upon the employer 
may be used for building a bargaining position for labour. Basically, the 
difference in the strategic source of worker strength relates to the mode of 
interference with competition in the labour market: In the first instance, i.e. 
restricting inter-firm or intra-firm mobility, worker power is based on 
curtailing inter-worker competition. In the second case, i.e. boosting 
worker mobility, worker strength results from the enforcement or reinforce-
ment of inter-employer competition for labour. The efficacy of the latter 
strategy, however, is very much contingent on the general scarcity of labour 
in the market or, at least, on the scarcity of particular skills that cannot be 
replaced without substantial costs to the employer. 
In most industrial relations systems de facto union power stems from a 
combination of the two principal strategic sources. In West Germany, the 
source of collective worker strength through mobility is of relatively great 
importance and is, of course, related to the vocational skills incorporated in 
a large section of the labour force. To be sure, there are also institutional 
(legal) limitations or costs to worker substitution by the employer (e.g. 
protection from unfair dismissal or redundancy payments). But overall, the 
constraints to the interchangeability of workers are, by comparison, less 
based on formal rules and regulations than on real differences of occu-
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pational competency. Thus, for example, despite the employers' discretion 
with regard to the volume and type of vocational training provided, there is 
a limitation on the competition between skilled and non-skilled workers 
resulting from the significantly different attractiveness of the two 
categories of labour to employers. 
That vocational skills are being standardized to a high degree allows for 
easy mobility of workers across firms. At the same time, due to a fair 
amount of skill-overlap of adjacent occupations and in the absence of craft 
unionism and the associated job control mechanism, there is a high degree 
of interchangeability of workers within firms which may be used by unions 
to pursue particular policy objectives such as employment stability and 
internal adjustment procedures. In other words, there exists a kind of 
exchange relationship between employers and workers under which the 
employment security of the core work-force is traded against the workers' 
cooperation in internal flexibility. 
The interchangeability of workers with different occupational skills is 
not only compatible with, but supportive of, the existence of industrial 
unionism in West Germany and the bargaining structure which provides for 
large-scale regional and industrial bargaining units (see Streeck 1984). 
Within the industrial unions skilled workers play a major role. Union 
officials, and also works councillors, as the statutory representatives of the 
workforces on the plant and enterprise level, are largely recruited from the 
ranks of workers holding vocational certificates (either apprenticeship or 
higher vocational degrees). And they regard, in practice, the skilled core 
labour force as their primary clientele (see chapter 24). 
Seen from an overall viewpoint of worker representation then, the 
strength and weaknesses of the German-type worker organization may be 
highlighted as follows: the strength of collective worker organization is 
very much linked to the versatility and inter-firm mobility of skilled 
workers based on comprehensive formal vocational training. Workers who 
do not possess formal vocational skills face an inferior competitive position 
in the labour market This inferiority is reinforced by unequal represen-
tation which works in favour of the skilled groups. There may be, and has 
indeed been, a vicious circle operating, e.g. with regard to job insecurity. If 
initially employers prefer skilled workers to unskilled ones, using the 
non-skilled workers as a reserve for periods of high but fluctuating demand, 
then this inequality may be reinforced by positive feedback effects of 
unequal representation. As we well know, employment instability lowers 
the propensity of a worker to join a union and, thereby, limits his chance to 
voice his problems and pursue his interests. As a result, the gap in em-
ployment opportunities between skilled and non-skilled groups may be 
widened. 
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The dominance of skilled workers in collective worker organizations in 
Germany is, furthermore, reflected in wage differentials according to skill. 
For instance, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled employees is 
substantially larger in the German automobile industry than, for example, 
in the US automobile industry. In the latter, the United Automobile 
Workers (UAW) as the main worker organization has been much more a 
union of semi-skilled workers (see Köhler, Sengenberger 1983: 381; 
Sengenberger, Köhler 1987). 
To illustrate the idiosyncrasy of the German pattern further, some inter-
national comparisons may be helpful. In Britain and in United States, the 
power base of craft unionism, where it does exist, rests on the inter-firm 
mobility of workers of the same trade or craft as in Germany, but it hinges 
at the same time on the limitation of access to particular jobs by other trades 
through jurisdiction or demarcational rules. There is, in other words, a more 
limited 'mobility space' opening up particular channels for worker move-
ment and foreclosing others. The vulnerability of this type of worker 
control can be discerned easily. A decline in the demand for the particular 
type of jobs or skills - perhaps by deliberate employer rationalization 
policies - threatens or removes the type of jobs to which the union holds a 
monopoly and, thereby, eliminates its power base. 
In Japan, to take another pattern variant, under the Honko (life-long) 
employment system in the big firms there is a considerable limitation of 
worker exchange across firms, based on human capital investments made 
by the employer (for details see Tokunaga 1984; Ernst 1980, 1988). The 
union bargaining power rests precisely on the high replacement costs the 
employer would incur if he exchanged labour, at least the regular workers. 
Permanency of employment to the Honko worker and employment security 
even in periods of slump are, on the other hand, a prerequisite for the high 
degree of intra-firm mobility of labour and the resulting efficiency and 
innovative potential. 
The weakness in this system, next to the fact that only a limited number 
of workers gain access to big firms, lies in the dependence of the worker's 
bargaining power on the vitality of particular firms. 
Let me summarize the last point of this section: in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, although the volume and standardization of apprenticeship 
training is much lower than in Germany, job demarcation and job boun-
daries along occupational lines are used as the primary device for job 
control, even outside the area of skilled work. There is, in other words, 
much more regulation of the job than in Germany. Jobs in Great Britain are 
defined in terms of a set of tasks or as a job territory and viewed as a 
property right by the job holder whereas in Germany, jobs tend to be 
defined more as a range and level of technical and organizational 
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competency. So, the difference is really between a rather exclusive job 
territory and a non-exclusive territory of skill or competence. And it is in 
this respect, where I consider the Japanese system of work-place relations, 
despite the absence of vocational training, to be much closer to the German 
than to the Anglo-Saxon pattern. 
LIMITS TO VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND OCCUPATIONAL 
LABOUR M A R K E T S 
As mentioned above, occupational-type labour markets coexist in West 
Germany with firm-internal labour markets. The relative importance of 
each varies by industry. The mix is related to factors such as product market 
structure, type of product, technology and firm size. For example, where the 
demand for the product is stable there are greater opportunities for firms to 
standardize production and use semi-skilled workers and attached work-
forces. Where, on the contrary, product market stability is low, either in 
terms of demand fluctuations or rapid changes in product type, highly 
attached permanent work-forces tend to become more risky and costly to 
the firm and, also, the employer tends to prefer more versatile skilled 
workers who are better equipped to adjust to the changing demands 
resulting from the volatility of the market 
During the 1950s and 1960s mass-production of consumer goods was 
greatly extended. Production processes were standardized, the division of 
labour in the firms elabourated, skilled jobs were broken up into semi-
skilled jobs (see chapter 3). Most studies on skill structures in that period 
revealed a tendency towards polarization: the previously important middle-
level qualifications, notably the skilled production and office workers, were 
replaced by a minority of highly skilled workers (technicians, engineers) 
and large numbers of semi-skilled workers trained on-the-job. 
Starting in the early 1970s, production in German industry has been 
restructured in favour of high-technology, intelligent products and product 
diversification; also, firms have to be much more flexible to adjust quickly 
to consumer demands ('tailor-made' products). 
The main competitive criteran, notably with respect to exported goods, 
are high quality, fast and on-time delivery, and services related to the 
product. Given these demands, many firms believe that they are better off 
with skilled workers who are more capable of providing the required 
quality of work and changes in the production programme. 
Above all, the interest of firms to develop internal labour markets 
depends on the business cycle or, more specifically, on the scarcity of the 
external labour supply. In periods of full employment and tight labour 
markets, as occurred in West Germany during the 1960s and early 1970s, 
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firms make greater efforts to internalize decisions on training, allocation, 
and pricing of labour. Through firm-specific benefits they attach their 
work-forces more closely. Firm-internal training schemes are extended, 
and the resulting skills, on average, are more job-specific rather than 
occupation-specific. Moreover, firms lower their hiring standards and take 
in more unskilled workers. All of these measures, in some way or other, 
tend to work in favour of firm-internal labour markets and what has been 
termed 'firm-centred labour market segmentation' and, at the same time, 
weaken the base for occupational-type market structures. 
The internalization of the pricing function of labour services during the 
full-employment period challenged the established lines of worker repre-
sentation between the unions and the works councils. Despite the reluct-
ance of German trade unions (operating largely outside the firms) to accept 
any decentralization in collective bargaining, second-round negotiations 
developed at plant level and additional wage elements were provided on top 
of the industry-wide wage rates (Teschner 1977). Moreover, during this 
period company agreements were concluded on recruitment, dismissals, 
compensation for transfers or downgrading and training. 
A tendency for relaxing efforts to conduct formal vocational training 
and, consequently, to diminish the base for occupational market structures, 
may also be observed in slack labour markets. As unemployment rises and 
skilled labour becomes available on the external market, firms may be led 
to reduce the volume of vocational training and, instead, satisfy their labour 
needs by selection procedures. 
In summary, while occupational labour markets are more widespread 
and more firmly entrenched in the labour market structure in Germany (and 
other German-speaking countries) than elsewhere, economic and insti-
tutional forces have operated to limit their incidence and viability. This 
explains why there has been incomplete success in public labour market 
policies designed to extend and consolidate occupational markets. 
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17 Education and Job Hierarchies -
Contrasting Evidence from 
France And Germany1 
BurkartLutz 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents results from a comparative investigation of German 
and French manufacturing companies in which the relationship between the 
educational system and resulting organizational structures within com-
panies is investigated. French companies reveal much more pronounced 
hierarchical structures than their German counterparts in terms of number 
of levels in the hierarchy, ratios between shop-floor and office personnel 
and wage differentials. The chapter demonstrates the close relationship 
between job hierarchies and the educational and training systems in each 
country and draws some political conclusions. The information contained 
here is based on a study conducted in the early to mid-1970s. However, the 
methodological design, comparative relationships and basic findings have 
served as a springboard for a number of other studies and continue to be of 
relevance today. 
Ever since those concerned with educational policy have become aware of its 
relationship to the so-called employment system, discussion on this theme has 
been dominated by the question of the need for graduates with specific edu-
cational degrees. Experts have based, and still base, their arguments and 
demands concerning educational policy on the necessities of the employment 
system. This is true both of the pioneers of educational expansion in the 1960s 
and of all those who now warn about an overproduction of university 
graduates. For example, in the 1960s it was argued that if additional highly 
qualified personnel could not be made available, further economic growth 
would be arrested due to an insuperable bottleneck. Today, on the other hand, 
it is argued that a majority of university graduates is doomed to unemployment, 
since there is no place for them in the employment structure. 
In contrast, this chapter contends that: 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
1 argumentation based on need has a very weak foundation and is un-
realistic if it assumes that, given a specific technology, a specific product 
can be produced profitably only if the personnel employed possesses 
specific training qualifications; 
2 complicated - and elastic - interrelationships exist between the edu-
cational system and employment structure; and 
3 due to these interrelationships, changes in the educational system sooner 
or later also influence the development of the employment structure. 
This chapter will first present some results from a comparative investi-
gation on German and French industrial companies. It will then demon-
strate the close relationship between the national employment structure and 
the respective educational and training systems in each country. Finally it 
will draw some conclusions concerning the current debate on vocational 
training policies in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
WORK ORGANIZATION AND SKILL STRUCTURES IN 
FRENCH AND G E R M A N COMPANIES 
At the instigation of a French governmental agency, an investigation was 
carried out in 1971-2 in seven German and seven French companies, the 
aim of which was to study the organization of these firms and to ascertain 
their wage and personnel structures. The companies investigated (in each 
country two medium-sized machine-tool factories, two relatively large 
paper factories, one medium-sized and one large plant in the iron and steel 
industry, and one small tannery) were selected very carefully according to 
the principle of 'matched pairs' and were largely comparable with regard to 
products, production techniques, size, regional location, etc. 
Comparison of the data from the German and French companies 
revealed four principal differences, which will be described briefly below. 
First, company hierarchy in France always includes more management 
positions and more management levels than in Germany. In the production 
and maintenance divisions in Germany there are twice as many workers per 
manager as in France. This reflects not only the fact that in Germany there 
are inevitably fewer personnel at the lowest level of management than in 
France, but also that the number of management levels is always greater in 
France than in Germany. 
These differences are especially pronounced in German companies in 
which skilled workers dominate. Thus, for example, the production 
division of a German machine-tool factory employs 450 workers, but only 
20 supervisors and managers at three management levels. The comparable 
company in France, which builds an identical machine, requires 40 super-
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visors and managers at eight management levels to control and supervise 
some 400 workers. To be sure, a majority of the German employees are 
skilled workers, whereas in France a majority of the employees are only 
semi-skilled workers or have been retrained as (semi-)skilled workers 
(Anlernfacharbeiter). These differences are quite similar, or even more 
striking, in the commercial management and in the technical offices of the 
companies. 
Secondly, technical departments and offices in France (in so far as there 
is any technical office at all in a specific company in addition to its 
production division) always have a significantly larger staff, are organized 
in a more hierarchical manner, and are more distinctly separated from the 
manufacturing division than in Germany. 
In the companies of the machine-tool and steel industries in Germany, 5 
per cent of the employees are occupied in the technical offices and depart-
ments: in France, however, the corresponding number is more than 10 per 
cent (as of 1971). In the machine-tool industry these employees are, above 
all, concerned with development, design, and operations scheduling; in the 
steel industry, with technical management, production planning, and 
quality assurance. Departments which in Germany are responsible to the 
production management are organized as independent departments in 
France and report only to the technical directors. 
In the case of one of the pair of companies compared in the machine-tool 
industry, both are independent enterprises with approximately 600 em-
ployees (leaving aside the sales departments, which each has organized in 
a different manner). The technical office of the company in Germany 
comprises two senior executives (head of the design department and head 
of the operations scheduling department) and 19 technical employees. The 
technical office of the French company includes 50 employees, one-third of 
whom exercise executive functions at three of four managerial levels. 
Development, design and quality are independent divisions, comparable to 
the manufacturing division in organization and hierarchy. 
Although this was not actually the task of the present study, it was 
ascertained that in at least a few of the companies compared, production 
staff and even production managers were controlled and manipulated by the 
technical department to a far greater extent in France than in Germany. 
French supervisors - supervisor, assistant supervisor, foreman, assistant 
foreman - possess, on average, clearly inferior technical qualifications 
when compared to their German counterparts. In some of the French 
companies examined, we were explicitly told the technical skills are less 
important for a supervisor than a responsible character and leadership 
qualities; sometimes therefore supervisors with training in completely dif-
ferent fields are hired. Also as a general rule, German production and 
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maintenance divisions employ significantly more engineers than their 
French counterparts; in France engineers are employed principally in tech-
nical offices or in higher managerial positions. 
Thirdly, the commercial management of all French companies studied 
employs significantly more personnel than its German counterpart and is 
organized far more bureaucratically and hierarchically. 
In some of the companies compared, the administration area in the 
French companies had up to three times as many employees as those in 
Germany (the German companies, however, employ fewer personnel than 
the French). This was found to be the case especially where the plants 
compared were subsidiaries of a company with several branches, in spite of 
the fact that (or because?) the German companies generally allow their 
subsidiaries far more freedom of decision than the central management of 
the French companies. The latter has strict regulations governing many of 
the operations, or controls the decision-making process itself, whereas the 
German branch factories are free to make comparable decisions on their 
own. 
Correspondingly, administration in Germany has essentially only two 
hierarchical levels, namely those of clerical employees and department 
heads. Only in very large companies is there a third level (central depart-
ment, division, etc.). The administrations of French companies, in contrast, 
generally have five or six hierarchical levels. Functions which are fulfilled 
in a German company by one or two clerical employees working in contact 
with a departmental head are organized in a French company in indepen-
dent departments with a departmental head, an assistant departmental head, 
and several office managers or group managers. 
Here, too, the different qualification structure is obviously of great 
importance. Whereas the clerical employees in German companies usually 
have gone through systematic business training, a majority of the em-
ployees in the administration area of French companies have had only 
lower secondary or secondary school education, have been trained on the 
job, and have had to work their way up step by step. 
Finally, white-collar workers and managers are not only more numerous 
in France, they also earn more, in relation to blue-collar workers, than in 
Germany. 
Theoretically, it would seem logical that managers and employees in 
technical and administrative offices in France should earn less, in com-
parison with blue-collar workers, and in particular skilled workers, than in 
Germany. If this were the case, it would mean that the respective countries 
make sparing use of the most costly personnel, employing less expensive 
staff instead. 
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Actually, however, the exact opposite occurs. Although technical and 
administrative offices in France employ about one and a half times more 
personnel than in German companies, the average salary of the French 
white-collar employee is significanüy higher (in relation to the gross 
monthly wages of a blue-collar worker) than in Germany. 
Moreover, while French supervisors and managers, in relation to the total 
staff, are almost twice as numerous (12 per cent) as in Germany (7 per cent), 
the income gap between managers and workers is far greater in France than 
in Germany. It only simplifies the case slightly to say that the income gap 
from one management level to the next is almost the same in both countries, 
and that the income hierarchy reflects the number of management levels, 
which, as we have already seen, is smaller in Germany than in France. 
Thus management and supervisory functions in French companies 
require 20 per cent of total wages and salaries, as compared to only 12 per 
cent in German companies. In Germany, workers receive 75 per cent of all 
wage and salary payments: in France they do not even receive 60 per cent. 
EDUCATION, ACQUISITION OF SKILLS AND COMPANIES' 
PERSONNEL STRUCTURES 
In contrast to the situation in French companies, the 'German model' of 
company organization and personnel structure is - comparing technically 
and economically similar companies - characterized in particular, as we 
have demonstrated, by a weaker hierarchy, a less rigid vertical and 
functional division of work, and thus greater autonomy even in subordinate 
jobs. In the 'French model', on the other hand, the performance of sub-
ordinate tasks is far more subject to hierarchical supervision and functional 
regulation and control; due to stricter vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal 
(functional) divisions of work, autonomy in the performance of tasks is 
obviously much more restricted than in Germany. 
This contrast between two types of structures in enterprises corresponds 
to an equally significant difference between the educational and training 
systems in the two countries, which results in a marked difference in the 
educational and skill structure of the working population. It goes without 
saying that the present situation in the educational system, which has 
resulted from the educational reform and educational expansion in both 
countries in the last decade, cannot be taken into account. Newer de-
velopments in the educational system had not yet shown any significant 
influence either in Germany or in France on the skill structure of personnel 
in the period in which the data quoted above were collected and for which 
the most recent statistics are available. This study reflects, rather, the 
situation in the educational system in previous decades. 
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French and German educational systems and personnel qualifications 
If one compares the general education and vocational training of the work-
ing population of both countries, three marked differences can be observed. 
Many more people have attended and graduated from institutions of 
higher general education in France than in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The opportunities for further education within the systems of 
general public education were expanded much earlier and more rapidly in 
France than in Germany. Whereas in Germany not even 20 per cent of the 
working population (as of the mid-1970s) have a certificate in further 
education, in France the figure stands at some 40 per cent. Furthermore, 
only 9 per cent of the working population in Germany, as compared to 13 
per cent in France, have a secondary school or university diploma including 
diplomas from higher technical schools and technical colleges which 
strictly speaking are not institutions of general education: meanwhile, 10 
per cent in Germany, as compared to 27 per cent in France, have lower 
secondary school certificates. 
This difference has not been altered by the rapid expansion of education 
in the last twenty years. No less than 55 per cent of young people entering 
the labour force in France in the years 1971-2 had completed schooling 
which corresponded at least to the level of the German lower secondary 
school certificate, or Mittlere Reife; in Germany, however, the number was 
only about 40 per cent. Moreover, 22 per cent in France, as compared to 
only 12 per cent in Germany, had completed secondary school education 
which qualified them to attend a university or college. 
Many more people in Germany than in France have completed vo-
cational training, opportunities ranging from apprenticeship or its French 
equivalent to university studies. Only 31 per cent of the working population 
in Germany have not completed some form of vocational training (a 
majority of these are women who otherwise comprise slightly more than 
one-third of the working population). In France, on the other hand, a 
corresponding 71 per cent have not completed systematic vocational 
training (with the percentage of men in this group scarcely lower than their 
percentage in the total working population). 
The average standard of vocational training in the German working 
population still remains much higher if we take into account the numerous 
workers who had completed vocational training when they began to work -
generally in handicrafts or the retail trade - but who were later forced to 
shift to unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. Even if we estimate this group at 
about 20 per cent of the working population, the percentage of workers who 
have completed vocational training in their field is almost twice as high in 
Germany as in France. 
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Education and training of the German working population are far more 
homogeneous than in France. In Germany the dominant form of obtaining 
vocational qualifications is vocational training within the dual system: in 
1971, 62 per cent of all employed persons (born in 1918 or later) in the 
Federal Republic of Germany had completed an apprenticeship. And even 
from among those employed persons with higher vocational qualifications 
comprising a degree from a university, technical college or comparable 
French institution (in Germany almost 14 per cent, and in France less than 
9 per cent), about half of those in Germany had completed an apprentice-
ship at some point in their training. 
In France, in contrast, only 20 per cent of the working population had 
completed apprenticeship-type training as of the mid-1970s. The combina-
tion of such practical vocational training with the prior acquisition of a 
higher degree from a school of general education or with a subsequent 
degree from a technical school or university remains completely atypical. 
Much more frequent, however, is vocational training at an intermediate 
level in public or private schools offering a large variety of subjects, 
specialized fields, and levels, for which there are no real equivalents in the 
German system. 
It should further be emphasized that in France a significant portion of the 
working population - more than 10 per cent - do possess an intermediate or 
higher degree in general education (including two years of basic university 
studies without the following specialized degree), although they have not 
had any systematic vocational training. 
It should also be stressed that in France vocational qualification courses 
for adults, usually of six to ten months' duration, are of considerable 
importance, quantitatively and qualitatively. In principle, these courses 
belong to the sphere of further training and thus often do not lead to the 
same certificates and degrees as initial vocational training. For many young 
working people, however, they represent the only opportunity to receive 
any vocational training at all. 
Labour supply qualification structure and companies' personnel 
policy 
It will be immediately obvious that due to the differences outlined above in 
the educational system and skill structure of the working population, an 
employer who wishes to initiate a specific production process will be 
confronted with entirely different problems in France and in Germany. 
The German company, partially due to its own training activities, will as 
a rule be able to rely on a large supply of manpower with completed basic 
vocational training in the form of apprenticeship as skilled worker or as 
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specialized employee; in other words, on training which ensures a rela-
tively high level of vocational skills which are immediately usable or can 
be easily activated. In France, on the other hand, correspondingly skilled 
manpower is structurally scarce. In addition, since most training takes place 
in public schools, the supply cannot be influenced by a specific company. 
Thus, in French companies a greater part of the skills required can and 
must be taught after an employee has been taken on. This is, of course, true 
only under die conditions found in average companies which cannot afford 
to lure a large part of the scarce manpower with completed vocational 
training by means of especially attractive job offers. This means that a 
French company must attach far greater importance to the question of how 
to ensure that the necessary skills are acquired in the daily routine of the 
company, on the job, than in the case of its German competitor. The latter 
can largely rely on the fact that the basic vocational training of its em-
ployees will have provided them with the qualifications required by highly 
specific jobs, without special in-company training having to be organized 
(see chapter 16). 
Under these conditions, the level of general education and the school 
degrees of its employees are of little importance to a German company. On 
the other hand, it is in the interests of a French employer with essentially 
the same business problems to use the general (social or cognitive) skills 
which his employees have acquired in the public school system as a basis 
for the acquisition of qualifications required specifically in the company. 
This has the following implications for the most important groups of 
personnel: 
1 Semi-skilled workers in Germany have often had at least preparatory 
vocational training in that they have completed an apprenticeship in a 
different field (usually handicrafts), whereas in France they have almost 
never had systematic vocational training or instruction of any kind. 
2 Skilled workers in German companies have, as a rule, a more ho-
mogeneous and, on average, higher qualification than in France simply 
because they have completed apprenticeships as industrial skill workers. 
In France, equivalent training for skilled workers covers a narrower 
sphere of vocational tasks than training for their German counterparts. 
In addition, only a certain proportion (in many companies a minority) of 
the ouvriis professionnels (skilled workers) have had training which 
corresponds to an apprenticeship; all other workers classified as skilled 
have had at the most one year's re-training within the framework of 
programmes for the training of adults. 
3 Nearly all German clerical and technical employees have completed 
apprenticeships, and technical employees in particular have also often 
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completed further training. In French companies, in contrast, vocational 
training of the employees is very heterogeneous. Often the level of 
general education plays an important, if not decisive, role in 
classification and promotion. This is especially the case with regard to 
clerical employees, whose vocational qualification is based primarily on 
on-the-job training and experience (which may be more or less oriented 
to the needs of the specific company). The technical employees include 
former skilled workers, graduates of the technical branches of the public 
school system, and employees who have only an intermediate or higher 
degree in general education, and who have acquired their vocational 
training exclusively through company experience. 
4 Supervisors and middle-management personnel in Germany almost 
always have the same basic qualifications as the workers they supervise. 
In France, in contrast, character, rather than proven vocational skills, 
seems to be decisive in the employment or promotion of supervisors. 
Middle-management personnel, who are in any case more numerous in 
France than in Germany, often have a higher level of formal education 
than in German companies. 
5 German senior executives are the most heterogeneous with respect to 
their educational background and training whereas, in France, they 
constitute the most homogeneous group. In France a senior executive is 
generally expected to have a secondary school diploma and, often, a 
university degree: among Germans at this level, on the other hand, 
almost all kinds of educational and professional backgrounds can be 
observed. 
Qualification structure and company organization 
At first glance, the model of company organization, personnel structure and 
income structure which we have labelled the 'French model', when com-
pared to its German counterpart, seems to represent an almost pathological 
deviation from the principles of industrial rationality. However, a closer 
inspection reveals that the models in each of the two countries are in fact 
quite rational in the light of company interests and of the prevailing con-
ditions on their labour markets and in their national education systems. In 
both cases, companies act as rationally as possible under the circumstances 
with which they are faced. The situation in France, which seems extremely 
irrational from a German point of view, is thus not the result of poor 
management, but rather the expression of different national conditions and, 
above all, differently structured educational systems. This point will now 
be demonstrated in more detail in the case of the manufacturing division, 
commercial management, and the technical offices. 
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An average German industrial plant with a production process typical of 
much of the machine-tool industry (typical, too, of many construction sites 
or of the continuously expanding maintenance departments of highly 
mechanized and automated industries) can count on an abundant supply of 
fully trained skilled workers who have acquired varying degrees of 
professional experience (either in the plant itself or in other companies with 
similar production structures). Consequently, they are qualified to solve 
most of the technical and organizational problems arising in the production 
process on their own initiative without this detracting appreciably from 
their standard performance. 
Thus the company has several alternatives. 
1 It can rely on a flat and relatively sparse leadership structure, in which 
the lower limits in the number of supervisors and middle-management 
personnel will generally be determined by technical and organizational 
necessities. For example, in every large division one foreman (Meister) 
responsible for important decisions at short notice must always be 
present. 
2 The company can select supervisors from among the skilled workers 
already employed who are able to assess production problems and to 
exert authority over skilled subordinates by means of their extensive 
experience and high-level competence (generally supplemented by 
specific further training leading to formal qualifications). 
3 It can restrict its role in operations scheduling, planning, and design to 
establishing basic principles and general guidelines. Technicians in 
these departments will nearly always be able to rely on theoretical 
knowledge and practical experience acquired formerly as skilled 
workers. 
The situation in comparable French companies is completely different 
Here, due to the insufficient qualifications - or more precisely, qualifi-
cations assumed to be insufficient - of a majority of the workers, the 
company finds itself obliged to take different courses of action. 
1 It must see that the production process and execution of tasks are 
continuously analyzed and controlled by special technical departments 
employing a large staff, generally with high-level formal qualifications. 
In this way, the company can ensure, by means of fixed, detailed rules 
of procedure, that a large number of specific problems, which in 
Germany would almost automatically fall to the skilled worker and 
Meister, are solved at an earlier stage. 
2 The company needs to ensure that a large number of technical managers 
with the necessary specialized knowledge is always present in the 
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factory to support the technical office, bearing in mind that only limited 
advance planning and regulation are possible in view of the diversity of 
tasks to be accomplished. Many problems which can be solved by 
qualified skilled workers and Meister in a German company require the 
active cooperation of such managers in France. 
3 It has to establish a large, hierarchically subdivided group of supervisors 
occupying a position between the planning and operations scheduling 
departments and technical managers, on the one hand, and the pro-
duction workers on the other. These supervisors have only very limited 
technical skills, but are needed in order to enforce strict enactment of the 
decisions taken by the engineers and technicians and precise observance 
of the rules and instructions which the latter have formulated. Such 
discipline can only be ensured by a well-staffed group of supervisors 
who control the work performed almost continually. 
These strongly contrasting structures of hierarchical and functional division 
of work in German and French companies influence, in turn, the oppor-
tunities for training open to the workers. In Germany, the relatively high 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by a skilled worker, or a group of such 
workers with a Meister, results in a situation in which continuous acqui-
sition of additional skills through experience and constant confrontation 
with new problems is not only made possible, but is also regarded as 
perfectly normal and, indeed, almost inevitable. Functions and working 
methods of Meister and engineers, designers, and work planners are 
organized in such a way that this process is supported and encouraged 
rather than hindered. In French companies, on the other hand, lack of 
confidence in the competence of workers and their immediate superiors not 
only reduces learning opportunities, but even appears to result in a negative 
selection, since the most qualified younger skilled staff apparently prefer to 
work in small concerns where they can expect to enjoy greater inde-
pendence. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the typical approach by 
French companies to the skill deficit of their workers threatens to per-
petuate this deficit or even to increase it. 
Al l of these observations are also true of the administrative and technical 
offices of companies in both countries. In this respect, however, those in 
France face a special dilemma. 
If newly employed staff have not gained the requisite competence in 
their previous training, the company must offer them the opportunity and 
the incentive to acquire skills relevant to the job concerned. However, it 
must also organize the work itself in such a way that no performance 
deficits result from the qualification gaps of its employees, before these 
gaps can be eliminated through assimilation to and experience in company 
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standards and routines. Both factors lead inevitably to bureaucratic 
structures with their twin aspects of explicit regulation and control and 
hierarchical differentiation. As a result of regulation and control, even 
employees with very limited skills can immediately be occupied in 
productive work by means of assignment to narrowly pre-structured and 
strictly supervised tasks. Hierarchical differentiation, on the other hand, 
provides for the necessary control and makes it possible to arouse interest 
in qualifications of specific use to the company by creating a system of 
rewards (such as promotion opportunities) in the area of employment 
concerned. 
This practice of creating incentives in a hierarchically stratified system 
of jobs must, however, take into account the fact that French companies 
have for many years been able - and forced - to rely on a relatively large 
supply of job seekers with differentiated degrees in higher general edu-
cation (including short-term university courses of little vocational value). 
These companies are thus under considerable social pressure to employ 
such young people: indeed, they are all the more willing to do so, since it is 
obviously in their own interests to exploit the differential value of these 
degrees and the processes of social and intellectual selection inherent in 
them. This, in turn, results in pressure for further vertical stratification of 
personnel, leading to different 'careers' for employees with different 
degrees, each career necessarily implying also a different level of oppor-
tunity for advancement. 
In this way, however, the interest of French companies in reducing the 
risks and costs of qualification for office employees by relying explicitly on 
documented school performance comes into conflict with their interest in 
containing these 'unproductive' parts of the company within reasonable 
limits. 
This contradiction may result, especially in medium-sized and small 
companies, in personnel and organizational structures such as those des-
cribed above, in which one out of every three male clerks occupies a 
middle-management position. 
Thus, the level and structure of the supply of skills resulting from the 
development of the education and training system contributes to the 
creation of specific forms of company organization, and of horizontal and 
functional division of work. In other words, the supply of skills has a strong 
impact on the qualifications structures of companies. Furthermore, dif-
ferent qualification structures require different income structures in order to 
function. 
In so far as entering the service of a company involves the gradual 
acquisition of appropriate vocational skills, as is in the case in France, a 
corresponding dynamic income structure will be essential to encourage the 
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learning process, either in conjunction with hierarchical advancement or 
independent of it. The more bureaucratic regulation and control appear 
necessary to ensure the operation of the company, the more the company 
will have to reinforce the vertical division of work and the implicit hier-
archy of power and influence with a corresponding income hierarchy. The 
more a company is interested in winning employees with advanced degrees 
in general education, the more it will have to rely on salary differentiations 
graded according to specific careers. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
The relationship between education, on the one hand, and the employer, on 
the other, has hitherto been regarded primarily as a simple relationship 
between customer and supplier. For the 'customer', the employer, the major 
concern was that sufficiently qualified manpower was available at the right 
time, whereas the 'supplier', the educational system with its various 
branches, was above all concerned with estimating and meeting the demand 
for its product. 
The results of the comparison between personnel structures, educational 
systems and qualification structures of the working population in Germany 
and France described above can, however, in complete contradiction to this 
assumption, only be explained if the following hypotheses are accepted: 
1 that employers are capable of achieving profitable operation and pro-
duction with personnel qualified in completely different ways; and 
2 that the educational system has a significant influence on the develop-
ment of employment structures. 
These two factors are closely interrelated. Since employers do not have a 
fixed need (or a iimitational' need as it was called in the discussions on 
educational policy in the 1960s) for a specific amount of labour with 
specific training, the educational system can develop and expand inde-
pendently within certain limits (to be explained in more detail below) 
without being completely 'uncoupled'. Since, however, employers cannot 
employ manpower haphazardly, they must at some point react to changes 
in the educational and qualification structure of the manpower available to 
them, by making changes in work organization, whether horizontally or 
vertically. 
Thus, it was possible for the educational systems in Germany and 
France, which were probably quite similarly structured in the early nine-
teenth century, to develop in completely different ways. And, at first 
glance, it would appear that the employment structures had developed in 
corresponding fashion. 
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It would, however, be wrong to conclude, in contradiction to generally 
accepted ideas, that educational policy dominates developments in the 
employment system, and to assume that education systems can make 
independent decisions to which employers must simply adapt after a certain 
period, accepting the structures that the educational system has created. 
Several recent studies (see Asendorf et al. 1975) have demonstrated 
quite clearly not only that changes in the educational system influence 
developments in employment structures, but that these developments in 
turn influence educational policy and the expansion of the educational 
system. Such influence is exerted through the connection between 
education and career opportunities as the most important determinant of 
educational behaviour. 
This connection was long ignored, although it really was quite obvious. 
The massive and rapid expansion of secondary schools, such as has taken 
place in the Federal Republic of Germany and all large industrial countries, 
can certainly not be explained by the fact that the employment system needs 
secondary school graduates. Today we realize that the decisive impulse for 
this expansion came from an increasing demand for places in such schools. 
This demand was in turn clearly motivated by the recognition of parents 
and children that career opportunities are determined decisively by edu-
cational qualifications. 
Thus education and employment interact in a very closely intertwined 
relationship. Educational policy means regulation and intervention within 
this relationship, and all educational demands which ignore this fact are 
illusive or demagogic. 
The ingredients of this relationship include the organization of employ-
ment structures in companies with a view of optimal utilization of the 
labour supply, the influence of education and training on positions and 
career opportunities conditioned by such organization, and the determin-
ants of educational behaviour induced by the latter. To varying degrees, this 
relationship can be influenced by what may be termed a 'meritocratic' 
principle, to borrow a term coined by French sociologists to describe 
conditions in their own country. What is meant here is a very strict con-
ditioning (and in extreme cases determination) of the access to jobs and 
career opportunities by means of educational qualifications. These obser-
vations hold several very far-reaching implications. 
First, the differences which exist today between educational systems and 
employment structures in Germany and France can be explained very 
plausibly by that fact that French meritocratic structures are more strongly 
developed. Parents and young people in France have little alternative but to 
think in terms of a long period of school education spent passing exami-
nations to as advanced a level as possible. Companies, on the other hand, 
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are forced to accept the hierarchical gradation in the education of their 
personnel and to adapt to this situation by creating special 'careers'. 
In Germany, however, the existence of two competing qualification 
systems has, at least up to now, been characteristic. Set against the system 
of general education, consisting of the three levels of general schools and 
the universities, has been the so-called vocational system, consisting of 
apprenticeship, technical schools and today's technical colleges. This com-
petition between the two systems probably explains why the hierarchical 
stratification in both is less pronounced than in France. It appears, however, 
very questionable whether this situation can last, as meritocratic structures 
apparently have an inherent tendency to expand their influence. 
The educational system in France, with its strong hierarchical differ-
entiations based on formal qualifications and selection, represents by far 
the most important, if not the only, system teaching professional 
competence (on the basis of very strict selection). Companies, therefore, 
have no choice but to adapt their organizational and employment structures 
so as to employ graduates of this system according to the special levels and 
profiles of the skills which they have confirmed in examination successes 
and the claims which they possesses on that basis. 
Since only a certificate from a higher or at the least intermediate-level 
educational institution offers a guarantee against lifelong condemnation to 
subordinate, poorly paid work, the existing demand for places in in-
stitutions of higher education cannot be checked, but at the most only 
channelled. In the end, work of this kind - mainly but not exclusively 
manual - will be required and expected only of those who, as a result of 
unfavourable social or intellectual preconditions or character development, 
have been sifted out by the selection process of the educational system and 
labelled as inferior. 
Correspondingly, expectations in the qualification potential of all those 
who have left the system without an intermediate or higher degree must be 
reduced. Consequendy, companies are, it would seem, inevitably forced to 
accept an increase in the division of labour, limitation in the autonomy of 
subordinate work, and therefore, an even greater deterioration in the quali-
fication opportunities and career perspectives offered in low-status jobs. 
For these reasons, structures and trends in France should not be regarded 
superciliously as if they had no direct relevance for the Federal Republic. 
On the contrary, specific developments taking place for some time in 
Germany threaten to force the education and employment systems in a very 
similar direction if given free reign (see Köhler, Grüner 1990 and chapter 9 
of this volume). 
The German public has begun to realize that opportunities for those with 
an academic background are far more interesting than positions generally 
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open to those who have completed apprenticeship as industrial skilled 
workers. The obviously meritocratic structures which have long existed in 
the German public service began to influence educational behaviour and 
career selection to an increasing extent in the 1960s. This was all the more 
the case as the working conditions offered by the public service to em-
ployees with higher qualifications simultaneously became more attractive. 
The previous independence and competitive strength of vocational training 
as opposed to the school and university system of general education is 
decreasing. The transformation of what were formerly higher technical 
institutions into technical colleges was only one step in this direction, 
though an important one. The establishment of special courses for 
secondary school graduates, a pet idea of some Ministers of Education and 
managing directors of large industrial enterprises, is another similar trend. 
Economic organizations now maintain that industry does not wish this 
trend towards education to continue any further in view of its tendency to 
prejudice the career and advancement opportunities of workers with 
practical vocational training. Yet, in fact, this process of gradual infiltration 
of university graduates can be observed in all sectors. It is only a matter of 
time before access to top management positions will be the prerogative of 
degree-holders only.2 
This process will definitely not be checked even by the rapidly 
increasing difficulties which university graduates encounter in their search 
for adequate occupations. On the contrary, these difficulties will give rise 
to displacement competition, whereby the stronger social position of 
university graduates will generally prevail over the 'mere' vocational 
qualification of competitors with practical vocational training. To be sure, 
not all university graduates will have access to relatively high-level 
positions, as has been the case to date. But this does not alter the fact that 
an increasing number of jobs will be accessible only to degree-holders. 
Following this general line of thought, it is quite conceivable that 
present conditions in France reflect future conditions in Germany. Far from 
outdated, the relationships between French educational and training 
systems, employment structure, and company organization (with all their 
negative economic and social effects) are, when seen in historical 
perspective, most likely the precursor of conditions in the Federal Republic. 
It is probably not yet too late to prevent such a development, especially 
since the particular constellation of the influx onto the labour market of 
young people born during the baby boom may create additional room for 
action in both educational and company personnel policy. 
The opportunity, however, requires fast and decisive action, oriented to 
future needs. At present in Germany, the vocational system of education 
and training comprises part-time and full-time vocational schools, technical 
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schools, high schools and colleges, and in-firm training. The major 
objective should be to strengthen these both in themselves and with respect 
to the system of general education so that they represent a real alternative 
for a future long-term situation in which fewer young people and a larger 
supply of training places are expected. The choice of this alternative should 
not carry the implication that the trainee is poorly informed, of limited 
talent, or lacking in ambition. 
Present educational and vocational training policies, however, scarcely 
correspond to this goal. For one thing, authorities are exploiting the 
shortage of training places to delay improvements or even to revoke 
reforms which have already been passed. Rather than eliminating the 
obvious faults and weakness of the dual system, it is as if the system had 
already been written off for the period following the influx of young people 
born during the baby boom. 
Secondly, instead of exerting efforts to expand vocational schools, the 
major increases in educational expenditure are being allocated to the 
universities. Moreover, despite the potential for intensified cooperation 
between vocational schools and in-firm training, which would be in the 
interests of both, the authorities have allowed jurisdictional squabbles 
which have actually prevented coordination of vocational school curricula 
and the regulations governing training. Vocational secondary schools are 
being increasingly misused as a reservoir for the selection casualties of 
secondary schools and those not accepted at the universities, in such a way 
as to perpetuate their inferior status in the eyes of those affected. 
Finally, rather than defending and confirming the principle of a uniform 
standard of basic vocational training (in the form of full apprenticeship) as 
the most significant strength of the German qualification system, those 
responsible are succumbing to the temptation of hierarchical differentiation 
of admission requirements and final degrees. This means that the minor 
advantages of improved channeling of the flow of pupils and higher selec-
tivity are being secured at the price of increased meritocracy. 
It is certainly not an exaggeration to say that the present situation in 
educational policy is dramatic and that the decisions which must be made 
between two alternative development trends will have dramatic effects for 
many years to come: the alternatives are either the reduction of vocational 
preparation and initial training to the point where they become mere appen-
dages of a broadly meritocratic system essentially oriented to the principles 
and values of general education, or the stabilization of practical vocational 
training (in institutions run by a variety of authorities) on a fresh long-term 
basis. 
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18 Mechanical Engineer versus 
Computer Scientist - Different 
Roads to CIM in France and 
Germany1 
Burkart Lutz, Pierre Veltz 
INTRODUCTION 
There are distinct differences between Germany and France in the way 
industrial production technology has developed. This chapter attributes 
these differences to structures and processes which are represented by the 
terms 'social reproduction of technical personnel' and 'social structuring of 
technical competence and knowledge'. In France, it is argued, a strong 
relationship exists between the erosion of traditional skilled work, the 
overwhelming school-based education of technical personnel and a strategy 
of (forced) computerization. In contrast, the more machine-oriented 
development path of German manufacturing technology is explained by the 
relative stability of the skilled worker tradition and its connection to the 
training of engineers. 
DIVERGENT STRATEGIES OF F L E X I B L E AUTOMATION IN 
FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY 
Up to now, most international comparisons of factory organization, 
division of labour, and skill and manpower structures have been based on 
the assumption that the implementation of manufacturing technologies is 
universal in character, not nation-specific, and does not systematically vary 
by economy. There are a number of very good reasons for assuming that 
this also applies to the computer-aided technologies of flexible automation 
that are increasingly determining the development of industrial production. 
However, a quite different picture emerges if a closer look is taken at the 
most important subjects of the comparative investigations carried out in the 
1970s in the large industrial nations of France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, namely the main aspects of technology development, structures 
of supply and demand on technology markets, the tenor of public dis-
cussion, the concrete situation of technological innovation within the 
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enterprises and the public programmes in support of these innovation 
measures. 
In France, agreement was fairly unanimous that the nation needed a 
strategy of technological development and industrial innovation based on 
the utilization of computers and computer science; for this reason, mastery 
of computer technology was considered decisive for the future of industry 
and the professional chances of the coming generation. 
In West Germany, on the other hand, computer-integrated manu-
facturing was not so much regarded as a break from the previous course of 
technical and industrial development as a continuation, expansion and 
intensification of existing trends and practices in industrial automation and 
the rationalization of enterprise processes. Indeed, computer technology 
was primarily regarded as a useful tool that could be used for classical, 
application-related forms of engineering science, such as in mechanical 
engineering, which undisputedly held a key position in the development of 
future industry and technical personnel. 
At least at present, these two different strategies do not display a similar 
degree of success. For example, in large parts of German industry in 
general, and the metalworking branch in particular, the development, pro-
duction and application of systems and components of computer-aided 
automation is gaining significance and becoming an accepted part of daily 
life in the enterprise. The French strategy of technical innovation and 
industrial modernization, however, is characterized by innumerable 
failures, abortive CIM applications and discontinued processes of product 
development. Moreover, while most of the German manufacturers of 
machine tools have gone through an unexpected period of prosperity due to 
the gradual integration of micro-electronics into their products, France has 
had to accept the widespread downfall of its machine tool industry, despite 
massive state support. 
These findings raise two groups of questions: 
1 To what extent do these strategies depend on the national structures of 
industrial work and factory organization as observed in the comparative 
investigations of the two nations? And can a plausible connection be 
established between the differing significance both countries give to 
skilled workers, on the one hand, and computer science and scientists on 
the other? 
2 Are these strategies of industrial innovation alternatives which industrial 
nations can choose? Or is only one of them destined to be successful? 
Could this explain current differences in the success of both strategies? 
Or does the French computer-centred strategy of developing manu-
facturing technologies (which is also being actively pursued by other 
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countries) open greater opportunities in the long run, despite the short-
term high initial costs due to overly ambitious and therefore failed 
innovations? Finally, which aspects of nationally specific structures of 
personnel, skills and organization contribute towards finding an answer 
to these questions? 
We will deal with these questions in three steps. The first (dealt with in the 
next section), argues that the striking differences in organization and skill 
structures in French and German companies are closely related to the 
extremely divergent way in which models of the 'social reproduction of 
technical personnel' have developed in the two countries since the end of 
the Second World War. In the Federal Republic, for example, practical 
occupational experience still plays a key role in the social reproduction of 
technical personnel, while in France it is increasingly dominated by a 
school-centred model in which the educational system has a central impor-
tance in the guidance, training and selection of future technical personnel. 
The second question (discussed on pp. 281-5), which extends far 
beyond the traditional scope of industrial sociology and labour economics, 
seeks to clarify the relationship that exists between models of the social 
reproduction of technical personnel and what could be called the 'social 
structuring of technical knowledge'. The task here is to examine the 
premise that the increased importance of schooling for technical personnel 
calls into question what, in the history of industrialization, used to be the 
given professionalism of technical knowledge and competence. 
Finally, the last step (discussed in the last section of the chapter) 
examines whether the strongly computer-centred strategies of technical 
innovation and industrial modernization as implemented in France can be 
interpreted as an attempt to react against the negative effects of the de-
professionalization of technical competence through the expenditure of a 
major technological and educational effort. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIAL REPRODUCTION OF 
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Ever since the emergence of industry and industrial technology, all modern 
societies have been faced with the task of having to make sure that the 
competence required for the application and development of technical 
knowledge is always at its disposal. The distinct class structures of all 
societies that have undergone the industrialization process made the divi-
sion of mental work (as carried out by the rulers and the educated) and 
manual labour (as carried out by the common people) seem part of the 
natural order of things. As professional status was by far the most wide-
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spread social expression of competence, the task of developing competence 
was realized historically by creating and maintaining mechanisms and 
structures to produce - and once the initial foundation was there - to 
reproduce generation after generation of technical personnel (meaning 
those employed for the execution of mental labour who are competent [and 
certified] in specific technical subject matter). 
Al l these mechanisms and structures can be summed up as 'the social 
reproduction of technical personnel'. The forms of these mechanisms and 
structures have changed considerably in the historical process of the 
development of industrial societies. Through this process, clear nationally 
specific characteristics have emerged. This divergent as well as convergent 
variance can be described with two ideal typical models without too much 
risk of oversimplification. 
The first model is characterized by the occupation-centred path of 
generating technical personnel. Where this ideal type dominates technical 
personnel are given practical tasks even at the beginning of their 
occupational career. Thus, they acquire much of their necessary technical 
competence by learning and experimenting in everyday work situations. 
Their learning process is generally accompanied by a more or less self-
directed study of relevant technical literature and/or guidance and training 
from experienced technical personnel. 
Characteristic of the other type of social reproduction of technical 
personnel is a path that can be described as being centred on schooling. In 
this model, technical competence is mainly acquired via classroom 
training. Thus, workers who gain admission to the ranks of technical 
personnel under this model have attained a particular level of education. 
It must be emphasized, even if a further examination of the issue is not 
possible here, that these different forms of acquiring competence are 
related to considerable differences in the social backgrounds of technical 
personnel, in the type and degree of selectivity exercised by employers and 
the specific value of the worker for the employers (whose decisions are also 
closely connected to societal prerequisites for the realization of one model 
or the other). 
Historically, technical personnel as an autonomous social group came 
into being in all industrialized nations under the clear dominance of the 
ideal type of social reproduction of technical personnel corresponding to 
the occupational centred path. 
At first, technical and management functions were so closely connected 
that traditional forms of gradual advancement to the level of foreman 
(Meister) on the basis of practical experience were taken for granted. In 
large enterprises, even members of the owner's family who were destined 
to take over technical management functions were generally prepared for 
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this task by working their way from the bottom up; in other words, learning 
from doing and assembling practical experience was even considered 
indispensable for technical personnel who, as an unquestioned attribute of 
their class position, had attended schools of higher education. 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, this form of access to the realm 
of technical personnel predominated to an equal extent in both Germany 
and France. With the development and stabilization of large industrial 
enterprises in both countries, a 'craft culture' arose, in which traditional 
craft skills and the new familiarity with industrial techniques were merged 
into 'professions' which, in turn, formed the basis for industrial work 
organization, professional labour markets and the trade unions (which were 
gaining in both members and power). 
The categories of technical personnel still relevant today also developed 
in a very similar manner in both countries, partly the outcome of processes 
involving differing paths, but mainly differing magnitudes of upward 
mobility for skilled industrial workers, (to the level of Meister, technician 
and engineer). The Meister, for example, incorporated much of the techni-
cal competence of an enterprise well into the twentieth century. The tech-
nician differed from the Meister-worker due to his technical competence, as 
demonstrated by his occupational title, but he also differed from the 
engineer due to the lower scientific level of both his skill and tasks. Finally, 
the engineer was either designated as such by his employer or had 
graduated from schools of higher education such as a German establish-
ment of technical education or a French Ecole des Arts et Metiers; whatever 
the case, he worked his way up into the higher levels of technical com-
petence (and generally, company hierarchy) on the basis of a long period 
working his way through Meister or technician tasks. 
However, from the very start, several differences existed between 
Germany and France that could help to explain their differences in develop-
ment since the Second World War. Already during the French Revolution, 
for example, France had created a system of elite technical colleges which 
were less concerned with preparing the students to perform the functions of 
technical personnel as understood in the context of this chapter than with 
educating them to assume leading positions in the state. The prestige of 
these schools and the privileges that graduation from one of them entailed 
impeded all attempts to expand and improve the practical aspect of the 
social reproduction of technical personnel through education; by the turn of 
the century, the Ecoles des Arts et Metiers, which were created to fulfd this 
very purpose, had been integrated into the social system of higher education 
(and thus became inferior rivals of 'the' technical colleges). At the same 
time, craft culture and tradition in France was concentrated on specific 
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industrial regions or centres and never became as widespread or taken as 
seriously as it was in pre-war Germany and as it still is. 
The model of social reproduction of technical personnel through pro-
motion of workers dominated in both countries until well into the 20th 
century. The swift and intense process of industrialization that swept 
Europe after the Second World War (in West Germany a little sooner than 
in France) was accompanied by a rapidly increasing need for technical 
personnel which was mainly met by promoting workers in the enterprise: 
Process and product innovations were no longer left to the chance ideas of 
unpredictable inventors; rather they were systematically developed in 
departments especially set up for these purposes. Moreover, the expansion 
of mass-produced standardized products made it necessary to undertake 
considerable efforts in both design and planning. The growth of mass 
production together with the mass mobilization of unskilled labour in 
industrial production laid the foundations for the triumphant advance of 
'Tayloristic' forms of work and company organization. The functional 
division of labour that characterized such forms of work initiated the 
expansion of production-related technical offices and service departments. 
Differences in employment trends soon became apparent between the 
two countries. In France, limits on the mass recruitment of technical 
personnel from the skilled worker pool were quickly set due to the absence 
of a craft culture, the small numbers and regional concentration of skilled 
worker training opportunities, and the lack of colleges primarily designed 
for ambitious young skilled workers such as the schools for technicians and 
engineers in West Germany. For these reasons, in order to satisfy their need 
for technical personnel, French industry had to fall back on well-educated 
employees who had either acquired their technical competence outside of 
the industry (such as in the army, navy, or the state railway) or through 
internal mobility of highly educated employees who worked their way up 
in the company through a system of ongoing training and promotion. 
In comparison, in the decades after the Second World War, West 
German industry had very large quantities of technical personnel equipped 
with training and professional experience as skilled workers (and usually 
with further vocational training) at their disposal. Due to the large-scale 
social and professional advancement that accompanied this situation, this 
provided for a very effective mechanism for social satisfaction. The number 
of technicians and engineers employed in West German industries rose 
between 1950 and 1970 from 160,000 to approximately 570,000, and was 
primarily a result of promotion of former skilled workers through the ranks. 
A considerable number of workers, in fact almost a third, who were skilled 
industrial workers during the 1950s, had risen to the level of technician by 
1970. 
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In order to overcome its quantitative and quantitative lack of technical 
personnel, France, since the 1950s, has charged its public education system 
with the task of training technical workers. Today, the social reproduction 
of technical personnel in France is mainly carried out through specialized 
education of young people which includes a littie practical experience that 
does not have much significance. The almost exclusive use of school-
centred education for training future technical personnel is organized along 
strictly hierarchal lines based on the level of general education achieved 
(and required) before the start of technical education, the length of time 
spent on education altogether and the prestige attached to the respective 
degree or diploma. 
The stratification within the category of technical personnel (which 
developed under the dominance of the system of social reproduction based 
on practical industrial experience in accordance with the logic of a difficult 
professional advancement) is, in France, completely harnessed to the 
system internal hierarchy of the education system. This system, already in 
the early 19th century, was based on meritocratic principles, a characteristic 
which became all the more pronounced after the Second World War under 
pressure from the rapidly growing demand for higher education. Although, 
naturally in the German tradition, a certain hierarchy underlies the different 
categories of technical personnel reflecting the general structure of social 
inequality, they have not completely lost their original meaning - i.e. the 
differing mixtures of 'theory' and 'practice' without any systematic 
difference in occupational value. In France, on the other hand, hierarchical 
categories of technical personnel only reflect different ways of dealing with 
technical problems to a secondary extent. Mainly, they document the 
differing degrees of success attained in the acquisition of education and 
knowledge, the mastering of examination requirements and conformance to 
the values that support this system. 
Although self-evident, it must none the less be emphasized that the 
dominance of school-centred models in the reproduction of technical 
personnel has far-reaching effects at the level of the skilled worker. In 
German-speaking countries, where occupation-centred models still play a 
central role in the generation of technical personnel, the chances for pro-
motion make apprenticeships more attractive and help make the decision 
not to attend an institute of higher education more acceptable to both 
parents and children. In France, however, entering training that leads to the 
level of the skilled worker generally means giving up the chance of 
acquiring more highly valued qualifications at a later date. Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that most young people do not take such 
a path voluntarily, but only if they are forced to, frequently because they 
have failed to gain better marks in comprehensive schools. Thus, 
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estimations of their chances to increase their educational level or strive for 
promotion are correspondingly (and for the most part accurately) low. 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 
AND TECHNICAL COMPETENCE AND THE K E Y R O L E OF 
PROFESSIONALISM AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 
Technical knowledge (or, in other words, knowledge of the characteristics 
of materials, the laws of cause and effect, principles of technical design and 
of process control) is in its very nature tied to application. This is the 
essential difference between technical knowledge and scientific 
knowledge, which, at least in principle, is the product of 'pure' findings 
based on scientific criteria of 'truth' and 'substantiation'. Of course, tech-
nical knowledge is closely connected to the findings of science out of which 
it derives its laws. However, the quality of technical knowledge is not 
merely determined, perhaps not even primarily determined, by how 'true' 
(in an intrinsically scientific sense) the theory is or how 'substantiated' (i.e. 
in strict accordance with the rules of scientific proof) the derivation of 
concrete principles based on the theory is. The quality of technical 
knowledge is far more determined by its applicability, its instrumental 
value for rational action and its ability to contribute towards the solution of 
practical problems. 
The fact that technical knowledge is oriented to application means that 
its cognitive substance cannot only be reduced to the application of scien-
tific principles. Technical knowledge always involves knowledge of the 
field in which an application is to take place, especially when the field has 
not been completely defined in scientific terms. And generally speaking, 
the essence of what can be called technical competence lies in the knowl-
edge of a field, in which there is familiarity with the concrete material 
substance specific to that field and the ability to act in an appropriate way 
even in cases of uncertainty. 
An industrial society cannot simply assume that the knowledge and 
competence it needs in a concrete constellation of applications will be at its 
disposal in order for selected solutions to correspond to 'state of the art' 
technology. The ways and means that a society (or its industry) adopts to 
deal with the task of reproducing technical competence can be described as 
the 'social structuring' of technical knowledge and competence. The his-
torical-empirical (and conceivable) forms can be placed along a continuum; 
at one extreme, the availability of technical competence is insured only 
through incorporation in the person of an individual worker, at the other, 
only through collective organization, that is, independent of the knowledge 
of any one particular person. 
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The greater the significance that is attached to the principle of personal 
incorporation of technical knowledge, the more a principle of structuring 
and ordering applies that can be described as 'professional'; the social 
structuring of technical knowledge becomes identical to the internal 
structure and organization of technical personnel in professions, and the 
way in which the social reproduction of technical personnel gets carried out 
becomes more important. On the other hand, the more that collective 
organization takes over the provision of technical knowledge, the more 
different structural moments and ordering principles of technical 
knowledge and competence come to the fore. These are almost completely 
independent of the social structure of technical personnel and its models of 
social reproduction. At this end of the continuum, since companies or 
enterprises are the primary means of organizing the application of tech-
nology in industrial society, rather than individually embodied know-how, 
such structural moments and ordering principles are determined by the 
enterprise and bear its imprint, as expressed by technical 'company culture' 
and 'style', or year-long prepared and revised internal handbooks, archives, 
data banks and collections of rules. 
The ordering principle of professionalism divides technical personnel 
and their specific fields of competence into professions with clearly 
demarcated areas of responsibility. The more this principle is applied, the 
more clearly demarcated these areas become, with worker identity being 
primarily, if not exclusively, derived from the profession involved. This 
structuring of technical personnel according to profession also determines 
how technical knowledge gets structured. In other words, the areas of 
responsibility of technical occupations define (or a decision is pushed out 
of them on how to define) the way in which technical knowledge is 
clustered, i.e. which of the many diverse areas of technical knowledge 
belong together and which do not. The rules of the art which determine the 
applications of technology and technical competence are formulated, 
conveyed and, where necessary, enforced at the level of the professions. 
The norms which establish what is 'do-able' at the current state of the art, 
what can be risked and which problems are to be seen as priorities are set 
within the framework of the professions, or at least in close connection with 
them. 
Furthermore, when the social structuring of technical knowledge is 
strongly characterized by the principle of professionalism, the 'cutting up' 
of technical knowledge and technical capability into professions forms the 
framework within which the acquisition of technical knowledge as an 
individual process of training and qualification takes place; the professions 
lay down the goals that the training process is supposed to conform to, they 
define the career expectations that can be achieved on the basis of certain 
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qualifications and which often form the main motivation for acquiring 
technical knowledge, even in difficult and unsure circumstances. 
In view of this situation, it is evident that fundamental changes in the 
prevailing models of the social reproduction of technical personnel cannot 
avoid having grave consequences for the social structuring of technical 
knowledge and competence. 
Historically, technical professions chiefly developed under the 
dominance of occupation-centred models. The way they are divided up 
reflects the focus of the practical application of technology that developed 
over decades of industrial development, and which correspondingly dis-
plays great affinity to the division of industry into branches. The creation 
and demarcation of professions was primarily determined by the principle 
of gathering together as many tasks and problems that could arise as 
possible with the most important means of solving them into what then 
could be considered the competence of a profession. For these reasons, it 
has always been the convention (and still is in cases where occupation-
centred models predominate) to keep the structure of professions of 
technical personnel identical to, or at least compatible with, the structure of 
industrial trades. (At the same time, this is one of the central factors which 
enables skilled workers to advance into the realms of technical personnel in 
greater numbers and is also a prerequisite for the communication of new 
experience and knowledge between the two groups of workers.) 
The more school-centred models predominate in an industrial nation, the 
more two factors emerge which endanger the practical and material basis of 
technical knowledge structured by profession, thus calling into question the 
provision of what long seemed to be available as a matter of course, 
namely, technical competence. This is a process that does not take place 
immediately, but can take up to a generation - the length of time that 
teachers and trainers who have themselves followed the occupation-centred 
path continue to teach. 
One factor derives from the particular logic of classroom training. It lies 
in the nature of the school-based acquisition of knowledge that it is 
generally achieved by going through a set course of study and material 
which draws its effectiveness from being systematic and its legitimacy 
mainly from its inner cohesion: in other words, by the fact that it is solidly 
anchored in the established sciences. The total system of tasks, problems 
and rules that make up problem solving, define an occupation's scope and 
determine its content, are, seen from a scientific perspective, completely 
heterogeneous and unstructured and thus are not taken seriously. 
In this connection, the ability to deal with uncertainty starts to play a key 
role. Dealing with uncertainty involves coming to terms with only partially 
defined (and at the current state of science, only partially definable) facts 
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and unpredictable events, which have to be coped with immediately and 
adequately, generally under time pressure. While dealing with uncertainty 
is almost a daily occurrence in industrial life, where it doubdessly provides 
excellent possibilities of learning to cope with such situations, it can only 
be presented in carefully given doses in schools, in the form of fully 
prepared simulations developed by the teacher and course of study. In this 
way, it cannot possibly take on the form of a real-life, ongoing situation that 
involves stress, but also the opportunity to rise to challenges. 
Since school-centred models of acquiring competence prevail in the 
social reproduction of technical personnel, considerable pressure arises to 
reorganize technical knowledge in accordance with the logic of scholastic 
education standards, which tend to be based on a scientific and systematic 
approach. This pressure can only be counteracted through the use of con-
siderable social and economic resources, as in the case of the German 
university clinics, where medical training is complemented with practical 
experience. 
This pressure to increase the scientific aspect of technical competence 
conveyed in school gets intensified to the extent that the ability to think 
abstractly and grasp abstractions has a central significance as a means of 
academic selection and criteria for academic success. And, as is the case in 
practically all 'modern' societies, school education takes over a key role in 
the allocation of social chances, thus making the educational system the 
potentially most important aspect of social control and selection. 
From the perspective of the application of technical knowledge in 
society, the pressure for changes in the way knowledge and competence is 
acquired engenders a two-sided risk if it is not neutralized by strong 
counter-forces. The first can be described as the risk of de-materialization 
of technical competence and the second as the de-professionalization of 
technical knowledge. 
The de-materialization of technical competence can be understood as the 
absence, or the reduced capability of technical personnel (or, to put it more 
precisely, the upcoming cohorts of technical personnel), to combine the 
application of scientific principles and laws with pragmatic rules in their 
dealings with the nature of material in their work and in adequately 
handling uncertainty. In this way, an important dimension which previously 
determined the difference between technical and scientific knowledge is 
lost. This dimension consists of the concrete and action-oriented relation-
ship to any given part of the material world of technical products and 
processes; it is a dimension that, due to its complexity, cannot be fully 
understood in scientific and analytical terms and which forms the central 
criterion of technical competence, thanks to the supra-individual (that is in 
occupations) mastery of accumulated knowledge through experience. 
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This is closely connected with a process that can be best described as the 
de-professionalization of technical knowledge. The more that technical 
competence, or, to put it more concretely, the people who incorporate 
technical competence, is withdrawn from the concrete reality of a certain 
field of activity and is confined to mastering the general scientific foun-
dations of technology instead, the more the professional structure of tech-
nical knowledge (which was centred on unique material conditions of a 
specific field of activity) will lose its character and its legitimacy. The 
functional foundation of the professions also disappears with the loss of 
competence and knowledge tied to the professions, not to mention the 
institutions and organizations based on professional status, such as the 
professional labour market, career paths that are specific to certain pro-
fessions, behaviour standards and principles of action linked to professions, 
and finally the relationship between technical training carried out in 
schools and practical work experience in the chosen profession. 
CLOSING THOUGHTS: COMPUTER SCIENCE AS A NEW AND 
UNIVERSAL F O R M OF DE-MATERIALIZATION? 
To the extent that it is possible to compensate deficiencies in personal 
training with the collective organization of technical knowledge and com-
petence, it is possible for the de-materialization of technical competence 
and the de-professionalization of technical knowledge to take place in an 
industrial society for a long period without causing serious consequences. 
For example, the formation of highly structured 'internal' models of 
mobility in large companies, based on the acquisition of skills, enables 
technicians and engineers who were exclusively trained in schools to learn 
a good deal of the knowledge and competence once brought by the tech-
nical personnel with industrial-based practical training who were 
promoted. It is also possible, although at the cost of much effort (Taylor 
was the first to tread this path), to formulate tacit knowledge, which is a 
major prerequisite for dealing with unexpected situations adequately, into 
formalized rules. In this way bureaucratically fixed and controlled routines 
more or less replace what, in the framework of professional competence, is 
achieved through the everyday dealings with materials. 
This results, of course, in technical knowledge and competence 
becoming more and more company-specific (to borrow a term from the 
theory of segmented labour markets). And indeed, only large companies 
which manage to steadily innovate their products and/or processes or, 
thanks to their superior market position, are able to pass on the very high 
costs involved in generating and keeping in reserve immediately utilizable 
technical knowledge are in the position to have technical competence at 
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their disposal under this system; competence which is freely available when 
technical knowledge is structured by profession into special skilled labour 
markets and professionalized communication. 
For this reason, an economy can only implement such alternatives to 
occupation-centred models of attaining technical competence, without en-
tailing massive disadvantages and loss of welfare, under very particular 
conditions over the long term. These conditions mainly consist of the 
dominance (and efficiency) of large stable enterprises, technology 
development which is based on well-known 'basic innovations' in which 
applications are only extended and improved in small steps, and the 
existence of sales markets for technical goods which neither force the 
companies to introduce product innovation at too fast a rate nor to imple-
ment improvements in the ratio of quality to price too quickly. 
Historically, these conditions existed in an almost ideal constellation in 
Europe in the post-war decades and in America since the 1920s (referred to 
as the 'Tayloristic syndrome' in chapter 3). This fully explains why many 
industrial nations did not seriously resist the decline of their craft culture 
and the rise of school-centred models for training technical personnel, and 
in some cases even speeded up the process. 
Of course, since the mid-1970s with the erosion of the 'Tayloristic 
syndrome', totally new conditions and requirements have appeared on the 
scene. For example, structural changes in the economy have made it 
necessary for companies to adopt more flexible forms of organization, and 
technical development has been influenced by the introduction of new 
technologies and/or turbulent conditions on the sales markets; moreover, 
new forms of competition have arisen on these very sales markets, and 
consumer behaviour has become more and more influenced by rapid 
changes in fashion. This has put economies that have adopted the school-
centred model of the social reproduction of technical personnel and the 
social structuring of technical knowledge in danger of taking a back seat in 
development. 
There are various strategies that a nation, its political and administrative 
system and its industry can employ in order to react to a situation in which 
it will become increasingly difficult to keep the required technical know-
ledge at its disposal to an adequate extent and level of quality (whether for 
economic, social or military reasons, etc.). Of course, almost all con-
ceivable strategies entail serious disadvantages and weaknesses in that they 
either take a long time to become effective or necessitate mammoth public 
investment or would doubtlessly awaken massive resistance on the part of 
powerful lobbies. 
In view of these circumstances, it would be somewhat surprising if a 
strategy that claims to have a solution to the problem of deficiencies in 
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competence were not met with great interest. This is even more the case 
when it involves the (expensive) installation of technical systems and does 
not entail conflict-laden and potentially risky changes to the structure of 
work and training. This strategy consists of the massive implementation of 
computers, programming and computer-aided information, control and 
communication systems; in other words, it is based on a totally 'new 
technology' that can indeed lay claim to function with considerable 
efficiency. 
For example, technically, design offices are now able, using finite 
element methods, to calculate the characteristics of complex structures and 
functional relationships with the help of high-performance computers. This 
task would have required practical applications or labourious tests in earlier 
times. In some cases, the application of computer-aided control systems has 
also enabled a degree of production automation that could not have been 
achieved in an economical manner with the usual control systems. 
However, two potential aspects of these 'new forms of technology' that 
are not technical in nature, but social in the broadest sense of the word, are 
of significance for the subject of this paper: the potential or ability of these 
'new forms of technology' to generate a new form of de-materialized 
practice and a new form of professionalism. 
For example, the foundations of computer science and the execution of 
practical tasks with the help of computers and computer-aided systems can 
be integrated into the school-centred models of training and further training 
with little problem. The necessary purchases are not exorbitant and students 
and trainees seem to enjoy carrying out practical work of all kinds on 
computers more than can be claimed for the other techniques and technical 
systems that educators have tried to incorporate into school courses. 
In this way, a new professionalism that is centred on computer capability 
has developed surprisingly quickly (independent of the highly hetero-
geneous ways that people entered the field). This new professionalism 
incorporates a competence in individual persons that is always ready for 
application, with increasingly clear standards for describing and evaluating 
this competence, a strong professional profile, and ever improving special-
ized labour markets. This is all the more remarkable because originally, 
computer competence could only be acquired in a form that was over-
whelmingly company-specific (primarily at IBM). 
Thus, while on the one hand, the customary content of technical 
knowledge is undergoing a growing tendency toward de-materialization 
and de-professionalization due to the increase in school training of 
technical personnel, a diametric process seems to be taking place in the 
field of computer development and application. A very specific and 
structured form of work has apparently developed in connection with 
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working at or with a computer that possesses considerable potential for 
socialization and qualification; it can hold its own in the structures and 
processes of scholastic selection and education hierarchies. It attracts 
particularly strong student performers and is proving to be a field in which 
a new form of professional competence can be acquired, with a broad range 
of applications and high prestige. 
In this way, computer science forms the basis of a new form of compe-
tence that can be adapted to individual professions or used in a universal 
sense for all forms of technology. Moreover, it can be generated in the 
education system at a relatively low price and be made available in great 
quantities on the labour market, especially in view of the fact that previous 
forms of technical competence structured according to profession have lost 
ground due to the destruction of traditional forms of skilled industrial 
labour and the rise of school-centred models of reproducing technical 
personnel. 
The critical question is then whether the French computer-based strategy 
of industrial modernization has any chance of success; whether this new 
form of computer-based technical competence can indeed incorporate the 
traditional content of technical knowledge (much more restricted to con-
crete applications) and thereby replace traditional forms of technical 
competence. The question is not, however, whether computer science will 
be adopted as a new, professionally structured field of study to complement 
traditional disciplines of engineering science (which are less threatened by 
the lack of practical experience in the school-centred reproduction of their 
personnel). Far more significant in this connection is whether this new form 
of technical competence can lay claim to the status of a 'meta-technology'. 
Although it does not have any systematic relationship to specific appli-
cations, this technical competence has a totality of universal solutions 
which could piece by piece appropriate the tasks that in the history of 
industrialization were found in exclusive areas of responsibility of specific 
fields and were oriented to limited applications and techniques. 
Only if this claim stands on a solid foundation can an economy hope to 
master the new challenges accompanying the downfall of the 'Tayloristic 
syndrome' by defining all technical problems that arise or become more 
acute as tasks that fall under the competence of computer scientists and 
whose solution is a matter for computer applications and computer-aided 
systems. Indeed, it is only if this is the case that it would be legitimate for 
an industrial nation to entrust its industrial future to a single strategy in the 
face of current (or threatening) deficits in conventional kinds of pro-
fessionally structured technical competence while renouncing the explor-
ation and implementation of other strategies which, admittedly, would be 
more conflict-laden, labourious and time-consuming. 
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Doubt about the advisability of such a course is surely appropriate, for 
since their development in the late 1940s and during the 1950s, computer 
science and computer applications have always been connected with far-
reaching promises and expectations (and fears) which have proved to be 
unrealistic in retrospect. Very little seems to indicate a fundamental change 
in this situation. 
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19 New Production Structures ä 
l'ltaliano? Similarities and 
Differences in the West German 
and Italian Steel Industries1 
Ingrid Drexel 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with structural changes which production work in the 
German and Italian steel industries has undergone due to rationalization 
and societal change. Though the impulses for change as well as starting 
conditions in both industries were quite similar, the resulting changes were 
very different: in the German steel industry new problems were defined 
mainly as skill problems and solved as such; in the Italian steel industry it 
was mainly wage structures, internal mobility patterns and work organ-
ization that were first criticized and then changed. In contrast to these 
apparent concrete differences, on a more abstract level, the same mechan-
isms oriented towards a broader utilization of individual as well as collec-
tive labour resources can be identified: mobilization and development of 
skill reserves, motivation and flexibility, etc. Based on these findings, some 
more general conclusions and questions are presented regarding new struc-
tures of production work, their theoretical conceptualization, their 
ambiguous consequences for workers' interests and the significance of 
political factors for particular outcomes. 
THE SUBJECT OF THIS CHAPTER 
Several recent studies have noted a trend toward a new type of labour 
utilization especially in the production areas of large-scale enterprises. The 
contention is that the traditional Taylorist, restrictive use of labour, char-
acterized by narrowly defined tasks, the separation of decision-making 
functions from actual production and low requirements in qualification is 
being increasingly substituted by one that draws more on the workers' 
performance potential. 
Various concepts have been brought forward to describe this develop-
ment which - in reality as well as in theory - is becoming increasingly 
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noticeable, and to place it in a broader perspective. Some of the earlier 
concepts in this connection were: 'rationalization based on worker's skills' 
(Asendorf-Krings 1979, 1979a); 'new strategy of raising profitability' 
(Drexel 1980); 'new performance policies in enterprises' (Altmann et al. 
1982); 'labour policy strategies for the structuring of work and the mobili-
zation of labour' (Dohse et al. 1984a), etc. 
The discussion today, however, is dominated by the Kern-Schumann 
approach (Kern, Schumann 1984a, 1985) which interprets the observed 
trends as new production concepts in the enterprise and predicts, partic-
ularly in prospering industrial sectors, an auspicious future. Other authors, 
however, dispute the validity of an interpretation of the new developments 
with such far-reaching implications (for example Dull 1985a). In short, 
West German industrial sociology is entering a debate on the extent and 
future of new forms of labour utilization and toward this end faces the task 
of developing theories to interpret the new phenomena occurring in 
industrial production. 
This study is meant to contribute some thoughts to this discussion. It is 
a comparative analysis of changes which have occurred in the West 
German and Italian steel industries since the 1950s and 1960s - a time when 
their situations were largely similar.2 
There are several respects in which an analysis of the changes in pro-
duction work in the steel industry in a two-country comparison is relevant 
in the context of the current debates. First, the processes of (at least partial) 
automation in the steel industry, and the large-scale rationalization pro-
cesses tied to them, occurred as far back as the 1960s. Thus, it can be seen 
as an early case of the implementation of non-Taylorist rationalization 
strategies. Secondly, a comparison of the structural changes in West 
German and Italian steel production can provide a new perspective on 
questions dealing with 'new production concepts'. By highlighting 
nationally specific and distinctive forms of structural change in one 
industrial branch, it is possible to overcome the limitations of an outlook 
fixated on the well-known conditions in one's own society. Both - the 
comparison over time and between nations - can contribute to a clearer 
picture of the general characteristics and connections contained in emer-
ging trends in development and can raise new questions. 
The following theses give an overview of the detailed results presented 
below: 
1 The core of new forms of labour utilization is not primarily the product 
of 'management science' or 'foresightful rationalization concepts' 
(Kern, Schumann 1984a, 1985). Mainly, they are the product of the 
erosion of traditional forms of labour utilization which were part of the 
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rationalization process of the past; an erosion induced by multi-
dimensional rationalization processes and by societal changes. The logic 
behind the erosion process seems to make its impact independentiy of 
comprehensive 'concepts' although its influence may be felt within and 
across such 'concepts'. 
2 The structural changes examined originated in different areas - skills 
and qualifying processes in the West German, work organization and 
wage policy in the Italian steel industry - and then proceeded to con-
tinuously force the other areas to adapt. 
3 At a somewhat more abstract level, it appears that the solutions developed 
in both steel industries lead back to a shared structural core. In other 
words, with certain exceptions, many aspects of change examined in both 
industries display far-reaching structural parallels. They can be analyzed 
as constituents of a new structural type of production work. 
4 For a part of the work-force, clear improvements in the conditions for 
the 'reproduction of labour' (its development, maintenance, and re-
generation) appear to be more or less necessarily tied to the new type of 
production work. However, this potential for improvement in the 
reproduction of labour created by the erosion of the traditional type of 
production work is never utilized fully. This indicates the irrevocable 
contradiction in enterprise interests with respect to the accumulation of 
capital and development of labour which tends systematically to limit 
the new developments in production work. 
5 Political factors also play a role in determining the extent to which the 
potential of the new type of production work is used in particular cases 
and where restrictions are applied: the definition of the specific focus of 
the problem, the actors who have the initiative in the change process and 
their general and comprehensive interests and strategies are of great 
importance. 
The following sections will begin with a description of changes in West 
German and Italian steel production. In order to present a total picture of 
the structural change in production work, and at the same time, to analyze 
the differences in the two cases, a condensed presentation which con-
centrates on structural relationships will be given. After the case studies, a 
comparative analysis of the structural differences and similarities of the 
changes follows. Finally, some theoretical and political inferences from the 
findings are laid out, which are presented more as questions than 
conclusions. This attempt to derive some general inferences is done to 
make the results of the analysis referable to and useful for the discussion on 
'new production concepts' outlined above, even if an explicit response 
based on the results is not possible here. 
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THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL TYPES OF PRODUCTION 
WORK IN T H E STEEL INDUSTRY 
The structural changes in qualification, work organization and wage policy, 
which have occurred in the West German and Italian steel industries over 
the last 10 to 15 years, are the result of a process that had already begun at 
least 10 years earlier and which is not yet finished today. It is a process in 
which traditional production work, and the qualifying processes that went 
along with it, were becoming increasingly deficient. As a result, various 
attempts at solutions were made, shaped by the erosion process of the old 
system and new problems generated by this process, but also by existing 
possibilities and restrictions. 
The following section discusses the increasingly deficient character of 
traditional types of production work. The starting point is the erosion of the 
classical system of qualification and training, and its relationship to the 
most important corresponding changes in work organization, work assign-
ment and wage policy. 
The traditional system of qualification and training and its most 
important functional requirements 
Since the beginning of this century, production enterprises of the North 
American and the important European steel industries have developed and 
gradually solidified very similar patterns of skill structures (and the work 
organization and division of labour tied to them) on the one hand, and 
processes of qualifying (based on work assignment, on-the-job-training, 
and internal company mobility in vertical mobility chains) on the other (ISF 
1966,1968; Stone 1975). They were characterized by: 
1 a strongly differentiated and hierarchical 'qualification pyramid': on a 
base of totally unskilled workers, several pyramids stand next to one 
another which are grouped around a particular production area (such as 
a blast furnace or a milling area), each with a number of different job 
grades; and 
2 a process which is based on learning on-the-job and chances to move up 
the hierarchy: qualifications, in part very high level ones, that are mainly 
acquired through years of 'learning by doing' through gradual move-
ment up the hierarchy to increasingly challenging workplaces in the 
same production area (for example, fourth, third, second foundry worker 
and head foundry worker); it was a qualifying process in which courses 
were the exception rather than the rule. 
These models of qualification structure and training process are closely 
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inter-related; they represent an integrated system. In practice, these 
structures were highly functional for the steel enterprise, in terms of a 
flexible acquisition of necessary skills, as well as for other personnel policy 
goals such as securing the willingness to perform and loyalty to the firm 
(Drexel 1980,1982). 
This system had some very basic functional prerequisites in enterprise 
structures as well as in the larger societal setting: 
1 work tasks which made it possible to acquire skills and experience in 
daily working conditions; 
2 a long-term continuous assignment of workers to the same production 
area which enabled the accumulation, a regulated structuring, and a 
generalization of experience; 
3 close cooperation in work groups hierarchically structured by task and 
skill, which allowed collegial responsibility for training of new workers 
and making necessary corrections in their trial runs; 
4 a relatively labour-intensive production style which made it possible to 
take the time and energy for such cooperative training processes as part 
of the job; 
5 a hierarchically structured pyramid of job tasks, wide at the base, 
stretching to a point, and a similarly hierarchical, highly graded wage 
pyramid, which incorporated wage incentives for frequent work-station 
changes and the therefore necessary acquisition of additional qualifi-
cations tied to them; 
6 rigid rules of intra-company vertical mobility (that is the promotion to 
work-stations with better conditions, better pay and higher job security) 
based on the criteria of seniority and 'doing a good job'; these rules 
acted as incentives for the workers to stay in one company and to 
achieve a high level of performance; 
7 a labour market situation which made it possible for the companies to 
recruit a large number of workers who were capable of actively and 
independently acquiring the necessary qualifications, and then choosing 
the best among them; and 
8 the worker's objectively and subjectively weak position in relation to the 
company which assured their acceptance of strenuous working con-
ditions, health dangers, and a certain job insecurity typically existing in 
steel production. 
These functional prerequisites for the system of developing and using 
labour, analytically separated for purposes of clarity, were naturally 
extremely inter-connected in a large number of ways in actual practice. 
Thus they partially balanced each other out; for example, cooperative 
workplace conditions that created good opportunities for learning through 
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observation, could compensate to a certain extent for possible deficits in the 
qualification potential of recruitable labour and vice versa. 
The erosion of traditional types of production work in the West 
German steel industry 
At about the beginning of the 1960s, the existing system, as described 
above, was continuously, and finally irreparably, destabilized due to the 
fact that many of the functional prerequisites in the company and in society 
began to fall apart or to disappear altogether. This was due, in part, to a 
multidimensional rationalization process, but also to certain societal trans-
formations. 
. . . As a consequence of multidimensional rationalization processes 
If one takes an overview of the most important qualitative changes that 
have taken place in the West German steel industry over the last 20 to 30 
years, it will become clear that these were part of a, not yet completed, push 
to raise profitability. 
Several aspects of this rationalization process have undermined the 
functional conditions in the company necessary for the ongoing use of 
traditional forms of labour development and capital accumulation. The 
most important are outlined here. 
Diverse, often large-scale and abrupt restructurings of production ap-
paratus and the accompanying labour transfers impede the practice of 
long-term assignment of workers to the same production area and thus 
erode the preconditions for gradual accumulation and generalization of 
experience and knowledge. This makes the procurement of high-level skills 
from experience impossible. In the wake of frequent transfer of workers to 
different production areas, skill structures oriented to particular production 
areas become problematic: when workers are transferred to different areas 
of the plant, they cannot enter at their current grade, but must start training 
again 'from scratch'. This situation and the accompanying loss of income, 
stirs up considerable conflict from the more qualified workers and lower 
level supervisors and therefore, often creates problems for the company. 
The high degree of differentiation makes it difficult for management to 
keep track of the qualification potential available in the enterprise and 
consequently to place the right people in the right job. 
Increasing mechanization and automation makes learning only through 
experience inadequate: growing complexity, integration of processes and 
lack of visibility of production processes makes it difficult, or even im-
possible, to learn by observing; at the same time, theoretical knowledge 
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becomes necessary which principally cannot be acquired through ex-
perience. 
The reduction of the number of job grades threatens the traditional 
step-by-step process of acquiring higher qualifications through upward 
mobility: the distances between die remaining job grades get larger, and 
that makes the transition from one grade to the next harder. The transition 
can no longer be achieved as quickly and with so much certainty ex-
clusively through individual efforts of learning through experience with 
support from colleagues. 
The reduction in the density of the work-force in particular job grades 
and the resultant work intensification changes the conditions of learning in 
the cooperative work group. The growing strain on all workers engaged in 
production tasks has the consequence that there is less time and energy 
available to help qualify new workers through explanation and correction 
of their work. Also, errors, which always occur in first attempts by inex-
perienced new workers, are less tolerated as capital intensive production 
makes breakdowns and repair more and more expensive. 
. . . As a consequence of societal transformation 
It was not only changes within the company, but also in the society that 
contributed to the erosion of traditional forms of labour development and 
the extension of labour utilization. 
There was a considerable decline in the supply of labour available for 
the West German steel companies through the middle of the 1970s in both 
quantity and quality. The overall economic expansion, and thus the intensi-
fied demand for labour in more attractive industrial branches, demographic 
developments, and increasing participation in higher education diminished 
the size of the available new labour pool. In particular, the traditional 
recruiting reservoir for production enterprises, consisting of young workers 
who had been trained in craft or small enterprises in professions such as 
butcher or baker in which they could not find jobs after the apprenticeship 
period, was reduced. Therefore, the steel industry increasingly had to 
recruit foreign workers with no previous occupational training. These 
newly recruited workers had greater problems obtaining skills in the course 
of the work process through their own initiative, which also limited op-
portunities for company selection. 
The social problems arising from typical working conditions in steel 
production (plant-specific, even production area-specific training; shift 
work; very strenuous working environment, etc.) increased rapidly and 
were also less and less accepted. Skill devaluation through transfer, wage 
losses, premature health problems and the consequent danger of losing 
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one's job, stirred up resistance on the part of the production workers and 
reduced the attractiveness of jobs in the steel companies on the labour 
market and therefore their recruiting chances considerably. 
The position of workers vis-a-vis the company, and the ability to push 
through their demands became stronger, due to the labour market situation 
as well as for political reasons. This limited the freedom of the company to 
decide how the social problems stemming from the various work and 
rationalization measures should be dealt with: the formerly common 
practice of pushing everything onto the workers' shoulders in the form of 
wage decreases and dismissals was becoming less and less possible. 
The erosion of the traditional type of production work in the Italian 
steel industry 
The picture yielded by a general examination of available analyses (in the 
form of case studies, see Michaeli et al.; Butera; Barisi; Villa), shows that 
the developments in Italy have considerable parallels to those in West 
Germany, with, however, some differences. 
First, the Italian steel industry also experienced pressure to raise profit-
ability, and companies, as in Germany, tried to achieve increased profit-
ability through a variety of measures. However, in Italy, the construction of 
new highly automated enterprises, and, in part, changes in the range and 
structure of existing enterprises and their automation processes, stood more 
strongly in the forefront than the reduction of personnel. 
The Italian steel industry, like the German, experienced a lasting trans-
formation in labour supply: one reason was the erosion of state-run systems 
of vocational training (which occurred in certain traditionally industrialized 
regions in which large numbers of students were favouring schools offering 
a more general, academic education); another reason was the limited reser-
voir of qualified workers trained in small industrial or craft firms in the 
unindustrialized regions of the new industrial sites in the South. Further-
more, it was caused by the changes in character traits demonstrated by the 
newly recruitable workers, who were considerably higher educated com-
pared to those in the past. 
Finally, partly as a consequence of these labour market developments, 
and partly independent of them, there were changes in the political power 
relations between company and labour in the Italian steel industry and in 
what workers were willing to accept. 
On top of these developments, which were more or less similar to those 
occurring in West Germany, came the effects of the 'job evaluation' intro-
duced in the Italian steel industry at the beginning of the 1950s; this wage 
system supporting Tayloristic work organization was apparendy much 
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more sweeping and damaging than in the German steel companies that used 
it. 
These developments resulted in serious problems: the worst problems 
are oudined below, gleaned from existing Italian case studies:3 
1 Of particular importance was the increasing difficulty of transferring 
workers to the necessary extent either up the hierarchy or across pro-
duction areas. This so-called 'rigidita' of labour derived from skill 
deficits, especially an insufficient range of knowledge. Another and 
perhaps greater reason was workers' resistance to transfer. In a period 
with a growing need to transfer workers, both presented a problem. 
2 The problem of quality in work performance increasingly made itself 
felt, a result of both skill deficits and motivation problems. 
3 The traditional hierarchy, especially lower- and middle-level managers, 
was increasingly questioned by higher level management as well as the 
unions. Central points of criticism were the technical incompetence of, 
in particular, the foremen icapi), the restriction of their functions to 
maintaining discipline and the increasing bureaucratization of company 
management. 
4 Working conditions and their negative effects were less and less 
accepted. This was expressed in high turnover rates of young workers, 
in growing criticism of health risks and in emphatic demands for 
changes in the organization of work. 
5 Workers in general showed a greater readiness to enter into conflict and 
had objectively and subjectively better chances to articulate and carry 
out their demands. This mainly political factor also intensified the 
'rigidity' of labour. 
Due to lack of information, it is not possible to estimate how widespread 
and characteristic these problems were in the Italian steel industry. How-
ever, the number and content of experiments initiated by the companies in 
the second half of the 1960s to improve work organization lead to the 
assumption that a sharp erosion of traditional production structures took 
place. It is especially apparent that the emphasis and type of criticism 
articulated from the end of the 1960s on by worker representatives and 
unions, and their demands for change, were a reaction to existing, broad-
based problems (even if they naturally intensified the situation at first). 
THE NEED FOR NEW SOLUTIONS 
The crisis of the traditional system exerted pressure on the enterprises by 
creating a multiplicity of problems, which tended to intensify each other. 
Change was inevitable. Attempts to deal with the situation by imple-
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meriting isolated 'small-scale' solutions proved inefficient. The necessity 
for a 'large-scale' solution increasingly made itself felt. The solutions 
which were conceptualized and, to a greater or lesser extent, put into 
practice are, at least at first sight, vasdy different. 
Solutions in the West German steel industry 
In West Germany, the principal method used to solve the problems was the 
creation of a new vocational training scheme. New systems of training 
leading to new qualifications gradually brought about changes in the 
overall structure of qualifications, in the patterns of work assignment and 
in the wage structures. Some details are outlined below. 
For years, enterprises had experimented with 'small-scale' solutions 
offering courses for lower-level supervisors and top-level production 
workers, and introducing a certain formalization of the traditional 'learning 
by doing', and in some cases also job rotation. Since these experiments 
proved to be insufficient, a comprehensive solution was created: a new state 
regulated vocational training scheme was developed which, over a period 
of three years, led up to a specifically created craft occupation (namely that 
of Hüttenfacharbeiter, i.e. skilled steel worker) and which was 
standardized throughout the steel industry. The level of theoretical and 
practical knowledge imparted during the training process is quite high; it 
comprises the entire production process, i.e. iron production, steel 
production and milling. 
The introduction of the new Facharbeiter qualification level had an 
impact on the entire hierarchy of qualification within the enterprise, at 
levels both below and above it: it was not only the junior staff who went 
through the new type of training and benefited from it, but also some of the 
older workers who had been with the enterprise for years, and had been 
trained on their jobs. However, only a certain proportion of production 
workers received vocational training, given the ongoing need for unskilled 
labour. Besides, despite union opposition, numerous steel enterprises 
introduced the second class qualification of Hüttenwerker which is reached 
after only two years' training. Even below this level, enterprises recruited 
unskilled workers to be trained on the job. They gradually gain skills and 
rise slowly in the hierarchy, but in their careers could only reach the level 
of skilled worker {Facharbeiter). For those who wanted to work as lower 
level supervisors (assistant foreman or foremen [Meister]), vocational 
training as well as additional courses became compulsory. 
As a result of all of these changes, production workers within the 
enterprise tend to be polarized, with well-trained skilled workers on one 
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side and unskilled workers on the other. The career prospects of these two 
groups differ considerably. 
Solutions in the Italian steel industry 
The Italian steel industry implemented a number of far-reaching inno-
vations in wage structure, work assignment, the organization of work and 
- albeit with comparatively little emphasis - training. Over many years, 
steel enterprises tried to find solutions for their problems by experimenting 
with new forms in the organization of work. At a later stage, union demands 
for new forms of work organization, wages, and mobility were fulfiled to a 
certain extent, only to be subsequently modified in the interest of the 
employer. The adoption of a far-reaching innovation process triggered in 
large measure by union demands is especially valid with respect to the 
partly state-owned steel industry. Since most of the material that is 
available deals with this sector, the following section concentrates on this 
particular area.4 
The following transformations can be regarded as the most important 
elements of the Italian solution. The extent of their implementation differs 
greatly across enterprises, and since the beginning of the 1980s has been 
destabilized. 
In 1970, a common wage system for blue-collar and white-collar 
workers, the so-called inquadramento unico, went into effect. There was a 
reduction in the number of wage groups to a total of eight (five for 
blue-collar workers and three for white-collar workers), as opposed to the 
24 or more discrete levels contained in the former rates. This resulted in a 
considerable compression of the wage hierarchy. 
In 1972, a wage agreement containing new regulations concerning wage 
structures and promotion within the enterprise was concluded. Of these 
regulations, the following are relevant in the present context: the transition 
from the lowest to the second lowest level was to go into effect auto-
matically for all workers after one year's employment. Al l other transitions 
from one wage group to a higher one were to be regulated according to 
whether or not the jobs formed part of a 'professional family', i.e. a 
hierarchically structured job scale where the additional knowledge neces-
sary for a particular job is based on that necessary for the job immediately 
below it in the hierarchy (e.g. fourth, third, second, first smelter). If this was 
the case, the enterprise was obliged to create the opportunity for every 
worker to gain the skills necessary for the job immediately above his own 
in the hierarchy. The worker had to be in a position to do work which 
entailed tasks of the higher level job, and when he had proved his abilities, 
he had the right to advance to the higher wage group. In this manner, the 
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wage 'careers' in this area were clear to everyone and had a secure basis, 
whereas up to then they had been rather uncertain, depending as they did on 
contingencies in the enterprise and the decisions of lower-level supervisors. 
The fact that the acquisition of knowledge and training took the place of 
'loyalty' as a criterion for promotion gave the workers, as well as their 
representatives, who were in charge of supervising the fulfdment of the 
wage agreement, an influence over mobility within the enterprise. 
In cases where a job was not to be part of such a hierarchically structured 
'professional ladder', additional skills and rights to promotion could be 
attainable through vertical and horizontal rotation. An increase in wages 
could be achieved, if the worker was prepared to continue working on a job 
of higher value in spite of having completed a certain fixed number of 
rotation days; or, conversely, if he was prepared to go back to lower jobs 
even after having achieved a higher qualification, if the necessity arose. 
In cases without the possibility of such rotation, jobs could be enriched 
in order to create career opportunities. In areas where even this was im-
possible, as well as for particularly stressful jobs, it was agreed that every 
worker was entitled to move to another job within the enterprise at the end 
of a certain period. 
Training measures were to be offered in all cases either in addition to, or 
instead of, those described. Successful participants could, after a certain 
period, be entitled to advance to the next wage group. In addition, it was 
agreed that workers with reduced performance should no longer be down-
graded. Instead, the enterprise should cover their retraining costs. 
These career regulations and the common wage structure for blue- and 
white-collar workers resulted in a marked rise in the average wage and a 
drastic reduction in wage differentials.Within a short time a large number 
of workers were now in the higher wage groups, often above the wage 
group associated with their actual workplace. 
The new agreements however, did not bring about an increase in 
efficiency and productivity to the extent expected by the employers. They 
also did not generate the improvement in the organization of work and 
subsequent increase in the workers' professionalitd that the unions had 
hoped for: higher professional skills and consequently a greater use of 
worker discretion within the production process. The training measures 
agreed upon were put into practice to some extent; but when unemployment 
rose sharply, they were revoked very quickly in several cases. Later, even 
the equalization of the wage structure was counteracted by the employers 
through renewed differentiation strategies. 
The unions reacted to these developments with two new demands: 
firsdy, a new 'professional model', a type of job which was to incorporate 
the tasks of blue- and white-collar workers and allow blue-collar workers 
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access to wage group 6, for which they had previously been ineligible; 
secondly, the recognition, valuation and enhancement of the workers' 
collective professionalità, i.e. their collective ability to control the pro-
duction process and to cope with the problems of qualification and training 
by themselves. The concept of collective professionalità was becoming 
more and more central to the unions' aims; its given principles were to be 
made more explicit and recognized by the enterprise. 
At the same time, the concept was to be enlarged by a programme for a 
basic transformation of work organization towards unità operative: teams 
in charge of clearly defined stages in the production process and with a 
collective responsibility to other teams and to management. Although they 
would at first include workers with different skill levels, the unità operative 
was to be regarded as homogeneous and was to, in fact, gradually achieve 
this homogeneity. The concept of unità operative made changes in work 
organization a principal objective of the unions' demands: the division of 
production functions into individual tasks, which was the basis of the 
traditional type of work organization and its logic of individualization, was 
to be replaced by a new logic which was collective (although limited to the 
particular team). 
A new wage agreement concluded in 1978, and even more so the one 
concluded in 1981, achieved a breakthrough: a specification and extension 
in the implementation of these innovations. The unità operative should 
eventually become the general basis of work organization. Furthermore, an 
- albeit limited - number of professional profiles was defined which were 
accorded a claim to wage group 6 for blue-collar workers. The jobs rated as 
wage group 6 were, however, excluded from the unità operative. As a 
result, the possible job rotation, training and 'career' prospects for those 
who worked in the unità operative were significantly limited. Above all, 
the enterprise had the right to prescribe technical and economic goals to the 
unità operative which were not open to negotiation and/or modification 
after conflicts. 
CHANGES IN THE WEST G E R M A N AND ITALIAN STEEL 
INDUSTRIES - SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
To summarize: far-reaching changes have occurred in both the West 
German and Italian steel industries; some of them have been realized fully, 
while the course has merely been set for others. Their main impact has been 
felt in different areas (qualification and training in West Germany; work 
organization, work assignment and wage structures in Italy). For this 
reason, they seem to have very little in common. 
But, as has been suggested above, this is true only at a very superficial 
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level: at a somewhat more abstract level, if we trace the transformations to 
their core, the principal problem-solving mechanisms reveal surprisingly 
extensive similarities. We can identify the following six central problem 
solving strategies - elements, as it were, of the steel industry's 'new 
production concepts'. 
Common problem solving strategies 
1 The traditionally strong vertical and horizontal divisions of the pro-
duction process into a variety of individual tasks have been reduced, 
making broader skill profiles possible: In Italy this was done by uniting 
several functions in unità operative, with their trend towards a homoge-
neous qualification of all team members, while in the Federal Republic 
of Germany production tasks - albeit only the more demanding ones -
were united to form the 'professionalized' function of Hiitten-
facharbeiter. This horizontal and vertical 'de-differentiation' of the 
employees' (formal) skill structure abolishes the traditional limitations 
put on the individual worker's qualification and performance potential 
to some extent. Broader and more comprehensive potential than that 
regulated by the traditional division of labour has been released, 
mobilized, developed and utilized; or in some cases, where informal 
modifications of the formal division of labour had taken place before, 
these were now made explicit and given official recognition. Thus a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition has been created for a broader 
sphere of activity for the individual worker as well as for more flexibility 
in the utilization of all production workers. 
2 An attempt has been made, through better work content, i.e. broader, less 
monotonous tasks and more decision-making, to motivate workers to 
feel a greater identification with the goals of production and to accept 
responsibility for larger units of production. In the Italian steel industry 
this has been achieved through an expansion of functions in the unità 
operative', in the West German steel industry, through a concentration of 
the more interesting and responsible functions in the jobs for skilled 
workers (Facharbeiter). 
3 The acquisition of broader and higher skills has been encouraged by 
establishing a close and formalized connection between working on a 
variety of tasks within the production process, which increases the 
acquisition of skills, and 'better', i.e. faster moving and more secure, 
careers. In Italy, the new wage group structure, the accessibility of wage 
group 6 to workers, and the regulations concerning mobility within the 
enterprise provided by the wage agreements have encouraged workers to 
keep acquiring skills either by working on different jobs within the 
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enterprise or by attending courses. In the Federal Republic, the same 
effect has been achieved through the introduction of vocational training 
and the constitution of a professional profile with the status of 
Facharbeiter (skilled worker), whose career prospects are generally 
better and more certain than those of a semi-skilled worker, as well as by 
making the attendance of corresponding courses a condition for pro-
motion to group leader and foreman (Meister) positions. 
4 In both cases, a short- and medium-term mobilization of the workers' 
latent qualification and training potential in an upward direction has 
been effected: in Italy, this has been done through the mobility regu-
lations; in the Federal Republic through adult training, i.e. the chance for 
some of the semi-skilled workers to receive training. This allows, in both 
cases, the creation of qualification reserves, i.e. potential that is signifi-
cantly higher than the skills called for in the present job. Similarly, in 
both cases, this produces certain selection and marginalization tenden-
cies for the weaker workers (although in Italy cases where workers fail 
to rise in the hierarchy are supposed to be, after a certain time, in-
vestigated by workers' representatives who are designed to counter this 
effect). 
5 It is not only the workers' ability to work in various positions, but also 
their readiness to do so, that is encouraged through the connection 
between better jobs and wages and job flexibility: former 'rigidities' and 
obstacles to flexibility on the part of workers are reduced, in Italy, 
through a decrease in wage differentials (which creates an increased 
margin for transfers without consequences on wages), through the mo-
bility regulations, and through the possibility for workers to be grouped 
in wage group 6; in the Federal Republic this is effected through the 
broad-based vocational training which makes multiple tasks gratifying 
rather than strenuous. This allows a fuller utilization of a worker's 
potential within the enterprise in terms of quantity as well as a higher 
intensity of utilization in terms of quality. Yet, in both cases, it is the 
enterprise which determines the extent to which the potential created in 
this way is actually utilized. 
6 Production work is re-evaluated through broader work tasks, greater 
discretion ('responsibility') and varying job assignments as well as an 
improvement in wage and career opportunities, be it in the shape of 
mobility regulations and the opening up of wage group 6, or be it in the 
shape of the status and career of a Facharbeiter. This makes for an 
improvement in the acceptance of production work within the enterprise 
as well as in its attractiveness on the labour market. 
The common denominator of all the measures described is, then, a 
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reduction of the restriction of both the utilization and the development of 
the individual and collective labour force contained in the old Tayloristic 
system. 
Structural differences 
Apart from these parallels, there are two notable structural differences 
between the German and the Italian problem-solving strategies. 
Firsdy, in Italy, the improvements described tended to include all 
workers. In West Germany, on the contrary, only those workers who had 
received vocational training were included; the situation of the semi-skilled 
workers very likely even tended to deteriorate, as their career opportunities 
were cut short. Thus, at least in terms of career prospects, a polarization of 
the German production workers became probable. 
Secondly, in the solutions adapted by the German steel industry, there 
was nothing that corresponded to the recognition of the inherently col-
lective character of qualification as expressed in the concept of 
professionalità with its implication of shared control of the production 
process. The orientation of the formal work organization to this collective 
quality of work as expressed in the Italian work-form unità operative5 also 
does not exist in the German solution. Certain cases of group work, if 
anything, can be regarded as steps in this direction. 
SOME INFERENCES AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
A new structural type of production work? 
The major result of the present comparison is that in both steel industries 
widely differing transformation processes - promoted principally by dif-
ferent social forces - have led to the appearance of 'something new' which 
in its central mechanisms is remarkably similar to the developments con-
tained in 'new production concepts'. How is this 'something new' to be 
theoretically understood and categorized? 
It has been demonstrated that a shared characteristic of the analyzed 
transformations is a more thorough utilization of productive labour. It is 
important in connection with the debate referred to above that there is not 
merely a broader utilization of extant labour potential, but also a broader 
development and a mobilization of labour potential. In addition, it is not the 
individual worker's labour that is at stake, but that of workers' groups 
(either that of teams or the entire work-force in an enterprise). 
The comparison also shows that the processes of development, mobili-
zation and intensified utilization require and cause changes in all of the 
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dimensions of the enterprise's structure that have been analyzed here: 
transformations not only occur in the qualification structure, but also in the 
areas of work organization, work assignment patterns and wage structures. 
The analysis demonstrates a close connection between the concrete forms 
of these four dimensions: a necessary inner consistency and coherence 
between specific patterns of work organization, work assignment, qualifi-
cation and wages. 
If this observation can be generalized, one could assume the existence of 
a limited number of historical structural types of work. The recent develop-
ments could be read as the beginnings of a new historic type of production 
work. 
This term yields two distinct advantages compared with the term 'pro-
duction concepts': first, it stresses the clear qualitative difference between 
two types of production work at the level of their structure and their inner 
logic, instead of defining them in terms of external features and quantity 
(such as 'more qualification', 'higher productivity', and the like). Second, 
this term emphasizes the objective character of the development of the 
production process instead of linking it to its perception and planning by the 
enterprise's management. The term 'new production concepts' coined by 
Kern and Schumann which is ambiguous in this respect, conceals just this 
paramount difference between objective and subjective strategies of 
capital. 
If a historical typology of production work holds true, a question arises 
which is also of political significance: to what extent do the assumed 
imperatives of consistency and coherence determine the design of a given 
production process in detail? The question is not a new one: how large is 
the scope for shaping a given production process (Gestaltungsspielraum) 
or, in Kern and Schumann's words the 'spectrum' of the new possibilities 
for development? 
Á new unity of the conditions of production and reproduction at a 
higher level? 
The comparison between the two steel industries suggests that there are 
certain constraints for consistency between a specific type of production on 
the one hand, and the level and form of the reproduction of labour on the 
other. 
This becomes particularly obvious through a comparison of the se-
quences of transformation in the enterprises analysed: the West German 
steel industry tended to begin by transforming the production process, 
improving the qualification, wage and career prospects only at a later stage. 
In the Italian steel industry, by contrast, owing to political pressure exerted 
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by the workers and their organizations, the improvement of the workers' 
opportunities for advancement (wages and career prospects) came first. It 
was only then that the enterprises started trying to assume control of and 
utilize these improvements for bettering productivity. 
In both cases, however, the analysis has also shown that the conse-
quences of the new type of production work for the workers have been 
contradictory: first, the potential for an improvement of the production 
workers' working and living conditions inherent in the new solutions was 
not utilized fully. The enterprises have striven to limit this potential in 
different ways: in West Germany, the rise in qualification and the extension 
of decision-making responsibility connected with it, was limited to a small 
number of production workers while the others tended to lose out. In Italy, 
after a period of homogenization, some (few) elite workers were given 
significantly better opportunities than the other workers. Trends towards 
the equalization of the job and wage structure were counteracted by the 
creation of new formalized intermediate levels, such as the two years 
training for specialists (Werker instead of the three-year training for 
Huttenfacharbeiter in the Federal Republic) or new intermediate wage 
groups in Italy. The improvement of training conditions for production 
workers in long-term employment does not benefit all workers auto-
matically, but requires a high level of personal commitment, activity and 
staying power. In view of the difficult working conditions typical for the 
steel industry this necessarily leads to selection and marginalization. 
In addition to this, there are new risks for the workers. The possibility of 
utilizing labour more efficiently both quantitatively and qualitatively which 
results from better training and more flexibility, naturally leads to a 
reduction of the total number of workers in an enterprise. For those still 
employed, a more flexible utilization of their labour and higher 
responsibility for the production process can - apart from certain positive 
aspects - result in growing health problems, especially those related to 
stress. Where formalized qualification measures take the place of 
traditional means of promotion within an enterprise, this 'appropriation of 
training' by the enterprise takes the control of the training of junior staff out 
of the hands of the experienced workers. Thus, they also lose the 
opportunity of educating younger workers politically and integrating them 
into the plant's traditions and colleagual codes. In addition, an increase in 
the importance of the workers' personal initiative as far as training and 
careers are concerned tends to sharpen competition between young and old 
workers in favour of the former; the protection of older workers from 
competition from younger, stronger and better performing workers that the 
traditional seniority principle provided, has been lost (for other new risks, 
see chapter 13). 
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In view of contradictory tendencies of this kind, a possible connection 
between new forms and levels of production work on the one hand, and 
better reproduction conditions on the other, should not be overestimated. 
The one does not automatically follow from the other. 
There are also theoretical considerations forbidding an overestimation 
of 'necessarily' positive consequences for the workers. If under certain 
conditions, the enterprise is interested in utilizing the workers' productivity 
potential as broadly as possible, and is hence also interested in its develop-
ment, the opposite is true as well: In order to keep reproduction costs low 
and to secure power, the enterprise is also interested in preventing, or at 
least limiting, the development of labour. As a consequence, it will be 
interested only in a limited utilization of labour. 
This contradiction in the enterprise's interests is irreducible. Depending 
on the historically existing economic and political conditions, this con-
tradiction takes ever differing forms: different compromises between 
restriction and development. 
New structural types of production and reproduction can hence be analysed 
systematically as products of specific historical compromises between these 
two general principles. Only in this manner can the limits of potential improve-
ments in the reproduction of labour be viewed systematically, and only in this 
way can phenomena such as the implementation of such improvements and the 
enterprise's attempts to revoke them be explained. Finally, it is only in this way 
that forecasts can be made which, alongside the progressive aspects of the new 
production structures, systematically integrate counter-tendencies and the limi-
tations resulting from such tendencies. 
The significance of political factors 
The results of this comparison allow certain inferences and raise certain 
questions regarding the significance of political factors, especially 
regarding the 'social actors' who have the initiative in the change process 
and the area in which a discussion and solution of problems is held. 
It is clear that it was of considerable significance for the way structural 
changes were set up that new solutions to problems were defined, 
developed and propagated in the Italian steel industry primarily by workers 
and their organizations, while this was done primarily by company manage-
ment in the West German steel industry. 
What significance does the area in which complex problems are 
primarily discussed have for further developments? In the West German 
steel industry the solution centred on the area of qualification and training 
- with the introduction of formalized vocational training, while in Italy -
more or less as its functional equivalent - new rules of mobility (see pp. 
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298-302) were created. Does this fact lead to differing forms of a more 
extensive utilization of labour and to differences in the scope of the new 
trends? Questions such as these, which cannot be answered here, are of 
great significance for analyses of comparable processes. 
Qualification has acted in West German discussions as the proxy for 
other problem areas for a long time. To speak about qualification and 
training problems in Germany always implies criticism of unsatisfactory 
work content, limited decision-making opportunities, restricted job en-
hancement, absence of responsibility in job tasks, low wages, lack of job 
security, and bad chances on the labour market. But, which problems for 
work and living conditions have remained in the shadows through this 
extensive definition of the qualification problem, and what consequences 
does this have? In the light of new developments, should not the identifi-
cation of worker interests with better skills that has been taken for granted 
up to now, and the special weight given to skill as a way to evaluate change 
be re-examined? Isn't this the lesson of the trend toward an intensified use 
of the higher skills of fewer and fewer workers contained in the 'new 
production concepts'? 
If this is so, a shift in the accentuation on the significance of qualifi-
cation is necessary. Towards this purpose, a look at the solutions of the 
Italian unions and the role that qualifications play within them could be 
useful: the concept of collective professionalità stresses the workers' 
capacity for control. And next to their individual capabilities and their 
ability to cooperate, it stresses the capacity to cope with the organization of 
the production process collectively. As shown, the collective 
professionalità was concretized through the unità operative, which were 
defined as being homogeneous and were, through their own initiative, to 
produce a real homogeneity including all production workers. Skill require-
ments were defined in close connection to other demands in a way which 
not only hindered further differentiation through qualification, but also 
counteracted existing differentiation. Concrete demands for changes in 
company skill and wage structures were integrated into a broader political 
perspective, one which transcended the goal of securing the individual 
worker's immediate reproduction and aspired to worker solidarity and a 
defence against work-force fragmentation. 
These points lead us to a final conclusion to be inferred from the 
comparison of the two steel industries regarding the analysis of a new type 
of structure of production work which may be developing: Political 
culture, political consciousness, and political perspectives of the worker 
movement are also significant for whether, and in which forms, new trends 
for the expanded utilization of the productive power of labour come to be 
implemented. 
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Part VI 
Large and Small Firms 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
A
ltm
an
n/
K
öh
le
r/M
ei
l (
19
92
): 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
nd
 W
or
k 
in
 G
er
m
an
 In
du
st
ry
. 
U
R
N
: h
ttp
://
nb
n-
re
so
lv
in
g.
de
/u
rn
:n
bn
:d
e:
01
68
-s
so
ar
-1
00
36
6 
20 The Development and Structure of 
Small-Scale Firms1 
Stefanie Weimer 
A specific institutional framework has contributed to the fact that the small 
firm sector of the economy has been able to hold a comparably strong 
position in the Federal Republic of Germany. In fact, for several years a 
new expansion of this sector has been registered. The following chapter 
investigates the reasons for the increase in jobs in small-scale companies. It 
is demonstrated that although the ongoing industrial restructuring process 
provides new opportunities for small firms, there are certain structural 
developments which in the long run may contain disadvantages for employ-
ment and quality of work in this sector. 
INTRODUCTION 
In spite of all the forecasts voiced by those involved with theories con-
cerning the process of economic concentration, an economically vital and 
quantitatively significant small-firm sector has held its own in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, as the following data will underscore: in 1986 in the 
manufacturing industry sector, 69.9 per cent of all companies, that is a total 
of 23,500, had between 20 and 100 employees. These companies employed 
a total of 1.1 million persons, which amounts to 15 per cent of all persons 
working in the manufacturing industries sector. The number of small-scale 
companies in the manufacturing sector having fewer than 20 employees 
totaled 51,000 in 1987, amounting to 330,000 employees. Additionally, 
there is the craft sector2 which consists almost entirely of small-scale 
businesses and which employed nearly 3.5 million persons in 1986. These 
data give an impression of the significance of the small-scale company 
sector in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The following discussion concentrates on small firms in the manu-
facturing sector. However, it should be kept in mind that, as in other 
industrialized nations, certain parts of the service sector are mainly the 
domain of small firms in Germany. For instance, in the so-called 'other 
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services' category of the industrial classification system, that is all private 
services that do not fall under the categories sales, banks, insurance, trans-
port or communications, more than 90 per cent of the firms had fewer than 
20 employees in 1987. Approximately 3.2 million persons were employed 
in these firms in that year (see Tengler, Hennicke 1987; Deutsche 
Bundesbank 1988). 
There is no single dominant type of small firm which can be distin-
guished from large firms on the basis of certain characteristics - e.g. wage 
levels - and which would make it possible to speak of a dualistic business 
structure based on the size of the firm. In the Federal Republic, the spec-
trum of small-sized companies ranges from crafts and artisan businesses 
which - often with a high percentage of manual work - produce for a local 
market, to small industrial or crafts businesses using state-of-the-art, often 
capital-intensive manufacturing equipment for the production of highly 
specialized, innovative and quality products geared for both national and 
international markets. There are small-sized companies which are capable 
of offering their employees working conditions comparable to those of 
large-scale enterprises, in terms of job security, wages and social security 
benefits. Some even offer conditions superior to those in large-sized busi-
nesses with regards to the scope for taking independent action on the job 
and the level of skills maintained. However, there are also small-sized 
companies which have relatively low wages, unstable job conditions, and 
work burdens which are no longer found to such an extent in large-scale 
companies (see Weimer 1983). 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF S M A L L FIRMS 
What is the institutional framework which has contributed to the formation 
and stabilization of a strong small-scale company sector in the Federal 
Republic of Germany? 
First of all, it should be pointed out that there are few or no exceptions 
made for small-scale companies as far as important regulations in social 
legislation or the system of wage determination are concerned. Therefore 
small-scale companies were never allowed to operate in a protected sector 
of the economy. The employer contributions to social security have to be 
paid by all companies and remain the same regardless of company size. 
There are some specific exceptions related to company size with regard to 
dismissal provisions, regulations on work safety and co-participation rights 
of the representatives of employee interests, but these pertain mosdy to 
very small businesses with less than five, or with less than 20 employees. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, wage agreements in the different 
sectors are concluded centrally for regional wage zones. Within these wage 
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zones, which often cover a wide geographical area, the same contractual 
wage applies to all firms covered by the agreement. No allowances are 
made for the profitability of individual firms or for companies of different 
sizes. The fact that the wage differential that exists in the Federal Republic 
between large and small-scale companies is very small in international 
comparison, is a result of this centralized wage system. 
As paradoxical as this may sound, the situation which imposes higher 
costs on small businesses has contributed towards improving their com-
petitiveness in the long run: small-scale companies cannot sit back and 
enjoy a competitive advantage resulting from lower wage costs. In order to 
be able to compete, they have been forced to enhance their productivity to 
a level commensurate with that of large-sized companies - which means 
continuously modernizing manufacturing facilities, or seeking gaps in the 
market for quality products. In order for such competition strategies to be 
successful, small-sized companies must be able to draw on a source of 
skilled, adaptable and versatile workers. Qualified personnel of this kind 
can only be recruited by small companies from the external labour market, 
and they can only retain such employees by offering working conditions 
and a stable employment relationship which is comparable to the standards 
set by large-scale companies. 
Another important condition is the existence of a vocational training 
system in the Federal Republic - of the formal, off-the-job type - which is 
particularly well adapted to the needs of small-company manufacturing 
with a high level of skill and craftsmanship. The transmission of vocational 
skills while work is actually going on, which is a typical characteristic of 
training within large firms, is in many respects dysfunctional for small 
firms: it is too protracted, and the gradual acquisition of skills requires the 
division of labour to be much more developed than is the case in many 
small firms. An off-the-job vocational training system provides training 
with a standardized content, which is not firm-specific. Skilled workers 
trained in this way can be utilized with a high degree of efficiency in the 
manufacturing area within a short period of time. Since a large proportion 
of industrial training takes place in craft and small-scale firms, the small 
firm sector always was able to gain access to skilled workers, despite the 
migration of the skilled labour force from the craft and small-firm sector to 
the large industrial firms. 
A third factor responsible for the position held by the craft sector in the 
Federal Republic is the formation of strong collective organizations serving 
craft businesses. While these influential self-help and support organizations 
do have a central umbrella organization, they are structured so as to reach 
all the way down to local levels, where they encompass every single craft 
firm. The collective organization of the craft sector did not take place 
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without the aid of the state which created the essential preconditions for this 
development by authorizing compulsory membership and the transfer of 
state functions to the self-governing organisations in the craft sector. The 
tasks carried out by these organizations comprise the entire system of 
vocational training, trade inspection, further training, company consulting, 
as well as the activities of advisory committees and expert groups etc. 
On the basis of this organizational structure, further forms of collective 
self-help came into being. Thus individual craft and artisan business sectors 
can draw on the support of strong cooperative organizations, which were 
originally founded with the aim of securing more favourable conditions 
through collective buying. In the course of time these cooperatives have 
extended their area of involvement considerably. Today they are active in 
supporting and carrying out further training, company consulting and 
directing industry specific research institutions. 
THE QUANTITATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE S M A L L - F I R M 
SECTOR 
An increased number of employees have been registered in the small-firm 
sector in the past 15 years in the Federal Republic of Germany. According 
to an investigation carried out by the Federal Labour Office, there was an 
increase of 580,000 jobs in small-sized companies with fewer than 20 
employees during the years 1977-85 in all industrial branches, including 
crafts and services. During the same period of time, companies with 20-99 
employees reported an increase of 89,000 jobs, whereas companies with 
more than 500 employees dismissed 225,000 employees (Cramer 1987). 
The reasons for the increase in jobs in the small-scale company sector 
remain largely unclear. The structural change toward the service sector is 
one, but not the only cause, for the trend toward smaller company size since 
small firms are also appearing in branches of the manufacturing sector - in 
areas as diverse as machine-building, electrical engineering and precision 
mechanics, wood and plastics processing, the foundry industry and lock-
smithing trade, as well as in structural steel and light metal engineering and 
in the food processing industry. 
The small firm phenomena could be a result of the increased establish-
ment of newly founded firms. Empirical data show a continuous increase in 
the foundation of new firms registered in the Federal Republic since the 
mid-1970s (see Szyperski, Kirschbaum 1981; Clemens et al. 1986). The 
question, however, is what the relationship is between this development 
and the increased number of jobs in the small-firm sector. One point is that 
investigations have revealed a close connection between increases in new 
small businesses and the high rate of unemployment. Apparently an above-
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average share of the newly founded firms in the craft sector were set up by 
unemployed people (Weizel 1986). This means that at least part of the 
employment growth in the small firm sector due to the establishment of 
new small firms could be a temporary phenomenon. Another factor indi-
cating the unstable character of new small firms is that their increase is 
accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the number of insolvencies 
since the mortality rate of newly founded firms is high. Nevertheless, the 
number of new entrants has been exceeding the number of failures since the 
beginning of the 1980s. However, even given a positive gain in the number 
of new small firms, the overall job potential created by them is small; as 
empirical studies show (Weizel 1986), the majority of newly founded 
businesses were one-man firms. Only after the second or third year do 
newly founded firms, that have survived that long, exhibit modest effects 
on employment. It was in particular newly founded firms in the craft sector 
that raised their level of employment (including the founder) about 2.5 
times (Weizel 1986). 
The contribution of new firms to the process of modernization of the 
economy on the whole should also not be overestimated: the largest number 
of newly established firms was in the artisan and craft business sector, 
followed by the commercial business and service area. The industrial 
manufacturing branch accounted for a very small percentage, and the 
number of high-technology-based firms (HTBF) was also comparatively 
low. An assessment of the new entries to the Commercial Register in 1983 
revealed - based on a favourable estimation - that the percentage of HTBFs 
came to 3 per cent, amounting to 1030 HTBFs from all of the firms newly 
established in that year (Anglo-German Foundation 1988). 
Another explanation for the increasing number of jobs in small-scale 
companies is that the already existing small firms are able to expand their 
employment level because these businesses have been more successful in 
adapting to ongoing structural change: the change in the structure of 
demand towards individual, more highly differentiated products, the 
increased competition from imports of standardized mass-produced goods, 
and the technologically determined decrease in the importance of econo-
mies of scale. Al l of these factors have been favourable to small firms 
because they correspond to the small firms' specific advantages such as 
flexibility, creativity and closeness to markets and customers. 
However, there are other economic indicators which would contradict 
the adaptation to structural change thesis: during the same period of time in 
which the number of persons employed in the small-business sector 
increased, the process of economic concentration in the overall economy 
did not slacken. Large-scale enterprises were able to further boost their 
share of investments and turnover. Moreover, the latest investigations have 
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shown that the difference in profitability between large and small-scale 
businesses did not diminish between 1979 and 1985 (Irsch 1985). The in-
creased economic significance of the small-sized companies seems to have 
been limited to the production of goods and services without manifesting 
itself as increased financial power. It seems as if a process of reorganization 
in the overall economic division of labour between large and small-sized 
companies is taking place, which is partially responsible for the increase in 
employment in the small business sector. This process consists of large 
companies contracting out parts of their manufacturing functions to small 
firms and thus creating more jobs there while, however, retaining their 
economic influence (see chapters 4,16). 
SOME STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS WITHIN THE 
S M A L L - F I R M SECTOR 
Besides the quantitative expansion of the small firm sector, there are some 
qualitative trends which might lead to considerable structural changes and 
transformations in the near future. On the one hand, these trends are leading 
to an expansion of employment in small firms, but, on the other, constitute 
a threat to the conditions of that employment and are bound to have an 
effect on the quality of jobs in such firms. 
There are a considerable number of small companies within the Federal 
Republic which are manufacturing for a national as well as a local market 
and which are competing directly with large-scale companies in their 
respective product market. For this reason small companies are experi-
encing increasing pressure. Two examples of this are presented below. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany certain areas of food processing 
have traditionally been the domain of small craft businesses. As opposed to 
the practice in other industrial nations, the mass processing of meat pro-
ducts and breads and pastries has not been able to establish itself on a broad 
basis. Small-sized businesses have managed to hold their own in this sector 
with the help of a competitive strategy which is rooted in quality standards 
and a highly diversified and individual range of products. However, these 
traditional craft firms and small industrial companies with their largely 
regional markets have recently been experiencing increased competitive 
pressures exerted by large trading firms, discounters and shopping centres. 
These enterprises, operating on the national market, either have their own 
production facilities or cooperate with large manufacturing companies in 
the food processing sector. The result is that the number of companies and 
employees in the small company sector are dwindling, and a considerable 
process of concentration can be observed (see Mendius et al. 1987). 
The second example comes from the furniture industry, a branch which 
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is characterized by small and medium-sized companies in the Federal 
Republic, and which has been experiencing a severe structural crisis since 
the end of the 1970s. The causes for this lie in excess capacities, growing 
import pressures, and cost pressures exerted by retailers organized in large 
purchasing groups. This branch has also been profoundly affected by the 
change in demand for more diversified and individualized products which 
create problems of expanded product variety, shorter manufacturing cycles 
and smaller batch sizes. In the furniture industry in the Federal Republic, a 
drastic process of contraction is going on (between 1980 and 1986 there 
were 21 per cent fewer companies and 25 per cent fewer employees 
registered) which is accompanied by a process of concentration (see 
chapter 6). The number of small furniture manufacturers, who succeeded in 
establishing themselves in a market niche are few indeed. A large number 
of small furniture manufacturers unable to hold their own on the in-
creasingly complex final product market, are attempting to survive by 
becoming suppliers of semi-finished products. The component supplying 
market in the furniture industry is growing because many large manu-
facturers are trying to cope with the increased demands for flexibility and 
the increased cost pressure by contracting out a growing number of steps in 
the assembly process to other companies. These subcontracting companies, 
which usually have fewer than 50 employees, tend to be extremely depen-
dent on one or two customers. They often fulfil the function of an 'extended 
workbench' and are highly replaceable (see chapter 15). Relatively few of 
these small-sized component suppliers have succeeded so far in securing a 
stronger position based on their own specific product and manufacturing 
know-how. It would appear as if in this particular branch, the small-scale 
businesses have not been able to capitalize on the trend toward more 
individualized and diversified quality products. 
A second developmental model which portrays the role of small firms in 
the Federal Republic is the relationship to one or several large-scale com-
panies based on a division of labour, whether as components suppliers or as 
downstream service firms concerned with the sales, installation, repair and 
maintenance of the products of one or several large manufacturers. The 
automobile repair trade is a classic example of the latter type. An example 
of components suppliers is the network of suppliers to the automotive 
industry located in Baden-Württemberg. These firms, some of which are 
relatively small, are autonomous in both economic and legal status, and 
drawing on their own specialized product know-how, usually supply 
several large manufacturers. 
This well-established division of labour between large-scale companies 
and their often small or medium-sized component suppliers is at present 
undergoing a fundamental change. In many companies a drastic reduction 
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of in-house production is currently taking place. The decentralization of 
manufacturing by contracting out certain steps in the assembly process to 
components suppliers is just getting underway in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. At the same time the suppliers are becoming more strongly 
integrated into the rationalization strategies of the large companies and are 
thus being confronted with new and very far reaching demands. Just-
in-time delivery, data links with buyers, the takeover of quality assurance 
and control, and increased involvement in research and development are 
aspects of production the suppliers must take into account. More and more 
large companies are pursuing a policy of single-sourcing, i.e. buying one 
part from only one supplier. The contracting out of various steps of the 
assembly process by buying complete components and aggregates instead 
of single parts is also on the rise. 
However, it is questionable whether all subcontractors, particularly the 
smallest firms, are in a position to finance the necessary changes stemming 
from the new demands. As a result, small contracting firms could be 
squeezed from the market or pushed down to the third or fourth level of the 
supply chain (see chapter 22). One consequence of these trends can be seen 
among the suppliers to the automotive industry in the Federal Republic of 
Germany where a wave of mergers on a national and also international level 
is taking place. 
If the small firms among the suppliers want to adapt to the new demands 
of their customers, they are forced to expand. Meeting the new demands 
also threatens to change their internal character; the introduction of flexible 
manufacturing systems, necessary to satisfy the increasing demands for 
product flexibility, strongly integrates suppliers into the planning and 
manufacturing organization of their customers. Thus, they have to alter 
their work organization and adapt it to industrial standards. For small firms 
this means: centralization and formalization of operational communi-
cations and decision-making processes, and increased standardization and 
division of labour. This, in turn, jeopardizes their fundamental economic 
advantages, namely their flexibility, individuality and the comprehensive 
use of qualified, skilled workers. 
It is in those areas involving the supply of differentiated and high quality 
custom-made and small batch products, for example equipment parts for 
manufacturing facilities, or in the tool manufacturing and mould-making 
sector, that small firms will most likely maintain a good position as 
suppliers to large enterprises. 
Also small firm industrial branches fulfiling downstream service 
functions for the products of large companies are at present confronted with 
a widening gap between the technological development of a given product 
at the manufacturer's level and the skills of the personnel in the servicing 
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firms. This problem, which is generated by the increasing share of micro-
electronic components and modern control technologies in many products, 
has become particularly acute in office machine repair, and is also evident 
in the heating and ventilation systems branch, as well as in automobile 
repair. In the case of office machine repair and the heating and ventilation 
systems branch, the result has been a loss of market shares to 'outsider 
industries.' Lack of expertise also makes it difficult for existing firms to 
expand into new fields and take advantage of potential new markets, for 
example, that of energy consulting for the heating and ventilation systems 
branch. This, of course, simply enhances market losses and the possibility 
of decline. In the office machine repair sector efforts are currendy being 
made to combat the existing skills deficit by developing target-oriented 
further training programmes - a joint initiative involving industrial 
associations, further training establishments and also a number of large 
manufacturers of office machines. 
One of the most widespread developmental models within the 
small-firm sector is the so-called industrial small-firm district. Do such 
cooperative structures play a significant role among small businesses in the 
Federal Republic? There are, in fact, some examples of regional coopera-
tive organizations of flexible, specialized small firms, for example the 
cutting implement industry in Solingen or the textile machine industry in 
Baden-Württemberg. At present we do not know terribly much about the 
history and functional mechanisms of these small firm centres since 
research in this field is just commencing in the Federal Republic. Empirical 
research on the example of Baden-Württemberg carried out by the Science 
Centre Berlin (Maier 1987) shows that industrial policies adapted to the 
needs and requirements of small firms and which favour concrete measures 
rather than financial assistance have played a significant role in the 
development of this industrial area. 
Baden-Württemberg's industrial policies have been an excellent 
example of this. Very early, as far back as the 19th century, it was 
recognized that specialized production for market niches is dependent on 
the international market. Thus, industrial policies in Baden-Württemberg 
were developed to support small firms in their export activities and assist 
their participation in international trade fairs. Also, the establishment of 
decentralized credit institutions rooted in the region helped small firms gain 
access to the capital market. One of the most important achievements of 
governmental industrial policy in Baden-Württemberg was the develop-
ment and further expansion of a comprehensive infrastructure for industrial 
vocational training and further training. This guaranteed the supply of 
qualified, skilled workers, which in turn is the prerequisite for the 
manufacture of specialized, high-quality products. These training centres, 
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which are organized on a supra-company level, are sponsored by the self 
administrated organs of commerce, the various Chambers of Commerce, 
professional organizations and partially by the municipalities. They are 
decentralized and situated at local levels, which enables them to cater 
directly to the specific needs of the companies in their vicinity. Local 
companies often participate in the conceptualization and execution of vo-
cational further training measures. The existing infrastructures also greatly 
facilitate and accelerate the introduction of new technologies in the small 
firms of the region. Thus, for example, these training centres offered the 
first courses in the Federal Republic for CNC-turning and CNC-milling. In 
so doing they cooperated closely with the manufacturers of such CNC-
machines and the potential local user companies. This way the companies 
were given the chance at a very early stage to become familiar with this new 
technology, to test its application potential for their company and to solve 
the related training problems. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion one could say that there is a broad foundation of small firms 
that have evolved historically in the Federal Republic of Germany, and that 
this constitutes favourable conditions for the further development of the 
small firm sector. However, as I have argued, there are some types of small 
firms in the Federal Republic currently facing severe problems of 
adaptation. To what extent small businesses will be able to cope with these 
problems and make use of their market opportunities will essentially 
depend on whether they succeed in solving the problem of the introduction 
of new technologies and whether they continue to supply qualified skilled 
workers by modernizing the form and content of vocational training and 
further training measures. In striving to achieve these objectives, coopera-
tive solutions are likely to play an increasingly significant role in the future 
among small firms in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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21 Small Supplier Firms at the 
Crossroads - Meeting New 
Challenges through Cooperative 
Retraining Schemes1 
Hans Gerhard Mendius, Stefanie Weimer 
INTRODUCTION 
With market requirements changing, inter-company cooperation is 
becoming more and more important as an instrument, especially for small 
businesses, to assert themselves on their traditional markets. Very little 
empirically based knowledge exists about the dissemination, actual forms 
and structural preconditions of cooperation between small businesses. 
Theoretical concepts are also in short supply. Taking the example of a 
special group of small businesses - small and medium-sized suppliers - and 
the example of a particular company function - further training - we shall 
examine the opportunities for implementing inter-company cooperation 
and the possible consequences for employees in terms of the value of the 
resulting qualifications on the labour market. 
At present small subcontractors are under heavy external pressure to adapt 
to new demands from their customers. New requirements from 
predominantly large customers include greater flexibility of delivery, the 
undertaking of quality assurance tasks, integration in the customers' com-
puter network, delivery of preassembled modules, and the contribution of 
their own development services. Therefore, small businesses are being 
forced to modernize their production technology and to restructure the 
entire organization of their company operations. This is bringing about 
profound changes, not least in the qualifications required. 
Workers with the right modern qualifications are generally scarce. Small 
businesses in particular have difficulties in recruiting them because big 
companies are usually able to offer better terms of employment that look far 
more attractive, at least at first sight. An alternative is to provide further 
training for the existing work-force. But it is precisely small businesses that 
usually have relatively little experience when it comes to staging further 
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training courses themselves and to making use of external offers of further 
training (see BIBB/IAB 1987). Against this background the question arises 
whether cooperative methods might not be able to help solve the problems 
of adaptation: 
1 in the form of inter-company cooperation on further training among 
several subcontractors, and 
2 and in the form of assistance for subcontractors from their big customers 
in solving their qualification problems. 
NEW QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS IN S M A L L 
SUBCONTRACTING FIRMS 
The new demands made by customers affect very different company levels 
and various groups of workers. New qualification requirements arising 
from the introduction of formalized and documented quality assurance 
processes for raising product quality are a central aspect of the new 
demands. Depending on the products and the production process, it is 
necessary to have a knowledge of measurement methods, statistical evalu-
ation methods, the operation of computer-controlled testing systems, the 
compilation of inspection plans and so on. A company's further training 
needs depend on the existing qualification structure (polarized production 
work dominated by semi-skilled workers or a preponderance of qualified 
skilled workers), and on how the new requirements are distributed among 
existing activities and positions. This distribution means for example, 
whether quality-control tasks are turned into an independent centralized 
function, or whether duties of quality inspection and documentation are 
integrated into the activities of the production department. 
Like other companies, small subcontractors tend, in our experience, 
toward centralized solutions. They set up new departments for quality 
assurance and man them with specialists, who are equipped with the 
necessary additional qualifications in training courses. In those places 
where quality-assurance departments, however, already existed, there is a 
notable trend toward reintegrating these functions in the production de-
partment. Some companies discovered that the awareness of quality in 
production decreased with centralization of the quality functions because 
the workers no longer felt responsible for quality, seeing it as the sole duty 
of the special department created for the job. 
Where production is based on skilled work, the integration of quality 
assurance is less of a problem. Care and accuracy are components of the 
skilled worker's training and form a basis for imparting a knowledge of 
quality-inspection methods. A need for new qualifications arises mainly in 
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cases where more demanding quality inspection duties (e.g. inspecting the 
dimensional accuracy of workpieces with complex geometries) are to be 
integrated in semi-skilled activities. 
Higher demands for quality can also produce a need for new qualifi-
cations in pure production tasks. Especially in production processes with 
highly repetitive components and a high proportion of semi-skilled work, 
e.g. in forges, plastic processing or the production of lathe-turned parts,2 
problems of qualification and motivation can lead to considerable quality 
defects with expensive follow-up inspections and repairs. In such cases, an 
enrichment of semi-skilled functions could prove sensible, also from a cost 
saving perspective. At present, acceptance of these considerations con-
tinues to meet with resistance among decision-makers in small businesses. 
Their implementation is made all the more difficult by the fact that there is 
practically no counselling available to small and medium-sized businesses 
on questions of work organization design.3 
In the small businesses examined in this study, a need for training also 
arose from the increasing use of program-controlled equipment and inte-
gration systems, a trend that has proceeded at an above average pace even 
in small craft sector businesses operating as subcontractors (see Haider et 
al. 1988:33 ff.). Training needs, when using CNC machines, depend a great 
deal on the way that technology use and workers are organized. With 
so-called decentralized use of CNC machines, the workers in the 
production department perform the work planning and programming duties 
themselves, and possibly even the short-term trouble-shooting. The 
production personnel require a knowledge of the way that CNC systems 
work, a knowledge of programming, and key qualifications such as e.g. the 
capacity for strategic, systematic, abstract thought (see Sonntag 1985; 
Hoppe, Erbe 1986). With the concept of work organization that emphasizes 
centralization, however, programming and trouble shooting are taken care 
of by the job planning and maintenance departments; activities in the 
production department are reduced to operating and monitoring the 
machines. Whether or not concepts of this type give rise to new qualifi-
cation requirements for workers in production depends on the extent to 
which they are left to perform functions of adaptive precision control and 
program optimization (see Part III). 
Although a decentralized concept of worker deployment is considered 
particularly well-suited for quality production in small businesses (see Erbe 
et al. 1989), it was apparent that in a number of supplier firms - after an 
initial phase with shop-floor programming - the programming function 
shifted from the shop-floor into a central job planning department or the 
design office when the number of CNC machines increased, and at the 
latest when CAD was introduced. 
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The introduction of computer-based design methods (CAD), which can 
be found in small companies whose components call for a considerable 
input of their own design work (e.g. in tool and die making for the working 
of metal and plastic), also leads to new qualification requirements in small 
subcontracting businesses. 
The new technologies, especially 3D-CAD and interlinked CAD/CAM, 
confront these small businesses with a training effort that is unprecedented 
in its intensity and structure, and which produces appreciable problems for 
personnel policy. If the system is to be put to optimum use, the lengthy and 
very expensive theoretical basic courses of instruction must be supple-
mented with extended training periods in the enterprise. Moreover, those 
needing the further training are the designers and those highly qualified 
skilled workers who form the interface in the job planning department 
between design and production. This means that to carry out these training 
programmes the company would have to release urgently needed skilled 
workers and specialists who perform critical functions for a considerable 
period of time. The fact that there is a lack of independent further training 
options in this area creates a dependency on the very specific training offers 
from the system manufacturers. Yet, the new qualification requirements are 
highly company-specific in nature. As a rule, CAD/CAM solutions are 
developed as customized systems, duly modified for the given specific 
requirement - making qualification requirements equally specific. 
Especially when implementing such technologies, a precise knowledge of 
company procedures and design is necessary to be able to adapt the 
programs. For this reason alone, there are limits to solving the problem of 
qualification through recruitment of new staff from outside the company. 
On the whole, the training needs of small subcontractors show parallels 
to comparable small businesses, but the pressure and pace under which the 
necessary modernization measures are taken and the resultant problems of 
qualification are very much greater. 
THE ADAPTATION OF QUALIFICATIONS AS PRACTICED IN 
S M A L L FIRMS 
Coping with new qualification requirements revealed patterns in small firm 
further training attitudes that were familiar from other investigations (see 
e.g. von Bardeleben et al. 1989; Koch 1988): 
1 Limitation of employee participation in the training measures to the 
absolutely essential and, as a rule, to a few mostly young workers with 
good preliminary qualifications and a willingness to take part in further 
training. It is not rare for small firms to rely successfully on 'interested' 
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workers trying to obtain new qualifications through individual further 
training activities in their own time and at their own expense. 
2 The dominance of short-term on-the-job courses of instruction of a 
rather unsystematic nature. The instruction of the majority of workers 
affected by the new technologies is usually undertaken by those who 
previously attended a course. This group thus assumes a multiplier 
function. 
3 Low utilization of external further training options which run for longer 
periods, are more formalized, and issue certificates. 
4 The great importance of training courses offered by the manufacturers of 
the equipment being installed. 
Some businesses have in fact organized further training courses them-
selves, drawing on professional, external further training expertise. In these 
cases the self-devised course content is generally closely tailored to the 
respective company's needs of adaption. In general, however, the con-
siderable need for requalification does not get reflected in further training 
programs that are either quantitatively or qualitatively well-developed. On 
the contrary, the outlined response patterns to training needs tend to 
produce appreciable problems. They result in excessive demands on the 
workers involved during the introductory phase, which often persist, albeit 
latently. And because no certificates are issued, there is no sure guarantee 
that the newly acquired qualifications will be duly rewarded financially, 
especially upon moving to a different firm. On the whole, unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers have only a slight chance of taking part in the training 
measures. For small businesses, this can have negative consequences such 
as a higher fluctuation of employees, a high degree of absenteeism, more 
faulty pieces, low job flexibility of workers with excessively narrow 
qualifications and, as a result, less-than-optimum utilization of capital-
intensive equipment. 
These shortcomings exist even though - except for a few regional 
bottlenecks - a wide range of training is offered that is specifically geared 
to current technologies.4 The fact that this expansion of the further training 
market has failed to leave its mark on small businesses points - among 
other things - to discrepancies between the content and organizational 
structure of existing training offers on the one hand, and the small 
businesses' specific requirements for further training on the other. 
In certain respects the demand for further training among small 
businesses is: 
1 specific, i.e. its content is often related to a production process applied 
by just a few companies, or to highly specialized products or materials, 
because small businesses often pursue pronounced market niche 
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strategies. Moreover, unlike a big company, a solitary small business is 
unable to fully utilize such company-specific further training measures 
to the fullest extent, and so it cannot push for such specialized training 
to be offered on the further training market. It is also, 
2 company-individual, in the sense that what is company-specific is not 
the content of the knowledge and skills to be taught, but which relevant 
parts are selected from the more general field of knowledge, the combi-
nations in which the particular knowledge is demanded, or the group of 
recipients for whom the specific knowledge is to be prepared. 
Precisely because the resources for a long trial and implementation phase 
do not exist, small businesses rely on the supply of further training courses 
which deal with concrete company application problems. The timing of 
many further training programmes - full-time courses during working 
hours - makes participation difficult, because small businesses usually 
work in single shifts. Personnel resources are scarce and do not allow the 
release of staff for lengthy further training courses during working hours. 
In small businesses there are practically no stand-by workers or planned 
manpower reserves such as are customary in big companies. The problem 
is all the more acute in subcontracting companies because they are often 
placed under considerable time pressure by their customers, are committed 
to tightly scheduled delivery obligations, and are often required to perform 
additional services at short notice. 
What would be most suitable for small businesses in terms of training to 
meet their new production requirements would be training options that are 
flexible in content and in organization: 
1 as a supplement to the prevailing programmes of standardized courses, 
further training institutions should provide more measures that are 
tailor-made, company-individual or geared to the needs of a small group 
of businesses. Of course, this in no way excludes the use of any available 
'standard modules'. Likewise, 
2 further training institutions should offer more measures that are imple-
mented on-site at the workplace, or meaningful combinations making 
use of both the training centres and companies. In this way the training 
would be more adapted to company processes and could also exploit the 
advantages of the workplace as a place of instruction.5 
INTER-COMPANY COOPERATION ON FURTHER TRAINING 
The development of suitable further training programmes for small busi-
nesses involves considerable costs that are not affordable for individual 
small businesses. One way to provide tailor-made training for small 
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businesses all the same is for several small businesses to join forces in 
organizing and carrying out such measures. Towards this purpose they 
could make use of the experience gathered by various small businesses in 
organizing such measures on their own. 
The simplest form of this type of cooperation on further training would 
be an ad hoc association of several neighbouring companies, which would 
then join with a further training institution in conceptualizing measures for 
the purpose of solving a qualification problem affecting them all. Such an 
ad hoc association could also include agreements concerning the mutual 
use of facilities and machinery in the participating companies for further 
training purposes. 
A more heavily institutionalized variant would be a permanent co-
operation - including a further training institution - aimed at a fundamental 
and lasting optimization of the actual further training practices in the 
participating companies. The job of the further training institution would be 
to ascertain each company's training needs, to draw up a long-term training 
plan, and to develop a coordinated programme of measures. The companies 
participating in the cooperation would make mutual use of each other's 
companies as places of instruction. 
Cooperation on training tasks already exists in vocational training, in 
which different companies take on particular parts on a revolving basis. 
Training associations of this sort have established themselves in the past 
few years and are stirring growing interest.6 The reason is the increasing 
tendency of particular companies to specialize on one product/one 
production process, while simultaneously quality requirements for basic 
vocational training are rising, due especially to the restructuring of training 
in the metalworking and electrical professions. This has made it more 
difficult for the individual company to conduct a complete, high-grade 
course of training. The question is, to what extent are the positive experi-
ences in basic vocational training transferable to cooperations on further 
training. 
Among the supplier firms there are isolated cases - and some miscarried 
attempts - of cooperative actions, too, but in areas quite different from 
training, e.g. the exchange of tools, joint use of capital-intensive test 
equipment, etc. Although the idea of an association for further training has 
elicited a certain interest, there are also considerable reservations. The 
doubts and apprehensions concern mainly: 
1 a fear of competitive disadvantages resulting from a drain of know-how 
to partner companies, especially with regard to association concepts 
involving the reciprocal use of production capacities for further training 
purposes; 
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2 a fear of skilled workers being poached by cooperation partners; 
3 the additional outlay of manpower resources and time arising with the 
organization of an association; and 
4 a lack of willingness to cooperate anticipated among potential partner 
companies. 
The difficulties of implementing cooperations on further training appear to 
rest on two levels. 
The first lies in the object of cooperation itself, i.e. further training: the 
idea of further training has almost no roots in small businesses, not least 
because no concrete experiences exist to evaluate its potential for solving 
qualification problems. There is a lack of consensus, therefore, concerning 
the strategic importance of the cooperation issue itself. For the decision-
makers in small businesses, further training is often a low-priority task; its 
economic utility is not always clear to them. 
There is not enough pressure to change the current practice of further 
training, in part because problems of adaptation resulting fully or partially 
from problems of qualifications are not registered as such. The short-
comings of the current response patterns for dealing with changes are too 
well concealed. Consequences such as the overtaxing of workers and the 
resulting deficiencies in the production process and the product are taken as 
given. For subcontractors, problems responding to the need to adapt qualifi-
cations, rank far behind other adaptation-related issues. The association 
idea is probably more successful in the basic vocational training sector 
because it helps to solve a major problem facing the company, namely the 
impending loss of company training capabilities. The fact is that having an 
apprentice programme remains the most important channel of skilled 
worker supply, especially for small businesses. This manifest company 
interest in training associations in the basic vocational training sector 
appears to outweigh even company fears of a know-how drain or the 
poaching of fully trained workers, which play a role here too. 
Cooperation on further training hits on a by and large unstructured field. 
Further training is far less regulated by law than basic vocational training. 
The existing training regulations give more or less detailed specifications 
regarding the content, aims and methods of vocational training, which all 
contributes to simplifying the practical implementation of cooperations in 
this sector in as much as it provides a framework of content and organi-
zation. 
Cooperation works most easily where it deals with fields of activity 
which are defined, which are capable of being performed outside the 
company, and which are far removed from the core area of production (e.g. 
sales, advertising). This is not the case with further training activities that 
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are designed in close consideration of company practices, specific appli-
cations, coping with a company's practical production problems, and with 
mutual use of each other's companies as a place of learning. 
A second level of restriction in the implementation of cooperation on 
further training lies in the particular group of businesses being investigated 
in this study, i.e. small subcontractors. 
Cooperative strategies are always difficult where the partners in the 
cooperation are (potential) competitors. In the case of small subcontractors 
the supposition was that a basis for cooperative behaviour existed in the 
similar customer demands directed at these businesses and in their 
accordingly very similar training needs. The heavy regional concentration 
of some of the investigated subcontracting sectors suggested that channels 
of communication already existed between the companies. 
Evidence shows, however, that in most cases, these favourable 
foundations are not utilized, but are overshadowed by the pressure of 
competition. The market for subcontracted parts tends to be tighter than 
markets for final products. Many of the small subcontractors have a limited 
- and sometimes identical - circle of customers. In a number of the small 
subcontractor supply branches the level of interchangeability is quite high; 
the applied production processes are similar, and only a few companies 
have specialized know-how at their disposal. Overcapacities in some areas 
and buyers putting greater pressure on prices and terms has triggered a kind 
of predatory competition. Against this background, the fear of a 'know-how 
drain' is particularly pronounced. Under these circumstances, a supply of 
workers trained in new methods, e.g. through a company's own further 
training efforts, becomes a competitive advantage. There is no particular 
evidence that communication exists among neighbouring competitors in 
the same region. Under these conditions it is not possible for trust - one of 
the fundamental prerequisites for a successful cooperation (see Midler 
1987: 219) - to develop. 
Admittedly, the considerable external pressure does favour cooperative 
strategies even among subcontractors, but such cooperation is typically 
between companies involved in different stages of the manufacturing pro-
cess or which manufacture complementary products. For example, greatly 
reduced innovation cycles and the trend toward a coincident development 
of parts and tooling in the automobile industry are forcing the tool and die 
makers to cooperate earlier and more closely with the builders of the 
machines into which the tools and dies are to be fitted. Customer demands 
for JIT delivery of complete components are triggering joint ventures 
among medium-sized subcontractors, who are setting up joint assembly 
works at the doorsteps of their customers. 
A more or less socio-psychological barrier to inter-company coopera-
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tion lies in the fact that the companies under examination are small busi-
nesses. The owners of small and medium-sized businesses typically place a 
very high value on independence and autonomy of decision. Accordingly 
they greaüy fear having to surrender something of this entrepreneurial 
freedom of choice in a cooperation. 
The above-mentioned obstacles and stumbling blocks to cooperation on 
further training between small subcontractors make one thing very clear: 
Cooperation between small businesses is not going to develop from the 
companies' own initiative - at least not in the further training sector. 
Cooperation on further training needs a push from outside. This makes it a 
marketing job for the further training institutions, but it also needs 
individual promoters to put it into practice.7 
FURTHER TRAINING - AN AREA OF COOPERATION 
BETWEEN S M A L L SUPPLIERS AND BIG BUYERS? 
In the previous sections it was explained in detail that one of the key factors 
behind small companies' training needs are the new demands being made 
by their big customers. It is a known fact that in the automobile and 
electrical industries in particular, but in mechanical engineering, too, 
company further training has been well developed and updated continually 
for many years. These big companies are accordingly equipped with 
substantial resources of infrastructure and manpower. They also possess 
appreciable know-how as regards the development and adaptation of 
suitable training methods and curricula for adults. Seen in these terms, it 
seems obvious that customers and subcontractors could cooperate intensely 
on the training of workers to respond to new requirements. This is all the 
more true considering that at least part of the training needs in 
subcontracting businesses is owed to the requirements of new technologies 
that had to - or still have to -be mastered by the manufacturers them-
selves.8 
The mere possibility of cooperation between a customer and his sub-
contractor is not enough, however. The cooperation must also be 
meaningful to both sides. For companies operating under market conditions 
this means that the cooperation must be profitable for all concerned. The 
suppliers' interest in cooperation with customers gets awakened when it 
proves to be the most favourable way to respond to requirements that have 
to be met in order to assert their position on the market.9 Provided coopera-
tion with customers on further training promised lasting help compared 
with other options, suppliers would probably be prepared to shelve their 
various doubts, such as whether customers are in a position to provide 
training that matches the supplier's specific problem, whether training 
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measures will be used to increase supplier dependency on the customer, 
whether supplier specific know-how - and even employees - might be 
poached. Some suppliers feel that the simpler solution would be for the 
customers to peg back their excessive demands and so get rid of the 
specious qualification problem. It is not clear where the customers 
interests' stand.10 They often stress publicly how interested they are in the 
existence and development of an efficient supply sector and hence in 
cooperation, and that the price of subcontracted products is by no means 
their only consideration in dealing with suppliers. But the impression which 
small suppliers obtain based on their regular negotiations on delivery terms, 
often looks completely different. 
What then is the real basis of the customer/supplier relationship? A 
subcontractor is attractive provided he can offer better services at the same 
prices or the same services at lower prices, compared not only with the 
competition, but also with the customer's own production. In making his 
calculation, the customer is strongly influenced by such factors as position 
on the sales market and the degree of utilization of his own capacities. At 
the moment, most big companies are producing at the limits of their 
capacities, which is why reduction of in-house production is not only to 
save costs, but also to gain workers and material capacities for an expansion 
of production. As such, the situation for subcontractors is particularly 
favourable. The process can be reversed, however, if the suppliers' 
customers face a decline in demand. In this case, in-house production can 
be applied as an instrument to improve a company's own capacity utili-
zation and to avoid expensive, often highly problematic staff reduction 
measures. 
A further point to consider, however, is that just a limited part of the 
subcontracted production will lend itself to reincorporation. First, the 
company has to have the right production facilities at its disposal; second, 
and more importantly, the work-force has to possess the right production 
expertise, and this becomes a greater and greater problem, the longer the 
subcontracting has been taking place. On the other hand, experiences of 
large companies with subcontracting are not always positive, and often 
there seem to be great differences in the way company departments assess 
the success in reducing in-house production. What the purchasing depart-
ment - whose importance increases with a decrease in in-house production 
(and vice versa) - considers to be a success can be evaluated quite differ-
ently by the production departments or by research and development. These 
departments can then be the source of important alliances with, for 
instance, a works councillor looking to increase in-house production. 
The comparative advantages of small subcontractors are generally con-
sidered to be: the willingness to implement changes quickly and to satisfy 
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special wishes (here the employee qualification structure plays an im-
portant part); a leading edge in production gained through specialization; a 
transparent organizational structure, with easy access to contact persons in 
a position to make decisions; and last but not least, their more favourable 
cost situation (mainly due to lower wages and social benefits). 
The disadvantages of small subcontractors as compared with bigger 
suppliers and a customer's own production are often seen to lie in product 
quality, quality assurance and quality documentation, the use of modem 
design methods, and incorporation in the customer's computer network. 
Big customers' attempts to enforce their quality standards unilaterally 
by specifying guidelines (their own quality manuals, stipulation of specific 
general standard requirements) can be viewed as a response to problems 
they were having with the quality of bought parts (not least those supplied 
by small businesses). It very soon became clear, however, that simply 
sending along the documents is usually not enough, so they provided 
suppliers with 'courses of standard instruction' on the quality standards and 
procedures of quality assurance. However, these were not adapted to the 
specific needs of small businesses. A number of big customers have also 
staged so-called supplier conferences as forums for general discussion and 
information. 
What is not common practice, however, is to provide comprehensive and 
timely information about impending new requirements, in a form related to 
the small supplier's specific situation and in a manner he can use, 
accompanied by a discussion of their implementation. Many technical 
services and departments for the quality assurance of bought parts are 
already providing help with the changes needed in production (albeit the 
help is frequently not preventive, but responds to problems after they have 
arisen). The help usually stops, however, at technical and organizational 
counselling, and reaches almost exclusively the top levels of manage-
ment.11 The further training of junior managers and production staff would 
be a field where a form of cooperation attractive for everyone could take 
place, especially since customers are gradually realizing that a great many 
roots of the problems are to be found at these levels. It would be easier if 
there were contact persons who were responsible primarily or exclusively 
for cooperation (and not for control), which seems to be the trend in the 
departments for supplier development recently created in a number of 
companies. 
The big companies in the sectors examined have been organizing a great 
diversity of training measures for their work-forces for quite some time, 
with increasing involvement of workers in production. It has been, and still 
is, necessary for the big companies, too, somehow to deal with the new 
demands deriving from their relationships with suppliers. But despite the 
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existence of considerable potential, the inclusion of suppliers in big 
company training measures is still in its infancy, in large part because up to 
now the idea of cooperation on training between subcontractors and 
customers has hardly been discussed. But probably the main reason is the 
failure to adequately illuminate the possible benefits for all concerned. 
Cooperation on training is attractive when it helps to increase the 
advantages of subcontracted supplies and services for everyone concerned. 
The supplier's interest results from his deficiencies in qualification; the 
customer's interest grows when he can count on 'surplus earnings'.12 This 
can be achieved in a number of ways: the first possibility is to set cost-
covering or profit-making prices for the provision of training services. 
Hardly anything is won this way in the long term, however, because the 
subcontractor will ultimately add these expenses to his prices and pass them 
on to his customers, thus closing the circle. This solution becomes attractive 
(regardless of the question of how the costs of the training measures are 
borne) when costs are avoided as the result of cooperating on training. This 
is the case when quality is improved, e.g. by a decrease in the percentage of 
parts unfit for assembly. The savings to be achieved in this way are not 
limited to the value of the faulty parts themselves (which is charged to the 
supplier), but above all from costs incurred by the refinishing, reassembly 
or even production stoppages which arise. Even if, through a redistribution 
of the training costs, the subcontracted product itself becomes more 
expensive, this outlay is more than compensated for by savings in extra 
quality. To be at all able to identify and utilize such margins, the customer 
has to carry out a complete cost calculation that also covers all the indirect 
costs of quality defects. And to actually be able to pursue this quality- and 
qualifications-promoting avenue, it is also necessary to inform the sub-
contractor about the productivity potential waiting to be tapped by quality 
improvements, and - in the event of success - to allow him to share in the 
benefits. The current extent of cooperation on training would tend to 
suggest, however, that this is not always the case. Still, a number of 
examples and starting-points do exist.13 
One automobile manufacturer has 'opened' up special courses on a wide 
scale to subcontractors. Designed to pass on information concerning a 
quality (assurance) guide-line drawn up and implemented by the auto 
manufacturer, the courses focus more on the dissemination of knowledge 
about quality standards and less on concrete help in creating preconditions 
for sensibly implementing the quality requirements. So far the course lacks 
an audience-specific orientation (the same course is held for people from a 
great assortment of companies with a great divergence of preliminary 
knowledge). Moreover, the more the course involves small suppliers 
(especially at the second and third step down the supplier chain), the greater 
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have become the problems of instruction, so that the possibility of a 
'preparatory course' is now being considered for these prospective partici-
pants. At the moment many suppliers tend to view this training as an 
obligatory exercise with limited practical value. The organization of the 
courses takes place under the sole responsibility of the training department 
From the customer's other departments such as Purchasing, Quality 
Assurance, Supplier Development, etc., there is no feedback as to whether 
and to what extent the training has actually reduced any quality problems, 
nor any follow-up considerations about an appropriate restructuring of the 
measures given any problems. 
A number of other companies occasionally give subcontractors the 
opportunity to send staff to training courses intended primarily for their 
own work-forces. In these cases, it is possible to go into the specific 
problems of the 'external' participants to a limited degree. Aside from the 
various instructions concerning quality guidelines, the emphasis is on 
courses for CNC, CAD, pneumatics and hydraulics, SPC and introductions 
to the use of data processing equipment for a variety of purposes (mostly 
PC courses). 
The ambitious plans being discussed by a major auto maker would go 
much further. Training measures are being considered as a worthwhile 
activity for subcontractors as well as for the customer. The manufacturer 
realizes that all of its departments affected by supplier relations need to 
cooperate closely if the project is to have a chance of success. In other 
words, the provision of training measures for subcontractors has to be 
integrated in an overall concept of supplier development, so that in addition 
to the department with direct responsibility, at least the quality assurance 
department for purchased parts and the actual further training department 
should participate. The concept has not been fully implemented yet, but in 
a first step the company has allowed subcontractors to attend courses from 
its own further training programme that seem appropriate. At the moment 
it is not possible to judge how well the programme is being received, nor 
can we tell whether the measures are being adapted to the special needs and 
qualifications of the participants (which would certainly be sensible), or 
whether full use is being made of the experience gathered from the sub-
contractors. 
Extensive support services are being provided - also in the area of 
training - to a specific group of suppliers by another large company. The 
targeted group are suppliers who have taken over production (with the 
necessary equipment) in 'traditional', technically developed areas which do 
not demand new, specialized know-how, and which the customer has 
discontinued himself but still requires. In this case, however, the reciprocal 
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ties have a quality extending beyond the 'normal', mainly market-oriented 
supplier/customer relationship and so cannot be considered exemplary or 
generally desirable. 
Another company sees its first and foremost duty as lying in instructing 
the some key figures in the subcontracting companies in its philosophy of 
quality, and in getting them to accept the necessity to perform systematic 
quality assurance. Enormous deficits in this respect are thought to exist 
among the topmost executives in small supply firms. It is believed that the 
need for training cannot be acknowledged until quality consciousness has 
been aroused. Then the supplier is helped to devise his own training 
measures, and he is also given the opportunity to participate in the 
customer's measures. 
These few examples illustrate that there really are starting points for 
cooperation on training measures between customers and small suppliers. 
However, to realize such a cooperation and have it meet either party's 
advantage, a number of conditions need to be guaranteed. This means, 
above all - as already suggested - illuminating the potential for savings. 
For the capacities of big customers to be utilized successfully over the long 
term by small subcontractors there has to be real cooperation on the 
structuring and implementation of measures. In other words, the customer 
must do more than simply make his technical capacities, training concepts 
and materials available; he must also be willing to modify, extend or 
simplify his measures in accordance with the needs of his new clientele. 
This means establishing the adaptation needs of small suppliers and 
mobilizing suitable expertise. Above all what this requires is that the 
departments involved exchange experiences with the customer and co-
operate. As mentioned above, supplier development is only beginning to 
establish itself as an independent function. As a rule, there is no direct 
contact, and virtually no indirect contact, between the customers and the 
supplier's further training departments. Nor can it be taken for granted that 
the quality assurance, supplier development, and further training depart-
ments get together at the same table. Joint discussions between these 
departments and the supplier do not take place at all. 1 4 
Possible steps in this direction are: carrying out a thorough evaluation of 
the measures already being applied, with particular emphasis on inter-
viewing participants from small subcontracting firms; utilizing the experi-
ence of staff from the customers' quality assurance and supplier develop-
ment departments; and tapping the knowledge of those subcontractor exe-
cutives who already have experience in carrying out training measures. Of 
course, representatives from training institutions could also be drawn into 
the conceptualization of proposed programmes. And last but not least, it is 
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important to take stock of the qualification situation at the subcontractors, 
i.e. to draw up a record of existing qualifications and to determine the 
employees' willingness for retraining. 
Cooperation between customers and suppliers could be made par-
ticularly attractive, if it proved possible to draw together further training 
associations of subcontractors and big customers, for whom a majority of 
the associated businesses are at least potential suppliers. This could then 
unite synergetic effects in both vertical and horizontal dimensions.15 But, 
there is still a long way to go to reach this point. Whether and how 
cooperation on training between small suppliers and big customers will 
develop depends, on the one hand, on the efforts of those involved. More 
important still, however, is what will happen to the status of subcontracted 
services, and this, in turn, is greatly influenced by the development of 
demand on the customers' product markets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cooperation between companies for the training of workers in small supply 
firms is certainly a sensible approach with high potential for dealing with 
new requirements. However, left on its own, cooperation on further training 
will not broadly establish itself. Cooperative training programmes require 
continuous management, with duties which extend beyond organization 
and coordination to the development and continuous 'maintenance' of 
communication channels and the motivation of the companies involved. 
Completely new tasks are facing the professional associations and further 
training institutions. 
The activities of the further training institutions and the picture they 
have of their role must change and become more company oriented. The 
further training institution must develop into a company qualification con-
sultant, with knowledge of company problems in production and appli-
cation. Besides offering further training in their own institutions, these 
further training institutions must become more involved in the principles 
and methods accompanying learning phases that take place within the 
company. Where specialized problems of company training go beyond an 
organization's know-how, it will have to make more use of external 
lecturers and act as an interface between demand in the companies and 
supply on the further training market. 
Up until now, the professional associations have been less active in the 
further training field than in vocational training. This is the outcome of 
limited manpower resources and evolved historical responsibilities, but it 
also has to do with the prevailing belief that further training should be 
regulated via the market and so does not require intervention by the 
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management and labour associations. Important functions of the profes-
sional associations could be to either initiate further training associations 
themselves or to give active support to their promoters. Where further 
training associations already exist, the professional associations must 
advise the further training organizations in determining the sector-specific 
requirements for further training and in future developments of relevant 
production technology. 
Cooperation on further training between small businesses is, in principle, 
possible in all sectors. In the subcontracting sector there is also the possibility 
of cooperation with big customers. As we have shown, points of approach 
certainly exist or could be created. But here, too, the initiation of suitable 
initiatives could gready profit if suitable promoters were to approach the 
customers. In other words, the first precondition is discussion with the 
customer about the idea of improving the quality of subcontracted products by 
providing training programmes for the suppliers' work-forces. A starting point 
could be the purchasing departments or the quality assurance divisions, which 
would then need to coordinate - and this has been the exception up to now -
with departments such as supplier development and especially those re-
sponsible for further training. For the customer, it would certainly be easier to 
cooperate with existing and specially created further training associations, 
simply for the synergetic effects (each has several hundred suppliers), as 
opposed to forging only bilateral contacts. Here again, the professional associ-
ations could act as an intermediary. Unfortunately, there is presendy a lack of 
manpower and material resources in the professional associations and in the 
further training institutions for these spheres of activity. 
If we were to try and estimate the possible effects of cooperation on 
further training in terms of its effect on the labour market, we could say the 
following: 
1 Without suitable precautions or incentives, there is a risk with further 
training activities in small companies that unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers will not be covered at all or only insufficiently, that instruction 
will be given only in qualifications that are oriented directly to appli-
cations and restricted to 'essentials', that these qualifications will turn 
out to be extremely company- and plant-specific, and that no company 
or, more importantly, inter-company certificates will be issued.16 
2 The continuous and comprehensive adaptation and improvement of 
existing qualifications under prevailing working conditions and with 
emphasis on the company as the place of learning is absolutely essential 
in light of emerging requirements, and it cannot be substituted by a 
(naturally meaningful) 'modernization' of basic vocational training 
courses nor by training activities isolated from company activity. 
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3 Inter-company cooperations on further training can help small busi-
nesses to pursue the training of their work-forces. Through the broader 
mobilization of expertise, further training associations afford better 
chances of avoiding the problems involved in internal company further 
training activities. Thus the activities undertaken by such organizations 
can be seen as a contribution to improving the efficiency of the labour 
market In this context, to assess the value of different types of measures 
would require not only an exact analysis of various training components, 
but also an investigation of their labour market value (i.e. the supply/ 
demand ratio for these workers on the labour market). 
In terms of reinforcing desirable effects, or preventing or mitigating prob-
lematic developments on the labour market or in educational policy, the 
question arises as to whether it is possible or necessary to seek government 
promotion of further training activities. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the structuring and implementation of primary vocational 
training as part of the dual system is a task performed with major state 
intervention. This takes the form of specifying standards for training 
courses (with the participation of labour and employers and of considerable 
financial support e.g. through the state vocational schools). Further 
training, on the other hand, is left up to the workers and companies.17 Al l 
the key socio-political groups agree that a comprehensive system of worker 
further training is imperative for the national economy's competitiveness. 
Assuming, therefore, that the status of further training will continue to grow 
in relation to primary vocational training, the question arises as to whether 
state participation would not be meaningful here, too. The statutory stan-
dardization of further training in a form comparable with primary 
vocational training is evidently not a serious consideration. On the other 
hand, there have already been political and scientific discussions on the 
question of controlling further training via public funding, and even 
attempts at putting it into practice.18 These attempts have demonstrated that 
a contribution to the 'modernization of the national economy' can be made 
by promoting further training measures, and that some meaningful results 
for labour market policy can be achieved, e.g.: 
1 a commensurate participation of otherwise disadvantaged groups 
(unskilled and semi-skilled workers, women, foreigners, persons with 
limitations in the jobs they can perform); 
2 measures whose content is designed better and which have an adequate 
time plan; 
3 acceptable conditions for participants (payment, claims on time, etc.); 
4 better opportunity to obtain - wherever possible - certified qualifi-
cations in demand on the labour market; and 
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5 incentives for making a joint-company response to the training problem 
instead of solving it by exchanging workers via the labour market. 
The promotion of cooperation on further training between small businesses 
and other small businesses on the one hand, and between small businesses 
and their big customers on the other, could help to achieve these desirable 
effects. Possible promoters would be the professional associations and the 
further training institutions, but also any existing self-organized initiatives 
of small businesses arranged for other purposes.19 It is conceivable that 
such groups would set up adequately equipped experimental models for 
inter-company cooperation on further training. The success of such 
measures does not depend only on the extent of the promotion, however, 
but is conditional above all on precise control, exact monitoring and, in 
particular, the full involvement of everyone in designing the measures.20 A 
further factor of vital importance is a commensurate 'public relations' that 
publicizes the possible advantages beyond the circle of those immediately 
involved. If there is a realistic chance of starting up a self-support process, 
a fixed period of state promotion of company training measures can be well 
justified on the basis of educational and labour market policy consider-
ations. 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
22 Small Firms in Big 
Subcontracting1 
Klaus Semlinger 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years many large industrial companies have attempted 
to reduce in-house production in favour of outside supply from independent 
subcontractors (outsourcing). Cost reductions and gains in flexibility are 
the arguments for this increasing inter-company division of labour. To what 
extent, however, there are general gains in flexibility and efficiency in the 
economy as a whole, or whether the result is only a shift of costs onto 
weaker and less powerful enterprises, is still an open question. This chapter 
argues that there is a highly unbalanced distribution of flexibility options 
and necessities to adapt as well as of chances and risks within the new 
subcontracting networks. In particular, the majority of the small and 
medium-sized suppliers and their employees seem to be negatively affected 
in their future prospects. 
Small firms are currently regarded as the new hope for achieving full 
employment. However, a closer look reveals that - at least in the FRG - the 
favourable trend in small business employment does not apply to all small 
firms. Many existing small firms have experienced job losses and the total 
increase of employment in the small firm sector is primarily based on newly 
founded businesses in the service sector. Additionally, even given small 
firm employment increases in the 1970s, large enterprises were able to 
increase their share of the gross national product during the same period so 
it can hardly be said that large companies have lost their competitive 
strength (Bade 1986). 
In fact, favourable development opportunities for small firms -
particularly in the manufacturing area - are not predicted to come from 
their direct competition with large enterprises, but in a complementary 
division of labour. Recent developments in the craft sector, which consists 
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mainly of small-sized firms, are claimed as empirical support for these 
forecasts: during the past few years, mainly those craft businesses have 
prospered which act as suppliers to industry or are involved in the distri-
bution, marketing, maintenance and repair of technical consumer durables 
manufactured by large enterprises (Marahrens 1980; RWI-
Handwerksberichte 1988). 
In order to 'sail in the wake' of large industrial enterprises, however, 
craft businesses acting as suppliers to industry are forced to adapt by 
industrializing their manufacturing structures (see Riihle von Lilienstern 
1986: 54). The problem is that the introduction of the technical moderni-
zation and adaptation measures demanded by their large customers often 
leads to conversion problems which endanger the very existence of many 
small firms (Bullinger 1987). In the following I will go into this issue in 
more detail by describing the position held by small firms within the supply 
system of large industrial enterprises, their perspectives, and their risks of 
adaptation. 
THE S M A L L SUPPLIER FIRM - A DEFINITION 
When we speak about small firms, it is often unclear what the term actually 
means. In many cases, it is also even unclear which level of organization is 
being referred to: the local plant, the (multi-plant) firm in a legal sense, or 
the (multi-firm) company as an economic entity. For the issues being dealt 
with in this chapter, it is of decisive importance to know whether the small 
supplier is an independent enterprise or a subsidiary of a larger company -
or in the extreme case a subsidiary of the customer itself. In the following, 
when I refer to a small supplier firm, it is to be understood as a legally and 
economically independent small enterprise. 
How should firm size be measured and exactly how large is a small firm? 
In many cases, the sales volume and/or the number of employees are used 
as the criteria for defining company size since these data are the most 
readily available and the easiest to use. The assumptions underlying the use 
of these data are that a firm's turnover is an indication of its economic 
power and that the number of employees reflects its capacity. Obviously, 
across different industries, using these criteria to draw the demarcation line 
between small and large firms is problematic. Therefore, it is necessary to 
add qualitative criteria and even then it is unavoidable to leave room for 
some ambiguity. 
Given the large number of qualitative attributes that vary by firm size, 
we have to restrict ourselves to a selection of criteria to define small firms. 
Since this chapter's focus is the effects that a more or less close relationship 
with one or several large buyer companies has on management and employ-
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ment policies in small supplier firms, those characteristics of small firms 
are selected which are of central importance for these policies, and which 
would tend to be affected by the exchange relationship with large buying 
companies. Thus, in this chapter small firms are companies: 
1 with management and control structures oriented towards the 
owner-enterpreneur (or a single managing director) with an only weakly 
developed hierarchy and functional division of management; 
2 in which the enterpreneur/directing manager is directly involved in 
company operations; 
3 which do little planning and where operational procedures and rules of 
decision-making are only slightly formalized; 
4 in which the exchange of information occurs in a relatively direct and 
personal way with a low degree of documentation and standardization; 
5 which employ a comparatively large share of skilled workers in an 
organization of production with a low degree of division of labour and 
6 with fewer than 100 employees. 
To conclude the terminological preliminaries we have to say something 
about what we mean by subcontracting or outsourcing. Here too, there is no 
satisfactory, generally valid definition of the term. Outsourcing is a substi-
tute for in-house production. In theory everything can be supplied by 
external sources (Mannel 1981). This definition, however, encompasses a 
highly heterogeneous field of subcontractors for which it will be difficult to 
identify a common pattern of structure and development. Therefore, the 
concept of subcontracting/outsourcing used in this chapter is limited to the 
supply of/demand for components and parts which are directly integrated 
into the buyer's product without much further processing and it includes 
other goods and services only if they are used exclusively in the 
manufacture of a given product or in a specific production process. This 
definition includes work for commission orders (Lohnfertigung) as well as 
the make-to-order production of parts and components and the supply of 
moulds and other special tools. All services relating to finance, admini-
stration, maintenance, and other overhead services are excluded from the 
definition as well as the supply of basic and raw materials, operating 
resources and energy, and, finally, all non-product-specific construction 
services and equipment. 
Thus, small supplier firms examined in this chapter are (formally) 
independent companies with the characteristics outlined above and which 
are members of an integrated inter-firm manufacturing group 
(Produktionsverbund) of at least one large buying enterprise. Furthermore, 
this chapter will concentrate on firms that directly supply to large-scale 
production. 
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OUTSOURCING AS A SPECIFIC F O R M OF DIVISION OF 
LABOUR 
Thanks to learning curve effects and other advantages of specialization, 
division of labour is associated with productivity gains. This not only holds 
true for the division of labour on the individual or plant level, but also when 
it is organized at the inter-plant level, in which case additional advantages, 
such as those resulting from optimal localization of tasks (Standortop-
timierung) can be realized. Based on this, the American automotive 
industry - the dominant industrial model well into the 1950s - had already 
established a highly differentiated system of specialized manufacturing 
sites back in the 1920s, whose status were that of subsidiary to the mother 
company (Feuerbaum 1956: 36). The concept of outsourcing, i.e. the 
division of labour over and above the individual enterprise level, goes one 
step further, in that work is not only divided up, but also allocated outside 
the company. Thus, the restriction or even the reduction of in-house 
production in favour of outsourcing cannot be explained by the productivity 
effects achieved by the division of labour alone. 
In the same way, the reason why enterprises decide to purchase parts 
from independent suppliers cannot be explained by additional economies of 
scale that can be achieved by standardizing components which than can be 
used for different products. The advantages of mass production for larger 
markets, i.e. decline of marginal unit cost, a more rapid capital turnover and 
improved control over capacity utilization could all be achieved by a 
corresponding in-house differentiation as well. Furthermore, the in-house 
approach has the advantage of assuring more reliability of supply and more 
direct, hierarchic-bureaucratic means of control. In fact, vertical integration 
and diversification have always been, and still are, a preferred way to 
secure the advantages outlined above. 
Meanwhile changes have occurred in these preferences: conglomerates 
no longer aim for 'stochastic economies of scale', i.e. the mutual com-
pensation of contrasting sales fluctuations, but seek instead to generate 
synergistic effects and the consolidation of 'strategic competence' 
(Grabher 1988: 76). Many large-scale producers, in particular, have started 
with a reduction of in-house production. Obviously, vertical integration and 
inter-company division of labour are strategic options (Sengenberger, 
Loveman 1988: 36), and the choice between in-house manufacturing and 
outsourcing is a management decision which has to take a multitude of 
factors into account. Before discussing the causes for the increasing impor-
tance of outsourcing in greater detail (see pp. 349-51), I will briefly lay out 
the basic rationale behind outsourcing. 
Scanning the criteria cited in managerial literature for deciding the 
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make-or-buy question, and reviewing relevant reports from industrial 
practice, four main aspects stand out, namely: 
1 Availability. In terms of size, employee skills, machinery, product and 
manufacturing knowledge - is the company in a position to cope with 
the task, or would it be necessary first to build up new and/or additional 
capacities or competence? 
2 Feasibility. Does the establishment or re-structuring of the old manu-
facturing system meet with resource bottlenecks, legal obstacles (e.g. 
patent or environmental law) or with other problems of implementation 
(e.g. conflicting departmental interests and opposing works councils)? 
3 Profitability: Given the potential for in-house production and 
considering the investment costs which may be necessary to build up an 
adequate capacity - would outsourcing be more economical or at least 
of comparative advantage so that a re-allocation of company resources 
will lead to efficieny gains? 
4 Suitability: How do outsourcing and in-house production compare in 
terms of uncertainty (supply bottlenecks, know-how drain, fluctuations 
in demand) and other more intangible factors (such as company image, 
goodwill market policies, organizational climate etc.)? 
These criteria sometimes overlap, and in some cases they may even contra-
dict each other. In the end, they are weighed according to whether the 
decision to be made concerns old or new goods and services, or the question 
of increasing outsourcing or expanding in-house production. The criteria do 
make it clear, however, that apart from cost advantages, outsourcing offers 
considerable gains in flexibility. By opting for outsourcing instead of 
in-house production, fixed costs are turned into variable costs, thereby 
reducing the risks of capacity utilization and amortization especially in 
cases of uncertain, irregular, low and/or temporary demand. 
THE POSITION OF S M A L L FIRMS IN SUPPLIER SELECTION 
Companies that wish to profit from outsourcing must select their suppliers 
carefully and subject their make-or-buy decisions to constant scrutiny. A 
multitude of criteria and procedures can be used to assess suppliers. The 
main criteria of assessment which can be singled out in practice are price, 
or more generally: the value obtained for the money expended, reliable 
delivery and the quality of the delivered goods (see Arnold 1982:80). There 
is no doubt that small firms can cope with these demands as well as large 
firms. In addition, the terms of transaction can be dictated to small firms 
more easily because their strategic market position tends to be unfavourable 
compared to that of large purchasing companies (due to their small market 
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share, with the large enterprise customer accounting for a sizeable share of 
their turnover) and because they have less room to manoeuvre (due to their 
limited financial power and their smaller capacity for planning and 
marketing research). On the other hand, there are at least two important 
reasons why small firms are less attractive for large companies looking for 
suppliers. 
First, there are the considerable R&D-efforts which are necessary to 
achieve a decisive lead in terms of product and/or process know-how. 
Small firms are usually unable to undertake such efforts when they call for 
high investments in equipment or require systematic, highly differentiated 
or long-term research (Brose 1984; see Acs, Audretsch 1986). Second, 
small firms hardly have the capacity to satisfy the quantity requirements of 
large-scale producing enterprises in the case of more complex parts and 
components, not to mention the requirements, when an even larger sales 
market is to be served to take full advantage of all possible scale economies. 
Providing a supplier with technical assistance, however, to improve its 
manufacturing competence would detract from at least some of the 
supposed advantages of specialization which are given as a reason for 
outsourcing, while dividing up the subcontracted goods between several 
small suppliers would jeopardize learning curve effects and economies of 
scale and additionally, would result in higher transaction costs. 
Therefore we have to think of direct supply (in the above-defined sense) 
from small firms as being mainly restricted to the niches of the inter-
company manufacturing network of large companies: small firms will be 
primarily engaged as subcontractors to supply small parts, custom series, 
special, yet less complex, manufacturing and development services, and to 
cover peak demands for or to bridge short-term supply gaps of such 
products. Therefore, although large enterprises have a considerable number 
of suppliers, among them many small firms, in terms of the value of goods 
or services supplied, the main share is allotted to only a few large supplier 
firms.2 
Thus, it is to be assumed that it is a mixture of rational calculation and 
pure habit that accounts for small firms playing a role as direct suppliers to 
large enterprises at all - especially to those who are engaged in large-scale 
production. In many cases, business relations have only managed to survive 
because the relationship evolved over a period of many years and has been 
cemented by personal contacts. Nevertheless, there are two reasons com-
monly cited for using small firms as subcontractors: their supposed low 
overheads and their high flexibility. 
The lower overheads of small firms result in part from their lower 
administrative costs, but a considerable part is also due to their lower wage 
and non-wage labour costs. Lower (non-) wage labour costs, however, do 
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not derive from higher productivity, but are the result of small firms' less 
comprehensive social services and fringe benefits and the, on average, 
inferior health and social security benefits given to small firms' employees 
(see Giebel 1985). Empirical investigations have shown that large enter-
prises organized as a multi-(small)-plant company can achieve a higher 
degree of technical efficiency than small single plant enterprises, yet are 
often unable to convert this higher efficiency into greater profitability due 
to their higher wage and non-wage labour costs (Aiginger, Tichy 1982:70). 
Accordingly, when large companies place orders with small supplier firms 
on cost saving reasons, they are not only doing so - either explicitly or 
implicitly - to benefit from the organizational or technological efficiency 
of these firms, but to profit from the fact that the employees in these 
companies only modestly participate in the yields generated by their firm's 
efficiency. 
Likewise small firms' flexibility cannot only be seen as a productive 
feature of their specific organizational structure: there is a big difference 
between flexibility in the form of 'active versatility' (Beweglichkeit) on the 
one hand, and 'passive pliability' (Beugsamkeit) on the other (see 
Semlinger 1988). The first type of flexibility is based on a high capacity for 
reaction and adaptation, resulting from efficient information processing, 
quick decision-making, and highly skilled employees capable of handling a 
wide range of tasks. With this type of flexibility, it is possible to quickly 
recognize and exploit small and temporary market niches and to respond at 
short notice to rush orders. In comparison, the second type of flexibility is 
characterized by the ability and readiness to submit to outside pressure, and 
to accept long-term risks and/or to cutback existing company goals. Con-
sidering the distribution of market power between large enterprises and 
their small supplier firms and the types of functions fulfiled by the small 
supplier, it is not difficult to imagine that a good deal of their attractiveness 
results from their greater readiness (passively) to adapt to the demands of 
their large-enterprise customers, particularly with regard to fluctuating 
capacity utilization and price concessions. 
This is not to maintain that all small supplier firms are inherently in a 
precarious situation of dependency. For example, it is possible to cite a 
number of small, specialized firms which have succeeded, at least in the 
short term, in becoming indispensable to their customers. However, they 
are, in fact, the exception to the rule, as interviews with industrial associ-
ations and major German automobile manufacturers have confirmed. 
Companies of this kind might be held up as the heroes of modern 'small 
firm lore', but they can hardly serve as a general model. Likewise it can also 
be assumed that the 'sweat shops', which are situated at the other end of the 
spectrum, cannot be expected to play much of a role as parts suppliers to 
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enterprises engaged in large-scale production, since the competitive ad-
vantage of these firms with their outdated manufacturing facilities, smaller 
proportion of skilled employees and comparatively large share of 
temporary workers is mainly restricted to their highly flexible capacity 
which can be almost arbitrarily expanded or diminished. 
The majority of the small firms involved in direct parts supply and 
product-specific toolmaking are located somewhere between these 
extremes. Their personnel and machinery standards qualify them for orders 
which are more demanding in terms of quality and adherence to scheduled 
delivery dates. The functions they fulfil, however, could be relatively easily 
replaced by in-house manufacturing or by other suppliers, explaining why 
purchasing companies exert considerable control over prices. When 
customers request short-term delivery or changes in product specifications, 
such firms achieve the flexibility demanded of them on the basis of their 
organizational structures (efficient communication and fast decision 
making), as well as their skilled work-force. Thus, their position within the 
inter-company manufacturing group is not only based on advantages in 
terms of overhead, but also on company attributes which - with reference 
to the literature (see pp. 343-4) - we hold as the typical characteristics of 
small firms. The following section will deal with the changing demands and 
requirements in the subcontracting markets that are likely to have a con-
siderable effect on these attributes. 
MODERN PURCHASING POLICIES AND T H E PERSPECTIVES 
FOR S M A L L SUPPLIER FIRMS 
Outsourcing as a strategic marketing and rationalization device 
The manufacturers of industrial mass products find themselves - given the 
present distribution of purchasing power on the consumer markets - con-
fronted with both market saturation trends and considerable price pressure 
exerted by new (international) competitors. They react to these challenges 
with product differentiation and further product development (increasing 
product diversity and shorter product life cycles) in order to stimulate and 
satisfy new markets and evade price competition. At the same time, they 
step up their rationalization efforts. Now that advanced automation tech-
nology in many cases has reduced direct processing time to the near 
minimum attainable - at least close to an economic optimum - enterprises 
are turning their attention to the concept of 'systemic rationalization' 
(Altmann et al. 1986). Systemic rationalization seeks to reduce processing 
stages by means of more manufacturing-oriented product planning and 
increased utilization of microelectronic technology, while striving to cut 
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back administrative coordination work, idle time in manufacturing, as well 
as buffer stocks and thus the corresponding capital costs, with the help of 
modern logistic concepts and increased utilization of electronic data 
processing. 
Thus, while market forces and marketing strategies compel enterprises 
to achieve greater product differentiation and higher product quality, there 
is also a call for a better fitting integration of the individual manufacturing 
steps due to the acceleration of throughput times and the reduction of buffer 
stocks induced by the new rationalization strategies. In other words, 
increasing complexity in operational processes has to be matched with 
greater demands on reliability. This does not leave the inter-company 
division of labour untouched. On the contrary, reducing in-house 
manufacturing and making increased use of outsourcing are important 
devices to cope with these contradicting demands. This means that greater 
demands will be made of suppliers; the criteria of supplier selection 
increases in number and pretension: flexible supply does not only have to 
be carried out within shorter time frames, but also has to be concerned with 
greater variations in ordered volumes and design of parts and components. 
The deviations now tolerated in terms of delivery dates, amounts delivered 
and product quality gets narrower. Finally, the accompanying services now 
expected include more R&D contributions, better financing arrangements 
(e.g. short-term credit), intensified quality monitoring and documentation, 
increased stockpiling and improved communication facilities. 
Modern purchasing policies are heading toward an intensification of 
inter-company cooperation referred to as 'integration of suppliers' (Gelder 
1986: 35) and 'dissolving the boundaries of the enterprise' (Becker, Weber 
1986: 37). In contrast to the usual processes of vertical integration, 
however, there is no economic and legal merger of the firms involved. With 
the help of new information and communication technologies, large enter-
prises are using the outsourcing strategy to establish a supply system that 
combines the reliability of vertical integration with the advantages of a 
market exchange relation (i.e. market pressure on price and performance) 
thereby minimizing the purchasing company's need to make risky invest-
ments and the danger of having to commit itself to a particular course of 
action. Thus, powerful purchasing companies are able to shift - at least 
partially - the burden of coping with the increasingly complex and dynamic 
market and production requirements onto the shoulders of their 
downstream suppliers. In doing so, they succeed in maintaining or creating 
greater room for their own flexibility while passing flexibility pressures and 
the associated risks to their suppliers. 
At present, the extent to which the cost savings and the new range of 
flexibility that large purchasing companies achieve by expanding 
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and modern information and communication technologies have provided 
purchasing companies with new means of realizing these objectives. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in the last few years there have been 
increasing complaints by suppliers about large enterprises' attempts to 
dictate prices, and quite often, business and trade associations have to 
mediate between suppliers and large-scale purchasers on disputes over 
conditions. The main points of conflict are: 
1 demands to gain insight into the technical and economic conditions at 
the supplier firm; 
2 reliability and completeness of order specifications; 
3 use and observance of commercial rights such as patents, licences, and 
the protection of company know-how; 
4 price setting and price adjustment clauses; and 
5 liability and warranty issues. 
This last point again touches on the distribution of risk; since this is a 
central aspect of intensified purchaser-supplier relations, we should take a 
closer look at it. Concentrating on those changes which 'naturally' emerge 
from present trends in outsourcing, a transferral of sales and manufacturing 
risks to the suppliers' shoulders should be mentioned first: with the shift 
from contracts specifying quantity to contracts only setting a quota of a 
more or less unspecified demand volume (some of which run for several 
years), the purchasing companies can restrict their purchasing obligations 
to their actual sales prospects. While short-term quantity-based contracts 
did not provide the supplier firms with the certainty of receiving a follow-
up contract - which could be regarded as a normal market risk which could 
be counteracted through appropriate sales efforts - the new type of quota 
contract ties up the supplier's manufacturing capacity, without the security 
of knowing whether it will be utilized as planned. 
Additionally, increased control and monitoring risks emerge which 
result from the new logistic concepts pursued by large purchasing com-
panies which pressure the supplier companies into shorter supply intervals, 
smaller batches of supplied parts and zero defect delivery. Particular 
problems arise (a) when purchasers demand parts to be delivered within 
periods shorter than their actual throughput times at the supply firm; (b) 
when batch sizes are called for which are smaller than the batch sizes 
optimal for manufacturing; and (c) when the purchasing company requests 
delivery to be synchronous with its own manufacturing processes while 
dispensing with the inspection of incoming goods. 
Finally, the reduction of the purchaser's own in-house production is 
resulting in more than just the transferral of direct production tasks. By 
demanding that their suppliers fulfil an increasing amount of research and 
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firms, as is already reflected in the observable practice of cultivating only 
one supplier for a particular part or part family (single sourcing), and/or the 
attempt to move increasingly toward the purchase of pre-assembled 
components. 
Al l in all, large supplier firms are most likely to be the ones to profit 
from this development, not only because it is easier for them to make the 
necessary investments, but also because single sourcing for large series 
manufacturing leads to an increased minimum of production and supply 
capacity. Additionally, there is an indirect reason for the trend toward using 
large supplier firms: the new integration technology minimizes the supply 
risk involved in outsourcing even with 'critical suppliers', i.e. suppliers 
whose economic existence does not depend on the particular supply 
relationship because new communication systems make this risk more 
calculable. Therefore, the extent to which control and influence need to be 
secured through economic dependence of the supplier is reduced. This 
meets with the rationale of increased outsourcing (see pp. 349-51), 
according to which a high degree of suppliers' economic autonomy is 
regarded as being desirable. In fact, a number of well-known, large com-
panies have stated that they would like their purchasing volume to amount 
to no more than 20—30 per cent of a given supplier's turnover, in order to 
avoid assuming direct or indirect responsibility for the supplier's capacity 
utilization. 
Thus, the outlook is an increasing process of concentration in the direct 
supply to large purchasing enterprises which will leave no room for small 
supplier firms of the traditional kind. At the same time it seems highly 
questionable whether small firms will be able to retreat to the second rank 
or to positions further downstream without undergoing the processes of 
adaptation outlined above: if all 'first rank' suppliers have to comply with 
the demands their purchasing companies make on them in terms of more 
flexibility and greater reliability, they will certainly want either to increase 
in-house production of tasks formerly subcontracted to downstream 
suppliers to make their position more secure or, as far as possible, to pursue 
an outsourcing strategy analogous to that of their large customers. Thus, 
while it is unquestionably demanding to adapt, it is not necessarily an 
advantage for weaker supplier firms not to be direcdy included in the 
current integration strategies of the large purchasing enterprises: firms 
standing at the sidelines may find themselves out of the supply business 
altogether in a very short period of time. 
However, as soon as small supplier firms undertake efforts to adapt, they 
are quickly confronted with financial obstacles, and they must also solve 
considerable organizational and structural problems. Whereas medium-
sized firms can deal with these challenges within the framework of a steady 
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organizational development, small firms will be forced to undertake pro-
found shifts in their internal structures which might result in a completely 
changed organizational character. What ends up being affected are 
precisely those aspects of their organization which - apart from low wage 
costs and overheads and their specific potential for 'passive flexibility' -
are regarded as the strengths of small firms and which establish their 
position as suppliers (see pp. 346-9), namely, their less formalized 
information, decision-making and planning systems; the more personal 
nature of their internal communication and social relations; a com-
paratively low degree of division of labour and the considerable emphasis 
which is placed on skilled workers with professional competence and 
vocational experience. 
The implementation of modern planning, control and (quality) 
monitoring methods means a stronger formalization and integration of the 
respective processes. This will threaten to restrict the level of autonomy, 
discretion and responsibility of the individual worker, and is likely 
generally to limit the potential for making spontaneous and improvised 
changes in production as well, i.e. it might negatively affect central attri-
butes of small firms' 'active flexibility'. 
Additionally, a more formalized and automated production process as 
well as the expectation of faster reactions to purchasers' requests for supply 
deliveries or order modifications will affect the internal communication 
structures. The danger is an increasing anonymity in company-internal 
communication between management and workers as well as in the ex-
change of information on the operational level. The personal character of 
intra-company coordination will be superseded by procedures which are 
determined by superficially objective constraints and requirements due to 
external demands. This, in turn, will also affect industrial relations within 
small firms (see Mendius et al. 1987: 180): a shift towards more formalized 
or externally controlled production processes, and the resultant restrictions 
to autonomy and informal arrangements will most likely meet with resist-
ance from the workers. Although this may not necessarily lead to higher 
exit or recruitment problems, it could result in a 'compensatory' loss of 
in-house cooperation, and thus, undermine another essential element of 
small firms' 'active flexibility'. 
Finally, all of the above-mentioned factors are likely to affect the skills 
profile of the personnel employed in small firms. The utilization of state-of-
the-art manufacturing and control technologies requires additional skills 
and qualifications which on the one hand extend beyond the traditional 
framework of skilled worker training requirements and which on the other 
hand could have a more company-specific character. This not only raises 
the problem of how these additional skills can be imparted within small 
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firms, but also the question of transferability of such skills to other firms. 
Currently it is skilled workers with qualifications which are acquired 
according to uniform guidelines and which are therefore relatively easy to 
assess and utilize in different company contexts, that form an essential 
precondition for the capacity of small firms to adjust rapidly to changing 
personnel requirements via the external labour market. At the same time the 
non-firm-specific character of skills helps prevent the loss of a particular 
job leading to prolonged unemployment of the worker affected. Thus, if 
small firms were to lose their contact to the skilled labour market due to an 
increasing importance of firm-specific qualifications, it would not only 
jeopardize employment security for employees, but also undermine another 
important basis of small firms' 'active flexibility' (see Sengenberger 1987). 
To sum up, the intensification of the inter-company division of labour 
induced by large enterprises confronts small supplier firms with the 
question whether they will be included in the process at all and, if so, 
whether their financial and organizational means will allow them to carry 
out the necessary adaptation measures. Additionally, if they adapt to the 
demands with short-sighted organizational changes oriented to the 
established patterns of large industrial enterprises, they endanger their 
special potential for active flexibility. Al l in all, it is still unclear, whether 
small firms will be able to compensate for this loss without achieving the 
ability possessed by large enterprises for long-term planning and larger 
manufacturing volume, i.e. without growing. In any case, it seems certain 
that small firms that want to have a chance in direct supply to large-scale 
producers, still might be called 'small' as far as their number of employees 
is concerned; in terms of their qualitative attributes, however, they will no 
longer have anything to do with the traditional understanding of a small 
firm. 
S U M M A R Y AND CONCLUDING R E M A R K S 
In view of developments to date and the inner logic of outsourcing within 
large inter-company manufacturing groups, it is questionable whether 
small firms will succeed in holding their position or will have to resort to 
positions downstream in the supply chain. It can be assumed, however, that 
the increased performance demands of large purchasing companies will not 
remain restricted to the first rank of suppliers and that their extension is 
likely to close rather than open the door in terms of the amount of parts and 
services ordered from small supplier firms. Therefore, in future, we are 
likely to be witnessing an even stronger concentration of supply in fewer 
companies - possibly organized in small units - with these enterprises 
seeking to use their new performance potential to get a competitive edge on 
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other supply markets where somewhat lower standards of efficiency, flexi-
bility and reliability are (still) valid. 
Similar developments are observable with regard to supply markets not 
included in this analysis, i.e. those for capital goods and overhead services. 
Thus, the pressure which large-scale production enterprises are exerting on 
their first-rank parts suppliers is not only cascading down the supply chain, 
but it might also spread out to the entire supply market, without any 
indication of where and how this process will end and how great the 
pressure on companies occupying different positions along the supply 
chain will be. Already today, this process is affecting a number of small 
supplier firms - companies which, as of now, are not direcdy part of any 
ambitious integration schemes - in such a way that they are forced to 
mobilize their potential for passive flexibility, i.e. to pursue or accept an 
intensification of work, a worsening of working conditions, a squeeze on 
their profits and the wasting away of their working capital (see DeiB 1989). 
The problem is that even when small supplier firms try to adjust 
productively to the increased requirements of the subcontracting market 
this may jeopardize their long-term market position: this is to be feared 
when adjustment and adaptation measures do not give due consideration to 
the specific advantages and conditions that small firms possess, and instead 
follow the patterns set down by large enterprises. Technologies and 
methods that enhance flexibility in larger enterprises can have a detrimental 
effect when implemented in small firms. Nevertheless, hardware and soft-
ware suppliers seem to be concentrating on optimizing integration, without 
regard to the long-term effects of their technology on personnel policies 
and company perspectives in small firms. 
It is to be feared that small firms that do have the chance to be 
incorporated in inter-company manufacturing systems and carry out the 
adaptation measures demanded of them will be confronted with increasing 
risks and demands on flexibility, while at the same time they will lose their 
traditional potential for 'active flexibility' (in terms of skills, qualifications, 
organization, etc.), without any sufficient (technological, economic etc.) 
compensation. Thus, from a long-term perspective, a short-term successful 
adaptation could prove a rather superficial achievement. In fact, it could 
turn out to be the nucleus of a grave threat to the small company's very 
existence. 
Al l in all, the dangers which the expansion of outsourcing entails for 
small firms would seem to outweigh its opportunities. Yet, it is not quite 
clear that an exclusion of traditional small firms from the inter-company 
division of labour would be in the interest of the large purchasing enter-
prises. Rather, it is quite probable that burying the small firm's potential for 
'active flexibility' would mean a loss in flexibility for the entire system. 
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This risk should encourage the parties involved to seek cooperative strate-
gies for adapting to changing demands and for securing this flexibility that 
goes beyond short-term interests. 
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Part VII 
New Technologies and 
Industrial Relations 
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23 Unions' Policies Towards New 
Technologies in the 1980s - An 
Example from the Metal Industry1 
Norbert Altmann 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis that the development of technology and organization - and therefore 
the utilization of manpower - can be directed, shaped and designed may be 
well known. In the everyday practice of instituting rationalization measures, 
however, this concept is hardly perceptible. Instead, technological deter-
minism prevails among engineers, management, and even within unions and 
works councils. Concepts dealing with controlling and directing technological 
and organizational developments are only gradually gaining ground and still 
remain primarily influenced by interests of capital and manpower utilization. 
However, the shape and form of tomorrow's working life will be determined 
by the way in which concepts of rationalization and a humane design of work 
can be attuned to each other. Thus the conflict of interest between employers 
and employees and their representatives will be a central theme of the future. 
In tackling this issue, the following chapter limits itself to the sector of 
manufacturing, mainly that of mass production within the metal-processing 
industry (including the electrical, machine-building, precision-mechanics and 
optics industries). However, the findings have a broader significance since 
much of the experience gained there is also valid in other areas. Taking 
company rationalization concepts and union design postulates as of 1988, the 
aim is to show certain tendencies which are conceivable as future develop-
ments in the FRG. Definite prognoses are not possible and not intended. Also, 
the new problems arising from unification with East Germany are not dealt 
with here. 
RATIONALIZATION AND HUMANIZATION 
Developments up to the end of the 1970s2 
Up until the beginning of the 1960s, economic growth in the Federal 
Republic of Germany was based on an expanding industrial sector and a 
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growing supply of labour (largely from the continuing stream of refugees 
from East Germany). Since then, however, growth has only been possible 
by intensifying production for several reasons. First, the labour market 
reserves were depleted and second, the overall volume of working hours 
was decreasing due to the age structure of the work-force, reduction in 
working hours, and extended education and training periods. One solution 
was to integrate workers with no industrial experience, particularly women 
and foreign workers, into the work process. In the 1960s, this increased the 
pressure towards job simplification and work organization with a high 
degree of division of labour, particularly in mass production. In 
manufacturing sectors where the average demands on skills were higher, in 
the machine-building industry for example, a strategy of polarized utili-
zation of skilled workers on the one hand, and unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers on the other was pursued in order to overcome manpower 
shortages. 
Tayloristic principles of work organization continued to spread, en-
tailing short-cycle, monotonous work with unvarying work tasks performed 
at a fast pace. At the same time, demands made on performance were 
intensified, based on refined methods of time and motion studies (MTM), 
as well as performance-related payment schemes (incentive wages). De-
qualification processes and processes of polarization became widespread, 
even in areas where skilled workers were employed. 
During the post-war years, in the 1950s and 1960s, compensation of 
increased work loads by rising real wages met with employee acceptance. 
However, the transition to the 1970s, a boom period with extreme man-
power shortages, saw a change in expectations and behaviour of industrial 
workers, skilled as well as unskilled. Tayloristically organized jobs became 
unattractive, particularly for German workers. 
This change brought with it an increased awareness of physical work 
strains and mental stress. In many instances, long periods of overwork 
resulted in reduced working ability and in an increase in latent and manifest 
forms of performance refusal: high rates of absenteeism (rates of 20 per 
cent were no rarity in assembly processes of the electrical industry), high 
labour turnover (up to 30 per cent), rising reject rates and quality defects. 
The wildcat strikes of 1969 and 1973 were also manifestations of a re-
jection of extended demands on performance (Schumann et al. 1971). 
In the first half of the 1970s, companies were faced with the question of 
whether Tayloristic work organization was still rational and efficient. The 
reasons for this, however, were not deficient employee performance or 
resistance, but the altered situation on the world market. Demands on 
flexibility and quality increased, and could not be met by rigidly organized 
Tayloristic work forms. Manpower with a limited range of skills could not 
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be utilized flexibly, nor was manpower of this kind oriented to product 
quality. The companies' problems were aggravated by negative feedback 
effects such as absenteeism, high labour turnover and increased difficulties 
in recruiting skilled personnel for job setting, quality control etc. In the 
mid-1970s these problems were discussed under the keyword 'the crisis of 
Taylorism'. 
During the phase from the beginning to the middle of the 1970s, several 
scientific concepts of work organization offering alternatives to Taylorism 
by showing ways out of rigid forms of work organization, unattractive 
work, and subjective loss of motivation gained considerable significance. 
Representative of such concepts are the well-known forms of work 
structuring and semi-autonomous work which have been developed in 
particular by the socio-technical approach of the Tavistock school: the 
optimization of technological and organizational design through the 
integration of social factors. This concept gained considerable influence in 
the Federal Republic through its application and extension in the large-
scale Scandinavian experiments of 'industrial democracy'. The approach 
emerging from these experiments emphasized a high degree of autonomy 
for individual workers and work groups, a considerable amount of worker 
control over their own work and the involvement of employee repre-
sentatives in the design of technology and organization. German industry, 
particularly the areas of mass production in the electrical industry, fine 
mechanics, and optics industry etc. began to take an active interest in these 
issues. 
The programme for 'Humanization of Working Life' (Bundesminister 
fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1974) initiated by the social democratic-
liberal government in 1974 played a crucial role in the discussion con-
cerning a reduction of Tayloristic work forms and in generally bringing the 
topic of improvement of work design to public attention. The programme's 
aims and objectives were: 
1 the establishment of a scientific basis for a humane and productive 
design of work; 
2 the development of models for a humane design of technology and 
organization; and 
3 the dissemination of pertinent knowledge in the companies. 
The programme was started primarily with the objective of gathering 
knowledge relevant to the practical application of laws which were passed 
at the beginning of the 1970s, the Work Constitution Act of 1972 among 
others. The law prescribes a ' humane' design of work in accordance with 
scientific findings (§ 90, 91). Other factors were certainly indirectly 
responsible, such as the previously mentioned problems of Tayloristic 
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forms of industrial work organization, social democratic-liberal concepts 
for a modernization of the economic system, and strong union pressure for 
better working conditions during the economic boom period. 
This programme was by no means merely concerned with the narrow 
aspects of ergonomic or organizational work design or on job safety and 
health-related factors, but also aimed at 'establishing the basic values and 
rights belonging to a democratic, social, and constitutional state within the 
world of work' (yearly report of the Project Management Humanization of 
Working Life 1976). 
The research and development work carried out within the framework of 
this programme had been financed with approximately 1.4 billion D M from 
1974 through 1989. A considerable amount of knowledge concerning the 
possibilities of humane work design was gained as well as a great deal 
about the limits imposed by the companies' performance policies. In 1989 
the Humanization of Work programme was reformulated, and as of 1990 
transformed into a research and promotion programme under the name 
'Work and Technology'. Now, the accent is more strongly placed on 
mastering innovation in the production process, including that of inter-
company integration, and on supporting small and middle-sized enter-
prises. Support, however, as before, comprises the humanization aspect 
with a particular accent on work and health protection and further training. 
Also, the issue of the design of work and technology remains a central 
focus. The yearly budget for this promotion programme is (from 1990) 
about 100 million DM. 
From the outset, the employers underlined the necessity of connecting 
humanization and efficiency, and it was, in fact, the aspect of efficiency 
which prompted the reduction of Tayloristic work during the beginning of 
the 1970s when new demands were made on flexibility and quality. For the 
employers, improvement of working conditions goes along with the 
adaptation of technical progress to market requirements, in which the 
establishment of new co-determination rights are not naturally included. 
From the employers' point of view, it was the effects that flexible work 
organization, such as job-enrichment or semi-autonomous groups, had on 
employee performance that were paramount. With such work forms, a 
wider level of skills could be attained, or skills previously blocked by a 
strict division of labour could be used more efficiently, thereby enabling a 
more flexible utilization of manpower. This, in turn, allowed staff re-
ductions and savings due to more intensive and efficient utilization of 
personnel, as in the case of being able to transfer personnel to fill vacancies. 
Tighter staffing could also serve the purpose of gradually selecting certain 
workers and thereby raise the average skill level within the company. The 
humanization effect achieved by more meaningful work, a greater scope for 
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decision-making and the general design of work was more a side effect of 
efficiency measures than anything else. 
Originally the unions regarded the government programme as being just 
a continuation of their traditional struggle for better working conditions, 
co-determination and protection against rationalization. Initially the purely 
ergonomic and physiological aspects - such as acoustic insulation, dust 
control and others - played an important role in controlling the observance 
of legal regulations. By participating in this programme, the unions were 
not seeking a policy of reconciliation and harmonization of opposing 
interests within the wider framework of humanization of work, nor did they 
initially regard it as an instrument towards attaining a stronger control over 
the design of work within the companies. Some time later, however, the 
research findings and design activities organized by the programme 
became more and more oriented to effects on individual and collective 
performance at work. Then the unions became increasingly sceptical about 
the German version of the socio-technical approach to work design. 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the unions' approach towards tech-
nological and organizational 'progress' and their concepts for collective 
agreements and regulations had undergone a fundamental change: tech-
nological and organizational progress was no longer regarded as a 'natural' 
development following its own inherent laws, but as an area of political 
activity. The main objective was no longer protection against the effects of 
technological development ('protection against rationalization') or wage 
compensation for negative effects of rationalization (extra pay for work 
burdens or general wage increases). Instead unions wanted to influence and 
shape technological developments and thus the goal to influence work 
design in general became decisive. (Naturally the former objectives of 
protection, for instance, dismissals, still remained part of union policy.) The 
quantitative, i.e. wage-oriented, collective bargaining policy began to turn 
gradually towards a qualitative one and has been so ever since. According 
to the new union policies, the design of work should take all of man's 
existential needs into consideration, while technology should fulfil the 
requirements of 'social compatibility'. 
The 'Collective Agreement on Wage Conditions II' in the metal-
processing industry in North Wiirttemberg/North Baden, which received 
much attention when it was formulated in 1973, had two main objectives: 
first, a precise monitoring of the demands made on performance (by fixing 
the norms for the determination of standard times in performance-related 
pay systems). In this respect, traditional orientations were adhered to, 
namely protecting the employees from the negative effects of a seemingly 
'unalterable' form of job design (IG Metall 1977). 
Second, however, the agreement laid down work pauses, certain criteria 
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of humane work design and the minimum duration of cycles in assembly 
line work. This was the first example of direct intervention in the 
employers' work design rights which exceeded the traditional protective 
regulations concerning work and health. It should be pointed out, however, 
that actual enforcement of the agreement on the company level left much to 
be desired. 
Conditions in the 1980s 
During the transition from the 1970s to the 1980s three new conditions 
appeared which had an influence on the question of shaping technology, 
organization and humane work design: 
1 The economic crisis, which set in around the end of the 1970s, and of 
course the development of new, computer-based technologies brought 
the impact on employment to the forefront. Employment protection, or 
at least a cushioning of dismissal effects by social plans and other similar 
measures, government employment policies, i.e. employment pro-
grammes and above all reduction in working hours became the focal 
points of union interest (Sengenberger 1984). 
2 The transition from a social democratic-liberal government to a 
conservative-liberal government in 1983 resulted in government 
measures which amounted to a de-regulation of the existing employee 
status in order to create incentives for employment. Toward this end, 
employment conditions and contracts were made, as the key words 
indicate, to be more 'flexible' and 'individualized'. This was to be 
achieved particularly by the Employment Promotion Law of 1985, 
which facilitated the utilization of temporary workers and part-time 
workers, suspended small and new enterprises from employment 
security regulations and set higher requirements for the realization of 
social plans (Rosenfelder 1985).The unions were confronted with the 
problem of protecting the uniform employee status and the effectiveness 
of general social-political settlements. 
3 The rationalization wave based on computer-aided so-called 'new tech-
nologies' (from CAD/CAM to FMS, particularly the integration of 
production planning, control and the manufacturing process itself (CIM) 
etc.) in German industry was a crucial factor (for a more detailed 
discussion of this issue see Parts II and III of this volume; IG Metall 
1983). 
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Basic concepts of rationalization at the beginning of the 1980s 
What consequences does the wave of rationalization occurring since the 
beginning of the 1980s on the basis of computer-aided technologies have 
for a humane design of work? (See e.g. Altmann et al. 1982a; Jürgens, 
Naschold 1984; Kern, Schumann 1984; Baethge, Oberbeck 1986; Schultz-
Wild et al. 1986.) The discussions in the Federal Republic among managers 
point to two fundamentally different concepts of development. On the one 
hand, there is the extensively computer-integrated manufacturing process 
(CIM) up to the unmanned automatic factory; on the other, there are 
decentrally organized work processes, which are under the autonomous 
control of highly qualified workers with a homogenous level of skills who 
have access to central production process data by means of interactive 
communication systems. 
The design objectives of centralistic automation are: minimal staffing, 
elimination of employee intervention, total irrelevance of working environ-
ment (since so few workers are necessary), elimination of all tasks 
requiring skills and qualification and the concentration of the latter in the 
development, planning and control departments outside the area of pro-
duction. While this design concept certainly appears utopic, it shows a line 
of technological and organizational thinking which is a product of tech-
nocratic engineering science and which is sometimes called 'technocentric' 
(Brödner 1985). 
In contrast to this 'technocentric' approach, there are numerous investi-
gations pointing toward a different course of development which could be 
called manpower-oriented or 'anthropocentric'. According to this concept, 
manpower is regarded as an important potential for productivity because 
implementation processes encounter a considerable number of problems 
and automatic manufacturing processes do not run at optimal levels. A 
broad use of employee skills and qualification is recommended in order to 
avoid inefficiencies in the work process (see Part III in this volume for a 
discussion of CIM and organization of work). 
While present research does not allow any definite prognoses, there are 
a number of signs pointing to a predominance of technocratic and central-
istic concepts being undertaken; this fact, however, is overshadowed by the 
broad discussions of so-called 'new management concepts' (Kern, 
Schuman 1984) whose realization in practice is doubtful. 
On the basis of data-technological integration a 'new type of systemic 
rationalization' is establishing itself (see chapter 4 of this volume for a 
description of this concept). This type of rationalization introduces com-
pletely new problems which were not considered at all in the research 
programmes or the policies of the unions in the 1980s. 
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THE DISPUTE BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS ON 
W O R K DESIGN 
This section deals with the far-reaching conflicts and differences between 
unions and employers concerning problems of work arising in the course of 
the introduction of new technologies (the metal industry and the metal 
workers unions - IG Metall remain the focus). The particular points to be 
addressed are: 
1 new patterns of stress; 
2 work content, scope for self-regulation and skills; 
3 wages and work performance; 
4 self-determination and control; 
5 flexibilization of working hours and employee status; 
6 co-determination at the workplace; and 
7 employment protection.3 
Problems of work design4 
Work design and health risks 
In the FRG it is generally assumed that the utilization of new technologies 
will cause a shift from - decreasing, but still existing - physical work 
burdens to mental and social stress. Innumerable aspects of work design 
have been subjected to regulation including ones initiated by the unions at 
the parliamentary level. Many of them, however, are becoming obsolete 
due to this shift in patterns of stress. This will make the works councils' task 
of monitoring and implementing these rules at the company level more 
difficult. 
The German Works Constitution Act from 1972 grants the works 
councils the right to extensive information prior to rationalization 
measures, but no right of co-determination (§§ 80, 90). The latter only 
comes into effect (§ 91) if the works council can prove that the form of 
work design being introduced is not in accordance 'with demonstrated 
scientific findings of a humane design of work', the design of work 
'clearly' contradicts these findings and that the worker is negatively 
effected 'to a notable extent'. It is difficult to furnish this proof, and thus 
worker representatives have few chances to intervene in the design of work. 
When new technologies are introduced, health risks may be closely con-
nected to work organization, as in the case of stress caused by isolation on 
the job or number of hours working at video work stations with radiation. 
However, in these cases it is almost impossible to meet the requirements of 
the law for intervening in the design of work. 
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The disputes over the introduction of video terminals are an example. 
Because of the anticipated, and in part scientifically proven, health risks 
due to radiation exposure at video work stations, the unions have been 
seeking to establish ergonomic workplace design, limited working periods 
at video terminals, compulsory eye checkups, etc. Recently these concepts 
have been expanded in the form of a design of work organization which 
allows diversified work tasks. While such alterations of work design could 
not have been established on the basis of the existing co-determination 
rights, numerous agreements of a similar kind were achieved at the com-
pany level mainly due to political pressure brought forth by the works 
councils. 
The basic structure of union activities in this area concentrate on two 
main areas: 
1 to shape and design technology and organization, instead of just pro-
tecting against its undesirable consequences in the case of scientifically 
proven negative effects. Human forms of work design and not mere 
corrections of problems are to be established. This is not only a question 
of knowledge (and research) and models of design, but also one of the 
investment potential of the enterprises concerned and last but not least, 
a question of power in negotiation processes. 
2 The works councils should not be burdened with the nearly impossible 
task of having to prove that certain company design measures do not 
meet the present standards of health, but instead, the companies 
themselves should have to prove that the new technologies they are 
introducing are in accordance with the latest standards of humane work 
design. Unless this problem is solved, it will be impossible for the works 
councils to deal with this issue in the future. 
Work organization and training 
It can be assumed - as previously outlined - that there are still strong 
leanings towards Tayloristic concepts of work organization with a high 
division of labour and polarization of skills. 
According to union concepts the utilization of new technologies should 
be designed in such a manner that two basic forms of work organization are 
realized: 
1 Diversified work tasks: an individual job should encompass self-
regulation in the execution of work, operations scheduling, executing 
and monitoring tasks and functions. 
2 Group work: in this case broad employee skills, and ideally a high, 
homogeneous qualification enable all employees to execute all tasks 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
within a certain area and to determine workplace rotation themselves. 
Qualified teamwork of this kind is regarded as a way to reduce work 
burdens and stress, attain a high level of skills and encourage solidarity. 
In both models the intention is to avoid unqualified and stressful residual 
work which arises in the loading and unloading areas of automated systems. 
These demands, which are in accordance with the course of manpower-
oriented work design outlined above, coincide with somewhat similar 
managerial concepts in a number of companies. Examples where manpower-
oriented work design are actually implemented can be found in the machine 
tool industry, where this kind of work has a long tradition, but also in the 
formation of teams for the monitoring, controlling and maintenance of 
flexible manufacturing systems and even in highly automated sections in the 
automotive industry. This type of personnel policy is generally restricted to 
circumscribed areas within the companies, however. Numerous residual jobs 
requiring unqualified workers remain (loading tasks, for example), and in 
many areas strong centralization tendencies are apparent. 
No matter what form of work organization gets introduced, the question 
of training remains crucial. In principle, unions as well as employers reckon 
with a growing demand for qualified workers and the existence of a current 
shortage of skilled workers. This is demonstrated by the fact that company 
expenditures on further training have multiplied over the last decade, 
although these training measures have been essentially oriented to 
company-specific adaptation to new technologies. 
The dispute between employers and unions on training concentrates on 
four points: 
1 company specific training, management's general objective, as opposed 
to training of a more general nature which can be of long-term use to the 
individual on the labour market; 
2 the restriction of access to further training by means of employer selec-
tion, as opposed to free access for all employees within the company 
wanting to pursue further vocational training; 
3 the attempts on the part of management to use further training measures 
to secure employee acceptance of rationalization measures without con-
sidering alternative forms of work design; and 
4 management attempts to circumvent the works councils' co-
determination rights concerning further training by carrying out in-plant 
further training measures in forms for which no such co-determination 
rights exist as of yet, such as small-group activities. 
The dispute leads back to two opposing training objectives: the companies 
are trying to achieve a higher level of skill in order to implement flexible 
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manpower utilization and fast adaptation to changes within the company, 
primarily by building up the core work-force; additional goals are to gain 
the acceptance of rationalization measures and avoid co-determination. 
The unions are trying to establish forms of further training to give the 
employees qualifications which will be of general use on the labour market 
in order to reduce employee risks in case of redundancy. Moreover, the 
unions calculate that a greater availability of skilled workers will serve to 
promote strongly those forms of work organization which can make use of 
these qualifications, secure or expand employee control over the work 
process, and allow room for individual development. 
As far as this question is concerned, the unions primarily rely on the 
works councils' capacity to achieve agreements within the individual 
companies to realize these goals. The works councils have a 
co-determination right concerning company further training measures (§ 98 
Works Constitution Act) which does not come into effect, however, when 
training measures are exclusively connected with company-specific 
requirements. In fact, this entire area does not belong to the works councils' 
traditional scope of activities. In those instances where the companies' 
'training offensives' are not connected with general questions of personnel 
planning and wage agreements - as is the case in some large firms - the 
works councils have hardly any influence. 
In the metal industry, a breakthrough occurred at the collective bargaining 
level with the 'new' general wage and salary agreement (I) in North-
Wurttemberg/North-Baden in 1988. The agreement aims, among other things, 
at the 'maintenance and broadening' of qualifications and is supposed to make 
it possible for individual employees to carry out a diverse range of functions. 
The agreement stipulates that the employer is obligated to provide information 
on (long-term) training needs due to technological and organizational changes 
and to discuss the issue once a year with the works council. In this way 
employee interests can be considered and possibly influence implementation 
of measures. The agreement does not give the works council co-decision-
making rights, nor does it include an obligatory training programme for all 
employees in a company. Also there is no guarantee for a job reflecting an 
employee's qualification level, or providing a corresponding job classification 
or remuneration. In any case, a more active role, one can even say politicized 
role, of the works council in a field that was previously neglected has, however, 
been achieved through the agreement. 
Wages and work design 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the grading of employees into wage 
groups is generally carried out on the basis of the requirements of the actual 
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workplace (using a method of analytical workplace evaluation). In the case 
of rationalization measures, this can have the effects described below. 
In those instances where the introduction of new technologies simplifies 
jobs - computer-aided typesetting methods in the printing industry for 
example - or when traditional, wage-compensated work burdens such as 
heat or noise no longer exist - downgrading (i.e. wage losses) may occur. 
Since traditional protection agreements only secure wages for a limited 
period of time, establishing jobs that make greater demands on skills and 
qualifications is a more lasting way of securing income. 
Therefore, unions have attempted to negotiate collective wage agree-
ments in a way that encourages management interest in a design of work 
processes that make greater demands on skills. 
The agreement on wage differentiation at VW (a company wage agree-
ment) is a first tentative step in this direction. Wage grouping is not 
determined by the actual jobs, but on a work system in the sense of 
diversified work tasks and group work. Wherever an employee works 
within this system, he earns a fixed wage for being able to meet system 
demands and requirements. This enables the company to make flexible use 
of personnel within the work process, with a minimum of administrative 
expenditures and complicated wage-calculation and without any problems 
for supervisors when employees have to rotate within the system. 
The union is ambivalent with regard to the attempt to link wages to 
individual qualifications (rather than work requirements). On the one hand, 
downgrading due to technological and organizational changes would not be 
possible; on the other, differences in social status would be rigidified. The 
Industrial Metalworkers Union tried to resolve this contradiction in a model 
wage agreement in one company (Vögele Wage Agreement 1982). 
In the Vögele case, wages are determined exclusively by individual 
qualifications (not by the actual job requirements), uniformly for all 
members of staff, including white-collar workers. Downgrading and 
resulting income losses due to decreasing work requirements caused by 
rationalization measures are therefore no longer possible. The agreement 
also lays down the conditions of technological and organizational design as 
well as work content: accordingly, employees are to be encouraged and 
given the chance to expand their know-how, a versatile use is to be made of 
their skills and work requirements and conditions which could lead to a 
reduction in performance and dequalification are to be avoided. This 
agreement can certainly be regarded as a considerable achievement in 
establishing a humane design of industrial work. However, the union was 
never able to establish similar collective wage agreements on a broader 
scale. Indeed, the German association of employers reacted to this setde-
ment by expelling the company from its ranks. It is apparent, however, that 
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the company has succeeded in increasing its staffs qualification level, 
motivation and orientation towards quality as well as achieving a high 
degree of flexibility as far as manpower utilization and adaptation is con-
cerned. 
Also on this issue, the 'new' collective agreement from North-
Wurttemberg/North-Baden in 1988 discussed above represented a 
broadening of former practice. Significant improvements were achieved by 
applying the (still used) analytical job evaluation at workplaces in which 
new technologies and new organizational forms were introduced. 
Moreover, the remuneration systems were adjusted to flexible and differing 
tasks, carried out by an employee within a single work area. The job 
classification was commensurate with the highest job requirements which 
were dealt with in a half-year period. 
Adapting the wage differentiation system in the Federal Republic to 
production methods with new technologies is no easy task. Both unions and 
companies find themselves confronted with contradictions with regard to 
this issue: 
1 Employers try to maintain wage differentiation as a way of controlling 
performance, a measure which at the same time impedes flexible utili-
zation of personnel and cooperation within a given work system. 
2 The unions are basically trying to reduce wage differentials, but are 
forced to adhere to the principle of performance related wage systems, 
because only in the latter case are they granted co-determination rights 
in wage design (according to the Work Constitution Act). 
The fact that an objective, analytical evaluation of individual performance 
is not possible in computer-aided, integrated technological systems and that 
certain tasks are decoupled from direct results in the work process has 
caused a trend towards payment systems artificially linked to performance 
and premium pay, etc. The unions aim to make these performance and 
working conditions part of the collective wage agreements. At present, the 
works councils can hardly make any legally based investigations on the 
connection between wages, performance and working conditions. 
Computer-aided monitoring of employee performance and behaviour 
Computer monitoring is a highly significant area of conflict in the utili-
zation of new technologies. The urgency of this problem is increasing in 
proportion to the new technologies which are being used to record and 
integrate production processes and personnel data. 
Up until the mid-1970s, personnel information systems were primarily 
being used for statistical and administrative purposes (recording of working 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
hours and wage accounting), whereas now they are increasingly deployed 
for planning purposes (personnel planning, for example). These systems 
can be used to monitor employee behaviour and performance when highly 
differentiated data concerning skills and qualifications, absenteeism, wil-
lingness to work overtime, etc. are linked with information concerning 
breakdowns, machine use, product quality, etc. (workshop-data processing-
systems). 
The unions criticize the development of a systematic evaluation using 
both data systems for its negative effects on employees, the most important 
being reduction of the scope for self-regulation on the shop-floor, selection 
of persons with under-average performance for expulsion from the core 
work-force, intensification of work by recognition of breaks in the work 
process and other similar factors. 
Basically the works councils do have co-determination rights regarding 
the introduction of technical equipment for monitoring behaviour and 
performance (§ 87,1(6) Works Constitution Act). It is from this legal basis 
that the unions derive the works councils' right to co-determine the design 
of data systems. 
The unions are concerned with two principles in influencing work 
design: 
1 Retention of a minimum of individual and collective scope for taking 
autonomous action on the job and also the preservation of employee 
production knowledge, thus securing a certain position of influence and 
power for the employee. 
2 Transparency of performance should not be exclusively a management 
privilege, otherwise the works councils' potential for negotiation and 
their strategies would be severely restricted. 
The severity of conflicts over these developments is due to the fact that 
central issues of company hierarchy are at stake. The interlinkage of per-
sonnel data and operational data enables the companies to pursue a form of 
personnel policy which is strongly anticipatory, disciplinarian and oriented 
to selection and which is not at the disposal of worker representatives. At 
present the works councils are decidedly unable to cope with these com-
plicated problems of technology and planning. The unions are trying to 
cope with this problem by offering works council members instruction in 
dealing with this new area, by defining the legality and illegality of in-
stances of technologically based monitoring by court order, and also by 
developing model-plant-agreements. Work disputes have already taken 
place in this area and employee awareness of these problems is particularly 
high, even though these control systems have not yet been widely 
implemented. 
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Flexibilization of working hours and employee status 
The disputes over new working hours policies in the Federal Republic are 
not only concerned with flexibilization or the effects of reduced working 
hours on employment. They also dealt with the employees basic right to 
have the power to dispose freely of 'working' and 'leisure' time. 
The dissemination of new technologies has made the flexibilization of 
working hours an issue of great importance; new technologies allow in-
creasing technological and organizational flexibility due to the possibilities 
of decoupling worker tasks from the production process; market develop-
ments and new logistic systems are impelling the companies towards 
flexible personnel policies; and lastly, the unemployment situation is 
demanding new concepts for regulating working hours. 
The employers are trying to use the separation of working hours and 
operational times to expand their companies' utilization periods. From the 
employer's viewpoint, a reduction of regulations concerning working hours 
will facilitate the following: adaptation of personnel volume to market 
fluctuations; expansion of operating times for machines or plant equip-
ment; the individualization of working hours; a rise in employment due to 
a larger number of part-time jobs (particularly by converting full-time jobs 
into part-time jobs); and lasdy, faster recruiting of new personnel due to 
less binding forms of employment contracts. For all of these reasons, 
flexibilization represents a new employer approach to working time policy. 
The unions are confronted with a two-sided problem: on the one hand, 
their goal is to create employment incentives by a reduction of working 
hours; within the context of the labour disputes in 1984 over the 38.5-hour 
week they had to concede the possibility of company specific solutions, 
thereby opening the door to flexible working hours. On the other hand, 
however, they must try and secure the so-called 'normal employment 
relationship', i.e. the permanent employment of individual employees. 
Only this form of employment provides an adequate individual income for 
a family, and also an adequate old-age pension on the basis of conventional 
legal and social security regulations. Finally, it is the 'normal employment 
relationship', i.e. the permanent integration of personnel as employees, on 
which the unions' own power rests. 
Within the Federal Republic of Germany, the deregulation of the 
'normal employment relationship' (particularly encouraged by the 
Employment Promotion Law 1985) has been resulting in an increasing 
tendency towards utilization of part-time work and temporary work, which 
are displacing full-time jobs. 
There are also contradictory interpretations of the employment incentive 
resulting from reductions in working hours. Employers give economic 
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growth rates the credit for new recruitments or slower rates of staff 
reduction, whereas the unions point to the effects of reduced working hours. 
The German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) states that the 
reduction of working hours by 1.5 hours for 4 million employees in 1985 
was responsible for 80,000 of the 250,000 persons newly employed 
(resulting in an employment effect of approximately 50 per cent in the areas 
direcdy affected by working hours' reduction). The metal workers union 
estimated, for 1987, (the year in which the 37.5-hour work week was 
introduced in the metal industry) 60 per cent of the reduced working time 
to have positive employment effects. 
The collective wage agreements of 1984 focused on the introduction of 
the 38.5-hour work week in the metal-processing and printing industries 
and in parts of the wood and plastic-processing industry. The employers, 
however, succeeded in establishing a flexibilization of working time, i.e. 
the hours set by the collective agreement only had to be met on average for 
all of the workers in an enterprise. Different groups of workers could have 
differing working hours ranging between 36 and 40 hours per week. This 
flexibilization (in 1987) was utilized by only 10 per cent of all companies, 
primarily large companies. 
The employers are continuing to pursue their aim of establishing more 
flexible working hours and they are now increasing incentives by offering 
tangible wage rises as an alternative to reductions in weekly working hours. 
While the metal workers union was originally reluctant to participate in 
the discussion on flexibilization, it could not avoid having to deal with this 
issue in the second half of the 1980s. What the union was and is demanding 
for the employees is currently being termed as 'autonomy of working time' 
or 'sovereignty of working time'. 
The most important points in the mid-1980s were: a maximum of eight 
working hours daily; a maximum of 40 working hours per week, and 
compensation in free time for any deviations in weekly working hours 
within two months; two work-free days on the weekends, which means 
particularly that Saturdays must be kept work-free; a maximum of 10 hours 
of overtime per month, and compensation for this with free time. 
The issues of variable shift times, variable forms of daily work and 
flexible working hours, etc. remain virulent. In 1990 the metal industry 
agreed to the introduction of the 35-hour week beginning in 1994. The 
agreement stipulates that work intensification through the shortening of 
work times should be prevented through special restrictions, and that 
performance should be defined and agreed upon at the enterprise level. 
Flexibility in working times was secured in that as much as 18 per cent of 
the employees in an enterprise can voluntarily extend their normal working 
time to 40 hours for which they can receive compensation in the form of 
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free time or extra pay. Overtime and the right to a free weekend remain 
regulated as described above. However, exceptions do exist and are 
increasing through special agreements at the enterprise level which has led 
to some conflicts between unions and work councils. The debate between 
worker representatives and employers continues to centre around these 
issues and on the relationship between working time and the company's 
operating time. 
These developments have had considerable consequences for work 
design and the quality of working life because flexible working hours and 
employee status are closely interrelated. For example, flexibilization tends 
to encourage an increase in marginal work-forces. This puts the works 
councils in an increasingly difficult position because flexibilization may 
secure positive working conditions for the core work-force, while reducing 
the works councils' potential to achieve a design of work which cor-
responds to the unions' concepts for a reduction in the division of labour, 
and which also secures the employees' legal status in the sense of a 'normal 
employment relationship'. 
At least within areas of mass production the flexibilization of working 
hours seems to add momentum to Neo-Tayloristic and centralistic work 
designs and to undermine the foundations of worker representation. 
Co-determination and work design 
According to the dual system of employee representation, the unions can-
not participate in the companies' design of technology and organization 
except within the framework of very general decisions that lie in the context 
of the 'Co-determination Law' of 1976. The previously mentioned 
collective agreements contain only limited possibilities for influencing the 
design of work. For years the unions have been trying to establish co-
determination rights pertaining to the introduction of new technologies 
within the context of the Works Constitution Act. However, at the moment 
the chances for this are rather poor. 
The works councils' opportunities can only be briefly sketched here. As 
far as central issues of work design are concerned, they only have rights of 
information and consultation. It is only in cases of work design with severe 
negative effects on employees that their co-determination rights come into 
play. In any case, the works councils' resources and information 
concerning technological and organizational changes have been rather 
deficient up to now. This is all the more so in the case of introduction of 
new technologies (see chapter 24). 
Co-determination at the workplace, with the direct participation of 
employees, has traditionally played a subordinate role in the official 
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policies of the German unions (while having caused much union-internal 
controversy). The objective of the Federation of German Trade Unions' 
(DGB) 'Co-determination Initiative' of 1984, however, was direct em-
ployee participation in bringing about a humane design of their own work. 
Of course, their participation was not intended to be independent of the 
institutionalized forms of worker representation, but to augment them. The 
models for direct employee participation are still in the discussion phase. 
The management of numerous companies have also initiated forms of 
employee participation along the principles of small-group activities. These 
have been met with considerable interest from employees who regard these 
participation forms as opportunities for making use of their skills and 
know-how to co-design their own work and cope with areas and tasks 
normally excluded from their work. Opposition arises (particularly in areas 
of performance and pay) where rationalization effects, due to work in 
quality circles for example, directly result in work intensification or staff 
cuts. 
A number of investigations have backed up union critiques that work in 
these small groups serves to promote strongly further rationalization and 
acts as a way and means of attaining relatively criticism-free acceptance of 
new technologies. These activities become particularly dubious as an 
instrument of participation in the case of complex, interconnected tech-
nological and organizational systems whose positive or negative effects on 
employees in other areas cannot be foreseen. 
Generally, the unions' position, particularly that of the metal workers 
union, is ambivalent on this issue. The use of small-group activities to 
establish other forms of participation apart from institutionalized worker 
representation is strictly rejected. On the other hand, the works councils' 
participation in these activities is regarded as a chance to achieve a certain 
degree of co-determination at the workplace and to harness employee 
motivation for union interests. Attempts are being made to use collective 
agreements within the company to influence the goals, participants and 
tasks of small-group activities, and these have already been partially 
successful. 
Employment protection and work design 
Employment protection is certainly the focal point of union policies and 
activities. The question is: can the issue of humane work design remain a 
priority despite the pressure the unions are under to first and foremost 
prevent personnel reductions? 
In the case of staff cuts, the measures taken by worker representatives 
are mainly defensive in nature and concerned with cushioning the impact 
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on employees. There are numerous highly complex forms of combined 
socio-political and collective agreements and regulations. Their effects 
centre on the 'balance of interests' anchored in the Works Constitution Act 
(§ 112), which then usually result in a social plan regulating severance pay, 
selection of persons to be dismissed etc. An influence on the actual design 
of work is usually not found in this context. The settlements within the steel 
and printing industry concerning the manning of jobs are an exception and 
rest on a long tradition. 
New forms of social planning are taking shape which could exert con-
siderable influence on training, manpower utilization and participation, i.e. 
the creation of employment plans rather than social plans. In this regard, the 
staff reductions which took place at one of the largest German companies 
in consumer electronics in the mid-1980s, was one of the first examples and 
still attracts considerable attention. 
The unions accepted the necessity of dismissing approximately 3,(XX) 
employees from this electronics company in Southern Germany. With the 
participation of local union representatives, company management and the 
works council worked out a social plan, according to which: 
1 Each worker affected by rationalization is given the opportunity for 
further vocational training at company expense. 
2 Dismissed employees receive government re-training support which is 
supplemented by company payments for a period of two years. 
3 Two equally staffed commissions were established with two objectives: 
one commission ('new production lines') analyzes new products and 
new markets in order to develop new employment possibilities and to 
secure locations of the plants. The second commission ('work design 
and training') is assigned with the task of determining the content of the 
re-training programmes and promoting the regional development of 
qualified jobs with humane working conditions. 
4 Employees over the age of 55 and those choosing to leave the work-
force are granted early retirement payments or severance pay according 
to conventional regulations. 
This case demonstrated the need for intervention into regional political 
structures to implement such far-reaching employment programmes. In this 
instance, new regional political activities involving local communities and 
authorities were initiated. These particular efforts have served to make the 
perspectives of controlling, shaping and designing technology and organi-
zation beyond the individual company level as well as within particular 
companies, and the importance of humane job design stand out as opposed 
to traditional protection measures against rationalization. 
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Union instruments for influencing technology and organization 
According to the concepts traditionally held by German unions, work is a 
process in which the individual should be able to find self-fulfilment and 
which should create social solidarity. Next to the protection against factors 
threatening basic living conditions, the shaping of technology and organi-
zation using the criteria of humane work design is presently (the end of the 
1980s), at least by virtue of this definition, an issue of nearly equal 
significance. 
Naturally the unions are active in all areas of social reform and social 
politics, and policies concerning technology are a central issue in our day 
and age. In addition to humane work design and co-determination, there are 
other demands being made on technology such as that of environmental 
compatibility, sensible use of natural resources, as well as disarmament. 
Aside from political campaigns and influencing the parties in parliament, 
the unions in the Federal Republic presently have little chance of influ-
encing the design of technology. The numerous technology development 
programmes - promoting micro-electronics, information and com-
munication technology, manufacturing technology - are all being carried 
out with minimal or no union participation at all (the Programme for 
Humanization of Working Life and the programme initiated in 1989, 'Work 
and Technology' being exceptions to this). 
Collective agreements remain the central instrument of union influence 
on the companies and thereby also on work design. In the Federal Republic 
collective agreements are usually valid for an entire industrial branch and 
for large regions (with the exception of special company collective agree-
ments, particularly in large-scale enterprises). Although a large number of 
collective agreements exist - in 1989 there were 32,000 valid collective 
agreements, 8,000 of which were company agreements - the basic 
tendency, at least within individual branches, is towards standardization of 
working conditions and employment status. This implies two things: 
1 An orientation towards what weaker companies can achieve and thereby 
a determination of the lower limits of the standards aimed for; and 
2 the realization, and, circumstances permitting, the improvement of 
general standards within the framework of the dual system of interest 
representation by the works councils. 
By their professional and strongly legalistically oriented courses of action, 
the works councils have so far been successful - at least to a certain extent 
- in realizing the second factor as far as wages and safety norms are 
concerned. The objective of influencing the design of technology, organi-
zation and working conditions, however, confronts the works councils with 
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totally new and unaccustomed tasks, for which their members are not at all 
qualified. Above all, this task is impossible to attain within the framework of 
traditional forms of participation and monitoring of adherence to given norms. 
In this difficult situation the unions are pursuing three strategies: 
1 They seek the conclusion of appropriate collective agreements. A model 
was presented in one area of the metal-processing industry in South 
Germany, which, however, was not realized (model of a collective Wage 
Framework Agreement for South Wiittemberg/Hohenzollern and South 
Baden 1982). This model agreement attempted to achieve a compre-
hensive regulation of the conditions of work and labour performance 
according to the criteria of a 'humane design of work' and contained 
numerous suggestions for regulations, such as job rotation and group 
work, company obligation to train all employees, fixing the relationship 
between wages and performance, etc. This model had up to 1990 never 
been implemented. 
2 The unions are also trying to instruct the members of the works councils 
in how to influence the design of work by making use of systematic 
combinations of existing legal regulations. The unions are also utilizing 
the research findings of the Programme for the Humanization of 
Working Life to present models of humane work design, to demonstrate 
their economic viability, and they are attempting to put these models 
into company practice via the works councils. The development of 
various forms of supportive material for the works councils is an 
essential task towards this end. The fact that the unions presently have 
few resources for these service tasks, is a crucial problem. 
3 Various forms of cooperation above the individual company level have 
come about, which, however, are still very heterogeneous and vary in 
scope. For example: union-organized consulting centres for the imple-
mentation of new technologies; collaboration with universities or 
research groups from the areas of social science and engineering 
science; collaboration of works councils from various companies on a 
regional level, so-called technology work groups or automation groups, 
particularly with the participation of union-oriented engineers, and other 
activities. 
CONCLUSIONS - PROBLEMS WITHIN THE DUAL SYSTEM OF 
E M P L O Y E E REPRESENTATION IN ESTABLISHING HUMANE 
WORKING CONDITIONS 
The conclusions presented here represent possibilities and should not be 
viewed as prognoses. They concern the unions' role in the establishment of 
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humane working conditions within the framework of the dual system of 
employee representation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Another 
important consideration that cannot be dealt with here is the effect of the 
unification of the two German states. 
The present wave of rationalization is by no means uniform. The type of 
new technologies, their scope and the period of time in which they are 
implemented depend on the economic and innovative potential of a par-
ticular company. This, in turn, differs according to industrial branches, 
regions, in-house personnel structures, the amount of qualified manpower 
on the labour market, etc. 
Basically, it can be expected that the working conditions of employees 
within the companies and also the conditions prevailing between the firms 
will become more heterogeneous in the next several years. Standardization 
of working conditions, to be brought about by the instrument of collective 
agreements valid for entire industrial branches and regions, is hardly 
realizable. In this way, the works councils' tasks will undergo a change, 
through the necessity of having to convert general perspectives of 
technological and organizational design into company specific imple-
mentations. 
The usual conclusion in industrial relations research is that this implies 
a loss in union functions and power and a concomitant increase in the works 
councils' influence and power.5 
This need not necessarily be so, however. While it may be the case 
within large-scale enterprises, in the automotive industry or the chemical 
industry for example, the majority of works councils in medium and small-
sized companies are increasingly unable to cope with these new tasks. New 
forms of union instruction and consulting and new union activities 
concerned with the co-design of technology and organization are the only 
way out of this impasse. 
Influencing the design of work necessitates a new way of asserting 
demands. It is no longer adequate for the works councils to concentrate 
solely on negotiating working conditions within the framework of 
collective agreements or that of the works constitution, or to 'enforce' 
regulations and see that they are adhered to. Influencing the design of work 
and technology means putting forth alternative concepts and not merely 
attempting to ameliorate negative effects. If this policy is carried out, it 
could become a new union instrument to mobilize and politicize the works 
councils, even when these concepts cannot be fully realized. 
In fact, initial steps in this direction can already be discerned. To the 
extent it is successful it would also serve to counteract the process of 
integration of the works councils into the interest sphere of their own 
companies, which some observers presume will take place. 
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There can be no doubt that the unions are thereby challenged to increase 
their consultation and service activities. This not only requires a redistri-
bution of union resources, but also new strategies of involving union 
members. There are tendencies pointing to the possibility that concepts and 
instruction measures could be developed on a regional level, which would 
focus directly on actual local problems. While this results in a certain 
amount of narrowing of the larger picture, a concentration of organizational 
resources and a process of union-internal democratization becomes 
possible. This process could serve to release new forces for mobilization, 
for example by reducing the communication deficiencies between the 
works council members of various companies within a region, by inte-
grating regional policies concerning infrastructure, location of plants etc. 
and also through the increased transparency of local union activities for the 
particular workers affected. These developments are more likely to 
strengthen the unions than to weaken them. 
In this context, the following is the most significant aspect: if the 
heterogenity of personnel within the companies causes the works councils 
to disintegrate by overburdening them with the task of having to represent 
widely divergent interests, and if the works councils do not succeed in 
integrating the groups of engineers and white-collar workers whose 
numbers continue to grow relative to blue-collar workers, then it will be 
most difficult to make the works councils effective. Al l attempts so far of 
involving engineers in union-oriented design programmes have met with 
limited success. 
The new technologies themselves have the potential to lend new power 
to the unions. The intra- and inter-company integration of logistic and 
distributive processes being brought about on the basis of the rapid 
development of information and communication technology make new 
strategies of labour disputes possible: spot strikes or conflict measures can 
result in extensive, far-reaching problems for the companies. The fact that 
works councils are not allowed to carry out strikes, points to the potential 
for strengthening unions rather than weakening them. 
The German unions cannot retreat from their traditional orientation to 
problems concerning society as a whole. Their moderate stand on social 
and wage policies was thus far pursued out of political consideration for the 
limited, but nevertheless significant co-determination and participation 
rights. In the 1980s, a process of social polarization took place within the 
Federal Republic of Germany which touched on the problem of 
unemployment and which caused this 'social contract' to crumble. New 
problems are arising due to the unification with East Germany. It not only 
strains the resources of the unions which, already in the 1980s, were too 
limited to solve the problems discussed here; more damaging, it once more 
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brings to the surface the issues of unemployment, regional differentiation, 
and the standardization of working conditions for all those employed. This 
leads to an important question: are the unions in danger of increasing this 
process of polarization by fighting for a humane design of work which 
primarily benefits those already employed, and then perhaps only members 
of the core work-force (and in the western part of the FRG)? 
Seen from the perspectives this paper has presented, the question can be 
answered without any reference to actual requirements of employment or 
social policies: the unions can only succeed in maintaining their own 
recruitment chances and the support and solidarity of their members, who 
are mainly skilled workers, if they manage to exert decisive influence on 
the working conditions of the core workers. This is the precondition for 
their power to improve the working conditions of the marginal workers, as 
well as influence the overall design of technology and work organization 
and thus, the employment situation as a whole. 
Influencing working conditions is a political concept and contains the 
vision of an active, purposeful design for the quality of working life as 
opposed to the rather vague compensation of negative social effects 
brought about by rationalization. 
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24 Rationalization Strategies and 
Representation of Worker 
Interests1 
Norbert Altmann 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on new rationalization strategies in industry and their 
effects on the representation of employee interests on the shop-floor level 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The three points that are dealt with 
are: which direction rationalization strategies will take; what opportunities 
employee representatives will have in influencing the design of technology 
and work organization; the problems faced by employee representatives in 
the FRG. 
The discussion confines itself to employee representation at the company 
level, that is on the activities of the works council, and concentrates on the 
manufacturing area within companies, primarily in the metal industry. 
Examples from the large enterprises in the automotive industry as well 
as smaller companies are given to elucidate the three points listed above. 
Companies of differing size and market dominance with strong and weak 
works councils are considered to point out the differences in work design 
and co-determination that can occur within companies, and the actual 
problems that arise in representing employee interests. 
RATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES 
' A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of Post-Taylorism.' Saturated 
sales markets and increasing international competition have made rapid 
product changes, the availability of a wide range of different models and 
types, high quality and short delivery periods, etc. a necessity. These are 
conditions, which could not and cannot be met by the traditional forms of 
Tayloristic and Fordistic work design. 
The question remains as to whether a new utilization of 'human re-
sources' to meet these conditions is really a central focus of new rationali-
zation strategies. 
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In the Federal Republic of Germany the concepts and ideas in work 
design which will play a central role in the future are often oriented to the 
so-called 'New Production Concepts' put forward by Horst Kern and 
Michael Schumann (1984). In the opinion of the authors, these concepts, 
propagated by a so-called 'enlightened' management, are an expression of 
company interest in achieving a better utilization of human resources. They 
are based on labour relations which, from the standpoint of management, 
are no longer regarded as being determined by a conflict of interest, but are 
viewed more in terms of 'mutual trust'. According to the 'New Production 
Concepts' there is a necessity for and a tendency towards re-
professionalizing manufacturing work for reasons of flexibility and quality 
assurance, as well as the objective of achieving maximum utilization of 
expensive manufacturing facilities, etc. 
This interpretation of new developments in work design is well accepted 
by employers in the FRG, as numerous official statements indicate. 
However, the assumptions concerning the segmentation of the labour force 
that derive from these concepts, which have also been described by the 
authors, are largely ignored. The unions are sceptical, but as they have 
placed great hopes on the development of more skilled work, particularly on 
skilled group work as the basis of a humane work design and greater chances 
for participation, the discussion going on within them is ambivalent. 
The topic is also highly controversial within the field of social sciences 
in Germany (Malsch, Seltz 1987; Dull 1985). Rather than enter into this 
debate here, it seems more fruitful to point out actual developments in 
rationalization strategies based on investigations carried out at the ISF 
(Dóhl et al. 1989; DeiB et al. 1989; Altmann, Sauer 1989). 
The point of departure of this research is the fact that within German 
industry a high degree of division of labour and central manufacturing 
control are still predominant organizational concepts. On the one hand, 
these organizational concepts are based on measures taken by management 
which are of a structurally conservative nature, and on the other hand, on 
the traditional attitudes prevailing among engineers. The latter tend to 
regard their own work designs in a rather exclusively technologically 
oriented manner, namely from the standpoint of pursuing what they 
consider to be the 'one best way', which usually means that of maximum 
control of the manufacturing process by means of control technology. This 
approach always involves the elimination of human intervention - the 
prime source of mistakes in the opinion of engineers - to the greatest extent 
possible. Moreover, this basic attitude of designers of technology goes hand 
in hand with the widespread assumption that workers will somehow find a 
way to adapt to the machinery once it has been installed. In their opinion, 
the problem of training can be solved by simplifying work. 
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The decisive factor, however, is not this structurally conservative and 
technology-centred point of view, and it is also not the concepts held by 
management, whether enlightened or not. Rather, the decisive factor is the 
strategic direction rationalization measures are taking which can be observed 
empirically and objectively and interpreted using capital utilization criteria. 
Under the present conditions of competition on the sales niarkets and the 
potential presented by information technology, rationalization is evidendy 
taking a new direction, one which we have termed 'systemic rationalization' 
(for a more detailed discussion of this concept, see chapter 4). 
This type of rationalization can be briefly characterized and summarized 
by the following three aspects: 
1 Rationalization strategies are no longer primarily oriented toward the 
performance of individual manufacturing processes or the efficiency 
and utilization rates of individual facilities, but instead toward optimal 
integration of all in-plant processes. New technologies tend to permit a 
more systemic kind of rationalization, which may not be pre-planned or 
consciously pursued in a systematic manner, yet which nevertheless 
effect the entire company and all areas of its production process. Con-
crete examples are the different ways and means that 'computer-
integrated manufacturing' (CIM) is applied. 
2 Besides this, the new type of rationalization strategically integrates 
supply, processing and distribution processes that take place outside the 
company, thus changing the division of labour between companies as 
well as the inter-company relationships which previously were 
determined by market and competitive forces and were regulated by 
contracts. With the help of information technology it has become 
possible to directly interlink company-external processes with in-plant 
operations. The companies' relationship to supply and sales markets as 
a whole is thereby subjected to rationalization measures. Examples of 
these developments are a number of new and different logistics systems, 
JIT-systems, etc. and new criteria of MOB-decisions. 
3 The new type of rationalization is characterized by what are seemingly 
contradictory objectives: on the one hand, flexibilization is intended to 
meet the new sales market requirements, on the other hand, in view of 
stiff competition, companies are seeking ways to reduce the cost of 
production at the same time. These conflicting objectives could not be 
attained through the use of conventional technology and organization. 
However, now it seems that the use of integrative organization and 
control technologies makes both objectives obtainable. This means that 
the flexible potential of human labour is no longer regarded as being the 
central issue of flexibilization and quality assurance, etc., for now the 
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potential for flexibility is contained in technology instead. The prime 
objective is to make the entire manufacturing system - from procure-
ment of parts and materials to the distribution of the finished product 
(including transport processes involved) - more productive and efficient 
over and beyond individual processes and plants; and also to reduce the 
amount of capital fixed in the system. 
This means that rationalization strategies are not specifically directed towards 
labour as a resource and therefore we cannot say that the end of Taylorism is 
in sight. What current rationalization strategies aim for is the utilization of 
flexible technology and the integration of all manufacturing, administrative 
and distributive sub-processes with the help of information technology: 
thereby perpetuating the division between planning and execution. 
It is quite clear that this does not mean that these developments eliminate 
the problem of human labour altogether or aim to establish 'full 
automation' or 'unmanned factories'. The practical problems are obvious, 
namely the considerable limits of control technology, the problems arising 
in cases of partial or insular implementation, interface problems between 
man and machine and between different systems, the lack of skilled 
workers in key positions or botdeneck areas, the diverging interests of key 
groups within the company, and last but not least, the limited experience of 
management in this field leading to exaggerated expectations based on the 
promises made by system manufactures and software houses. 
The potential implied by new technologies, however, is also evident: the 
tendency to achieve even greater integration which is generated by control 
systems once they are installed and the pressure to organize inter-company 
relationships in such a way that an integrated manufacturing process is 
brought about. The result could be called computer-based Neo-Taylorism 
with a new polarization of labour - not only within companies, but between 
them as well. It would be misleading to suggest that this new type of 
systemic rationalization is already widely established. However, it is 
definitely a direction in which strategies have been developing. 
THE REPRESENTATION OF E M P L O Y E E INTERESTS AND 
THE CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY AND W O R K 2 
Before dealing with the problems of employee representatives in coping 
with systemic rationalization, some remarks on the existing institutional 
structure of industrial relations in the Federal Republic of Germany may be 
useful. 
1 A characteristic feature of industrial relations in Germany is the strict 
division between industrial unions active on a supra-company level, 
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encompassing both region and industrial branch, and the internal com-
pany organs representing the employees, namely the works councils. This 
dual structure was regulated by the Works Constitution Act in 1972. 
Collective agreements represent the unions' central instrument in their 
dealings with the employers' associations. These agreements contain 
general provisions regulating the conditions of employment, the basic 
factors on which wages are based and the reference figures for wages. 
2 The works councils are entrusted with the task of giving concrete form 
to the collective agreements at the individual company level. Toward 
this purpose, an independent level of negotiation takes place between the 
works council and company management. The results of these negoti-
ations are generally formulated by company agreements. There are -
besides others - three characteristic aspects of this level of negotiation: 
firsdy, the strong orientation to regulations defined by Federal law and 
by collective agreements; secondly the commitment to achieving 
consensus stipulated by the works constitution (the spirit of mutual trust 
and ban of industrial actions based on works councils' decisions); and 
thirdly the cooperative and company-oriented attitude held by the works 
councils. 
3 In contrast to union organization in Great Britain and the United States, 
it was possible to cope with the social effects of the conventional forms 
of rationalization which have taken place step-by-step, point-for-point 
within this structural framework. The principles involved in this process 
have traditionally been the stabilization or increase of wages, employ-
ment security, and the reduction of work loads and stress or at least their 
material compensation. 
Up to now, one of the weaknesses of the German system of employee 
representation lay in the fact that the instruments of negotiation as defined 
by law and collective agreements did not permit any substantial inter-
vention in the technological and organizational design of work processes. 
The initial attempts toward achieving a so-called 'qualitative' collective 
bargaining policy (as opposed to a quantitative or wage-based policy), in 
effect since the beginning of the 1970s, which were geared toward the 
design of technology and work organization, have made few inroads so far. 
The basic demands centre on an abstract idea of 'humane design' of 
technology and work organization. Primarily this means the reduction of 
division of labour, particularly between planning and execution. 
Apart from eliminating or reducing stress, work loads, monotonous 
assembly-line work, and so on, the concrete demands focus on three points: 
1 the creation of meaningful and comprehensive work content granting the 
individual worker a broader scope for taking action and making 
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decisions, and allowing the integration of mental and physical demands 
made on workers, in other words, diversified jobs; 
2 the development of group work, for which numerous individual aspects 
are defined, such as the number of group members, the wage structure, 
the exact definition of tasks, etc.; and 
3 all aspects of these demands for the design of work forms and work 
organization include co-designing training for such jobs. 
Al l in all, the unions' primary goal is not the pursuit of protectionist and 
compensatory policies, although these are still necessary and are also 
undertaken, but rather that of gaining some kind of control over 
technological/organizational developments, and of obtaining a certain 
amount of influence on the design of technology and work organization at 
the company level (see chapter 23). 
If it were really true that the general thrust of rationalization strategies 
were going in the direction of re-professionalization of production work, 
and the division of labour were dissolving, then the demands which the 
works councils have made on work design in terms of job diversification, 
group work and training would be welcomed with open arms. 
This is, however, clearly not the case. If we look at the automotive 
industry, for example, we cannot speak of an end of Taylorism. Of course 
it cannot be ignored that numerous pilot projects and measures have been 
carried out in this industrial branch which were influenced by Japanese 
management concepts, experiments in the United States or in Scandinavia 
(at Volvo, for instance) and which in the FRG were also brought about due 
to the support of strong works councils. 
Nevertheless, the picture that emerges from the findings of a number of 
different investigations and studies is that no long-lasting or revolutionary 
changes have come to pass as the following examples indicate (Jurgens et 
al. 1989; Klebe, Roth 1987; Roth, Kohl 1988; in the sense of 'new pro-
duction concepts' Kern, Schumann 1984). The largest share of tasks still 
involve direct manual labour (in parts assembly and final assembly, for 
example) which is mostly simple, semi-skilled work. In assembly processes 
we find forms of work design that were basically developed back in the 
1970s under the key word 'work-structuring' (job-enlargement for various 
tasks requiring the same level of skill; job rotation and decoupling from 
rigid machine cycles, etc.) These measures, however, amount mainly to a 
new performance policy (Altmann et al. 1982). They serve to exploit 
existing tacit skill potential which was previously blocked by a rigid 
division of labour, and also enable a more flexible utilization of labour. 
This, in turn, allows tighter staffing and cost savings, due to the fact that 
personnel can be utilized more intensively. Flexible utilization of labour 
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makes possible the reallocation of individual workers to similar workplaces 
where they are able to replace absent colleagues. This tighter manning can 
also be used for a step-by-step selective elimination of personnel, thereby 
enhancing the average skill level. In this sector, meaningful job tasks and a 
greater scope for self-determination on the job are more side effects than 
anything else. 
In areas with a higher degree of automation (in the pressroom or metal-
working departments, for example) there is an increased utilization of 
skilled workers, although their numbers are still limited. These workers 
have to deal with tasks relating to maintenance, quality assurance, program 
adjustment and production control. There are numerous ongoing experi-
ments strongly geared to a general utilization of skilled workers. However, 
there are diverging opinions about whether these forms of work will 
actually be established on a broader scale. In any case, it is not possible to 
conclude that an increase of average skill level within individual work 
processes will result in a requalification of manufacturing work. These 
higher average skill levels are the result of the quantitative reduction of 
lesser skilled tasks, such as loading, and the integration of maintenance 
tasks into manufacturing work. 
Accordingly, this development has resulted in a qualitative and 
quantitative erosion of previously independent tasks and areas, such as 
maintenance and repair. Al l in all, this amounts to a restructuring of the 
work-force at the plant level in which skilled workers perform manu-
facturing work and lesser skilled workers are eliminated. In general semi-
skilled workers have little chance of assuming the role of skilled worker 
through company training measures or on the basis of their experience. 
The monitoring of complex equipment by so-called system leaders does 
not typify the future of work, but instead documents the fact that a few key 
positions will arise at the critical interface areas between central control and 
fine tuning on the shop-floor level. While the range of tasks to be coped 
with in these positions is broad and diversified, they do tend to increase 
segmentation of work as a whole. 
Group work does exist in the sense of so-called system supervision 
teams which have a higher and more homogeneous level of skill and cope 
with larger facilities and manufacturing systems. Experience gained to date 
on the effects of group work indicates the following: first, far reaching 
training measures for so-called 'polyvalent hybrid skilled'3 workers are 
reduced, because these workers cannot really make use of their broad range 
of skills in everyday work; second, the self-determination of work within 
the group results in new forms of division of labour and specialization, 
particularly in order to meet the demands for a rapid attendance to break-
downs and failures; while third, self-selection processes are triggered off by 
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which those group members who are substandard in terms of perfor- mance 
and skills are pushed out of the groups, thus forming the basis for a gradual 
selection of certain personnel and eventually, personnel reduction. 
Naturally training measures play a considerable role here and all auto-
mobile manufacturers invest substantial sums and didactic know-how in 
such training. It must be emphasized that these training measures are 
strongly geared to meet current, company specific requirements, and that 
the selection of trainees is primarily decided by members of medium and 
lower management. By no means can it be said that this training is 
accessible to all interested persons. 
The possibilities for comparing operational data and performance data 
give rise to new forms of monitoring, or at least a new dimension to 
supervision, even in view of the fact that direct performance monitoring by 
technical means is not permitted without co-determination of the Works 
Council (§ 87,6 Works Constitution Act). In large-scale companies in the 
automobile sector numerous company agreements have been concluded 
with the aim of restricting the connection between personnel information 
systems and production data acquisition (PDA). 
These forms of work readily portray a type of rationalization which is 
technology-centred and geared toward central control which only builds up 
skilled and engaged personnel in certain key positions. 
Today, the decisions made at the headquarters of large automobile 
manufacturers not only affect their own manufacturing sites, performance 
and output targets, but direcdy or indirectly determine the suppliers' pro-
ducts, manufacturing methods, scheduling, and ultimately the conditions of 
work in supplying firms. Initial CAD/CAM integration between auto-
mobile manufacturers and suppliers on the basis of standardized, manu-
facturer-unspecific data transfer systems, just-in-time (JIT) connections 
with flexible delivery calling, detailed specifications for methods of quality 
assurance and control, etc. represent considerable demands being made on 
the suppliers' capacity to adapt in terms of technology and organization, 
quite apart from the pressure of international competition to which these 
companies are exposed. 
Systemic rationalization forms are directed toward the entire context of 
the manufacturing process, from material and particularly the parts supply, 
all the way through to distribution of the finished product. In what way will 
these forms of rationalization actually affect the suppliers? 
The specific situation of suppliers is too complex to go into here in 
detail, especially in light of the diversity in companies that would have to 
be considered (for a discussion of suppliers problems see chapter 22; 
Altmann, Sauer 1989). The decreasing number of parts and components 
manufactured by the automobile manufacturers themselves and increasing 
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product complexity certainly offer opportunities for suppliers. Yet, at the 
same time, as the German magazine Manager put it, the supply companies 
have the automobile manufacturers 'breathing down their neck'. The 
general trends are well known: the increasing dualism of suppliers with a 
capacity for development and innovation on the one hand, and those who 
are no more than an extended work bench on the other; reduction of direct 
supply and single sourcing, the pressure to change locality in order to adapt 
to the manufacturers; far-reaching specifications concerning the purchase 
of material, manufacturing methods and quality assurance; the trend toward 
component assembly at the supplier level; initial CAD/CAM integration; 
manufacturing and delivery on call; integration into just-in-time systems, 
etc. 
How do these developments, which are an important part of the 
rationalization measures taken by the automobile manufacturers, affect the 
employees in supplier companies? Some factors are: 
1 Relocation to the proximity of automobile manufacturers in order to 
secure just-in-time delivery may have considerable effects on employ-
ment and unemployment in the original locations. 
2 Production synchronous manufacturing and just-in-time systems often 
result in structures of working hours in supplier companies which 
threaten to become increasingly difficult to control, leading to overtime, 
short-time work, flexible working hours, weekend work and the utili-
zation of temporary work and fixed-term work contracts. 
3 In cases in which suppliers fulfil the function of extended work benches, 
more unskilled and repetitive forms of work will be the result. 
Al l in all, the integration of suppliers into the logistics chain makes them 
increasingly dependent - with the exception of large-scale enterprises in the 
electronics industry and other similar big suppliers. Management within the 
dependent companies becomes less capable to manoeuvre as far as the 
design of technology and work is concerned. 
Highly significant is the fact that, apart from the automotive industry, we 
have been able to discern similar developments in other industries, for 
example in a branch of the consumer goods industry (i.e. furniture manu-
facturing; see Dohl et al. 1989; DeiB et al. 1989). Here the new forms of 
company internal, integrative rationalization as well as the inter-company 
division of labour and supply have brought about even more problematic 
effects on employees than those occurring within the auto industry. One 
such effect is the industrialization of small crafts businesses, which came 
about through the concentration of production of parts and components in 
series, and resulted in a considerable trend toward dequalification for the 
employees. Another example is the shifting of work processes involving 
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dangerous materials into the small business sector, where an adequate 
know-how in dealing with such materials is lacking. 
THE PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTING E M P L O Y E E INTERESTS 
IN COMPANIES 
It is clear that the representatives of employee interests can hardly ride on 
a wave of mutual interest with management as far as the reduction of 
division of labour and the end of Taylorism are concerned. In fact, shifts in 
work design generate new problems. 
One must realize that union programmes addressing possible future 
forms of work design place a further burden on employee representatives at 
the firm level in coming to terms with the new, systemic-oriented rationali-
zation forms. This is the case because collective agreements formulate their 
demands in an increasingly general form. It is up to the works councils to 
give these demands a concrete form. This is the reason why some scientists 
and unionists refer to a shift of employee interest representation to the 
company level: meaning that the power of the works councils on the 
company level is on the rise, while the role of the unions is being reduced 
to the function of a service institution (see Midler-Jentsch 1988a). 
This is a rather lopsided picture, however. Large and strong works 
councils, and this is particularly the case in the automotive industry, are 
capable, under certain circumstances, of concretizing the skeletal specifi-
cations of programmes without union help. However, the works councils in 
economically weak industrial branches or enterprises, or in small firms, 
might not succeed in this task even with the help of union counselling, let 
alone without it, especially in industrial branches outside of the metal 
industry (with regard to automobile suppliers see Doleschal 1989). An 
important aspect of this issue is the basic question of what is involved when 
union policies try to introduce their demands on the design of work and 
technology at a political level. 
It is true that the works councils in the automotive industry have suc-
ceeded in achieving some spectacular co-design measures. But they are 
also proof of the fact that even strong works councils have difficulty in 
breaking through the technology-oriented design concepts of systemic 
rationalization. And when they do succeed, it is usually in limited areas. 
These few cases serve as models for alternative and humane forms of work 
design. 
One example is group work, which has been acclaimed worldwide as 
representing a humane and also productive form of work. However, group 
work in the German automotive industry is to be found only in mechanized 
and automated processes such as pressrooms, foundries, metalworking 
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shops, body assembly and paint shops. In these areas, as mentioned above, 
what is primarily involved is the monitoring of complex manufacturing 
facilities and the integration of control tasks, maintenance and repair, 
trouble-shooting and sometimes also the fine tuning of control pro-
grammes. Mainly, when we talk about group work at present, we are talking 
about pilot and experimental programmes. Al l in all, there is only a small 
number of mostiy skilled workers employed in some type of group work in 
the automotive industry. (For example, of programmes initiated by the 
works councils, about 7,000 workers out of about 450,000 employees in the 
automobile industry were involved in some form of group work in 1988). 
What is more, apart from system supervision teams, several work groups 
only came about due to the pressure exerted by works councils. In these 
instances, the conflicts concentrated firstly on the integration of lesser 
skilled employees (instead of selective processes to eliminate them) and 
secondly on the introduction of wage systems for these groups, which 
would dampen individual competition and which would compensate for the 
increased demands made by the rotating job assignments within a given 
system (Brumlop 1986). The works councils have only succeeded in 
achieving these aims to a limited extent. 
What are the problems which the many, yet in most cases, weaker works 
councils face outside of the automotive industry, in supplier companies or 
in those industrial branches which are economically weaker and less 
organized in terms of employee representation? 
The following points touch on some problems which have their ob-
jective basis in the systemic character of company internal integration and 
in the structure of conventional interest representation (Altmann, Dull 
1987). As a scenario we have chosen the gradual, but still difficult imple-
mentation of individual components of CIM - i.e. CAD, C A M or 
production planning and control systems (PPC) etc. - which tend to be 
oriented to centralized control. 
The effects resulting from integration based on data technology within 
the company (as caused by CAD/CAM, for example) and between com-
panies (between client and supply companies, for example) are difficult for 
the works councils to assess. Past experience is no longer applicable. Once 
decisions have been made in favour of comprehensive systems which are 
open for further expansion, and the latter are installed, it is almost im-
possible to correct the effects. The works councils are understaffed and lack 
the required know-how to cope with this situation. 
The problem of obtaining information undergoes a complete change. Up 
to now it was primarily a question of prompting management to provide 
timely and comprehensive information (Bóhle 1986). But how is the 
information provided by management on manpower-relevant aspects of 
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technology implementation going to be judged? Even for management, 
especially in smaller companies, it is difficult to objectively assess the 
implications of introducing various new technologies and control systems, 
as well as their possible extensions. Thus the required implementation 
period and the necessary skills are generally underestimated. At the same 
time, the works councils are no longer able to draw on traditional sources 
of information such as persons responsible for the manufacturing area or 
members of personnel management. Information channels to those 
promoting computer-based integration measures, such as project groups of 
engineers and planners do not exist, and, in any case, communication 
between the two parties on technical subjects is nearly impossible. Com-
munication from the bottom upward, from the work-force, is also 
negligible, due to the fact that they have little or no experience with the new 
rationalization measures. 
In the Federal Republic the traditional provisions of protection against 
rationalization only come into effect when a direct connection can be 
proved to exist between the rationalization measures and their effects on 
personnel or an individual person. In the case of integration measures it is 
difficult to prove such a connection. The reasons for rationalization and the 
effects on personnel are usually not connected to each other: the redun-
dancies or transferrals of employees occurring in such cases often take 
place in upstream or downstream company areas, or in supply companies or 
downstream firms, such as repair workshops. The same thing holds true for 
the demands made on altered structures of working hours or for demands 
made on skills, etc. This means that it becomes increasingly difficult to 
apply the corresponding laws, collective agreements and company agree-
ments. The interaction between management and works councils is beset 
with mutual uncertainty and lack of calculability and the conventional 
forms of solving conflicts lose their effectiveness (Köhler et al. 1987; Deiß 
1988). 
It remains difficult to estimate in what way the structures of personnel 
and skills within the companies will change; it is virtually impossible to 
make any generally valid predictions. Any statements made must do justice 
to the particular company and other industrial branch-related aspects. It is 
certain, however, that the weight given to various employee groups will 
shift and thus the basis of employee interest representation within the 
company. Competing interests among the employees, particularly those of 
the rationalization winners and the rationalization losers, will have an effect 
on the works councils and will make it difficult to achieve a uniform 
definition of problems, negotiation concepts and design objectives. It will 
be difficult to standardize negotiation results attained within a given 
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company in other companies or throughout an entire industrial branch. 
Thus a pillar of solidarity and labour mobilization will break apart. 
Employee training, or at least their adaptation to new technologies, will 
become more important for the companies; of course, the same also holds 
true for employees. Traditionally, the sectors of training and re-training 
have not been a central focus of negotiation for the works council, although 
a limited right of co-determination does exist. Both sides have a growing 
interest in training and it will certainly become an area of conflict due to 
contradictory interests: for one, re-training is connected with the selection 
of individual workers instead of ensuring comprehensive training for all; 
furthermore, some forms of re-training, for example in quality circles, are 
carried out in a way that primarily ensures the acceptance of company 
measures and thereby undercuts the co-determination rights of the works 
councils; and lastly, it will be difficult to translate the newly acquired skills 
into higher wages, as they do not fit into the traditional job evaluation 
criteria. 
New technologies offer new and considerably enlarged potential for 
centralized monitoring and control of performance and employee 
behaviour. This has often been paraphrased as the development toward the 
'transparent employee'. Of course, this is currently more a matter of dis-
cussion than actual reality - apart from those exceptions which must 
nevertheless be taken seriously. Management's increasing potential for 
acquiring information concerning the work situation and employee be-
haviour deprives the works council of its up to now 'exclusive, hands-on' 
knowledge and thus its basis for demands, negotiation leeway and 
mobilization. 
Al l of this is hard to reconcile with the unions' demand for a 'humane 
design' of technology and organization. Works councils in small and 
medium-sized companies hardly have any chance of receiving direct advice 
from their unions when new technologies are introduced, or in those cases 
where such technologies are forced upon their company from the outside 
within the context of integration measures. Here, the classic forms of union 
education prove inadequate. By no means is it possible to turn works 
councils into broad-based experts; however, they must at least be capable 
of making well-founded and viable demands on company experts and on 
management if they wish to achieve anything at all. Whether they will be 
able to count on the help of union-oriented engineers, computer scientists 
or similar employee groups must remain totally open at the present time. 
A second scenario of systemic rationalization deals with the inter-
company division of labour and integration. The effects that rationalization 
measures have on upstream and downstream companies are not considered 
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at all by the works councils of those companies from which they originate. 
Traditionally, there has been virtually no contact between the works 
councils of companies which are part of a logistics chain. (Incidentally, this 
is quite in contrast to the many efforts made by the management of supplier 
companies to keep in touch with each other and find a joint approach to at 
least some of their problems.) This occurs all the more because the supply, 
service and trade relations of these companies extend beyond regional 
boundaries and the limits of industrial branches and thus go beyond the 
scope of the industrial unions. 
The works councils in upstream and downstream companies cannot 
count on receiving any information or help from their colleagues. In so far 
as we are talking about works councils of small and medium-sized 
suppliers, they are in a much weaker position from the start. In such 
companies, management's capacity for devising strategies is more or less 
limited, particularly when the company is part of a technological and 
organizational integration concept, via delivery systems, for example. Such 
companies not only have to cope with pressure exerted on prices by the 
purchasing companies, but must handle extensive demands on the tech-
nological and organizational design of their own manufacturing processes. 
It is decisive here that it is not only a matter of the company's own 
machinery and facilities; integration into a wider system as we have shown 
- directly affects the skills structure of the employees, the time structure of 
work, etc. The extension of integration measures requires negotiations and 
agreements with the superordinate companies, and possibly with external 
advisors, in which the works councils cannot take part according to present 
works constitution and co-determination laws. Management of supplier 
companies may make tactical use of their limited capacity for devising 
strategies by pressuring the works councils to accept certain measures lest 
the company's existence be threatened. 
In sum: in most cases there is no forthcoming information or cooperation 
whatsoever from the works councils of the superordinate companies which 
could provide the works councils of dependent companies with an indi-
cation of how external rationalization measures might affect staff within 
their own companies. 
The basic question of the out-sourcing or the re-integration of pro-
duction is also a special problem for the works councils of the large, 
dominant companies: make-or-buy decisions are no longer solely deter-
mined by economic and market criteria, but also by whether or not suppliers 
can be integrated into the overall logistic chain by means of data transfer 
technology. In such instances the works councils have virtually no chance 
of influencing MOB decisions. Even in cases where at least some rights to 
check on out-sourcing decisions have been granted, as was the case in a 
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large-scale company in the Federal Republic at the end of the 1980s, there 
is no feedback at all on the effects on employment in the given supplier 
companies. 
This 'non-relationship' between the works councils even extends into 
subsidiaries of one company. In instances where there are formal relation-
ships, via the general enterprise works council, for example, or through 
direct personal contacts, interplant relations are often deliberately blocked 
off and information withheld when it is a matter of employment security at 
one's own location. This 'non-relationship' is even more pronounced 
where the connections extend beyond the boundary of a given industrial 
branch, i.e. in instances where the respective union cannot be called upon. 
In this context, one should keep in mind that when regional union repre-
sentatives are summoned by the works council, in principle they are only 
concerned with solving the problems of the given company. These 
problems are beginning to get recognized and at least within the automotive 
industry, a change in attitude is beginning to occur at the regional level. 
Al l in all, the unions are faced with a critical and completely unsolved 
organizational problem, namely the organization of employee interest 
representation throughout the logistics chain. This is all the more a problem 
in that concepts for coordinating the works councils must not only extend 
beyond the individual companies, but also beyond entire industrial 
branches. Global sourcing and internationalization of the firm itself (for 
example, in connection with the European Common Market) will intensify 
this problem - not to mention 'new problems' caused by the integration of 
newly installed works councils in the region of the former GDR. Its solution 
is an urgent task which the industrial unions will not be able to ignore much 
longer in view of systemic rationalization in the form of inter-company 
integration and internationalization. 
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Notes 
1 NO END IN SIGHT - CURRENT DEBATES ON THE FUTURE 
OF INDUSTRIAL WORK 
1 There are a number of works in German on the development of German 
industrial sociology. A few examples are: Lutz, Schmidt 1977, from the per-
spective of ISF; Schmidt 1974, in the context of European and American 
industrial sociology; Schmidt et al. 1982; and Pries et al. 1989; 1990, on the 
1980s; Brandt 1990, with regard to Marx's influence on German industrial 
sociology. Foreign language analyses on this subject can be found in Lutz 1978; 
Altmann 1987. 
2 This is one source of the difficulty in translating the texts in this volume. 
References to social theory and specific theoretical traditions oblige the use of 
special terms even in detailed analyses of particular technological and work 
systems (see chapter 2). See Lutz, Schmidt 1977 for a more detailed discussion 
of this issue. 
3 A good overview of the German discussion on social scientific research 
methods and an extensive bibliography can be found in Kern 1982. 
4 A number of methods are used simultaneously or successively in the case study: 
expert interviews, intensive interviews, group discussions, various forms of 
analyzing jobs and work processes, analyses of company materials, company-
related analyses of the regional labour market, and local conditions surrounding 
the company. More in-depth questioning of the labour force generally proceeds 
with partially standardized interviews that are mostiy based on the experiences 
gathered from the qualitative methods. 
5 See the comprehensive literature in the Federal government's research project 
'Humanization of Working Life'; on the international discussion Coriat 1982; 
Hirschhorn 1984; Knights, Willmat 1985; Blackburn et al. 1985. Important 
contributions on this subject are: Mickler 1981; Dohse et al. 1984. From ISF: 
Asendorf-Krings 1979; Altmann et al. 1982a; Drexel 1981; 1981a; 1982; 
Drexel, Nuber 1979; Köhler, Schultz-Wild 1985; Lutz 1976,1981a, 1982a. 
6 See Brandt 1981, 1986, 1990; Benz-Overhage et al. 1982; Bergmann et al. 
1986; Malsch, Seltz 1987; Jürgens et al. 1989; Pries etal. 1989,1990; and many 
others. 
7 The work of ISF is based on theoretical considerations, which cannot be 
presented in detail here, known as the 'Munich Betriebsansatz (strategy 
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approach),' which achieved wide recognition in German industrial sociology. 
See Altmann, Bechtle 1971; Altmann et al. 1978; Bechtle 1980. 
2 STRANGER IN PARADISE - AN AMERICAN'S 
PERSPECTIVE ON G E R M A N INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY 
1 This paper is based on several years' experience working in German research 
institutes, discussions with other strangers grappling with the intricacies of 
German social structures and institutions, and explanations from willing 
German colleagues about their society and their research. 
2 Interestingly enough, quantitative data analysis has gained momentum in 
German academic circles in recent years. Influences from abroad, pressure from 
companies and government agencies, the increased attempt to 'market' results, 
and desires to be legitimated through the use of numbers, even questionable 
ones, all have led to this development. Ironically, in the United States, historical 
sociology and more qualitatively directed research are gaining ground, probably 
for the same reasons that the opposite trend is occurring in Germany. 
3 Having an 'Abitur' does not rule out the vocational education route. Several 
training programmes, particularly in the white-collar sector, prefer their partici-
pants to have completed gymnasium. 
4 Union structure is unusual in German institutional forms in the way boundaries 
between worker classifications and employee types are crossed. This came 
about because, after the Second World War, unions decided that they should not 
compete with one another, as politically based unions do, and decreed that only 
one union could exist in a particular industry (Industriegewerkschaft) and, 
above all, for all employees (both blue- and white-collar) in one plant 
(Einheitsgewerkschaft). 
Unlike the United States, in Germany, a particular industrial union (from the 
German Federation of Trade Unions, DGB) has the right to represent all of the 
employees in that industry, and all firms belonging to the employer association are 
bound by its agreements. (The situation for small general unions such as the 
Federation of the Christian Unions (CGB) or White Collar Worker's Union (DAG) 
is somewhat different. They can represent employees across industrial lines, but 
have little influence.) Employees themselves decide whether they personally want 
to be union members. In 'closed or union shops' in the United States, the employees 
vote for or against unionization and a certain union. If the majority votes pro-union, 
all employees covered by union agreement must be members. 
5 This is a complicated issue since the relationship between skill, job classifi-
cation and wage differs by industry and private and public sector in Germany. 
Here we are speaking only about the manufacturing sector such as the auto 
industry, metalworking industry, electrical industry, etc. 
3 THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POST-TAYLORISTIC 
RATIONALIZATION AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF 
INDUSTRIAL WORK 
1 This chapter was written in the context of the ISF project 'B2' on post-
Tayloristic rationalization in conjunction with the special research unit SFB 
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333. It is based in part on the results of the research presented in Part DI of this 
volume. 
2 This path refers to Peter F. Drucker, an American specialist on organization, 
author of Concept of the Corporation (1972b), who has written extensively on 
humanistic forms of work organization. 
4 SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION AND INTER-COMPANY 
DIVISIONS OF LABOUR 
1 This article is based on empirical research on rationalization in the German 
furniture-making industry, carried out between 1983 and 1985, and on research 
dealing with the establishment of new relationships between manufacturers and 
suppliers in the automobile industry, which consisted of intensive case studies 
in different branches of that industry. The most important publications coming 
out of this research are: Altmann et al. 1986; Dohl et al. 1989; DeiB et al. 1989; 
Altmann, Sauer 1989, and DeiB et al. 1990. 
2 It has become increasingly difficult to make a conceptual distinction between 
technology and organization at the company level in developed capitalist coun-
tries. Hierarchical organizational constraints are built into the organization of 
information and communication technologies and are inseperably inter-
connected within organization technology. Thus, organization technology's 
function in the process of rationalization - mediated by production techniques 
and labour - is to bring about and control the entire organizational network or, 
in other words, to coordinate all productive work (see Brandt et al. 1978). 
3 As a result, new dependencies as well as new sectoral and industrial structures 
develop (for more on this issue, see the contributions in: Altmann, Sauer 1989 
andBieber, Sauer 1991). 
4 This is not contradicted by the fact that the application of systemic rationali-
zation measures has significant effects upon workers. We would like to point 
out here, for instance, that tendencies toward extensive utilization of tech-
nological equipment have led to an enormous increase of work at night and on 
Saturdays (as well as to a debate on the extension of work to Sundays). In line 
with the often discernible reduction of in-house manufacturing in the centres of 
capital accumulation (see pp. 56-9), this extension of de facto work hours also 
effects upstream production stages. 
5 ON THE HISTORY OF NC-TECHNOLOGY - DIFFERENT 
PATHS OF DEVELOPMENT 
1 The issues raised here represent preliminary hypotheses and findings coming 
out of an ongoing research project at the ISF in Munich (see Hirsch-Kreinsen 
1989). The empirical basis of the following arguments are the extensive 
material laid out by David Noble (Noble 1979; Noble 1984) concerning NC-
development in the United States, and about a dozen detailed conversations 
conducted mainly in 1988 with experts who had a large role in the development 
of NC-technology in Germany. The undoubtedly important role of Japan in the 
general issue of NC-development is not dealt with here due to the preliminary 
nature of the work presently underway. 
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6 THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 
M A R K E T S IN SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION PROCESSES 
1 This chapter is based on part of the results of an extensive empirical investi-
gation which was carried out on the subject of changing rationalization 
strategies in the furniture industry, the machine tool industry and the foundry 
industry. The study was completed in 1987; the findings on the furniture 
industry have since been published (DeiB et al. 1989; D5hl et al. 1989); see also 
chapter 15. A less detailed version of this paper was the basis for a presentation, 
later published in Lutz (ed.) 1989. 
2 Two points should be made here: (1) These two trends represent widespread 
marketing strategies, which can be plausibly argued at a theoretical level; they 
are, however, ideal-typical forms, and thus not completely generalizable. (2) We 
view firms who belong to a widespread 'middle group', not dealt with here, who 
try to pursue both market strategies or try to market products somewhere between 
exclusive and mass-produced, in danger of disappearing from the market. At the 
same time, if firms from the two types described above manage to obtain an 
economic and technological-organizational foothold, they are in a good position 
to eventually pursue both strategies. In this context, a selection and centralization 
process takes place, which could conceivably cause a convergence of the two 
market strategies. This process is too complex to go into detail here. 
3 At this point, it should be pointed out that the existing (or potential) network of 
supplier relations effects the solution to these problems (see DeiB 1989; Dohl 
1989, and chapter 22 of this volume). 
7 THINKING MACHINES, DREAMING ENGINEERS? 
TOWARDS APPLIED EXPERT SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY 
1 This chapter was written in conjunction with the German Senate's Investigatory 
Commission on Technology Assessment. An earlier version, under the title, 
'Evaluation of Expert System Applications in Industrial and Service Environ-
ments', appeared in: T. Bernold, U. Hillenkamp (eds): Expert Systems in Pro-
duction and Services II, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam/Oxford/New 
York/Tokyo 1989, pp. 130-146. 
2 In the third case the utilization depends on the source of the shortage, that is the 
company interpretation of the source, whether this is personnel policy, the 
labour market or any other factor. 
3 Government-defined vocational training of skilled workers according to 
specified occupations, usually a 3 1/2-year apprenticeship, with alternate 
training in companies and education in public vocational school. 
4 International comparative investigations have shown that countries with a lesser 
developed system of vocational training, such as Great Britain and the United 
States, show a higher degree of in-plant division of labour under similar con-
ditions (for example Lutz 1976; Sorge et al. 1983). 
5 Li several enterprises I had the curious experience when dealing with managers 
and system engineers, in which the very same people who vehemently opposed 
socialist economic planning pushed totally planned systems in their own enter-
prises. The vision of total calculability, rejected on a social level, seems to be 
very attractive at the enterprise level. 
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6 This replacement may occur in a number of different ways: replacing parts and 
aspects of expert work in order to accelerate work speed; dividing expert work 
into development of knowledge and a larger number of application functions; 
and in some rare cases, replacing experts altogether. 
8 COMPUTERIZED MANUFACTURING AND SENSORY 
PERCEPTION - NEW DEMANDS ON THE ANALYSIS OF WORK 
1 This chapter is based on two research projects, whose results are published in: 
F. Bohle, B. Milkau: Vom Handrad zum Bildschirm - Eine Untersuchung zur 
sinnlichen Erfahrung im Arbeitsprozeß, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York 
1988, and H. Rose (ed.): Programmieren in der Werkstatt - Perspektiven für 
Facharbeit mit CNC-Maschinen, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York 1990. 
2 For more detail see Hacker 1987: 355 
3 See in this regard Prinz 1984 and the critical discussion of psychological 
theories of perception in Hoffmann-Axthelm 1984, as a review of theories of 
perception. 
4 Li its original meaning in the study by Popitz, Bahrdt et. al., this refers to the 
ability 'to perform a complicated technical operation in such a way as to be able 
to assimilate it immediately in one's own motions and to continue doing it'. It 
is described in more detail as follows: 'This is neither an intellectual 
achievement nor is it a mechanical or automatic form of response. The word 
'intuitiveness' comes to mind, because it nicely describes the state between the 
two.' (Popitz, Bahrdt et. al. 1957: 197.) 
5 Individual approaches to this (e.g. Popitz, Bahrdt et al. 1957) have not been 
developed systematically. Only in studies on 'emotional work' in the area of 
personal and support services or in coming to terms with 'housework' have 
phenomena such as emotionally guided action, and subjective involvement been 
included as important components of job skills. Extensions of the concept 
apply, however, only to dealings with people, and even then just to particular 
aspects of work-related actions. 
6 Studies on new kinds of dangers in the work process deal, for example, with 
such phenomena as: the destruction of holistic, emotional perception and the 
ability to think intuitively. Critics of artificial intelligence see man's superiority 
as lying in his capacity for intuitive action, associative thought and physical 
sensory perception. Li our opinion, these studies indicate important aspects of 
dealing with new technologies; but here, too, reference is made mainly to 
human skills whose significance for the work process has yet to be defined. See 
critical discussions of new technologies e.g. Weizenbaum 1978; Brod 1984; 
Turkle 1984; Rose 1982; Roszak 1986; Metder-Meibom 1987; Volpert 1985. 
For critical discussions on the limits of artificial intelligence, good examples are 
Dreyfus 1985 and Dreyfus, Dreyfus 1986. 
7 Our approach differs in this sense from primarily psychological theories (of 
perception) which do not explicitly take into account and reflect this relation-
ship. Thus the emphasis is not on intra-psychic events and physiological 
processes, but on the function of sensory perception in practical action. 
8 The focus here is on the identification of differences between man and machine, 
i.e. the computer (see Volpert 1987). 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
9 This largely corresponds to the term emotion as used in psychological theories; 
a good example is Izard 1981. 
10 See the description and critical appraisal of the concept of feelings which 
predominates in science and practice in Ulich 1982. 
11 Particular mention should be given to studies and concepts of sensory per-
ception based on phenomenological approaches and Gestalt psychology (Straus 
1956; Merleau-Ponty 1966, etc.); approaches in psychological research derived 
from the criticism of the 'cognitive transition' in psychology and in which 
feelings are seen as being more than merely subordinate or disturbing com-
ponents of action and whose significance in terms of practical action are 
examined (Ulich 1982; Mandl, Huber 1983 etc.); studies of the systematic 
quality of eidetic and associative thought and intuitive cognition (Goldberg 
1985; Watzlawick 1982 etc.); investigations into the social function and 
meaning of non-rational forms of behaviour which are significant in terms of 
cultural psychology (Boesch 1980; Boesch 1983; Lorenzer 1981) and, finally, 
studies within the framework of philosophical epistemologies in which the 
contemporary concept of rationality is modified and extended. See, in 
particular, the pathbreaking work of Langer 1965/84. 
12 For the concept of the body referred to here see particularly Böhme, Böhme 
1985. 
13 In this context it should be pointed out, for example, that within the framework 
of a philosophical theory of cognition even as late as the nineteenth century, 
'identification' was labeled an important principle of cognition (Böhme, Böhme 
1985). 
14 Excerpts from interviews with experts which now follow are based on a 
presentation of our findings in Bohle, Milkau 1988. We refer to these without 
quoting them explicitly. 
15 The phenomena described here are mentioned in existing industrial sociological 
studies. However, they have never been systematically related to one another, 
but have been treated as isolated phenomena. Studies oriented to social-
psychological factors and concerned with the way in which workers 'experi-
ence' their work represent a more productive approach. The results of these 
studies - for instance on skilled workers' relationships to their machines -
closely resemble our findings (see Volmerg et al. 1986). 
16 It should be pointed out here that this does not fully describe the activities of 
skilled workers. We have accentuated only those aspects which are of particular 
interest for our topic. Moreover, the following analysis is limited to skilled 
workers' activities in small and medium-sized series manufacturing, i.e. work 
and production structures that are not, or only slightly, affected by Tayloristic 
principles of work organization. 
17 See, for example, the presentation in Bergmann et al. 1986; and the chapters in 
Part IU. 
18 See as an example the work of Kern, Schumann 1984. 
19 Compare, for example, the study on development in the machine-building 
industry by Dörr 1985. 
20 We use the term 'strain' here - in contrast to its use in work sciences - in the 
sense of demands which are experienced by the workers as basically negative 
and unmanageable. 
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9 DIFFUSION OF CIM-TECHNOLOGIES - DYNAMIC 
DISSEMINATION AND ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF 
INNOVATION 
1 Portions of this paper, which is an extended version of one first published in 
Computer-Integrated Manufacturing Systems (CIMS), vol. 2, no. 4, Nov. 1989, 
under the title 'On the Threshold of Computer-Integrated Manufacturing -
Diffusion Trends of Q M Technologies in West German Industries', pp. 240-8, 
are reprinted by permission of the publishers Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd. The 
paper deals with results from a study on diffusion trends of CDM-technologies 
which ran from 1986 to 1989. The empirical basis of the project was a postal 
survey of standardized questionnaires in Autumn/Winter 1986-7 answered by 
about 1,100 firms from the German capital goods industries. As a follow-up to 
the postal survey, short case studies were undertaken in 60 firms of the sample 
which demonstrated advanced stages of computer integration. The results of the 
project are summarized in Schultz-Wild et al. 1989 and Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 
1990. Besides the author, members of the project were Christoph Nuber, Frank 
Rehberg and Klaus Schmierl. 
2 Compare, for example, the illustrative descriptions of successful cases of 
computer-based industrial automation in Jorissen et al. 1986. 
3 Especially with regard to the dynamics of the increasing application of flexible 
manufacturing systems and cells compare Fix-Sterz et al. 1987 and 1990. For a 
more detailed account of the possibilities and effects of this line of technology 
on employment policies compare chapter 11 in this volume and Schultz-Wild et 
al. 1986. 
4 Refer to AWF 1985 for an attempt to clarify the abbreviations and terminology 
dealing with computer technology. 
5 The following statements are based on 1,096 questionnaires filled out by West 
German companies in the capital goods industry. The results of the question-
naires were weighted by size of company and industrial branch according to 
their proportion of employment in the West German capital goods industry. The 
survey, carried out by ISF Munich, occured in the context of the RKW-Project 
A 161 and was conducted during the autumn and winter of 1986-7. For more 
details of the survey findings see Schultz-Wild et al. 1989. 
6 Computer-aided production planning and control systems, also termed manu-
facturing requirements planning (MRP). 
7 Computer-aided process planning and programming. 
8 Computer-aided design (and engineering). 
9 Computerized production data acquisition. 
10 According to our survey findings skilled workers are the largest personnel 
group in machine-building companies; on the average their share is 41 per cent 
compared to 28 per cent in the other sectors of the capital goods industries. For 
blue-collar workers only, there is a ratio of about 1.7 skilled to 1 semi-/unskilled 
worker in machine-building companies whereas in the rest of the capital goods 
industry the ratio of about 1.2 semi-/unskilled to 1 skilled worker holds true. For 
further details see chapter 10 and Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990: 40 ff. 
11 Please note that in this case and also all others, specifications only refer to 
whether an individual company is using or plans to utilize a given technology in 
the near future. This says nothing about the number of systems or aggregates per 
company or the extent of application. For example there may be a considerable 
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future increase in the total number of CNC-machine tools even if there are 
hardly any new companies expected as first time users and a sort of saturation 
limit can be said to have been reached in this respect. 
12 CAQ-systems predominate in the electrical industry, where they are far more 
widely utilized in companies of all sizes compared with mechanical engineering. 
13 Only within the electrical industry, with its prevalence of large-scale enter-
prises, are higher diffusion rates in evidence. 
14 The following paragraphs are based on contributions of my colleague Hartmut 
Hirsch-Kreinsen; compare our collective papers Hirsch-Kreinsen, Schultz-Wild 
1990 and 1990a, and for a more detailed analysis and examplification Hirsch-
Kreinsen etal. 1990. 
15 For a more extensive and systematic analysis, compare Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 
1990, esp. chapter VI, from p. 139. 
16 This point of view is also gaining increasing attention in the primarily tech-
nologically oriented discussions within engineering science; see for example 
Martin, Kivinen et al. 1990; Martin, Ulich, Warnecke 1990. 
10 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION - ORGANIZATIONAL 
CONSERVATISM? 
1 The empirical basis of this chapter are two projects on technological and 
organizational change in the mechanical engineering industries, carried out in 
the years 1985-90. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were utilized. The 
results of the quantitative survey are presented in chapter 9. The analyses of 
organizational developments - the focus of this article - are based on 60 case 
studies in companies with a high level of CIM-applications. A summary of the 
two projects' research results can be found in Schultz-Wild et al. 1989 and 
Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990. Members of the project group were - apart from 
the authors of this article - Marhild von Behr, Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen, 
Christoph Nuber, and Rainer Schultz-Wild. 
2 The 60 case studies (between one and five days per plant) focused on manu-
facturing departments with a high rate of computer utilization. The main points 
of reference were the development of division of labour according to functions 
and skills and the concepts for rationalization put forward by the managers 
interviewed; for more details see Schultz-Wild et al. 1989. 
3 On the difference between centralistic and workshop-oriented CIM-
technologies, see chapters 5, 6,9 and 18. 
4 Compare chapter 11 for a detailed description of such a strategy. 
5 The labour supply certainly is of high importance for the development of job 
structures. This becomes particularly evident in international comparisons. 
Compare Sengenberger in chapters 14, 16, 17; see also Dull 1989; Köhler, 
Grüner 1990. 
11 F L E X I B L E MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS AND WORK 
ORGANIZATION 
1 This article presents results from a project on flexible manufacturing systems, 
job structures and training policies conducted in the years 1978-85. The 
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conceptual background was developed in the the projects 'C3' and 'C4' of the 
special research unit 101 (see foreword and Part I). The analysis is based on a 
longitudinal case study dealing with the entire process of planning, designing 
and implementing a flexible manufacturing system (FMS) in a large West 
German machine-building plant. This process required approximately seven 
years (1977-84) and was sponsored by the German government. The project 
group participated as researchers in the implementation process. A summary of 
the findings is published in Schultz-Wild et al. 1986. Members of the project 
group - apart from the authors of this article - were Inge Asendorf and Burkart 
Lutz. 
12 BRINGING SKILLS B A C K TO THE PROCESS 
1 This is the revised version of a paper based on studies commissioned by the 
CEC-FAST programme in cooperation with the European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) entitled 'New Production 
Systems' (see Brödner 1987). Some parts of the paper were published in 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1988, pp. 82-8, 
and later in Warner et al. (eds) 1990, pp. 87-99 and are reprinted by permission 
of the publishers Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd. It is based on results of several 
research projects on computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) and the 
development of skill structures in West German metalworking industries, 
results of which are presented in the preceding chapters (see also Hirsch-
Kreinsen et al. 1990). The author would like to thank his team colleagues from 
the ISF, particularly Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen, Christoph Köhler, and Christoph 
Nuber, for their helpful suggestions and feedback. 
2 For a discussion of the advantages of the use of qualified skilled workers in 
complex manufacturing systems see chapter 11. 
3 Compare, for example, the paper by Peter R. Everitt 1985: 'The Manufacturing 
Cell: 'A Plant within a Plant". 
4 This was how an executive of a German machine-building company at Systec 
'86 in Munich paraphrased the demand presently being voiced to give more 
consideration to those affected by changes in the work situation when planning 
and introducing new computer-aided systems (Hummel 1986). 
5 Compare individual CAM-components: CNC, DNC, FMC, FMS etc. 
Unfortunately the use of terminology for CIM-components is by no means 
uniform (see Lay 1987). 
6 See also Braczyk's argument about 'prescriptions' on work organization and 
skills embodied in production technologies (1987). 
7 For examples see Hirsch-Kreinsen, Schultz-Wild 1990a, Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 
1990, and chapter 9 in this volume. 
8 It is interesting to note that recently there are indications that systems which 
started out with different basic concepts are beginning to converge. However, 
this is likely to prove to be a very long-term developmental process. An example 
of this is in the development of NC-programming methods. It can be assumed 
that due to the further development of interactive-graphic programming 
methods a standardization of operator modi will take place between systems 
originally based on office programming and those oriented towards workshop 
programming (see chapter 5). Generally, the concepts of open-system 
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architectures seem to better suit the diverse technical and organizational 
conditions of different users and open up market opportunities, especially for 
small supplier companies. 
9 For a more detailed report of the relevant constellations and interests in the 
course of company implementation processes see Hirsch-Kreinsen, Schultz-
Wild 1986a; compare also Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990 and chapter 10 in this 
volume. 
10 See the recommendations by the working group (organized by FAST and 
CEDEFOP 1986/87) to the European Community concerning initial and 
continuing training for new manufacturing systems, Sellin 1987. Compare also 
Sorge 1990. 
11 A systematic, comparative analysis of the different European educational and 
vocational training systems is naturally not the intent of this chapter; we will 
restrict ourselves in the following to pointing out several problem constellations 
which are important for the question of future factory structures. 
12 The dual system is the combination of in-plant training and vocational training 
in public schools in the FRG (see chapters 2 and 16). 
13 A comparison of the utilization of flexible manufacturing systems in France and 
in Germany, for example, indicates that certain variations in system-concepts 
and layout (greater significance of the central computer and software programs 
in France; stronger concentration on processing machines, handling facilities 
and transport systems in Germany) relate to different labour supply and pro-
fessional orientations of engineers. See chapter 18. 
14 See, for example, the case where semi-skilled workers were successfully trained 
to become skilled operators in a complex flexible manufacturing system 
(chapter 11); for more details see Schultz-Wild, Asendorf et al. 1986. 
13 WORK STRUCTURING AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
POLICIES 
1 This chapter is based on surveys on the implementation of 'New Forms of Work 
Organization' in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s in the FRG as 
well as in Italy and France (Altmann, Dull 1979; Dull et al. 1983), and compre-
hensive empirical studies (1976-80), which made use of case studies, process 
analyses, expert interviews and group discussions (nine long-term and 12 
short-term case studies in companies, mainly in mass-production industries, 
including 17 cases of new work forms, compared with nine traditional ones). 
The results are published in Altmann et al. 1981; 1982a. This contribution is a 
revised and edited version of an article published in 1982 in German (Altmann 
etal. 1982). 
2 By sequential processes, we mean forms of work organization in which the 
individual operations within a section of manufacturing or assembly follow one 
another both in terms of steps and time. In contrast to assembly-line work, 
however, manual and automatic stations, work stations with and without cycles, 
connected and unconnected to technical systems, divided and not divided by 
buffers, are connected to one another. Sequential processes differ from the job 
shop principle, production islands, and automatic processes, etc. 
3 For an investigation of the works councils' position on these issues see Altmann 
etal. 1981. 
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14 THE FUTURE OF THE MASS PRODUCTION WORKER 
1 This chapter is based on joint international research conducted by the ISF and 
the Paris-based Groupe de Sociologie du Travail, CNRS. The study was entitled 
'Assembly automation as an element of company-wide rationalization'. 
German members were - besides the authors - N. Altmann and M. Moldaschl; 
French contributors were D. Chave and G. Lemaitre. Research was undertaken 
between 1986 and 1990 in German, French and Italian production sites of a 
(European) multinational company in the consumer electronics field. Of central 
concern was the relationship between company rationalization strategies and 
personnel policy. The method used was case studies relating to the production 
and assembly of televisions. Research results will be published in 1991. 
2 In answering this question we will not specifically consider an important 
socio-economic dimension of the mass production model's crisis, namely the 
labour market and the gradual diminution of that labour reservoir, out of which 
the 'mass production worker' was previously recruited (Lutz 1982b). 
3 Here, we will not take into consideration the fact that Germany has, of course, 
always witnessed contradictory interests between labour and its organizations 
of collective representation concerning the societal regulation of performance 
intensity and wage levels (see Part VII). 
4 Discussions with experts were carried out on all levels of the company organi-
zation (a total of 150 discussions); they ranged from the company management 
to the foremen, and included technical offices directiy dealing with production, 
members of the work council, and union representatives (from outside the 
company). The collection of material was supplemented by a total of 40 very 
detailed work-psychological analyses and 150 interviews with assembly 
workers. 
5 CAP = Certificat a"aptitude professionelle. In France, this certificate is a basic 
substitute for initial training; similar to the German craft certificate, it is 
generally recognized in the labour market. Significant differences between the 
two do exist, both with regard to the training content and the transferability of 
the respective certificates. 
6 Both in the Federal Republic and in France, social plans serve as a 'settlement' 
between the company and its employees in cases of dismissals; such plans 
usually entail a financial setdement. In the Federal Republic, the work council 
has the right to co-determine the social plan's design. 'Alternative social plans' 
(in French: reconversion) attempt to substitute financial settlements with 
measures aimed at a reintegration into the labour market. Besides further 
training, these measures include placement assistance, creation of 'employment 
companies' along the lines of technology parks, etc. Despite several spectacular 
cases (e.g. in the French steel industry), 'alternative' social plans have not really 
got off the ground. For the situation in the Federal Republic see Part VH. 
7 Directly connected with the group model is the master craftman's loss of 
function. He is taken out of the hierarchy and is given a kind of directing 
function as a 'technical advisor' of several groups ('area technician'). The 
groups are only responsible to the area supervisor, who is responsible for a total 
of about 300 employees. 
8 For a discussion of the historical development of union positions regarding the 
model of Tayloristic work organization in France and in the Federal Republic, 
see Linhart et al. 1989. 
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9 Regarding the system of 'norm-based negotiation' in the Federal Republic see 
Dull, Bechde 1988. 
15 TOWARDS A POLARIZATION OF SKILL STRUCTURES 
1 This chapter is based on the findings of a comprehensive empirical investigation 
concerned with the implementation of new technologies in the woodworking 
industry in the Federal Republic of Germany. Particular attention was paid to 
the furniture-manufacturing industry. The investigation was carried out 
between 1983 and 1987 and consisted mainly of case studies and interviews 
conducted with experts, which were performed at numerous furniture manu-
facturers (firms utilizing new technologies), as well as analyses carried out at 
supplier firms and the manufacturers of wood processing machinery and new 
organization and control technologies. For a detailed account of the findings see 
Dohl et al. 1989, and DeiB et al. 1989. 
2 Moreover, it should be pointed out that the (often occurring) initial increase of 
auxiliary tasks such as the feeding, piling and transport of workpieces, is 
followed by the step-by-step automation of transport and handling areas; this, in 
turn, invariably results in the reduction of many unskilled and simple semi-
skilled jobs. 
3 Concerning the development of the purchasing firm's demands and the changes 
on the supplier markets in this branch, see DeiB 1989, and Dohl 1989a. 
16 VOCATIONAL TRAINING, JOB STRUCTURES AND T H E 
LABOUR M A R K E T - A N INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
1 This chapter arose from the ISF project 'B 5' on 'Labour Market Structures and 
the Small Firm Sector' carried out in conjunction with the special research unit 
333. It summarizes research results from several studies on company job struc-
tures and labour market structures. For a more comprehensive discussion of 
these issues, see W. Sengenberger: Struktur und Funktionsweise von Arbeits-
markten - Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich, 
Frankfurt/New York 1987. 
2 During the 1980s re-definition and restructuring of occupational classification 
took place. In the metalworking sector, for example, 40 different occupations 
were consolidated into six major categories. 
3 This is not to say that the overall representation of worker interests and worker 
concerns is necessarily inferior in Germany. It suggests merely that, by inter-
national comparison, job control through restrictive rules has not been very 
advanced in West Germany. 
17 EDUCATION AND JOB HIERARCHIES - CONTRASTING 
EVIDENCE F R O M FRANCE AND G E R M A N Y 
1 This chapter came out of a presentation given at an international seminar of the 
UNESCO Institute for Education in 1978 and a 1981 published collection of the 
proceedings. The information is based on a detailed presentation and analyses 
of results from an investigation of seven matching pairs of French and German 
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factories carried out by ISF, Munich and LEST (Labouratory for the Economics 
and Sociology of work, Aix-en-Provence) described in Lutz 1976. 'Politique 
d'éducation et organisation industrielle en France et Allemagne' (Maurice et al. 
1982; in English 'The Social Foundations of Industrial Power - A Comparison 
of France and Germany', Cambridge, Massachusetts 1984) is also based on 
material gathered from this study. 
2 On this problem and the significance of the former higher technical institutions 
see Lutz, Kammerer 1975. 
18 M E C H A N I C A L ENGINEER VERSUS COMPUTER 
SCIENTIST - DIFFERENT ROADS TO CIM IN FRANCE AND 
GERMANY 
1 This chapter is a product of the project group 'B2' ('Influences and paths of 
development of Post-Tayloristic rationalization strategies' of the special 
research unit 333). It is based on a wide range of research projects whose 
findings are presented elsewhere in this volume (see chapters 3, 5). 
19 NEW PRODUCTION STRUCTURES A L ' lTALIANO? -
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE WEST G E R M A N 
AND ITALIAN STEEL INDUSTRIES 
1 This chapter is based on a presentation given for employee representatives and 
experts in the Italian Steel Industry in Sesto San Giovanni. It was first published 
in Italian and then - in an expanded version - in German (Drexel 1983; Drexel 
1985). The information contained is partly based on an extensive investigation 
carried out in the West German steel industry (Drexel, Nuber 1979; Drexel 
1982), and partly on secondary analyses of Italian studies (Butera 1979; Micheli 
et al. 1976; Bechtle 1982; Barisi 1982; Villa 1983), supported by discussions 
with Italian experts. 
2 The investigations carried out by Drexel and Nuber in various continuous 
process industries in West Germany, particularly in the chemical and steel 
branches, centred on changes in the skill and training of production workers: the 
introduction of state-regulated and -controlled training schemes for skilled 
workers in areas, which up until then only had unskilled and semi-skilled 
personnel trained on the job (including the foreman [Meister]). These mo-
mentous changes observed in enterprise qualification structures and policy were 
revealed to be an aspect of a transformation of the entire structure of production 
work which was subject to the same logic in all branches of the continuous 
process industries included in our investigations: rationalization through a 
strong reduction in the quantity of labour, along with an intensified utilization 
of the quality of labour - thus, the same logic which is central to the 
rationalization strategies characterized by Kern, Schumann as 'new production 
concepts' (see Drexel 1980 for a summary). 
3 The majority of these case studies are analyses and documentations of experi-
ments with new forms of work organization, which were set in motion by 
companies and carried out by scientists. Thus the following analysis represents 
what companies and scientists considered the central problems; the opinions of 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
workers and their representatives are only indirectly represented, but will be 
dealt with below in the context of union demands. 
4 Also for reasons of available material, the chapter is limited to the period up to 
1981. 
5 We must not, however, overrate the importance of the collective perspective 
implied in the unitä operative as it is always limited to the individual team. 
Also, the workers belonging to wage group 6 are excluded from them. 
20 THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF S M A L L -
SCALE FIRMS 
1 This chapter is based on a research project within the framework of the 1986 
programme 'New Industrial Organization' administered by the International 
Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva (see Sengenberger et al. 1990). It is a 
revised version of a paper presented at the Congress of the Comitato Regionale 
Dell' Emilia Romagna of the Confederazione Nazionale Dell'Artigianato 1989. 
2 There are no strict regulations or clear criteria, such as number of employees, 
turnover, or the existence of a particular production structure, in the Federal 
Republic governing the classification of a firm as a craft enterprise; it is simply 
a legal-normative definition. If a firm wishes to be classified as a craft enter-
prise, a master craftman's certificate is required in order to manage the firm. 
21 S M A L L SUPPLIER FIRMS AT THE CROSSROADS -
MEETING NEW CHALLENGES THROUGH COOPERATIVE 
RETRAINING SCHEMES 
1 This chapter is based on a research project on new demands on suppliers in large 
and small company alliances and the challenge for training policies; the research 
was conducted by the authors in 1989, in the course of which experts were 
interviewed from several supplier sectors with small company structures 
(hardware production, plastics processing, tool and mould-making), in large 
purchasing companies (from the automobile, electrical and mechanical 
engineering industries), and in further training institutions and associations. The 
German report was published in 1990 under the title: S. Weimer; H.G. Mendius: 
Neue Anforderungen an Zulieferbetriebe im Groß-Kleinbetriebsverbund - Eine 
Herausforderung für die Qualifizierungspolitik' in the series: Working Papers 
of the working group SAMF (Social Science Labour Market Research), 
Universität, Gesamthochschule Paderborn, November 1990. 
2 It seems that small and medium-sized companies employ more unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers than was previously assumed; see Paulsen 1987. 
3 Issues of finance, business economics and production engineering predominate 
in the consulting services offered by the statutory associations and by private 
business consultants. 
4 In the Federal Republic of Germany, further training measures are offered by 
several institutions, such as the chambers of industry and commerce, craft 
associations, employers' associations and unions, state institutions and com-
mercial further training enterprises, in addition to the companies themselves. 
5 In view of the special types of qualification requirements (key qualifications) 
Altmann/Köhler/Meil (1992): Technology and Work in German Industry. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100366 
connected with the new technologies, it is assumed that on-the-job learning pro-
cesses, and hence the company as a place of learning, will become more 
important in the future. 
6 According to one survey, 6 per cent of craft businesses and 23 per cent of 
industrial companies have already made use of training associations or are 
interested in them (see Meyer, Schwiedrzik 1987). 
7 Experiences with primary vocational training associations reveal that the com-
mitment of an individual institution played a central role in the creation of 
nearly all the associations (see Meyer, Schwiedrzik 1987). 
8 This is true, for example, of certain basic qualifications in the area of CNC, 
CAD, SPC, etc. 
9 For the sake of simplicity we speak of 'the suppliers'. Obviously, the situation 
is very complex and depends on the subcontracted product actually supplied 
(e.g. a relatively low-value serial part or a highly complex tool), the position on 
the product market in question, the share of turnover earned with the respective 
customer, and many other factors. For reasons of space, this article is unable to 
elaborate on most of the differences. Arguments refer generally to suppliers of 
serial parts (see Altmann, Sauer 1989). 
10 Of course, there are enormous variations in the interest of a cooperation on the 
customer side, depending on the type of supplier and the products bought. Here 
it is important whether the customer is actually or potentially able to make the 
parts in question himself, whether he has the right production know-how for the 
job, whether there are many, few or no other roughly equivalent alternative sup-
pliers, and how innovative the supplier is held to be, etc. 
11 A further factor is that many subcontractors look on the staff in these depart-
ments of their customers first and foremost as being those persons who conduct 
the often highly unpopular 'audits', who reproach them for real or nonexistent 
defects, who impose conditions with more or less consideration, who classify 
them as A, B, C or D suppliers, etc. All these functions do not make it easy for 
the customer's agent to be viewed primarily as someone with whom you can 
confidently discuss problems and develop solutions. 
12 The customers' further training departments have an additional specific and 
possibly very vital interest: cooperation on further training with subcontractors 
can help to raise their status within their own company. First in what tends to be 
a 'qualitative' dimension, i.e. when others perceive that they have contributed 
at least indirecdy to improving the quality of the end product (a benchmark of 
every modern corporate philosophy); and second (and far more profanely), by 
showing that the cooperation on training with suppliers serves either to improve 
the utilization of (otherwise threatened) existing capacities or to catalyst the 
installation of additional capacities. 
13 It is obvious that (even with extensive adaptation to the suppliers' needs) just a 
part of the measures organized by the customers is suitable for suppliers and 
that, vice versa, for most aspects of the suppliers' training needs the customers 
are irrelevant. In many cases, however, the provision of instructional materials 
and places of learning could be an important aid for initiating measures to be 
carried out by suppliers or further training institutions. 
14 The fact that this could well provide a starting point for cooperation on further 
training is clearly shown by a workshop we conducted in the course of the 
project, at which we managed to assemble a number of representatives of the 
above-mentioned departments from several large purchaser companies, 
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executives from small supplier firms, representatives from associations and 
educational organizations, and scientists. 
15 This would certainly be natural if all the businesses involved were suppliers of 
the large company participating in the training association. In our talks there 
was also occasional willingness to offer training beyond the group of companies 
for which business relations exist, e.g. to potential suppliers as well. 
16 It should be noted that a worker with a fundamental, broadly based vocational 
qualification - in contrast, say, to a semi-skilled worker - is equipped with the 
preconditions for obtaining additional qualifications which, although highly 
oriented to actual conditions or company-specific problems, can be used in 
other areas than the one in which they were acquired. An occupational qualifi-
cation provides good opportunities for productive integration of company-
specific elements - a basis lacking even in those unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers with lengthy experience. 
17 The role played by worker representatives in company further training is not 
discussed here. The question as to whether 'further training is a sphere of 
activity for works councils' has been up for debate for at least 15 years (see 
Maase et al. 1975). The question has always been answered in the affirmative 
by the unions; recently there have also been collective agreements with regu-
lations to this effect and more are being striven for. It is also true, however, that 
in those small businesses where there is a works council, further training is, as 
a rule, not one of the works council's priorities, in contrast again to initial 
vocational training. Forward-looking further training concepts still depend on 
the employee and on the cooperation of the of company representatives. Some 
deliberations on this subject are to be found in: Mendius, Wendeling-Schroder 
(1990). 
18 The 'training' focal point of the special labour market programme in 1979 can 
be taken as an example. Some of its initiators also looked on it as a sounding 
board for the promotion and regulation of further training within the framework 
of the Employment Promotion Act. Not least for this reason it was the centre of 
massive political disputes, but at the same time it was also accompanied and 
evaluated scientifically with relative intensity. There was - sometimes massive 
- criticism of the programme's details and of substantial shortcomings in 
management, resulting in considerable cashing in. On the whole, however, the 
promotion of company training was classified generally as a sensible instrument 
of labour market and training policy, which needed to be refined and selectively 
applied (see for example, Mendius et al. 1983; Bosch et al. 1983; Sauter 1982; 
Scharpf et al. 1982). With the change of government in 1982, critics of the 
political components of the special programme took over the functions, and 
since then the findings do not seem to have been used systematically, nor have 
the medium-term effects been examined. 
19 Consideration could be given, for example, to the supplier circles which -
originating in Baden-Wiirttemberg - already exist in a number of the German 
states. Medium-sized businesses from various supply sectors have joined forces 
in these circles, mainly so as to work together in the procurement of orders, in 
purchasing, in developing contracts and in sales. 
20 In other words, the company and inter-company worker representatives should 
be included along with the participating suppliers and purchasing companies, 
professional associations and training organizations. 
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22 S M A L L FIRMS IN BIG SUBCONTRACTING 
1 In addition to the quoted sources, this chapter is based on a number of inter-
views with experts, particularly with individuals from trade associations and 
several large German automobile manufacturers; these interviews were 
conducted within the framework of a project sponsored by the Federal Ministry 
of Reseach and Technology and carried out together with H.G. Mendius and S. 
Weimer on the potential of small firms for taking strategic action. The contri-
bution is a revised version of K. Semlinger, 'Stellung und Probleme kleinbetrie-
blicher Zuüeferer im Verhältnis zu großen Abnehmern', in N. Altmann; D. 
Sauer (eds) Systemische Rationalisierung und Zulieferindustrie, Frankfurt/New 
York 1989. 
2 For example, the German Automotive Industry Federation estimates that 280 
firms account for 80 per cent of the parts and components supplied to the 
automotive industry by subcontractors. 
23 UNIONS' POLICIES TOWARDS NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN 
THE 1980s - AN E X A M P L E FROM T H E M E T A L INDUSTRY 
1 This chapter is based on a synthesis of results from diverse studies on work 
design, carried out by the ISF München and which also included union policies 
and activities. It is a revised version of a paper presented to the Nordic Institute 
of Advanced Occupational Environment Studies (Espoo, Finland, 1987). 
2 See Altmann, Dull 1979 for an extensive bibliography. 
3 For a further discussion of the issue of inter-company integration and its 
consequences for the unions, see chapter 24. 
4 Much of the information in this section is based on union and employer 
periodicals, in particular: WSI-Mitteilungen; Die Mitbestimmung; Kittner, 
Gewerkschaftsjahrbuch (yearly); Zimmermann 1982; Institut für Angewandte 
Arbeitswissenschaft Köln: Mitteilungen; Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände 1983. 
5 Ongoing discussions in the United States and also those in the Federal Republic 
generally foresee a decline of the unions (see Müller-Jentsch 1988). The 
following factors are held responsible for this: the differences between old and 
new industries; the increasing use of qualified manpower (engineers, white-
collar workers) without any orientation, ties or loyalty to the unions; polari-
zation of staff according to rationalization 'winners' and 'losers'; decreasing 
company-size and extinction of the 'mass worker'; company specific works 
council orientation; decreasing chances for a standardization of working 
conditions; restriction of union activities to the area of service functions. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, however, there are trends moving in the 
opposite direction which should be pointed out: 
1 apparent willingness of union members to actively seek better working 
conditions and their solidarity even in times of economic crisis (strike for 
35-hour week); 
2 altered priority of values on the part of the employees, implying new goals in 
life and less blind acceptance of 'technical progress'; 
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3 new social movements with effects on the unions (women's liberation move-
ments, the German Environmental Parties, i.e. the Green Party); 
4 young workers who disapprove of the unions' bureaucratic organization 
while accepting their political objectives; 
5 the continued recognition of the unions as the sole representative of employ-
ees, regardless of their actual integration; 
6 initial fears of the effects of rationalization among engineers and white-collar 
workers and their need for representation; and 
7 the employers' own interest in functioning unions, due to the fact that the 
traditional forms of industrial relations ensure calculability and relatively 
limited conflicts. 
These aspects point away from the thesis of the decline of the unions in the 
FRG. 
24 RATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES AND 
REPRESENTATION OF WORKER INTERESTS 
1 This chapter extends the analysis provided in the previous contribution on Work 
Design and Unions in that it addresses the problems of the works councils and 
thus the 'dual structure' of interest representation. It is based on the same study 
as the preceding chapter as well as the investigation on systematic rationali-
zation (see Dohl et al. 1989; DeiB et al. 1989; Altmann, Sauer 1989). 
2 We deal with the effects of rationalization using the example of the automotive 
industry. 
3 This is a German concept of a type of skilled worker which derived from some 
companies' attempts to train skilled workers so that they could master all 
components of a modern production process (electronics, mechanics, hydrau-
lics, pneumatics, etc.). This allows a group of workers who are overseeing a 
production facility full autonomy and flexibility in carrying out their work 
assignments. In practice, this concept was never realized. 
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106-8,109 
flexible delivery, 323,349,350 
flexible manufacturing cells (FMC), 
124,125 
flexible manufacturing systems 
(FMS), 99,100,125,160-84, 387-8 
flexible production, 7, 228; and 
computerization, 49-50,112,124, 
129,186; craft sector, 49; division 
of labour, 161,166-8,169-70, 
174-7,185-8; foreman's role, 161, 
169,171,173-5; group work, 
160-84; and market requirements, 
387; mass production, 49,52, 94; 
metals industries, 303,304, 363, 
364; and skilled workers, 113,152, 
187, 205,208, 211, 255,386; and 
small firms, 52, 342, 347, 348-9, 
350,351,355-8 
flexible standardization, 216, 217, 218 
flexible work, 364, 369,373 
flexible working hours, 375-7, 393 
food processing, 318 
Fordism, 4—11, 30; see also Taylorism 
foreign organizational models, 57, 390 
foreign workers, 43,171,362 
foreman: capital goods industries, 144, 
151; in CIM technologies, 191; 
decision-making, 266-7; in flexible 
manufacturing systems, 161, 169, 
171,173-5; furniture manufacture, 
231,234,240; in mass production, 
210-11; qualifications, 259, 277-8; 
steel industry, 298,299, 304; see 
also shop-floor 
framework planning of work 
processes, 137 
France: CIM technologies, 274-89; 
education system, 257-73; job 
hierarchies, 257-73; mass 
production, 215; skill erosion, 274; 
technological development, 
274-89; training, 220-1,223-4, 
257-73 
furniture manufacture, 227^ 42,319,393 
further education, 16,43-4,262-5 
future of work, 1-11,26-45,148, 
212-26 
German Democratic Republic (GDR): 
refugees from, 262; see also 
unification 
German Research Fund, 15 
Gewerkschaft, 19 
globalization of supply, 58 
graduates see qualifications; tertiary 
education 
group leader, see leadership 
group work, 187-8,192,203,204, 
211,221,381, 391,392; automobile 
industry, 370, 394-5; employers' 
attitudes, 364,378; in flexible 
production, 160-84; metals 
industries, 294, 296,302,303,305, 
309, 364; in sequential production, 
209; skilled workers, 160-84, 
187-8,192, 203,204; union 
attitudes, 369-70,390; and wages, 
210; workers' attitudes, 370,378 
hand, see tactile 
handcraft: in wood processing, 228, 
229,235, 237, 239, 242; see also 
craft sector 
hazards of CNC machines, 118 
health of workers, 207-8, 294,296, 
298,307,368-9; see also stress; 
working conditions 
hearing and machine control, 105, 109, 
114,116,118 
hierarchies, see job structures 
higher education, 16,43-4,262-5 
homogeneity of production, 41-4 
hours of work, see working hours 
human centred approach to rational-
ization, 94,95,101,102,183,190 
human integrated manufacturing, 189 
humane work design: and division of 
labour, 389-90 
humanization of working life, 19,159, 
201, 366, 372, 385; and health 
risks, 368, 369; effects of 
computerization, 366,367; and staff 
cuts, 378-9; unions' role, 380-4, 
386,389-90,394,397 
Humanization of Working Life 
Programme, 15,182, 206, 363, 364, 
380,381 
HiittenfacharbeiterlHuttenwerker, 
299,303,307 
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immigrant workers, 43,171,362 
in-house manufacturing, 55 
incentive wages, see 
performance-related wages 
income, see wages 
industrial action, 389; see also strikes 
industrial democracy, 363 
industrial divide, 36 
industrial relations, 250-1, 252; 
Britain, 250-1; effect of unification 
of Germany, 383-4,399; and 
inter-company relationships, 383; 
Japan, 255; mass production 
industries, 361-84; and new 
technologies, 361-99; structure of, 
388-9; see also conflict; no-strike 
agreements; strikes; unions; works 
councils 
industrial robots, 126 
industrial sociology in Germany, 1-11; 
American perspectives, 12-25; 
research, 15,56-9 
industrial unions, see unions 
information flow to works councils, 
395-6,398,399 
information technology, see computer 
innovation, technological, see 
technological innovation 
innovative rationalization strategies, 
149,151-3,157 
insolvencies in small firms, 317 
institutions, see social institutions 
integration of computers, see 
networking 
integration of production, 46, 47, 
48-9,387,388 
integration of suppliers, 350,395,398 
integration of tasks, 205 
inter-company relationships, 46-59, 
218, 387; between small firms, 329; 
cooperative retraining, 323-41; in 
craft sector, 315-16; division of 
labour, 46-59,350,351, 353, 387, 
397; effects of rationalization, 
77-91,349-50, 392, 397-8; and 
labour relations, 383, 397; machine 
builders and users, 77-91,230,231, 
232, 235; networking, 46,48,49, 
53,55,56,58,135, 320,323,334, 
353,387,392,395; small firms with 
big customers, 323,332-8,341, 
342-58,397-8; works councils, 
397-8; see also integration; 
outsourcing; subcontractors 
interchangeability of skilled workers, 
247-8, 391 
internal labour market, 154,166,247, 
249,254,255,285 
intervention in automated assembly, 
219 
intuitive action, 107,115 
Italy: production structures, 215, 
290-309; training, 221-2, 225-6 
JIT, see just-in-time 
Japan: industrial relations, 255; 
life-long employment, 254; 
productivity, 251; worker rotation, 
250 
Japanese organizational models, 57, 
390 
job classification, 21-2; see also 
workplace evaluation 
job demarcation, 248, 250-1 
job design, 145,365 
job enrichment, 203,250, 301, 325, 
364 
job losses, 141,181,294,342 
job rotation, 170,176, 250,370, 372, 
381,394 
job satisfaction, 250 
job shop manufacturing, 161 
job structures, 144,161,166,174-7, 
179,187-8,191, 243-309; France, 
257-73; Italy, 290-309; and labour 
markets, 245-56; metals industries, 
290-309; and training, 245-56, 
386, 390; and works councils, 396-7 
just-in-time delivery (JTT), 320, 331, 
349, 353, 387,392,393 
Kern-Schumann approach, 5,36,37, 
41, 51, 53,159, 291, 306,367,386, 
390 
knowledge, 96-7, 98,105,118,274, 
276, 281-9 
LSI in machine tool control, 66 
labour: division of, see division of 
labour; mobility of, 247, 248, 252, 
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253,254,285; polarization of, 4, 
18-19,54,207,255,324,362; 
reproduction of, 206,214, 274,292, 
306,307,308; turnover, 362,363; 
see also semi-skilled workers; 
skilled workers; workers 
labour costs: effects of rationalization, 
47,50,213 
labour market, 34,154,166,217; craft 
sector, 249, 251,278, 315,317; 
external, 154,166,247,315; 
internal, 154,166,247, 249,254, 
255, 285; and job structures, 
245-56; metals industries, 294,296; 
post-war Europe, 28; small firms, 
315; technicians, 279 
labour relations, see industrial relations 
labour savings of rationalization, 52-4, 
386 
labour supply: and expert systems, 95, 
98; from former GDR, 10; metals 
industries, 296, 297,362; shortages, 
5, 73, 222, 224, 255-6,296, 297, 
362-3,388; skilled workers, 5, 
42-3,52-4, 208,263-4,279; and 
Taylorism, 212-15; and wages, 28; 
and work structure, 154, 191-2 
large firms: relations with 
subcontractors, 323,332-8, 341, 
342-58, 397-8 
law of wages, 28 
lay-offs see redundancy 
leadership, shop-floor, 211, 231,232, 
233, 304, 391; see also foreman 
learning and skill, 95,250 
learning through experience, 293, 295, 
296, 327 
levels of management, 258-60 
life-long employment in Japan, 254 
location of industry, 58, 345,393 
logistical networks, 58 
Lutz, B., 14, 26-45 
MRP see PPC 
machine building, 74, 75; 
computerization of, 127,129-39, 
275; division of labour, 94; France, 
275; manufacturers' interaction 
with user companies, 77-91, 230, 
231, 232, 235; polarization of 
workers, 362 
machine tools: NC, 63-76 
macro-economic influences on 
production, 7, 8,214-15 
maintenance, 175,187, 234, 235,241, 
250, 251,391 
make or buy decision (MOB), 345, 
346-51, 387, 398-9 
management, levels of, 258-60 
manpower policy, 166-9,193 
Manufacturing Technology 
Programme, 183 
marginalization of groups of workers, 
207,209,211,377 
market influences on rationalization, 
71-2, 74, 77-91,218, 387 
market and integration, 55-6 
Marxist orientation of industrial 
sociology research, 15, 24 
Maschinenbaukultur, 74 
mass production: division of labour, 
214, 219, 362; flexible processes, 
49,52, 94; foreman's role, 210-11; 
in furniture manufacture, 229, 230; 
industrial relations, 361-84; scale 
effects, 29,30-1, 213,216-17,317, 
345, 347; work reorganization, 
199-242, 279; workers' future, 
212-26 
materials handling: automatic, 126,130 
meaningful work, 389, 391 
Meister, 277-8,299; see also foreman 
meritocracy, 270-1, 280 
meta-structure of enterprise, 33 
microprocessor control of machine 
tools, 66 
mobility of labour, 247, 248, 252, 253, 
254,285 
monitoring see performance 
NC technologies, 63-76,138; see also 
CNC; DNC 
neo-Taylorism, 5-11 
networking, 134,135; inter-company, 
46,48, 49, 53, 55, 56, 58,135, 320, 
323, 334, 353, 387,392, 395 
networks, logistical, 58 
no-strike agreements, 20, 23 
Noble, D.F., 63^ 1, 65 
non-skilled, see unskilled 
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numerical control see NC 
objectifying action, 106-9 
occupational labour market, 247,249, 
255-6 
office machine repair, 321 
office oriented innovation, 135,139 
office programming in NC 
technologies, 63-4, 66, 112,138, 
150, 235,325 
on the job training, see learning 
through experience 
open systems, 67,96,139,189-90,196 
outsourcing, 319-20,323; assembly 
by suppliers, 393; automobile 
industry, 58,320, 345, 392-3, 394; 
definition, 344; as division of 
labour, 345-6; interest 
representation in suppliers, 59,392, 
394; make or buy decision, 345, 
346-51,387,398-9; 
single-sourcing, 320, 354,393; 
supplier selection, 346-9; suppliers 
relations with manufacturers, 56-7, 
59, 342-58,392,395; from small 
firms, 319-20,323-41,342-58; see 
also subcontractors 
overlaps of skills, 247 
overtime, 376, 377,393 
PDA, 127,130,131,138,149,392 
PPC, 124,127,128,131,133,135, 
136-7,149,151,153,189,395 
PPC/CAM, PPC/CAP, 127,135 
PPS, 99,147 
parallel work stations, 203 
part-time work, 375 
pay, see wages 
pensions, 375 
performance of company and work 
structure, 201-11 
performance measurement, 23-4,214, 
373^ 1, 376-7,392,397 
performance-related wages, 23-4, 206, 
214, 362,365, 373^1,375,376 
personnel information systems, 373-4 
Piore, M.J., 51-2,53, 73 
poaching of skills, 329-30,333 
polarization of workforce, 4-5,18-19, 
54, 207, 227-42,255, 324, 362 
political factors in work design, 383-4 
political factors in technological 
innovation, 101-2,157-9,182-3, 
202,225-6; metals industries, 292, 
297,308,309 
political structures in employment 
programmes, 379 
polyvalence of workers, 250, 391 
population, see demographic 
post-Taylorism, 4-11, 6, 8-9,26-45, 
157-9, 385; division of labour, 
38-9,54,192,219 
power within companies, 51,214 
preassembly, 323,354 
problem-solving, 250,284,303-5; see 
also decision-making 
process-related use of skills, 185-97 
production data acquisition (PDA), 
127,130,131,138,149, 392 
production intelligence, 38 
production planning and control 
systems, see PPC 
production planning systems (PPS), 
99, 147 
production process design, 7-9 
productivity agreements, 221 
productivity of workers, 249,250, 
251,301 
professional knowledge, 282-5,287, 
301-2, 303, 309 
professional organization, 95 
profitability: small firms, 315, 318, 
357; steel industry, 291,295, 297 
programming in NC, 63-4, 66,112, 
138,150,153,235, 325 
promotion, see career patterns 
purchasing decisions, 49,345,346-51, 
349-53,387,398-9 
qualifications of workers, 16-17, 35, 
43-4,54,75,192-5; foremen, 259, 
277-8; France, 261-73; Italy, 292, 
293-5, 297,305,309; metals 
industries, 292, 293-5, 297,305, 
307,309; small firms, 323,324, 
325,326-8,330, 339,356; and 
wages, 372 
quality assurance, 205,211,386,391; 
by suppliers, 392,393; computer 
aided (CAQ), 127,133,189; metals 
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industries, 362,363,364; small 
firms, 320,323,324, 325,334,335, 
337,349,350,352,355 
Quality of Working Life, 206 
redundancy, 141,181,294,342, 
378-9,392,396 
refugees from GDR, 362 
regional industrial structures, 58 
regulation in post-war Europe, 28, 30, 
33-5 
regulation theory, 27 
reliability: of expert systems, 97,98, 
100,102; of machine tools, 174, 
178,187; and worker stress, 296 
relocation of suppliers, 393 
representation of workers, see 
industrial relations; unions; works 
councils 
reproduction of labour, 206, 214, 274, 
292,306, 307,308 
reprofessionalization, 5,26, 38, 39-41, 
52,390 
research: into expert systems, 101-2; 
into industrial sociology, 15, 56-9; 
into work actions, 119-20; into 
work design, 390 
research and development by small 
firms, 323, 347,350,353,393 
reskilling, 9, 22-3, 41^ 4, 52,141,196, 
207, 208,209 
responsibility of workers, 4-5,304,355 
retraining, 323^41,379,397 
robots, industrial, 126 
rotation, see job rotation 
Ryle, G., 96 
Sabel, C.F., 51-2,53, 73 
safety of CNC machines, 118 
salaries, see wages 
scale effects of mass production, 29, 
30-1, 213,216-17,317,345, 347 
Scandinavia: industrial democracy, 
363; research in work design, 390 
schools, 16; technician education, 274, 
278,280,283-5,286, 287, 297 
scientists: control of technological 
development, 64,76 
seeing and machine control, 109, 114, 
116 
self-determination, see autonomy 
self-fulfilment and work, 380 
semi-skilled worker production, 144, 
146,147,161, 390,391 
semi-skilled workers: furniture 
manufacture, 228, 235; metals 
industries, 305; small firms, 325, 
339 
sensory perception and work 
processes, 104-20 
service industries: small firms, 317 
servicing and repair industry: small 
firms, 319,320-1 
severance, see redundancy 
shift working, 376-7 
shop-floor autonomy, 188-90,191, 
266-7 
shop-floor control centralization, 138, 
183,189-90,192,391 
shop-floor leadership, 211, 231,232, 
233,304, 391 
shop-floor oriented innovation, 135, 
180 
shop-floor programming in NC, 63, 
66,112,138,153,325 
shop-floor scheduling, 137-8 
shop-floor skill requirements, 230-42 
simplification of work, 386 
simulated factory, 217-18 
single-sourcing, 320, 354, 393 
size of company: effect on 
reorganization strategy, 154-5 
skilled worker production, 144-7, 386 
skilled workers: and automated 
assembly, 222; and expert systems, 
93-103; and flexible production, 
113,152,187, 205, 208, 211, 255, 
386; France, 274-89; from former 
GDR, 10; in furniture manufacture, 
228,229,230-42; group work, 
160-84,187-8,192, 203,204; 
interchangeability of, 247-8, 391; 
metals industries, 292, 299-302, 
303-5, 362, 363, 364; and new 
technology, 112-20, 386; poaching 
of, 330,333; process-related work, 
185-97; reserves, 208,213-14; 
resources, 42-3, 52-4,154,191-2, 
263-4, 279; shortages, 5, 73,154, 
222,224,255-6,297,362-3,388; 
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small firms, 315,321-2,324,330, 
355; and systemic rationalization, 
18-19; and Taylorism, 212-15; 
training of, 17-19, 73,94, 95,98, 
192-5,208-9,274,277-85,391; 
unions, 253-4; woodworkers, 
235-42,393; and work structure, 
154,191-2 
skills: acquisition of, 294,295,303; 
adaptation, 208-9, 233; decline in 
demand, 227-42; deficits, 187,202, 
230-4, 267, 298; division of, 248; 
erosion, 93, 95,98,99,103,136, 
158-9,191,232,234, 274; gap, 41; 
and learning, 95,250; overlap of, 
247, 253; poaching of, 329-30,331, 
333; polarization of, 4-5, 227-42; 
process-related use of, 185-97; 
requirements, effect on education, 
43- 5, 75,192-5,257-8; structure 
of workforce, 192,193,227-42, 
293-5 
small firms, 54, 58,75, 313-58; 
component supply, 319-20, 
323-41,342-58; dangerous 
materials handling, 394; definition, 
343-4; furniture manufacture, 319, 
393; manufacturing sector, 313-22; 
relations with big customers, 323, 
332-8, 341, 342-58, 397-8; 
retraining, 323-41; works councils, 
397-8 
small firms districts, 321-2 
social compatibility, 365 
social contract, 383 
social control: education as, 284 
social institutions and processes: 
influence on technological 
development, 63, 72-6, 202, 286, 
292; interaction with the firm, 
16-21,28-9,30-2,33-5,37,40, 
44- 5, 214,286 
social plans for unemployment 
cushioning, 366,379 
social reproduction of technicians, 
274,276-81,282,283 
social security costs, 214 
social structuring of technical 
knowledge, 274, 276, 281-9 
societal consequences of 
computerization, 48 
sound, see hearing 
staff cuts, 378-9,392,396 
standardization: flexible, 216,217,218 
steel industries: Italy compared with 
Germany, 290-309 
storage systems: computerized, 126 
strategic aspects of new work forms, 
204-11 
strategic capacity of firm, 33 
strategic purchasing decisions, 49, 
349-53 
stress: effect of company 
rationalization, 9,38,169, 206, 
207-8, 209, 211, 238,368-9,389; 
effect of new technology, 99,100, 
117-19; and group work, 370; 
metals industries, 294,296,307, 
362 
strikes, 362,383; see also no-strike 
agreements 
structural conservatism of production, 
39-41 
subcontracting, definition of, 344 
subcontractors: cooperation on 
training, 323-41; relations with 
customers, 323,332-8,341, 
342-58,392; working conditions, 
392; see also outsourcing 
subjectifying action, 18-19, 104-20 
subprocess interdependence, 47-8 
supervisor, see foreman 
suppliers, see outsourcing; 
subcontractors 
supply, globalization of, 58 
surplus value, 7 
Switzerland: NC technologies, 72, 74 
systemic rationalization, 6-8, 148, 
218,387-8; and division of labour, 
46-59; in furniture manufacture, 
229-30; and inter-company 
relationships, 77-91,349-50, 392; 
machine builders' interaction with 
users, 77-91; and skilled workers, 
18-19; and suppliers, 392; unions' 
attitudes, 367 
systems engineering, 57 
tacit knowledge, 285 
tacit skills, 105 
tactile contact in machine control, 109 
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Tavistock school, 363 
Taylorism, 4-11, 27-45, 94-5,147, 
158-9,166-8,180,241,279; 
automobile industry, 390; crisis of, 
363; labour deployment, 4,29,94, 
166-8,192, 212-15,214; metals 
industries, 297, 362,364 
Tayloristic syndrome, 26,30-5,213, 
286, 288 
technical knowledge, 274, 276, 281-9 
technicians: France compared with 
Germany, 278-85; school-based 
education, 274,278, 280, 283-5, 
286,287,297; social reproduction 
of, 274; supply of, 279-85 
technological determinism, 73-4, 76, 
93,190-1,317, 361,386-7 
technological development, 63,72-6, 
77-91, 274-89 
technological innovation, 163-6, 
180-4, 279 
technology transfer, 183,196 
temporary work, 375,393 
tertiary education, 16,43-4, 262-5; 
see also education 
timber industry: work structure, 
227^ 12 
time and motion studies (MTM), 23-4, 
362 
time regime, 24, 214 
tools: interaction with workers, 109-20 
touch, see tactile 
trades, see craft sector; skilled 
workers 
trades unions, see unions 
training, 16-19, 75,171-2,174-7, 
192-5, 202, 208,209, 381; Britain, 
251; costs, 335; France, 220-1, 
223^1,257-73, 277-81, 283-5; 
furniture manufacture, 236; group 
work, 391,392; Italy, 221-2, 
225-6,293-5, 300; and job 
structures, 245-56,386, 390; and 
labour market, 245-56; metals 
industries, 293-5,297-300,301, 
304,307,309; skilled workers, 
17-19,73, 94,95,98,192-5, 
208-9, 274, 277-85,391; and small 
firms, 315, 321-2,323-41; union 
attitudes, 370-1; and wages, 371; 
and works councils, 370-1, 397; see 
also education 
transfer of technology, 183,196 
uncertainty, see decision-making 
unemployment: and growth of small 
firms, 316-17,342; and relocation 
of suppliers, 393; social plans, 366, 
379; see also employment 
protection; redundancy 
Ungelernte, 17-18 
unification of Germany: effect on 
industry, 9-11,383-4,399 
unions, 14-15,19-21,181, 221,224, 
225,248,388-9; bargaining power, 
252; Britain, 254,389; collective 
bargaining, 256; demarcation 
issues, 248; Italy, 301-2; metals 
industries, 298, 301-2; and new 
technologies, 361-99; and 
rationalization, 250-1,385-99; 
relations with works councils, 
19-21,380-4,389,394,399; 
skilled workers, 253-4; and 
training, 370-1; United States, 254, 
389 
United Automobile Workers, 254 
United States: industrial sociology 
research, 15,390; job classification, 
21-2; NC technologies, 63-76; 
unions, 254,389; see also American 
universities, see tertiary education 
unskilled labour, 29,38-9 
unskilled workers: in furniture 
manufacture, 228, 230; small firms, 
339,393 
user companies' interaction with 
machine manufacturers, 77-91 
video work stations, 368-9 
vision, see seeing 
vocational training, 16-19,75,94, 
192-5,221, 224,225; craft sector, 
245-6,286,315; France compared 
with Germany, 261-5; Italy 
compared with Germany, 297; and 
job structures, 245-56; and labour 
market, 245-56; metals industries, 
297,299-300, 304; and small firms, 
315,321-2, 323^ 41 
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wage differentials: Volkswagen, 372 
wages: collective agreements, 34, 365, 
371-3, 381,389; as cost factor, 213; 
as demand factor, 213; differentials, 
161-2,175-6,179, 254, 257, 
260-1,268-9; and flexible work, 
373; France compared with 
Germany, 260-1,268-9; furniture 
manufacture, 235; and group work, 
210; Italy, 292, 297,300,302,303, 
304,307; law of, 28; metals 
industries, 292,295, 296,297,300, 
302,303,304,307; 
performance-related, 23-4,206, 
214, 362, 365,373-4, 375, 376; 
post-war Europe, 28, 29,30,31; 
and qualifications, 372; effects of 
rationalization, 208, 209-10, 365; 
small firms, 314-15, 334, 347-8; 
and training, 371; United States 
compared with Germany, 21, 23-4; 
and work design, 371-3, 390,394 
weekend working, 376,377,393 
welfare capitalism, 28 
welfare state, 27-8, 30, 33^ t 
women workers, 152,163, 362 
work and self-fulfilment, 380 
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